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x PREFACE 
 Vladimir Putin is one of the most important leaders of our era. He is in equal 
measure misunderstood and condemned. He has been at the helm of the world’s 
largest country since late 1999, and his decisions have shaped not only Russia but 
also some of the key issues in world politics. It is therefore crucial to understand 
what motivates the man, what shapes his policies and what the consequences have 
been. Th is study is an exploration of these issues, focused on explaining the Putin 
phenomenon through the prism of ‘paradox’. A paradox is something that at fi rst 
appearance appears absurd or untrue, yet the contradiction ultimately makes 
sense. A paradox appears to deny the truth, yet the implied meaning reveals some 
deeper truth. In practical terms, the duality of meaning refl ects a particular type 
of politics, as in George Orwell’s ‘war is peace’. It was indeed Orwell who coined 
the term ‘cold war’, and the world stumbled into a Second Cold War from 2014. 
Equally, Russia formally remains committed to the principles of the ‘democratic 
revolution’ that gave birth to the independent country as it emerged from the Soviet 
Union in 1991, yet from early on it became a ‘managed democracy’. Democracy 
by defi nition requires the open-endedness of outcomes and the fi rmness of rules, 
yet in post-communist Russia it is the rules that are fl exible and the outcomes 
predetermined. Can a managed democracy be a democracy at all? Who does the 
managing, and with what justifi cation? Th ese are the issues explored in this work. 
 Th e Putin phenomenon is a response to the challenges facing Russia, but it is 
also the outcome of the complex reaction between the man and the system. Putin 
refl ects the contradictions and paradoxes of contemporary Russia, but he is also a 
unique leader who is both more and less than the country that he rules. He is more, 
because of the extraordinary powers vested in the presidency by the December 
1993 constitution. Th e president is designated as the ‘guarantor of the constitution’ 
(Art. 80.2), suggesting that they stand outside of the constitution in order to protect 
it, a paradox of power that cuts through the whole system. Th is helps explain the 
emergence from the very early days of a self-designated power system focused 
on the presidency but not limited to it, which eff ectively claimed supervisory or 
tutelary rights over the management of public aff airs. Th e administrative regime 
derives its power and legitimacy from the constitution, but it is not eff ectively 
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PREFACE XI
constrained by it. A ‘dual state’ emerged, in which administrative and democratic 
rationality are entwined. Th is is why it is misleading to call Russia an ‘autocracy’. 
Th e authoritarian features are rooted in a non-democratic technocratic appeal 
to the pursuit of the public good. Th e priority under Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s 
was economic and political reform, and then under Putin from 2000 as economic 
development, state sovereignty, national unity and international status. Putin’s 
ability to articulate an agenda of progress, although in contrast to the Soviet 
years no longer embedded in a coherent vision of the future, helps explain his 
extraordinary and enduring popularity, which with some ups and downs has been 
maintained at levels far exceeding those normally found in liberal democracies. 
 Putin is also less than the country, in the sense that his rule, as we shall see, 
draws its power from most of the main political and ideological constituencies, 
but he allows none full rein. Putin is a brilliant ‘faction manager’, maintaining 
the stability of the dual system by playing off  the various groups against each 
other but allowing none to assert its dominance over the others. Th is means 
that policymaking is oft en fragmented and incoherent, representing the lowest 
common denominator by not threatening vested interests. It also means that 
policies are oft en contradictory and go round in circles, endowing the system with 
the air of stagnation and suff ocation. Th e Putin system is effi  cient to the degree that 
government is ordered and strategies, plans and policies are adopted; but much 
of this ‘effi  ciency’ is devoted to perpetuating the system itself rather than to the 
development of the country. Paradoxically, the greater the managerial effi  ciency 
of the administrative system, the less the potential of the country is released. 
Putin is genuinely appealing to the country that exists, but he has not been able to 
articulate a vision of the Russia of the future. 
 As always, the context is crucial, and this applies no less to my attempts to get 
to grips with the phenomenon. Th is is my fourth book devoted to the study of 
Putin’s rule, and it may well not be the last if Putin remains leader until 2024, as 
he is constitutionally mandated to do following his re-election for a fourth term 
in March 2018. He may even fi nd a way to stay in power for longer. Each book 
has been diff erent. Th e fi rst,  Putin: Russia’s Choice , was published in 2004, with 
a revised version issued in 2008, and focused on Putin’s development as a man 
and as a political leader, and it traced how he came to power then consolidated 
his rule. Th e book considered the ideational framework in which Putin operated 
as well as the key features of Putin’s statecraft , including an aversion to revolution 
accompanied by political managerialism and statism. It also examined the main 
policy areas, including changes to the federal system, economic reform and foreign 
policy. Th e second book,  Th e Crisis of Russian Democracy , came out in 2011 and 
examined the tension within the power system in the transition from Putin to 
his temporary successor Dmitry Medvedev in 2008. Th e constitution (Art. 81.3) 
limits the Russian president to no more than two  consecutive terms. First elected 
in March 2000 and again for a second four-year term in March 2004, Putin was 
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faced with the choice of either changing the constitution to remove term limits or 
declaring himself some sort of ‘national leader’, as many of his supporters at the 
time urged him to do. Putin refused to take this path, thus distinguishing himself 
from the standard pattern of authoritarian leaders. Putin chose to obey the letter of 
the law and, in a ‘managed succession’, arranged for Medvedev to be elected, while 
he became prime minister. Th e so-called tandem was created. Putin scrupulously 
held to the black letter of the law, while Medvedev represented the most liberal 
of the possible choices. Medvedev advanced plans for the modernisation of the 
country accompanied by a ‘reset’ in relations with the United States. Not much 
was achieved, but liberal reform and international engagement were placed on the 
agenda. 
 Th e third book,  Putin Redux , published in 2014 aft er Putin’s return to power 
in 2012, described how the modernisation agenda was derailed, as so oft en, by 
the onset of the global fi nancial crisis (GFC) in 2008 and foreign developments, 
notably the war in Georgia in August 2008 and then the Libyan crisis in 2011. 
Medvedev was not allowed a second run at the presidency, and the modernisation 
and democratisation rhetoric associated with his rule came to a juddering end. 
Putin’s return to the presidency was announced with clinical brutality at a congress 
of the ruling United Russia party on 24 September 2011. Th ere was to be a reverse 
castling move ( rokirovka ), undoing the tandem arrangement of 2008. Putin would 
return to the presidency, while Medvedev would become prime minister. Th is 
was declared to have been the plan all along. Th is may or may not have been 
the case, but either way the cynicism of the move appalled the intelligentsia and 
ordinary citizens. Th ere were rumblings of discontent culminating later that 
autumn in the emergence of the ‘white ribbon’ democracy movement. Widespread 
electoral fraud in the parliamentary elections of 4 December provoked the 
greatest upsurge of political activism since 2000. Th e regime responded with a 
combination of concessions and repression. Th is is what I call the ‘regime reset’: it 
was not liberalisation, but it did involve some deconcentration of political 
management, including the return of gubernatorial elections and reforms to the 
party and electoral systems. Th e regime had no intention of giving up control, 
but it understood the need to ensure credibility and legitimacy by granting some 
concessions. 
 In March 2012, Putin was elected to what had become, following the adoption of 
constitutional amendments in December 2008, a six-year presidential term. Putin 
returned to the Kremlin convinced that the West was an untrustworthy partner. 
Th e attempt to establish a viable relationship with the West through the ‘new 
realism’ between 2000 and 2012 had run into the sand, and now Putin advanced 
a neo-revisionist strategy that sought to advance Eurasian integration as the 
counterpart of the European Union (EU), accompanied by a signifi cant deepening 
of the relationship with China and with Asia as a whole. His ambitious programme 
to restore Russia’s great power status ( derzhavnost’ ) had mixed results. Relations 
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with the Atlantic system deteriorated, provoking a direct confrontation over 
Ukraine in 2014 and the seizure of Crimea. Sanctions were imposed, exacerbating 
what was already an economic slowdown. Putin’s popularity soared as a result of 
the return of Crimea and the Sevastopol naval base, but there were soon signs of 
‘Putin fatigue’, especially among young people who had grown up knowing no 
other leader. By the time that Putin came to run for his fourth, and if he stuck 
to the constitution, his last term in March 2018, the economy was pulling out 
of recession, although growth remained sluggish and living standards depressed. 
Th e administration used its resources to ensure a high turnout, and Putin, not 
surprisingly, won decisively. As Putin returned to the Kremlin, the foundations of 
his rule changed as society and elites began to think of Russia aft er Putin. 
 Th is book takes up the story to cover recent developments and places the larger 
Putin phenomenon in context. It covers its historical origins, makes comparisons 
with earlier periods of Russian and Soviet history, and draws on cross-national 
studies. Putin’s return to power in 2012 inaugurated a new and more decisive era 
in Russian foreign policy. His more assertive neo-revisionist foreign policy sought 
not to destroy the international system but to modify the way that it worked. As 
far as Moscow was concerned, a more assertive foreign policy would create the 
conditions for a more equitable and peaceful system of international politics, but 
the eff ect was the opposite. Th e paradoxical approach allows the close integration 
of domestic, ideational and foreign policy factors in the Putin era. Th e work ends 
with an evaluation of the Putin phenomenon, one of the great political curiosities 
of our era. 
 Canterbury, April 2019 
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1 1   PUTIN AND HIS TIMES 
 Th e question facing Putin when he assumed power in 2000 is the same one that 
faced Yeltsin as the fi rst Russian president between 1991 and 1999 and the one 
which shaped Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform eff orts as the last Soviet leader between 
March 1985 and his departure from offi  ce in December 1991. Th e problem is a 
simple one, but Russia’s destiny is to be found within its endless ramifi cations. 
Th e issue can be formulated as follows:  Would Russia join the existing US-led 
liberal international order, adapt to its norms, conventions and power hierarchy, 
or would it try to maintain its autonomy as a great power and separate political 
civilisation, even if this generated confl ict with the dominant power system? 
Gorbachev’s response was to ‘leap forwards’: formulating a new model of world 
order in which he hoped the question would become irrelevant. Gorbachev sought 
to transcend what he came to see as the sterile divisions of the Cold War to create 
a transformed inclusive and cooperative world order in which the West and the 
Soviet Union would be co-creators and become partners. Instead of this new world 
order based on  transformation , an alternative post-Cold War system was proposed 
based on the logic of  enlargement of the existing Atlantic system, or more broadly, 
the expansion of the historical West. Th e tension between adaptation to the norms 
and institutions of the historical West, and the attempt to forge a model that was 
perceived to correspond better to Russia’s traditions and national interests, has 
shaped post-communist Russia and aft er an early honeymoon period determined 
the character of Putin’s leadership. His Soviet upbringing and work in its security 
forces was only one factor shaping his complex political personality. 
 From  kommunalka to the Kremlin 
 Putin’s background before assuming the presidency in December 1999 is both 
unusual and typical. It is unusual because of Putin’s multifaceted past, comprising 
a number of elements that together constitute a striking biography for a world 
leader. It is typical in that Putin in several respects epitomises Russia’s fragmented, 
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22  THE PUTIN PARADOX
tragic and disjointed recent history. Putin’s complex biography refl ects the 
contradictions of Russia itself. Th e several facets of his character represent the 
pluralism now deeply embedded in society.  1  Surveys suggest that about a fi ft h 
of the population, or some twenty-fi ve million people, adhere to the democratic 
values as formulated by the West, but various strands of neo-traditional and 
other critical thought, oft en deeply antithetical to Western values, maintain a 
powerful hold. Th e cosmopolitan urban and well-educated classes are balanced 
by millions who live in small towns and the countryside, with values that tend 
to be more insular and traditional. Th us, when Vyacheslav Volodin, at the time 
the deputy head of the Presidential Administration (PA) responsible for domestic 
political aff airs, declared at the Valdai Discussion Club on 22 October 2014 that 
‘Putin is Russia, and there can be no Russia without Putin’,  2  he was making a 
political declaration, but this notorious formulation also captures something of 
the complex bond between Putin and the country. Th e denial of complexity too 
oft en leads to one-sided or distorted portrayals of Putin’s leadership. Without an 
understanding of the context, there can be no understanding of the personality, 
policies and processes.  3  
 Putin was born in Leningrad (as St Petersburg was then known) on 7 October 
1952.  4  He was the youngest of three children, with his older siblings born in the 
mid-1930s: Albert died in infancy, and Viktor died of diphtheria during the 872-
day siege of Leningrad. His mother, Maria Ivanovna Putina, was a factory worker, 
while his father Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin was a conscript in the Soviet 
Navy, serving in the submarine fl eet in the early 1930s and then in the NKVD’s 
destruction battalion before joining the regular forces, where he was severely 
wounded in November 1941. He later worked in the Yegorov wagon-building plant, 
where he was secretary of the workshop communist cell. Putin started School No. 
193 on 1 September 1960 in Baskov Lane, in the street where his family lived in 
a communal apartment ( kommunalka ) with two other families. Putin notes in a 
recent fi lm, ‘We lived in one room, in a communal fl at, on the fourth, the top fl oor. 
Sometimes the roof would leak.’  5  He was an unruly child and one of the few in 
his class who refused (or was refused) to join the Young Pioneer organisation. At 
the age of 12, he took up sambo, a Soviet martial and combat sport, and went on 
become a judo black belt, instilling in him a new sense of discipline. Putin studied 
German at High School No. 281 and now speaks the language fl uently. 
 He entered the Law Faculty of Leningrad State University in September 1970 
and joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) before graduating in 
1975. He had long wanted to join the Committee for State Security (KGB), and this 
infl uenced his choice of what to study at university. His early years in the KGB up 
to 1985 were uneventful in career terms. Putin served initially in the Second Chief 
Directorate (Counter-Intelligence) and then in the First Chief Directorate (PGU), 
where he monitored foreigners and consular offi  cials in Leningrad. Putin ended 
up working in the most sensitive department of the PGU, Department S, requiring 
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a high level of expertise and skill from its offi  cers. Th ese were peak years for the 
‘stagnation’ associated with Leonid Brezhnev, but they were also the years when 
some sort of Soviet ‘normality’ became established. Even today, many in Russia 
regard this period of peace, stability, modest but tangible development and high 
prestige as one of the two superpowers as the best of times. 
 In August 1985, Putin’s career took a sharp turn when at the age of 32 he was 
posted to Dresden in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). He moved there 
with his wife Ludmila and daughter Maria, and his younger daughter Ekaterina 
was born in Dresden in 1986. He worked as a senior case offi  cer, although the 
precise details of his activities remain vague. It appears that Putin worked as a 
Department S offi  cer working with ‘illegals’, deep cover intelligence assets.  6  Putin 
described his work as ‘pretty routine’, including recruiting informants, information 
gathering and transferring the material to Moscow.  7  Working abroad, Putin missed 
the excitement of Gorbachev’s great reforms:  perestroika (restructuring),  glasnost’ 
(openness) and  demokratizatsiya (democratisation). Gorbachev had been elected 
in March 1985 as a representative of the younger generation of Soviet leaders, 
and his six years in power saw the communist system dismantled and the staging 
of the most open and honestly counted elections in Russia’s history. By 1989, the 
structures of communist power had gone, and the new political thinking (NPT) 
in foreign policy brought the Cold War to an end. Gorbachev’s initial aspiration to 
modernise socialism through ‘reform communism’ were soon dashed; but he also 
failed to eff ect a Chinese-style manoeuvre of creating a ‘communism of reform’, 
whereby the party puts itself at the head of the movement to restore a market 
economy. As Putin felt even in distant Dresden, the whole system of governance 
was dismantled with nothing eff ective put in its place. Th e Berlin Wall was 
breached on 9 November 1989, and in a famous incident on 5 December, Putin 
telephoned Moscow for orders as a crowd prepared to storm the KGB residence, 
but ‘Moscow was silent’.  8  Soviet power was crumbling and it would soon disappear. 
 Although not a participant of the domestic turbulence, Putin recognised that 
East Germany’s political system was even more repressive than the Soviet Union’s. 
In his four-hour series of interviews with Oliver Stone aired in June 2017, Putin 
described the GDR as entirely lacking ‘the spirit of innovation’ and noted that it 
was a ‘society frozen in the 1950s’. Stone conducted more than a dozen interviews 
with Putin over a two-year period, with no subject off -limits, and the series 
provides a fascinating insight into Putin’s thinking.  9  Putin made the same point 
in his book of interviews published as he assumed power in early 2000:  ‘It [the 
GDR] was a harshly totalitarian country, similar to the Soviet Union, only 30 years 
earlier.’ He noted, ‘Th e tragedy is that many people sincerely believed in all those 
Communist ideals’,  10  implying that he was not one of them. Th ere is no evidence 
that Putin was ever a committed communist in ideological terms, although he 
was a fi erce patriot. Th e point is important, since it indicates a pragmatic cast of 
mind, a trait that characterises his leadership. Although Putin was distant from the 
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hopes and expectations of  perestroika , he was witness to its consequences, above 
all the weakening of state capacity and the accompanying social disorder. Putin 
is critical of revolution and spontaneous social activism, but while alert to the 
negative consequences of autonomous social and political activism, he appears 
blind to its potential for emancipation and renewal. Th e concepts of ‘reform’ and 
‘modernisation’ are absent from his lexicon. 
 Putin returned to Russia in January 1990 with not much to show for his eff orts 
in East Germany and with an uncertain future. In June, he was appointed to the 
International Aff airs department of Leningrad University. At the same time, in May 
1990, Putin became an international aff airs advisor to one of his former professors, 
Anatoly Sobchak. In March 1989, Sobchak had been elected an independent to 
the new Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD), where he became co-chair of the 
Inter-Regional Group of Deputies, which provided support for Yeltsin’s political 
ambitions. In April 1990, Sobchak was elected a member of the Leningrad City 
Council, and in May, he became chair. From the fi rst, Sobchak demonstrated 
authoritarian inclinations, although couched in the language of democracy and 
reform. He pushed through proposals to create a directly elected chief executive 
and won the subsequent mayoral election in June 1991 (accompanied by a 
plebiscite on restoring the city’s original name). On 28 June 1991, Putin became 
head of the Committee for External Relations in the St Petersburg mayor’s offi  ce, 
responsible for international contacts and attracting inward investment. On the 
second day of the coup against Gorbachev’s federal reform plans, on 20 August 
1991, Putin resigned from the KGB with the rank of lieutenant colonel. Putin later 
commented, ‘As soon as the coup began, I immediately decided which side I was 
on’,  11  although the choice was not an easy one since he had spent his career in 
‘the organs’. Th e CPSU was disbanded soon aft er, although Putin appears never to 
have renounced his party membership.  12  Faced with the coup, Stone asked Putin 
whether he still believed in communism, in the system, to which Putin responded, 
‘No, certainly not, But at the beginning I believed it … and I wanted to implement 
it.’ So, when did he change? ‘You know, regrettably, my views are not changed when 
I  am exposed to new ideas, but only when I’m exposed to new circumstances.’ 
Th is was Putin the arch-pragmatist. He was also the realist who understood that 
‘the political system was stagnating … it was frozen, it was not capable of any 
development’, and drawing on the experience of the GDR, he concluded that ‘the 
monopoly of one political force, of one party, is pernicious to the country’. 
 Sobchak served as mayor from 1991 to 1996, with Putin in March 1994 
becoming one of the deputy mayors, while the other, Vladimir Yakovlev, in the end 
challenged his patron. In these years, St Petersburg hosted several major cultural 
and sporting events, but the infrastructure degraded and the city was engulfed by 
criminality and poverty. In an attempt to alleviate food shortages in late 1991, Putin 
authorised the export of metals and other goods worth $93 million in exchange for 
food, but while the goods were exported, very little, if any, food aid arrived.  13  An 
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investigation led by Marina Salye, a member of the city legislature, recommended 
that Putin be dismissed for inappropriately licensing the deal and then failing 
to monitor it adequately.  14  Accusations of corruption were used by both sides in 
the struggle between the mayor’s offi  ce and the city soviet for power in the city, 
a microcosm of the struggle between Yeltsin and the Russian CPD, which ended 
in the bloodshed of October 1993. Despite the serious charges against him, Putin 
thrived and became acquainted with some high-profi le foreign visitors to the city, 
including Henry Kissinger. All this came to a crunching halt with Sobchak’s defeat 
in the election against Yakovlev in June 1996, with Putin refusing to serve under 
the new mayor, whom he accused of treachery.  15  
 Putin moved to Moscow, and in August 1996, he became a deputy head under 
Pavel Borodin of the Presidential General Aff airs Department, responsible for 
Russian property abroad. Th is was the beginning of Putin’s vertiginous rise. On 26 
March 1997, Yeltsin appointed him a deputy head of the PA, a post he retained until 
May 1998, and head of the Main Control Directorate (until June 1998), a job that 
involved monitoring expenditure. On 27 June 1997, Putin defended his doctoral 
( kandidatskaya ) dissertation at the St Petersburg Mining Institute, supervised 
by the rector Vladimir Litvinenko, on the subject of  Th e Strategic Planning of 
Regional Resources during the Formation of Market Relations . Putin argued that the 
state had an important part to play in maximising natural resources to advance 
national developmental goals, a principle that he implemented as president. In an 
associated article, Putin argued that Russia’s mineral resources, and in particular 
hydrocarbons, would be central to the country’s economic development for the 
foreseeable future. To achieve the most eff ective exploitation of these resources, 
the state would have to take the lead in regulating and developing the resource 
sector, although using ‘purely market methods’.  16  Typically, Putin favoured the 
market but not market  forces . Th e resource sector became the prime example of 
a managed market. As president, Putin relied on a set of ‘national champions’, 
taking the form of Gazprom for gas and Rosneft  for oil. Gazprom in particular 
became an instrument of state policy, and although condemned as a distortion of 
market forces and an avenue for corruption, this form of state capitalism built on 
the Soviet legacy and comparative developmental experience.  17  
 On 25 May 1998, Putin was appointed fi rst deputy head of the PA responsible 
for regional aff airs and on 15 July became head of the commission responsible 
for the bilateral ‘treaties’ between Moscow and the regions. Putin now oversaw 
the work of regional administrations and clearly opposed the ad hoc rather than 
constitutional character of the agreements. His predecessor, Sergei Shakhrai, had 
signed forty-six agreements with forty-four regions, but Putin halted the process, 
and when he became president he allowed them all to lapse, except the one with 
Tatarstan which was renewed in 2007 (but which fi nally ended on 26 June 2017). 
Putin was not long in this post. On 25 June 1998, he was appointed director of 
the Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor to the KGB, where he conducted 
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a radical purge and reassignment of staff . Putin once again soon moved on, this 
time to become prime minister. He was nominated on 9 August and confi rmed 
by parliament on 16 August 1999. Yeltsin made clear that he considered Putin 
his designated successor. Th is was an even more diffi  cult period than usual, with 
Russia suff ering from endemic fi scal crisis which culminated in the partial default 
of August 1998 and persistent political instability as Yeltsin’s health failed. 
 Th ere was also renewed turmoil in Chechnya. Th e fi rst war was launched 
in December 1994 and ground on until August 1996, when the Khasavyurt 
agreement granted the republic a fi ve-year interim period of self-rule that could 
well have ended in independence for ‘Ichkeria’. Instead, the republic descended 
into internecine confl ict, the imposition of harsh elements of Sharia law, public 
executions, hostage taking and killings. In the summer of 1999, armed incursions 
into neighbouring Dagestan and the creation of radical Islamist enclaves there 
created a security threat of the fi rst order. Th e still-unexplained explosions in two 
Moscow apartment blocks and one in Volgodonsk took a heavy toll of lives. Th e 
Chechens were held responsible, although the precise circumstances remain a 
mystery. In September, Putin launched what was to become the second Chechen 
war, which in the end defeated the radical Islamic authorities while co-opting 
Chechen forces defending traditional representations of Chechen nationalism. 
Th e second war, like the fi rst, was accompanied by the terrible loss of life and 
material destruction. Putin’s defence of the territorial integrity of Russia and 
dynamic personality, especially compared to the years of rule by a debilitated 
Yeltsin, prompted a sharp rise in his popularity. Putin’s endorsement of the new 
political party called Unity gave it a surprise success in the December 1999 
parliamentary election, winning the second largest share of the vote (23.3 per 
cent) – the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) came fi rst with 
24.3 per cent. 
 Conditions were now in place for the fi rst of Russia’s managed successions. On 
31 December 1999, Yeltsin addressed the nation to announce his resignation and, 
as stipulated by the constitution, Putin as prime minister became acting president. 
Putin’s fi rst decree that day provided immunity for Yeltsin and his family. Preterm 
elections were held on 26 March 2000, in which Putin won in the fi rst round with 
53 per cent of the vote, with the CPRF leader since 1993, Gennady Zyuganov, 
coming second with 29 per cent. Putin was formally inaugurated on 7 May, and he 
appointed the former fi nance minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, as prime minister. Th e 
Putin era had begun. 
 The many Putins 
 Putin’s precipitous ascent led to much speculation about ‘who is Mr Putin?’. Th is 
question is not susceptible to any simple answer, since Putin remains a protean 
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fi gure onto which people project their own prejudices, ambitions, aspirations and 
hopes. No single element in his biography or career shapes his political preferences. 
Th e Hill and Gaddy biography does a good job in identifying the various facets 
of Putin’s political personality, but it fails to integrate them into a dynamic or 
convincing portrait of the man or the system. Lacking a broader analysis of the 
political context of his work or a conceptual framework for the analysis of his rule, 
the work arbitrarily (in methodological terms) draws on one aspect (Putin as a 
KGB ‘case offi  cer’) to explain the onset of a period of confrontation with the West 
in his third term aft er 2012.  18  Putin’s ambition to join the Soviet security service 
and his subsequent employment by the KGB and the FSB no doubt contributed 
to his understanding of politics, but other experiences also shaped his views.  19  
As deputy mayor in St Petersburg in the early 1990s, Putin was responsible for 
the liberal transformation of the city’s economy, seeking to harness the power of 
the market and international capital to create a capitalist economy. Th is required 
many insalubrious deals with organised interests, some of which may have been 
criminal, but this was the only way to get things done in the chaotic conditions of 
Russia’s ‘primary accumulation of capital’ phase of development. 
 Corners were undoubtedly cut, reinforcing what became Putin’s goal-
oriented managerial strategy: processes and institutions were subordinated to the 
achievement of defi ned ends. Even this result-focused approach is tempered by 
Putin’s legal training, so even if ends shape means, formal adherence to the law 
and regulations remain paramount in his statecraft . Although the foundations 
of a capitalist democracy were established in the 1990s, the Putin years saw the 
development of the legal and regulatory framework for a market economy and a 
liberal democracy. However, when we come to discuss the dual (and possibly even 
triple) state, we shall see how contradictory elements were embedded in Russian 
state development in the Yeltsin years, which became more deeply entrenched 
aft er 2000. Condemnation of the ‘chaotic 1990s’ is one of the founding myths of 
Putin’s rule, but his system owes much to the principles of statecraft  and political 
economy laid down in that decade, reinforcing the multiple and contradictory 
features of Putin’s leadership. In the Stone interviews, Putin insists that he favours 
private property and privatisation but opposes the way that the oligarchs in the 
1990s exploited their ties to the state apparatus to grab whole industries on the 
cheap. Putin also revealed that he had been subject to fi ve assassination attempts, 
and contrary to the view that he was anti-American, he emerges as someone ready 
to do business with the West, if the terms are right. 
 Two historical events shape Putin’s political character. First, the infl uence of 
what in Russia is called the Great Patriotic War, the terrible confl ict unleashed by 
Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. By then the Second 
World War had been raging for nearly two years, with France and the western 
part of continental Europe occupied by Germany but with Britain standing 
alone and defi ant. Poland and much of Eastern Europe had been delivered to 
9781788318303_pi-306.indd   7 15-Oct-19   12:25:34
88  THE PUTIN PARADOX
Germany in the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 23 August 1939 and its subsequent (secret) 
Protocols. Following the failure to create an eff ective collective defence alliance 
against Hitler, Joseph Stalin sought to buy time and turn the German war machine 
against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)’s capitalist enemies in the 
West. Th is may well have been a rational policy, but the savage character of the 
Soviet occupation of eastern Poland and other territories, accompanied by mass 
deportations, the slaughter of some twenty-two thousand Polish offi  cers at Katyn 
and elsewhere, the failure to build adequate defences along the new border and 
the obsequious character of the relationship with Hitler, was not. Stalin refused 
to acknowledge the many warnings of the impending German attack and was 
shocked when it came. Entire Soviet armies were destroyed, and Moscow barely 
escaped capture in the winter of 1941–2. Th e blockade of Leningrad from 8 
September 1941 to 27 January 1944 was one of the longest and most savage sieges 
in history, accompanied by mass starvation and over half a million deaths. Putin’s 
mother only survived because of the rations given to her husband as a soldier. 
Putin grew up in the war’s long shadow, and to this day victory in that struggle 
remains the foundational moment of Russian national identity. Some twenty-
seven million Soviet people were killed in the titanic struggle, which brought the 
country’s armed forces to Berlin. Victory endowed the Soviet Union with a great 
power status, consolidated in the Yalta and Potsdam agreements of 1945. Th is is 
tempered by Stalin’s horrifi c collectivisation of agriculture in the early 1930s, which 
provoked a widespread famine (called in Ukraine the  Holodomor ), the murderous 
purges of the 1930s and his costly wartime mistakes. Nevertheless, the country’s 
heroic sacrifi ce garnered the laurels of victory, the consolidation of a security zone 
in Eastern Europe, the status of a founding member of the post-war order and the 
validation of the achievements of the Soviet system combine to make the war one 
of the foundations of national identity today. 
 Th e second major event is the self-dissolution of the communist system and the 
subsequent disintegration of the USSR. In 1988, the major instruments of CPSU 
rule were dismantled, including the whole  apparat of the Central Committee and 
its agencies. In March 1989, elections were held to a newly empowered CPD, and 
this ballot (along with the election to the Russian CPD a year later) was the freest 
and fairest Russia has seen. By 1989, the Soviet Union was no longer recognisably 
communist, and in the autumn, most countries in the Soviet bloc shook off 
communist rule through ‘velvet revolutions’ and began what was described at the 
time as the ‘return to Europe’. Th e CPSU in February 1990 was stripped off  its 
‘leading and guiding role’, and power shift ed to the newly established presidency 
and a newly empowered parliament. In foreign aff airs, by 1989 the Cold War 
was over, and the country looked to a new era of transformed relations with the 
Western powers. However, powerful national movements gathered force in the 
union republics, with Russia under Yeltsin in the lead. Th e Russian Declaration 
of State Sovereignty of 12 June 1990 marked the moment when Russia defected 
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from the country whose heart it had been for over half a millennium. A cascade 
of sovereignty declarations gave way to declarations of independence, despite 
Gorbachev’s attempts to negotiate a new ‘union treaty’ to hold the country together. 
On 7–8 December 1991 at Belovezhskaya Pushcha in what was then Belarussia, 
the Soviet Union was abolished by the leaders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, 
and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created. Russia became 
the ‘continuer state’, assuming the Soviet Union’s legal and treaty obligations, as 
well as its debts, but above all its permanent United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) seat. 
 Th e Great Patriotic War and the Soviet collapse haunt Russian history. Th e fi rst 
reinforces Putin’s belief that Russia has to defend its sovereignty diplomatically 
and militarily, and the second that centrifugal trends have to be curbed. Th is 
gives rise to Putin’s enduring commitment to ‘stability’. He saw the consequences 
of wartime destruction and the ill-thought-out reforms in the Gorbachev years, 
which provoked the dissolution of the communist system (which does not seem 
to have bothered Putin very much), and the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
and the weakening of the state (which worried him very much). Although Putin 
in April 2005 talked about the collapse ( krushenie ) of the Soviet Union as ‘a major 
geopolitical catastrophe of the [twentieth] century’, he certainly did not mean that 
the USSR could be recreated. Th e phrase has been misinterpreted and taken out 
of context.  20  Putin explained that he considered the event so catastrophic because 
millions of members of the Russian nation suddenly found themselves outside 
of the Russian Federation’s borders, and the Soviet downfall opened the door to 
oligarch power and mass poverty. He went on to insist that Russia’s development 
as a democratic state was ‘the main political-ideological task’, but Russia had come 
to democracy by ‘the hard path’, and thus democracy was especially valued in the 
country. He declared that democracy was something that Russia had itself chosen 
and that it was not something imposed from outside, and hence the country 
would do it on its own terms and in its own way.  21  Political shocks, irresponsible 
mobilisation and the imposition of ‘reforms’ in his view precipitated revolution and 
collapse. As he put it in his landmark statement on the eve of taking power,  Russia at 
the Turn of the Millennium (known hereaft er as his  Millennium Manifesto ), ‘Russia 
has reached its limit for political and socio-economic upheavals, cataclysms, and 
radical reforms. … Be it under communist, national patriotic, or radical-liberal 
slogans, our country and our people will not withstand a new radical break-up.’  22  
His response was to limit the autonomous mobilisation of political interests, 
intensify the monitoring of NGOs and curb external fi nancing and infl uence on 
political actors in Russia. 
 While Russia remains an intensely pluralistic country, the political representation 
of contending views has been stifl ed. As in the Soviet years, everything is political, 
but not at the level of ‘the political’ – the agonistic formal and institutionalised 
contention between deeply held views on a nation’s destiny and policies. In 
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this sense, Putin depoliticised the policy process, the counterpart of pragmatic 
policymaking. Technocratic rationality claims to be superior (and may well be 
in certain limited respects) to the short-termism of democratic contestation and 
governmental turnover. It allows longer time horizons and the implementation 
of long-term strategies. However, sovereignty is shift ed from the democratic 
citizenry to administrative elites and specialists (the technical intelligentsia). 
Th is displacement reproduced the ‘stability system’ that predominated in the late 
Soviet years, although in conditions of greater openness and exposure to foreign 
infl uences. A stability system is one in which the political regime monitors and 
controls social and political forces, and thus stands outside of politics. Putin’s 
‘stabilocracy’ is embodied in the tutelary role of the administrative regime, 
claiming to know better than the views expressed by democratic majorities and 
insulated from the emotions of the democratic masses. Th is is a technocratic 
understanding of the political sphere and inevitably raises fundamental questions 
about political legitimacy. By what right does a self-constituted regime close 
itself off  from popular accountability? Th e unstable foundation of the semantic 
shift  in the meaning of stability from a technical term to an ideological principle, 
paradoxically, generates instability.  23  
 Th is is the paradox that ultimately undermined the legitimacy, and hence 
durability, of the Soviet Union. In the late Soviet years, the earlier mobilising 
belief in world revolution, industrialisation and modernisation eroded, and 
instead regime legitimacy was based on ‘eudaemonic’ performance; that is, the 
ability to deliver tangible public goods, rising living standards and stability. Th is 
represented a ‘social contract’: in exchange for limitations on public autonomous 
political participation, the regime would deliver improved prosperity and security. 
In its fi nal years, the regime could no longer keep its end of the bargain, especially 
when the privileges and corruption of the elite became known, provoking the 
people to demand more meaningful political participation. Th is burst out in 
the wave of civic activism during perestroika, including the creation of a vibrant 
network of  neformaly (informal associations) as well as the beginnings of a reborn 
competitive party system. Th is democratic wave soon ebbed, although Yeltsin rode 
on it to take power in an independent Russia. Once in the Kremlin, he no longer 
needed popular mobilisation and political pluralism, and instead relied on the 
administrative system. In this way, post-communist Russia recreated a stability 
system. A new ‘social contract’ also promises to raise living standards in exchange 
for political passivity. Equally, the Putin system is in danger of being caught in 
the ‘eudaemonic trap’, when a regime is unable to deliver on its promises. In 
Putin’s case, the basis for legitimation is broader than that of the earlier system 
but nevertheless relies on performance criteria that erode popular support when 
not fulfi lled. 
 Coming aft er jarring shocks to society and the political system, the promise of 
stability was certainly attractive for large parts of society. Putin’s administration 
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positioned itself as both the heir and repudiator of three earlier systems:  the 
Imperial, the Soviet and the liberal 1990s. Th e fi rst two collapsed and the third 
ended in chaos, although all three had notable achievements to their credit. Putin 
sought to exploit the accomplishments, in terms of domestic development and 
status abroad, while repudiating the failings. Th is is the classic task of a restoration 
period, selecting what useful elements from the revolutionary period to incorporate 
into the new order. Th is renders Putin’s rule an eclectic mix of systems and 
histories, incorporating elements of all preceding orders but not fully articulating 
their individual purpose and logic. Th is is the trademark characteristic of the 
Putin phenomenon: taking a little from each historical era but allowing none to 
become dominant. Th is makes it diffi  cult for the Putin system to articulate its own 
meaning and purpose other than stability itself. Th is entails the danger of repeating 
the mistakes that destroyed the earlier regimes, including political closure and, in 
the case of the Soviet regime, social, political and economic stagnation. 
 Awareness of Russia’s historic vulnerability and the concomitant emphasis on 
stability are the foundations of Putin’s leadership, and it is in this context that his 
achievements have to be assessed. Putin’s rule has been extraordinary, and he joins 
the ranks as one of Russia’s longest serving leaders. Leonid Brezhnev came to power 
as part of a collective leadership in 1964, and the latter part of his eighteen years 
in power are known as the era of stagnation ( zastoi ). Putin joins an illustrious and 
sometimes less-than-distinguished grand pageant of Russian leaders. As an avid 
amateur historian, he is well aware of the succession of heroes, reformers, misfi ts 
and mass murderers who have preceded him at the helm of the country’s destiny. 
Opinions are divided over which category Putin will join, and this very divergence 
of views is a characteristic feature of the Putin phenomenon. For some, he is the 
man who presided over the degradation of Russian democracy and who became 
the sponsor of attempts to subvert the West.  24  For others, he is the leader who 
stabilised the country and provided a framework for development while asserting 
Russia’s sovereignty at home and abroad, an act of defi ance that brought down the 
wrath of the Atlantic power system on his head.  25  
 Th e religious side of Putin’s personality is undoubtedly important and has 
probably been underestimated in the various biographies. Putin was baptised into 
the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as a child, and there are indications that his 
spiritual advisor is Bishop Tikhon (Shevkunov), formerly Archimandrite at the 
rebuilt Sretensky Monastery in central Moscow and the author of the bestselling 
 Everyday Saints and Other Stories . At the same time, Putin entertains a utilitarian 
view of organised religion as one of the pillars of his vaunted ‘stability’. During the 
2012 presidential election, the close link between Putin and Patriarch Kirill was 
stressed, but they appear to have drift ed apart as a result of the Ukraine crisis. For 
Putin, organised religion (and not just the ROC) is one of the main supports of 
the regime in inculcating patriotic sentiments in the population and the source 
of spiritual values and ethical values compared to the amoral West. By contrast, 
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Patriarch Kirill criticises the state’s historical infl uence on the church. Whereas 
Putin wanted Kirill to condemn the Ukrainian authorities aft er 2014, the ROC was 
cautious since the Moscow Patriarchate is head of some two-thirds of Orthodox 
parishes in Ukraine, who fi nd themselves under intense pressure to subordinate 
themselves to the Kiev Patriarchate.  26  At the same time, Putin is always respectful 
of the other ‘traditional’ religions in Russia: Judaism, Islam and Buddhism. Putin 
himself is a philo-Semite, attributed to friendship with his Jewish neighbours 
in his childhood  kommunalka , and he has gone out of his way to forge a strong 
relationship with Israel and to respect its security interests. Th e support of local 
authorities in the construction of churches and the general encroachment of the 
church into matters of morality and education provokes resistance in society, 
especially since the constitution stipulates the separation of church and state. 
 Th e Putin system is trapped in a liminal space between democracy and 
authoritarianism. It has elements of both, but the logic of neither is given free rein. 
Th is is not a no man’s land, since the country is living and developing in that space, 
but it is one where diff erent rationalities of governance compete, accompanied 
by contesting ideological orientations and appreciations of the past. None is 
‘hegemonic’, that is, no single vision of the public good and vision of the future 
predominate. Instead, competing interpretations of Russia’s destiny and place in 
the world coexist. 
 The post-Cold War context 
 Th e post-Cold War era has been shaped by the tension between transformation of 
the European security order and the enlargement of the Atlantic system. Yeltsin tried 
to fi nesse the question and do both. However, as it became clear that enthusiasm 
to adapt to Western modernity entailed acquiescence to the logic of enlargement, 
a powerful head of resistance built up within the country. An oscillating pattern 
of cooperation and confl ict between Russia and the West was established, and 
this was the situation inherited by Putin. As the most European leader Russia has 
ever had, he tried to negotiate a way out of the impasse. Th is involved attempts to 
forge a closer relationship with the European Union (EU), and he even suggested 
membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), a strategy that 
could be called  transformation from within . For various reasons (explored in 
 Chapter 6 ), this failed in the most spectacular manner. By the time Putin returned 
to offi  ce for his fourth presidential term in 2018, the pendulum had swung fi rmly 
towards a position of entrenched confl ict. Th is is the Second Cold War: as diff erent 
from the fi rst as the Second World War diff ers from the fi rst. All three leaders – 
Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin – believed that there was some sort of Russian third 
way between subordination to the logic of US-led liberal order enlargement and 
outright resistance.  27  Th is larger logic of international relations in the post-Cold 
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War years since 1989 is the matrix within which Russian domestic politics were 
shaped and the paradoxes of the Putin phenomenon developed. 
 Th ere could be no straightforward ‘return to Europe’ for the newly independent 
Russia. By then the liberal international order in Europe was made up of two key 
components: NATO and what was soon to become (as a result of the Treaty of 
Maastricht) the EU. NATO was created in 1949 as a way of containing the USSR 
as well as of ensuring the continued commitment of the United States to West 
European security. In 1990, the Soviet equivalent of NATO, the Warsaw Treaty 
Organisation (WTO), was disbanded, but NATO not only continued but aft er 
some hesitation in the early 1990s (aware of the alienating eff ect that expansion 
would have on Russo-Western relations) also began a process of  enlargement . Th is 
represented the augmentation not only of a security organisation but also of a 
whole ramifi ed power system, accompanied by forceful ideological and normative 
claims. Post-communist Russia to a degree shared these normative principles 
because the country became an independent state through what was considered at 
the time to be a ‘democratic revolution’, albeit ‘unfi nished’.  28  
 Th e problem was that Russia could not be a passive recipient of a transformation 
based on models generated elsewhere. Just as the country sought to become 
the co-creator of a new world order, its whole history militated against simple 
adaptation to patterns devised elsewhere. Russia sought solutions to historical 
problems within the framework of its own cultural traditions. Th is is why Russia’s 
‘democratic revolution’ always looked anomalous from the perspective of classic 
theories of democratisation and included elements that were far from democratic. 
Th e popular movement was led by a former communist regional boss, and the 
popular movement never gained a solid independent basis. Th ese contradictions 
were exacerbated by the perceived threat of the Western enlargement agenda. At the 
time of German unifi cation in 1990, there were heated discussions about whether 
the united country would be a NATO member and whether in return for Soviet 
acquiescence for unifi cation a pledge had been given not to enlarge NATO beyond 
the united Germany. Although not all scholars agree, the general consensus is that 
repeated verbal promises were given to that eff ect.  29  Today, the majority of former 
Soviet bloc East European states are members of NATO, as well as the three Baltic 
republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). In April 2007, Georgia and Ukraine were 
promised membership at some point in the future, a commitment that provoked a 
serious deterioration in Russo-Atlantic relations. With Montenegro’s accession in 
2017, total NATO membership rose to twenty-nine. 
 Th us, the fundamental process at the end of the Cold War became enlargement 
of the Atlantic community. By contrast, Gorbachev and his successors in Russia 
sought  transformation , a negotiated end to the institutional and ideational 
structures of the Cold War in which Russia would become a founder member of a 
new political community. Instead, all that was on off er (and as far as the Western 
powers were concerned, it was quite a lot) was associate membership in an existing 
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concern. No one really believed that Russia could join NATO without changing 
the character of the organisation and of the whole Atlantic system. Th ere were 
understandable fears that Russia’s membership would lead to normative dilution, 
institutional incoherence and, above all, a weakening of US leadership. Fully 
fl edged Russian membership would mean that it would have constituent authority 
and veto powers. In the post-Cold War era, there were simply not enough Western 
leaders, let alone military planners, ready to take the risk and weaken (from their 
perspective) a functioning enterprise in favour of an uncertain and possibly 
dangerous alliance with Russia. Th is was certainly something vigorously opposed 
by most former Soviet bloc countries in Eastern Europe. In addition, as the country 
plunged into the chaos of the 1990s, Russia was a much weakened power, and its 
voice could be safely ignored. Th e resurgence of powerful neo-traditionalist and 
security ( silovik ) forces further justifi ed the enlargement of the Atlantic system 
while the going was good. Th e start of the fi rst Chechen war in December 1994, 
accompanied by the savage bombing of civilian objects and brutal attempts at 
pacifi cation, only confi rmed the fears of a nationalist backlash. 
 It seemed reasonable to ask why the Atlantic powers should make concessions 
and transform themselves, when Russia hardly seemed an attractive and 
desirable partner. In any case, the off er was on the table for Russia to establish 
a ‘strategic partnership’ with the enlarging system. Th is was formulated in 1997 
through the creation of a NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). NATO 
promised not to station forces in Eastern Europe on a permanent basis, not to 
place nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, and to work on adapting 
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.  30  Th e PJC format proved 
inadequate, and following the 9/11 attack on New  York and Washington and 
Putin’s support in the struggle against terrorism, including intelligence sharing 
and opening up bases in Central Asia for the war in Afghanistan, enhanced 
cooperation and a more equal partnership was on the agenda. On 28 May 2002, 
the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) was established at a summit in Rome as ‘a 
mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision 
and joint action in which the individual NATO member states and Russia work 
as equal partners on a wide spectrum of security issues of common interest’.  31  
Russia’s status was enhanced from one against the others to what was intended 
to be a higher degree of partnership as part of an expanded security community. 
However, the agreement avoided giving Russia a ‘veto’ in any shape or form on 
NATO security issues.  32  Neither side pursued a zero-sum strategy, yet in the 
end without a structural transformation, aspirations for genuine partnership 
proved nugatory. NATO continued to hedge against Russia’s possible resurgence 
as a security threat (prompted in particular by the concerns of East European 
countries), but hedging inevitably represented a lack of trust and inhibited even 
small steps towards ‘transformation from within’. Despite endless statements of 
good will by both sides, the estrangement intensifi ed. 
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 Much the same logic applied to Russia’s relations with the EU. It was initially 
assumed that in the civilian sphere there were greater opportunities for deep 
engagement. A  Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was signed 
in 1994, although it only came into eff ect in December 1997 because of the 
Chechen war. At the St Petersburg summit in May 2003, it was agreed to develop 
four common spaces in the framework of the PCA: economy and environment; 
freedom, security and justice; external security; and research, education and 
culture. At the EU–Russia summit (the PCA stipulated biannual meetings, 
alternately one in Russia and one in the EU) in Rostov-on-Don in mid-2010, a 
Partnership for Modernisation was signed, which attempted to reset relations, 
but such a rebooting signalled the deeper exhaustion of the relationship. Th e 
foundations for an enduring partnership based on trust and mutual respect were 
missing. Th e original PCA came to an end aft er ten years, and although renewed 
annually, no new framework agreement has been devised. Aft er 2014, the biannual 
summits have been abandoned. Each side blames the other for the deterioration, 
and both sides are right. Th e problem lies in a diff erent plane, the very basis of 
post-Cold War international politics. Th e politics of enlargement by defi nition 
assumes a linear and, ultimately, teleological view of political change – that the 
end point is known and all that has to be done is get there. Russia was to adapt 
to the existing norms and values of the predominant liberal order. Th is would 
undoubtedly have provided a framework for Russia to transform itself into a more 
liberal, a more democratic and a more compliant state. 
 Instead, the Moscow leadership already under Yeltsin argued that Russia would 
transform itself into a liberal and market democracy, but it would do so in its 
own way and at its own pace. Above all, it argued that the transformation should 
be mutual, including a transformation of the system of European international 
relations and, above all, of European security. Th e West insisted that Russia had to 
transform itself, while Russia asserted that it would do so, but as part of a broader 
transformation. Russia hoped that its membership would transform the historical 
West (with the Atlantic powers and institutions at its core) into a ‘greater West’ 
in which Russia would be a constituent member and thus with all the rights of a 
co-founder. Th e same applies to Europe where Gorbachev in a landmark speech in 
Strasburg in July 1989 had proclaimed a ‘common European home’. Russia sought 
to transform the single-minded axiological logic of EU enlargement into a more 
dialogical process – in which all are transformed as a result of interaction with 
each other. Instead, Russia was off ered a ‘strategic partnership’ with the smaller or 
core Europe, as institutionalised in the EU, in which the norms and institutions of 
the EU would predominate. By contrast, Russia favoured the transformative and 
pluralistic creation of a greater Europe (the current term for common European 
home), in which it would be a founder and core member. Th e idea of a greater 
Europe displaces the monist idea of the EU as the sole representative of Europe 
in favour of a more plural model, in which the EU would be part of a broader 
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pan-European community. Both the greater West and greater Europe ideas are 
based on a dialogical approach to politics – the view that engagement transforms 
both subjects. Instead, the West tried to stay the same and enlarge; while Russia 
was to change and assume a new power and normative identity. 
 Th is, then, is the fundamental question. Once it became clear that there would 
be no transformational politics at the end of the Cold War, and instead the logic 
of enlargement would prevail, what should Russia do? Should it associate itself 
with the historical West and the smaller Europe as a subaltern and adapt to the 
existing institutions and norms, or should it assert its own autonomous great 
power and normative identity? Yeltsin and Putin, as noted, tried to fi nesse the 
question by fi nding some sort of middle course, but both failed in this endeavour. 
By the time he returned to power in 2012, Putin had given up the search and now 
unequivocally advanced the view that Russia would be an independent source of 
sovereign power in the international system. Th is gave rise to a neo-revisionist 
foreign policy: one that remained committed on the vertical axis to the institutions 
of international law and governance, above all the UN, but in horizontal relations 
with other states would challenge the hegemony of the US-led liberal order. Th is 
inevitably brought Russia into confrontation with the Atlantic system. Th is was 
balanced by the creation of an anti-hegemonic alignment with China and some 
other states. 
 Th is was the framework in which Russian politics developed in the post-Cold 
War era, and in which Putin devised his policies. Foreign policy in this account is not 
something external but at the heart of Russia’s identity and civilisational character, 
and the central facet of Putin’s rule. Russia is far from unique in this respect, but 
given its size, history and vulnerable geographical location, the interaction of 
domestic and foreign policy in Russia is exceptionally close. Putin devised his own 
specifi c formulation of the challenges. Th e external threats reinforced the power 
and legitimacy of the regime at home, but this does not mean that the fundamental 
structural dilemmas facing post-communist Russia were imagined. In the absence 
of benign and transformed European international relations, the move from 
‘strategic partnership’ to open confrontation was, if not inevitable, certainly likely. 
In that context, Putin’s statecraft  is only the latest manifestation of enduring themes 
in Russian politics and his leadership only a small chapter in Russia’s history of 
resistance and adaptation to external developmental and security challenges. 
 The democracy paradox 
 Th e Putin project is predicated on maintaining diff erentiation and pluralism in the 
international system, while at home it seeks to depoliticise diff erences and manage 
contestation between social groups and elite interests. Th e standard narrative 
would suggest that as the contradictions of the Putin system accumulated, the role 
9781788318303_pi-306.indd   16 15-Oct-19   12:25:34
17
PUTIN AND HIS TIMES 17
of scapegoating would intensify. Th is meant identifying the West as the source 
and the inspirer of Russia’s problems, a feature accentuated at times of political 
stress. Th us, the fl awed December 2011 parliamentary elections, followed by the 
largest political demonstrations of Putin’s tenure, were accompanied by a virulent 
response to alleged Western ‘interference’. Th is was not without some substance, 
since the US secretary of state at the time, Hillary Clinton, is recognised for her 
interventionist approach in international aff airs; yet the campaign clearly had an 
instrumental purpose, to mobilise core supporters against the ‘other’, both internal 
and abroad. Th e Putinite system of internal political management recognises the 
political subjectivity of other political actors as long as they are ready to sacrifi ce 
their autonomy. Th e strategy of depoliticised state management delivers a certain 
type of stability but requires intense ‘manual management’ to achieve its goals. 
Managed democracy stifl es genuine dialogical politics, but by the same token, it 
attempts to build consensus from the centre and avoids extreme forms of axiology. 
 Putin is oft en accused of destroying Russia, but fi lm director Andrei 
Konchalovsky argues instead that ‘Russia has destroyed Putin’. Like previous 
Russian leaders, he fi nds it hard to ‘rule a state whose population has no idea about 
democracy … and according to inviolable tradition voluntarily delegates all power 
to one single individual’. In Konchalovsky’s view, the Russians were an archaic 
nation, even though they used iPhones, with a system of values still rooted in the 
eleventh or twelft h century, before the creation of a bourgeoisie or citizenry. Th e 
absence of defensible property rights, a Manichaean way of thinking in which there 
is only light or darkness, and where reforms always run into the sand shape the 
destiny of the nation. It also makes the country remarkably resilient, and sanctions 
have little eff ect because Russians are used to endurance and in case of confl ict 
will rally round the Kremlin.  33  Th is characterisation is misleading, since numerous 
studies reveal a sophisticated understanding and desire for democracy in Russia, 
accompanied by an awareness of how far the existing system falls short.  34  But there 
are cultural and historical diff erences. For the West, democracy is the only political 
form relevant to the modern world; for Russia, however, the concept is in danger 
of joining the ranks of failed experiments, alongside fascism and socialism. Th e 
experience of near state collapse in the 1990s, accompanied by the enrichment of 
a small group of oligarchs, traumatised the nation and shapes perceptions to this 
day. Historical experience determines views, reinforced today by the structure of 
post-Cold War international politics. While for the West liberalism has become 
the ideology of modernity, in Russia it is widely perceived to be the creed of an 
expansive (and quite oft en hostile) power system. 
 Post-communist Russia has suff ered from a particularly sharp form of what 
can be called the ‘democracy paradox’, where majorities may elect a government 
that threatens the democratic process that brought it to power. Th e vote in July 
1932, in which the Nazis won 37 per cent of the vote, propelled Adolf Hitler 
to power and can be considered a tragic instance of the problem. Th e paradox 
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was refl ected in the way that the ‘democratic’ forces, with the help of American 
advisors, manipulated the 1996 presidential election to get Yeltsin re-elected for 
a second term, even though his health had collapsed.  35  In a closed-door meeting 
with oppositionists in February 2012, Medvedev apparently conceded that the 
result had been rigged: ‘Th ere is hardly any doubt who won [the election]. It was 
not Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin.’  36  If there had been a genuinely free and fair contest, 
the communist leader Zyuganov would probably have won. Th is would have 
provided Russia with the experience of a competitive transfer of power, something 
the country still lacks. Th e manipulative techniques of electoral management 
were forged in the 1990s in conditions of genuine political pluralism, and they 
were then honed by Putin in a more managerial environment. His co-optation 
strategy drastically reduces the competitive character of political pluralism and 
delivers votes to what has now become a complaisant parliament and for his (or 
his surrogate’s) repeated election to the presidency. 
 Th e democracy paradox is far from unique to Russia, and although it is 
repeatedly used by authoritarian leaders to justify their hold on power, it highlights 
genuine dilemmas. Th ese were identifi ed by Samuel Huntington in 1968 in his 
exploration of the political conditions for successful modernisation. Huntington 
looked at what political institutions would be able to deliver both stability and 
development, and controversially asserted that order itself was a crucial quality, 
irrespective of what would nowadays be called ‘regime type’ at the political 
level: democratic, authoritarian or something else; or free market or socialist at the 
economic level. He argued that economic development and political stability were 
two separate things and that it was a mistake to confl ate them.  37  Th ese arguments 
have lost traction in the post-communist era, and instead the emphasis has been 
on democratisation as the supreme value. As a pragmatic developmentalist, it is 
hardly surprising that Putin has returned to Huntingtonian themes in his politics 
of stability, and these are embedded in the character of Russia’s post-communist 
transformation as a whole. 
 All Kremlin leaders since 1991 have tried to insulate themselves from social 
pressures. Th e political basis of this gulf between the regime and society is that the 
regime constituted itself consciously as the bearer of a certain set of goals, which 
lacked an autonomous social basis, and hence had to be created from above  – 
a rerun in reverse of the Bolshevik revolution. In the 1991–3 period, this took 
the form of a political confl ict between the presidency and parliament. Aft er the 
violent denouement of October 1993 and the adoption of the new constitution 
in December 1993, the terms of the relationship changed. Th e regime now had 
the institutions of a modern liberal democracy to work with and over the years 
became increasingly adept at manipulating the required outcomes through the 
formal institutions of constitutional democracy. Th is gave rise to the dual state. 
In the Yeltsin years, the manipulations were relatively crude, notably in the 
1996 presidential election, when Yeltsin forced his way back into the Kremlin 
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for a second term through fl ooding the electoral market with perhaps up to 
$500 million (way above anything permitted by electoral law) and whipping up 
fear of a ‘communist  revanche ’. Th ere were also attempts to create a pro-regime 
party. In the fi rst instance, this was Yegor Gaidar’s Russia’s Democratic Choice, but 
following its disappointing performance in the December 1993 election, the plan 
shift ed towards a ‘two-wing’ strategy: a centre-left  party headed by Ivan Rybkin 
and a centre-right grouping that in the end took the form of Our Home is Russia 
( Nash Dom Rossii , NDR), headed by the prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin. 
 However, when Chernomyrdin showed signs of harbouring presidential 
ambitions, he was summarily dismissed in March 1998, and his party dissolved. 
Th e initiative passed to the opposition. In late 1998, the mayor of Moscow, Yuri 
Luzhkov, and some regional leaders, including the president of Tatarstan, Mintimir 
Shaimiev, created the Fatherland ( Otechestvo ) party. Another potential presidential 
candidate, Evgeny Primakov, created his own party, All Russia ( Vsya Rossiya ). Th e 
two allied in the Duma election of December 1999, merging to create  Otechestvo-
Vsya Rossiya (OVR), and rallied behind Primakov’s candidature in the anticipated 
June 2000 presidential election. For the fi rst time in post-communist Russia, it 
looked as if there would be democratic leadership rotation. Instead, Putin was 
appointed prime minister in August 1999 as the regime candidate, and thereaft er 
the Kremlin’s political technologists set to work to create a new political party, 
 Edinstvo (Unity). Established only in September 1999, against the background 
of war in Chechnya, a vicious media campaign against Primakov, Putin’s soaring 
popularity and selective incentives to bring over wavering governors, Unity did 
remarkably well in the December 1999 Duma election. It came second, aft er the 
CPRF, with 23 per cent of the party list vote and with 73 members of parliament. 
Yeltsin resigned on 31 December, and acting president Putin waged a ‘non-
political’ campaign for the pre-term presidential election of 26 March 2000. 
He presented himself as the voice of reason, far above petty party politics and 
personality confl icts. Th is was an enduring trait in which he viewed the public as 
less than an electorate that had to be won over but as assumed supporters who, if 
they had any sense, would vote for him. 
 Th is was the fi rst national experience of a distinctive sort of Putinite rationality, 
and one that had profound resonance among the Russia public. Putin easily won 
in the fi rst round with 53 per cent of the vote, with Zyuganov trailing far behind 
in second place with 29 per cent. Putin’s victory was helped by a sympathetic 
media and the structural conditions of pre-term elections, but he also tapped 
into a deep well of popular sympathy for his style and policies. In other words, 
Putinite rationality was congruent with popular policy and political preferences. 
Th is was a type of centrist pragmatism, seeking to take ‘the political’ out of politics, 
presenting a set of ‘common sense’ policies that avoided extremes while off ering a 
way out of crisis. Given the degradation of the political process in the Soviet years, 
the short-lived and ultimately catastrophic character of the outburst of genuinely 
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competitive political life during perestroika, and then the shabby political 
confl icts and manipulations of the Yeltsin years, release from that sort of ‘politics’ 
represented an undoubted relief for a large part of society in the early 2000s. 
 Putin then went on to shape the institutional conditions for his representation 
of political rationality. Th is included the absorption of the former oppositional 
parties. In 2001, OVR joined  Edinstvo to create United Russia (UR), with the top 
offi  cials of both taking leading positions in the new political formation. Over 
time, UR became the genuine ‘party of power’ to which NDR and the other regime 
parties of the 1990s had aspired.  38  In the end, most governors joined the new party, 
and it became something analogous to the old CPSU, replicating its practices in 
appointments, infl uence networks and privileges; and also by the 2010s generating 
the same sort of public hostility and contempt. Putin also went on to create a 
number of para-constitutional institutions (discussed below). All this refl ected 
what can be called the ‘post-communist syndrome’, in which attempts to replicate 
the institutions and ideas of European modernity in postmodern conditions, 
leavened in the Russian case by some pre-modern prejudices, inevitably generates 
tensions. According to the commentator Vladimir Pastukhov, Russia cannot 
have a political ideology along the lines of the classic left –right division of the 
modern era, since Russia remains a pre-political society that has failed to separate 
property from power.  39  Governance in contemporary Russia is in part based on the 
circulation of rents, in which businesses are vulnerable to ‘raids’ by more powerful 
competitors, in league with the legal and security apparatus (where many of the 
raids originate in the fi rst place). 
 Th e political consequence of the failure to separate power and property, according 
to the political scientist Alexei Zudin, led to what he calls ‘monocentrism’, a term 
that avoids the normative baggage associated with such terms as ‘democracy’ and 
‘authoritarianism’. In Zudin’s view, Putin created a strong centre of power focused 
on the presidency around which the political system was reconstructed. Th is is in 
contrast to the system under Yeltsin, which Zudin characterises as ‘polycentric’, with 
numerous independent centres of power and infl uence, notably the governors and 
the oligarchs as well as the mass media. Th rough various strategies of co-optation 
and penalties, the system by 2004 had been refashioned.  40  Th ereaft er, a Soviet-
style ‘circular fl ow of power’ was restored, in which regional and other elites owe 
their positions to Putin, who in turn relies on them for support. Although the 
administrative regime undoubtedly aims to be monocentric, there are powerful 
horizontal forces which the Putin system has to take into account. Th e so-called 
Putinite ‘vertical of power’ is greatly tempered by the power of horizontal forces 
at all levels. 
 Such a system has little to do with democracy, but at the same time there 
remains tension between authoritarian practices and democratic legitimation. 
Th e problem existed in a diff erent way in the Soviet years but could be resolved by 
various ideological contortions, above all, derived from the foundational Stalinist 
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idea of ‘socialism in one country’. In post-communist Russia, the legitimacy of the 
system is derived from the democratic principles embodied in the constitutional 
state, and the machinations of the regime are denied rather than justifi ed. Th ere 
is no sustained ideological justifi cation for the monocentric practices of the 
administrative regime. Th ere is therefore an absence rather than a presence in the 
ideational fi eld, which is fi lled by the administrative rationality of the regime itself. 
Th is accentuates technocratic managerialism and refl ects Putin’s profound aversion 
to the restoration in Russia of anything resembling ‘an offi  cial state ideology in any 
form’.  41  It also entails depoliticisation of the system of regime rule – since if it became 
the subject of politics, it would then be contested through the democratic process 
itself. Th ere have been various attempts to fi ll the ensuing vacuum in ideological 
orientation. Vladislav Surkov, the head of the domestic politics department of the 
PA between 2000 and 2011, outlined the idea of ‘sovereign democracy’ as a way of 
providing ‘basic ideological theses’ for the country.  42  Characteristically, Putin was 
sceptical, while Medvedev was outright dismissive. 
 In his third term from 2012, however, Putin sought to shift  the ideational 
basis of his rule from technocracy to culture and argued that ‘conservatism’ 
would be the ideology of the ruling party, UR. In his speeches of this period, he 
defended traditional values against the West’s alleged betrayal of its own cultural 
foundations. Although Putin remains a pragmatist rather than an ideologue at 
heart, there are certain principles that remain consistent throughout his rule. Th is 
includes an outcome-oriented approach to politics, an unwillingness to risk the 
fate of the country to the vicissitudes of unconstrained electoral competition (a 
characteristic he shared with Yeltsin), a strong sense of destiny and duty (although 
he seldom speaks of these things), and a contempt for demagogic populism other 
than his own formulation of them. Putin’s centrism is derived not only from the 
sociological and historical realities of the country but also from his own inherent 
caution and repudiation of ideological certainties. Th is explains why there is so 
little of Soviet or liberal certainty in Putin’s thinking. Putin is sceptical that the 
market on its own can advance development, hence the emphasis on the state 
in modernisation, but his economic statism is embedded in classical, even rigid, 
macroeconomic orthodoxy. 
 Th is comes through in his assessment of democracy. Putin is never one to be 
constrained by institutions or the uncertainty generated by genuinely competitive 
elections. Th is does not mean that Putin rejects democracy, but he has a distinctive 
understanding of how it should work. First, his consistent belief is that coherent 
public policy (as interpreted by him and his team) is a value higher than the pure 
chance embedded in the unfettered electoral process. Just as in the economy he 
favours the market but seeks to limit market forces, so in the political realm he 
practices a form of  dirigiste democracy: elections are fi ne as long as they do not 
give power to a demagogue, a Russian ethnonationalist, a neo-communist or even 
a radical liberal who would destabilise society by imposing structural reforms 
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and undermine long-term development plans. Th is model is certainly elitist, in 
the belief that the ruling group better understands the needs of society than a 
randomly selected politician, who has to promise the earth before the election and 
whose horizons by defi nition stretch no further than the next election. However, 
and this is the second strand, this elitism is grounded in a populist understanding 
of democracy – the belief that the ‘will of the majority’ can be understood and 
articulated in an unmediated way. In his address to the Federal Assembly in 
December 2013, Putin argued, 
 Today, many nations are revising their moral values and ethical norms, eroding 
ethnic traditions and diff erences between peoples and cultures. Society is now 
required not only to recognise everyone’s right to the freedom of consciousness, 
political views and privacy, but also to accept without question the equality 
of good and evil, strange as it seems, concepts that are opposite in meaning. 
Th is destruction of traditional values from above not only leads to negative 
consequences for society, but is also essentially anti-democratic, since it is 
carried out on the basis of abstract, speculative ideas, contrary to the will of the 
majority, which does not accept the changes occurring or the proposed revision 
of values.  43  
 In other words, the regime can speak on behalf of the true interests of the people. 
Just as Russia posited itself at this time (as it had done in the late nineteenth 
century) as the ‘true Europe’, as opposed to the actual Europe which seemed to be 
denying its own values, so Putin here suggests that there is a true democracy that 
stands outside mere electoralism, and he is its truest representative. 
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 2   STATE, SOCIETY AND 
REGIME 
 Russia continues to suff er from the ‘long hangover’ of the dissolution of the 
Soviet system and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.  1  Th e Soviet Union 
reformed itself out of existence, and Putin vowed that this would not happen to 
Russia. A  party state ruled the USSR, although the balance of power between 
the party and the state varied. During Stalin’s long pre-eminence, the All-Union 
Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (VKP(b)) became the instrument through which 
Stalin ruled and was itself purged repeatedly. In 1952, the name was changed 
to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and Article 6 of the 1977 
Soviet constitution fi nally recognised that the party exerted a ‘leading and guiding 
role’ in the state and society. Up to then, the party had retained an ambiguous 
constitutional position  – all-pervasive but not formally recognised. In post-
communist Russia, the functional analogue of the party is the administrative 
regime, giving rise to a regime-state. Although the regime lacks the CPSU’s formal 
institutional framework, with party cells in every Soviet factory and institutions 
all the way up to the Central Committee and the Politburo, in structural terms it 
is comparable. A power system stands outside of constitutional institutions and 
processes, governed by its own rules and understandings ( ponyatiya , a code of 
mutual comprehension) which together comprise an ‘informal constitution’. Th e 
administrative regime exercises a pervasive infl uence over political processes and 
society. Parties are shaped, elections are managed and the normative framework 
of political life is constantly modifi ed in response to evolving challenges but 
governed by one constant principle – to ensure the autonomy of the regime, to 
ensure that it is not swallowed by society on the one side or forced to abide by 
constitutional rules on the other. Th e system is not foolproof, and each electoral 
cycle is something of a trial for the managerial capacities of the regime. As little as 
possible is left  to chance, but because of the dualism inherent in the system – the 
tension between constitutionally mandated competitiveness and regime-driven 
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managerialism – there are always opportunities for acts of resistance and unexpected 
events. Th is is a dynamic model of Russian politics, which recognises that the 
legitimacy of the administrative regime is dependent on its formal compliance 
with the norms of the constitutional state. Th ere is permanent, although seldom 
creative, tension between authoritarianism and constitutionalism. 
 The birth of the regime-state 
 Th is system is far more complex and sophisticated than a simple one-man personal 
dictatorship. Th e president in post-communist Russia is less constrained by checks 
and balances than post-Stalin Soviet leaders, yet even the ‘super-presidential’ 
powers enjoyed by the offi  ce are limited by horizontal restraints. Th e system is 
not a simple top-down power  vertikal , to use the common Russian term, but is 
constrained by powerful ‘horizontal’ forces, various interest groups representing 
deeply entrenched factional communities. Putin is by far the most authoritative 
and pre-eminent element in the regime-state, but he also has to ensure that the 
various horizontal pressures remain balanced and that constitutional norms retain 
vitality. If he infringed the unwritten rules, then the system would be destabilised 
and his power would be jeopardised. He could of course repudiate the constraints 
and openly rule as a dictator, in which case any pretence of balance between 
democratic principles and authoritarian practices would be jettisoned. Th e other 
alternative would be to subordinate the leadership, and the regime as a whole, to 
the unconstrained operation of constitutional norms. Th e road to a functioning 
democracy would be open, and the regime-state would wither away. For this to 
happen, the conditions that gave rise to the predominance of the administrative 
regime and its associated managerial rationality would have to be overcome. 
 Th e regime-state was not Putin’s invention but was formed in the 1990s. It 
emerged as a distinct type of governance in the Yeltsin period but achieved a peak 
of functional effi  ciency under Putin. Putin did not create what Russians call the 
 sistema , the interlocking network of rules, practices and institutions that make up 
the Russian polity. In fact, as Grigory Yavlinsky (one of the major political leaders 
in the 1990s and still at the head of the Yabloko party) argues, Putin is a product 
of the system that he inherited, created in part with Western help when in 1996 
they ensured Yeltsin’s re-election and with it the Kremlin-oligarch alliance, which 
in the end delivered Putin.  2  Th ere could be no ‘democratic backsliding’ under 
Putin since the system in the 1990s was far from democratic. He calls the system 
‘peripheral authoritarianism’: it is peripheral because it lacks innovative industries 
than can generate domestic growth and instead relies on raw material exports; 
and it is authoritarian because of the control over institutions exercised by the 
ruling elite led by one man. As he puts it, ‘the entire period since the collapse of 
the Soviet state has seen a continuous consolidation of the authoritarian power of 
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the bureaucracy, operating under the distinctive conditions of Russia’s peripheral 
capitalism’.  3  Th e system reproduced not only the fl aws of the Soviet period but also 
those of imperial Russia, including over-centralisation, lack of balance between 
governance institutions, weakness of feedback loops from society and weak 
parliamentary oversight over executive authorities.  4  Th e key point is to prevent 
any ‘signifi cant concentration of political resources in the hands of any other 
group’.  5  To this end, media resources, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and elections are managed. However, with the old growth model exhausted by 
2012, Putin turned to a conservative ideology to shield Russia from the West, 
guaranteeing a breakdown in relations. Yavlinsky is right about the origins of the 
system and some of its features, but his model of peripheral authoritarianism fails 
to capture the dynamics of Russia’s domestic politics or the logic of relations with 
the world outside. He is, nevertheless, right to stress that Russia’s monopolistic 
state-centred economic system fosters the tightening of authoritarianism. 
 Post-communist Russia is distinctive in several respects. Most remarkable 
is the speed with which a power complex emerged, separate and distinct from 
the constitutional system. In part, this is because of the extended deadlock over 
adopting a new constitution.  6  Th e Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 
(RSFSR) adopted its last constitution in 1978, a modifi ed version of the 1977 
Soviet constitution. Both underwent signifi cant changes during perestroika. One 
of Gorbachev’s major institutional innovations was the creation of what were 
intended to be more powerful legislatures, to counter the CPSU’s power and to 
provide a new source of legitimacy for government. In Russia, the new CPD was 
elected in March 1990 in a remarkably free election. Although Communists still 
predominated and there was no competitive party system, dynamic associations and 
groups rooted in civil society participated in the campaign, the votes were counted 
fairly and in parliament the debates were open and covered comprehensively by 
the media. However, the new CPD was a travesty of eff ective parliamentarianism. 
It had over a thousand members and it was poorly structured into stable political 
groups. It was in eff ect a permanently sitting constituent assembly, able to change 
the constitution by a simple majority. To allow the system to work, a two-hundred-
strong Supreme Soviet was carved out from the larger CPD. By any defi nition, 
this was a constitutional monstrosity and generated permanent instability. It was 
not able to assume the burden of governance aft er the banning of the Communist 
Party in Russia aft er the failed coup of August 1991. 
 When Russia offi  cially became an independent country on 1 January 1992, 
instead of holding new elections, the Yeltsin administration focused on the 
economy. Th e country was in a desperate situation, with food supplies running 
low and economic linkages snapping.  7  Th e old command planning system 
disintegrated but regulated market mechanisms were absent. Th e vacuum 
allowed a predatory class of capitalist entrepreneurs to emerge, combining the 
illegal earnings of underground operators, the bank capital of the late perestroika 
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years and administrative capital in the form of links to governmental agencies. 
A distinctive type of political capitalism was established, which fl ourished in the 
form of the ‘oligarchs’. Th ese were years of permanent crisis. On the one side, 
Yeltsin was elected president of Russia on 12 June 1991 with 57 per cent of the 
vote, trouncing his fi ve opponents. Th is gave him a convincing source of popular 
legitimacy, which allowed him to face down the putschists in August 1991. On 
the other side, the Russian CPD had also gained democratic legitimacy through 
election. Th e fundamental question needed to be resolved:  Would Russia be a 
presidential or a parliamentary republic, or some semi-presidential combination 
of the two? Th e only way the question could be resolved peacefully was through the 
adoption of a new constitution, but that would mean the premature termination 
of the authority of the CPD, which its members were reluctant to do. Th e country 
entered a period of extended constitutional crisis (defi ned as a contest over the 
principles of governance), accompanied by a deep political crisis – a struggle for 
power between Yeltsin as the incumbent president and the speaker of the CPD, 
Ruslan Khasbulatov, later joined by the vice president, Alexander Rutskoi. Th ese 
two crises were exacerbated by intense ideological confl ict between the so-called 
democrats (as they were termed at the time) and neo-traditionalists of various 
stripes, ranging from Russian nationalists to neo-Stalinists, as well as Eurasianists, 
who were sceptical about the whole idea of Western-style democracy. Lurking in 
the wings were the security agencies, devastated by the collapse of the Soviet order 
and ready to recreate Russia in their image. 
 On 25 April 1993, Yeltsin held a referendum in an attempt to break the 
deadlock, followed by the convocation of a Constitutional Assembly, but the 
impasse remained. Th e crisis was resolved by Yeltsin’s ‘constitutional coup’. On 21 
September 1993, he issued decree No. 1400 dissolving the CPD and announcing 
elections to a new assembly. Th e CPD dug in, appointing Rutskoi president and 
on 3 October launched a violent assault against the Moscow mayor’s offi  ce and the 
Ostankino TV building. Yeltsin fi nally persuaded military leaders to act, and early 
on 4 October, tanks fi red on the White House, the seat of the CPD, and by the 
end of the day, the rebel parliamentary forces surrendered. Yeltsin then rammed 
home his victory by amending the draft  constitution to increase the powers of 
the presidency. Th e Russian constitution was adopted in a referendum on 12 
December 1993, in a vote that was tainted by fraud in an attempt to ensure the 
required minimum turnout of 50 per cent and the 50 per cent vote in support. Th e 
new constitution was approved by 58.4 per cent on a turnout of 54.8 per cent of 
the registered electorate but only 30.7 per cent of the total electorate. On the same 
day, elections were held to a new slimmed-down State Duma of 450 members, a 
parliament that could only exist if the constitution was adopted. Half of the new 
assembly was elected through proportional representation on party lists (PLs), 
and half in single-member constituency seats. Russia’s Choice, the party of the 
‘democrats’, won only 15.5 per cent of the PL vote (although with the addition 
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of the thirty single-member seats it became the largest party in the Duma with 
seventy seats), while Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 
(LDPR), a populist-nationalist party, came out on top with 22.9 per cent (but with 
only fi ve single-member seats), with the revived CPRF coming third with 12.4 per 
cent. Against the background of mass poverty and devastating social dislocation, 
the weakness of the organised democratic forces was exposed. 
 Th e December 1993 constitution is a liberal and democratic document. Its fi rst 
two chapters, draft ed before the events of autumn 1993, enshrine an extensive 
range of liberal and human rights, as well as social benefi ts, but the later chapter 
on the executive is unbalanced and grants excessive powers to the presidency. 
However, the main problem is not with the black letter of the basic law but the 
absence of the spirit of constitutionalism, where the law is obeyed and confl icts 
adjudicated by an independent Constitutional Court. Compliance problems 
are compounded by the vagueness of many of the constitution’s provisions. 
Although powerful in its declaration of liberal principles and human rights, the 
mechanisms for their implementation, above all in matters of accountability, 
are not specifi ed. Th is vagueness in constitutional provisions has allowed the 
mechanisms to select membership of the upper house, the Federation Council 
(FC), to be changed several times, for the voting system to become the subject 
of endless major revisions, for the manner of choosing regional governors to 
move from direct election to appointment and back, and for independent local 
government to be radically weakened by the 2014 municipal reform. Th e list could 
be extended but this instability in part is derived from the hurried and ultimately 
un-negotiated way the constitution emerged out of the political crisis in late 1993. 
Th e constitution was written for Yeltsin’s convenience, allowing the presidency to 
overshadow parliament and to rule without eff ective accountability mechanisms. 
 By the time of the second State Duma elections on 17 December 1995, the 
CPRF had consolidated its position as the main opposition party, and it came out 
on top of the party list vote with 22.3 per cent. Th e LDPR came second with 11.2 
per cent, while the new centrist offi  cial party, NDR, trailed in third place with 10.1 
per cent (but won ten single-member seats to become the second-largest group, 
aft er the communists, in parliament), while the social liberal party Yabloko came 
fourth with 6.9 per cent. It was clear that what was termed Russia’s ‘democratic 
revolution’ lacked substantive public backing. Th is further widened the growing 
gap between the power system centred on the Kremlin (the administrative regime) 
and the constitutional provisions for free and fair elections. Th is was evident, as 
noted, in Yeltsin’s bid for a second term in 1996. In ailing health, his standing in 
opinion polls at the beginning of the year was in the low single digits, yet through 
massive spending, a virulent press campaign against Zyuganov and the application 
of ‘political technologies’ (including the hiring of American political consultants), 
and what would later be described as ‘administrative resources’, Yeltsin made it 
through to the second round. In the fi rst ballot on 16 June, he won 35 per cent of 
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the vote to Zyuganov’s 32 per cent, and aft er promising third-placed Alexander 
Lebed a post in the administration, Yeltsin went on to win the run-off  vote on 3 
July with 53.8 per cent to Zyuganov’s 40.3 per cent. Between the two rounds Yeltsin 
suff ered a heart attack, although this was hidden from the public, and for the next 
several months he largely disappeared from view as he underwent a multiple 
heart-bypass operation. 
 It was not only Yeltsin’s health that was failing. Th e 1996 election is oft en 
considered the moment when Russian democracy died. Th e massive abuse of 
the privileges of incumbency, accompanied by the fear that a Zyuganov victory 
would halt Russia’s move towards the market and liberal democracy, meant that 
the self-defi ned democratic forces intervened to ensure an outcome that would 
allow the continuation of reforms. Th e dilemma was a real one, described as the 
‘democracy paradox’ above, and the issue still divides Russian opinion to this day. 
Was it right for administrative resources to be used to save market democracy, 
even if their use undermined the principles of liberal democracy? Did the alleged 
rightness of the cause justify underhand means to defend that cause? At the same 
time, just as the Bolsheviks made a socialist revolution in a country lacking a 
developed working class, the democrats in power argued that the social base for 
democracy in Russia was lacking. For this reason, reformers sought to privatise as 
quickly as possible, believing that the disbursement of formerly socialist property 
to a new class of capitalists would create the social basis for the new order. As in 
1917, the political revolution preceded the social conditions required to ensure 
its fulfi lment. Anatoly Chubais devised a system of coupon privatisation intended 
to give the whole population a stake in the new economy, but these ‘talons’ were 
bought up by those with capital, and very few citizens were ever paid dividends on 
their share of privatised property. Equally, on the eve of the presidential election, 
the cash-strapped government agreed to the ‘loans-for-shares’ scheme, whereby 
the government received loans from some leading oligarchs in exchange for shares 
in major companies. Everyone understood that the government would not be in 
a position to repay the loans, and thus some major enterprises were gained on the 
cheap. Th is also applies to the fi re sale of state property, which allowed leading 
oligarchs to amass major industrial empires in auctions which they typically 
organised to exclude competitors. Th is is how the major Yukos oil company fell 
into the hands of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. 
 Th is was political capitalism of the classic sort. In both the political and 
economic spheres, there was no spontaneous evolution of the social forces and 
institutions underpinning democracy, or of market players constrained by law 
and generating resources through entrepreneurship. Instead, the power system 
intervened to manage not just administration but also political competition itself, 
while in the economic sphere the business tycoons were in eff ect state-appointed 
oligarchs. Th e constitutional crisis of 1991–3, the electoral setbacks to the ruling 
group, the strongly presidential constitution, the challenge from the revived CPRF 
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and the nationalist-populist LDPR, the weakness of the social base for democracy, 
the intense ideological divisions and the fear of some sort of Soviet restoration 
through the ballot box, all encouraged the formation of a ‘regime’ separate from 
constitutional constraints. Th is reinforced the social division identifi ed by the 
sociologist Simon Kordonsky, in which millions of people live outside the realm of 
law and government institutions:  
 We have two normative systems:  the offi  cial one, which is built around the 
written law, and the second one, which is informed by the quasi-law [mutual 
understandings] called  ponyatiya . Th e two systems operate within the same 
space, within the same people. People are split within themselves:  they live 
according to the  ponyatiya , but interpret other people’s behaviour according 
to the law.  8   
 Th is applies as much to the regime as to society. 
 The meta-factions of Russian society 
 A powerful presidency is the heart of a regime system of rule that eclipses the 
constitutionalism in which it is embedded. Th is refl ects an enduring culture of 
power that has been superimposed over the new democratic institutions and 
normative order.  9  Post-communist practices reproduced elements of communist 
and pre-communist political cultures. For those who believe in path dependency, 
deep patterns were reasserted. Many countries are described as having ‘hybrid’ 
political systems, combining elements of democratic principle with authoritarian 
practices, and Russia is certainly one of them. Even the most consolidated of liberal 
democracies contain hybridity, otherwise they would be impossible to govern, and 
across the world there has been a creeping increase in unaccountable executive 
power accompanied by societal illiberalism. In such a system, ‘the main benefi t of 
controlling a modern bureaucratic state is not the power to persecute the innocent. 
It is the power to protect the guilty.’  10  Administration of public aff airs invariably 
requires a combination of authoritative leadership and accountability. Although 
such a spectrum exists, there is a qualitative diff erence between a consolidated 
liberal democracy, where the courts are substantively independent, where 
property rights are defensible and where elections are genuinely competitive, fairly 
contested and accurately counted, and systems where these qualities are in one 
way or another diminished. On this spectrum, Russia lies towards the latter end. 
 Th e question is why. Th e answer lies not in Putin’s imputed malevolence and 
hunger for power but in the character of the dual power system that he inherited 
and then honed, as well as in the political and sociological character of the elite 
structure and political economy. About two hundred thousand people make up 
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the political elite, including local and regional politicians and up to the great mass 
of elected and appointed offi  cials in Moscow, as well as the leading fi gures in the 
plethora of think tanks and analytical centres.  11  Running in parallel are the various 
relevant institutions of the Russian Academy of Sciences and universities. Media 
institutions, print and electronic, as well as social media sites play an infl uential 
part in shaping popular attitudes. Above all, the military and security apparatus, as 
well as the judicial organs, act as major constituencies in structuring elite politics. 
Britain is considered to have a self-reproducing elite structure that is far from 
hermetically sealed yet which replicates certain structures of thought and political 
preferences.  12  Th e existence of an ‘establishment’ is contested, yet the idea can be 
also applied to Russia. 
 A relatively small group shapes the country’s destiny. Some are holdovers from 
the Soviet period, notably in the military and security apparatus and academic 
establishments, whose political views were shaped by the ‘long 1970s’, the years 
between the destruction of the ‘Prague Spring’ in 1968 and the appointment of 
Gorbachev in 1985. Putin is very much of this generation, no longer imbued with 
the idealism of the 1960s and the belief in ‘socialism with a human face’ but not yet 
enthused and then disillusioned by Gorbachev’s perestroika. A new elite generation 
is emerging, but it was only as he entered into his fourth term that Putin started 
appointing them in signifi cant numbers as he tried to avoid the sclerosis that 
characterised the stagnation of the late Brezhnev years. However, one of the most 
consistent sociological fi ndings is that in substantive political orientations there is 
not much diff erence in world views between elite generations in Russia, with the 
new cohort having been thoroughly socialised into traditional views on domestic 
order and Russia’s great power role in the world. Th ere had been an expectation 
that as the Soviet generation passed away, a more pro-Western group would take 
their place. In fact, the older generation had been inclined to take a more positive 
view of the West, but the younger generation has lost that starry-eyed idealisation. 
 Russian political thinking is typically divided into three great trends:  the 
Westernisers, Slavophiles and Eurasianists. While catching something of the main 
trends, such a categorisation does not capture the complexity of contemporary 
Russia. Instead, we can represent the Russian ‘establishment’ as structured 
into four great factions, each of which cuts across the generations. A  faction is 
here defi ned as a sociological-ideational formation that does not take the form 
of a political party and is broader than any ethnically or family-based clan but 
represents an enduring national political viewpoint or constituency.  13  Th ey can be 
defi ned as epistemic-interest groups, combining ideational preferences with socio-
professional affi  liations. Th e factional model provides the key to understanding 
the character of Putin’s leadership. Th e supreme form of Putin’s managerial role 
is as faction manager, ensuring that incompatible groups and ideas are kept in 
permanent balance. Th e regime draws on these forces but is not dominated by 
them. Putin’s statecraft  is based on his ability to ensure that all main factions 
9781788318303_pi-306.indd   30 15-Oct-19   12:25:34
31
STATE, SOCIETY AND REGIME 31
have enough of a stake in the system so as not to defect, but not enough to allow 
any faction to dominate or to become so powerful as to threaten his political 
independence or the fundamental interests of other elite and establishment groups. 
 None are able to impose the entirety of their political agenda, but each contributes 
to policy formulation. In some areas, one faction shapes policy rather more, while 
in another, an opposing faction has a greater voice. Th us, the economic liberals 
shape macroeconomic policy, the neo-traditionalists the cultural sphere, the 
security agencies foreign policy (although not unchallenged) and the Eurasianists 
Eastern policy. Th is is a recipe for a politics of consensus and ‘centrism’, but since no 
policy is pursued with consistency and to the full extent of its logical development, 
this is also a recipe for policy confusion, stagnation and stasis. Th ese ideological 
trends are more than permitted discourse within an overarching Putinite narrative 
of Russia’s resurgence as a great power but refl ect genuine diff erences rooted in 
the intellectual history of the nation and the sociological realities of the country. 
It is not a question of the regime allowing some tonal variation to a central 
narrative but the fragmented character of the mainstream itself. Th e Soviet era had 
extirpated a genuinely hegemonic class-based power system, and in its stead the 
post-communist ‘establishment’ is ideationally divided. Th ere is only one point on 
which most are agreed, and that is the idea of an independent and strong Russia; 
but when it comes to a more fi ne-grained defi nition of what Russia should be, 
the consensus breaks down. In its absence, the regime seeks to co-opt as much as 
possible from contending narratives but does not allow any to predominate or to 
potentially frame a new hegemonic historic bloc. 
 Th e political-interest factional spectrum can be cut in many diff erent ways. 
Marlene Laruelle identifi es three ‘ideological ecosystems’: the military-industrial 
complex, encompassing all of the power agencies; the Orthodox realm, including 
the Russian Orthodox Church, some business-people closely aligned with it such 
as the former head of Russian Railways, Vladimir Yakunin, and the businessman 
Konstantin Malofeev, the head of the St Basil the Great Charitable Foundation, 
and various conservative politicians; and the PA, which under Surkov generated 
the idea of ‘sovereign democracy’ and throughout sought to shape the country’s 
ideological terrain by advancing the idea of state-centred development and Russia 
as a multinational great power.  14  Instead, I identify four ideational-factional blocs, 
which represent the main sociological classes and groups as well as the main 
ideational matrices.  15  Th e four factions are far from internally coherent, let alone 
monolithic, and there is a great deal of overlap in personnel and ideas. Each of 
the factions is divided into endlessly quarrelling and contesting subgroups. 
Putin exploits this characteristic to ensure that none of the blocs consolidates to 
represent an alternative hegemonic and power constellation. As noted, one or 
another faction has more infl uence in certain policy areas, but each has a stake in 
the system. Th eir leaders are part of the Russian establishment, but the roots of the 
factions reach deep into society. Th ey run in parallel and intersect with the classic 
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sociological categories of class, profession, gender, region, ethnicity and religion, 
and they aggregate political preferences from across these divides. In conditions of 
post-communist societal fragmentation, it has been impossible to recreate a classic 
party system, at a time when even in some mature capitalist democracies party 
systems have been fragmenting, leading to a range of ‘party substitutes’ acting as 
the functional equivalents.  16  Political preferences are aggregated in a fl uid manner, 
with ‘networks’ substituting for political parties.  17  
 Th e liberals make up the fi rst group, divided in turn between legal 
constitutionalists, economic liberals, liberal statists, social liberals and radicals.  18  
Th e divisions are real, but mostly far from decisive, and in the main this faction can 
be likened to the ‘national liberals’ of the Bismarck-era Kaisserreich, supporting a 
strong Russia with a liberal economy. Th e legal liberals seek to complete Russia’s 
long revolution of constitutionalism by ensuring the rule of law and the better 
functioning of the judicial system. Th ey draw in particular on the tradition 
of statist liberalism advanced by Boris Chicherin to argue that a strong state is 
one that not only works through law but which is also constrained by a genuine 
spirit of constitutionalism.  19  In other words, the legal liberals seek to close the 
gap between the two wings of the dual state by bringing regime practices into 
closer conformity with constitutional principles. Th is was the aspiration of the 
Medvedev presidency between 2008 and 2012, and was given expression in the 
various publications of the think tank charged with devising a programme to fulfi l 
this goal, the Institute of Contemporary Development ( Institut sovremmennogo 
razvitiya , INSOR). It published a series of studies that pushed the Medvedevite 
reforms to their limits. Its fi rst major report in 2008,  Democracy: Development of 
the Russian Model , examined Russian political institutions and conditions for the 
development of a free society.  20  Its major report,  21st Century Russia: Th e Shape 
of a Desirable Future , called for Russian politics to be thoroughly democratised, 
the drive for market relations to be completed and for Russia to work towards 
eventual NATO membership and partnership relations with the West.  21  Its last 
major publication in 2011 set the agenda for a putative second Medvedev term, 
warning in desperate tones that the choice facing Russia was not between detailed 
policies but rather ‘between the country’s future and the absence of such a future’.  22  
 Economic liberals dominated macroeconomic policy throughout the Putin era. 
Alexei Kudrin served as fi nance minister from 2000 to 2011 and in those years 
stabilised the rouble and fi nances. He introduced the countercyclical strategy of 
investing oil rents in a Stabilisation Fund in the good years to fi nance defi cits in 
harder times. Th e national wealth fund saved the country from excess borrowing 
in the fi nancial crisis of 2008–9 and again in 2014–16. Kudrin is a classic national 
liberal, supporting the attack against Khodorkovsky and Yukos in 2004 for fi nancial 
reasons, yet in 2011 he came out strongly for more democratic and competitive 
elections. He opposed the diversion of scarce resources to military needs, and it 
was over this issue that he was publicly sacked by Medvedev on 25 September 
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2011. Kudrin spoke at the protest rallies at the end of the year and later established 
the Centre for Strategic Research (CSR), an analytical group draft ing economic 
reform ideas. Th e economic liberals were dominant in Medvedev’s cabinet when he 
took over as prime minister in 2012 and again when he formed a new government 
in 2018, much to the chagrin of the other factions. Th e economic liberals pursue 
an orthodox macroeconomic policy seeking to achieve balanced budgets and 
low infl ation through tight credit and a reduced national debt, accompanied by a 
diversifi cation strategy to reduce dependency on energy rents. 
 Russian liberals across the spectrum tend to assume a statist infl exion. Th is, 
for example, was the case with Khodorkovsky, who always acknowledged the 
need for a strong but constitutionally constrained state.  23  On his release from 
jail in 2013, Khodorkovsky settled in London and sponsored the Open Russia 
Foundation, which works for the creation of a law-based constitutional state 
with competitive and free elections. Khodorkovsky feared that the emergence of 
another insurgent politician on the model of Yeltsin’s populism during perestroika, 
which condemned the alleged slowness of Gorbachev’s reforms, would simply 
reproduce authoritarianism in new forms. Hence, Khodorkovsky called for a 
constitutional reform that would abolish the strong executive presidency and 
create a parliamentary republic.  24  Medvedev is also a liberal statist, as demonstrated 
in his period as president between 2008 and 2012. Although later his status and 
authority was reduced, he continued to exercise a moderating infl uence on policy. 
Apparently the price for his agreement to the ‘castling’ manoeuvre in 2011 was 
that he would remain prime minister until the end of Putin’s third term; but in 
recognition of his loyalty and hard work he was reappointed in 2018. Overall, 
there is a broad category of ‘regime liberals’, willing to work within the system for 
their own benefi t and out of concern for the fate of the country. Th ese ‘systemic 
liberals’ are the subject of particular critique by radical liberals, many of whom 
launched their broadsides from abroad.  25  
 Th e social liberals are represented by the Yabloko party headed since its 
foundation in late 1993 by Yavlinsky. Social liberals condemn the excesses of the 
privatisation of the 1990s, which allowed productive capital to be concentrated 
in the hands of what are conventionally called the ‘oligarchs’, and later fought for 
redistributive policies. Th eir goal, in short, was some sort of social capitalism.  26  
Many of these positions were adopted, in a rather more dynamic and populist 
format, by Alexei Navalny, the fi rebrand anti-corruption campaigner at the head 
of the Foundation for the Struggle against Corruption (FBK). Navalny had, in fact, 
been a member of Yabloko before he was expelled in 2007 for ‘causing political 
damage to the party; in particular, for nationalist activities’. Having once described 
himself as a ‘nationalist democrat’, in recent years he has stressed the latter while 
downplaying his ethnic Russian nationalism. His social and political programme 
remains close to that of Yabloko, although on the Crimean question he is more 
‘patriotic’. 
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 Th e only major exception to the statist or social orientation are the radical 
liberals, who tend to adopt Hayekian positions (neo-liberalism) regarding the 
dangers of excessive statism in economics and politics, and are more ready to leave 
matters to unrestrained market forces. Coming out of the excessively statist Soviet 
system, the attractions of minimal statism are understandable, but in the 1990s, 
the country veered from one extreme to another. Putin’s centrism is an unstable 
combination of these positions, with the strong reassertion of state power, creating 
a type of state capitalism in industry and manufacturing, accompanied by elements 
of neo-liberal marketisation in areas such as healthcare and education. Radical 
liberals tend to assume that there is a single appropriate response to complex 
policy questions, which can move into a monism that repudiates the pluralism that 
has traditionally been the core of liberalism. It is also oft en coloured by arrogant 
elitism. For example, the journalist Dmitry Travin notes that with the stifl ing of the 
opposition, ‘ordinary Russians have no one to tell them how miserable their lives 
are becoming’.  27  In foreign policy, the radical liberals tend to follow the Atlanticist 
line and uncritically accept the rationality of Western positions. An extreme 
example is the former chess champion Garry Kasparov, who called on the West 
to declare ‘war’ against Putin’s regime. He argued that ‘the mantra of engagement’ 
is no more than a synonym for appeasement and that ‘dictators only stop when 
they are stopped’.  28  In his view, ‘Russia’s descent back into totalitarianism can be 
traced to the West doing too much to respect the legacy of the USSR as a great 
power, not too little’.  29  In other words, the West was too soft  on Russia aft er the fall 
of communism and should have humiliated and marginalised the country even 
more. It is not clear how this policy could serve Russian national interests, but not 
surprisingly, it was taken up enthusiastically in Washington. Equally unsurprising, 
such a radically negative stance (unfairly) discredited liberals as a whole in Russia. 
 Th e second group is the  okhraniteli - silovik bloc. It is hard to translate the term 
 okhranitel’ , but the word defi nes a political trend since the late nineteenth century 
to assume some sort of ‘guardianship’ role over the Russian state. Th e  siloviki 
represent the security apparatus and their associates, focused in particular on the 
main bodies such as the FSB as well as the Russian Investigative Committee (RIC), 
hived off  in 2011 from the Prosecutor General’s Offi  ce (PGO). Together, they 
comprise the security bloc (in the broadest terms), who consider themselves part 
of Russia’s long ‘guardianship’ tradition ( okhraniteli ) but who as a self-identifi ed 
caste exploit their position for economic advantage. Th e fi rst incarnation of the 
 siloviki took the form of the Alexander Korzhakov, Mikhail Barsukov and Oleg 
Soskovets group, who launched the fi rst Chechen war in December 1994 and then 
called for the 1996 presidential election to be cancelled. In between the two rounds 
of the 1996 presidential election, the liberal-oligarch group led by Chubais seized 
the initiative and dismissed their rivals, and opened up the golden, although 
short-lived, age of oligarch power. Th e late 1990s saw elements of ‘state capture’ 
by the oligarchs, accompanied by the consolidation of what was called ‘the family’. 
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Th is group at various times included Yeltsin’s daughter Tatyana, her husband 
Valentin Yumashev (who later went on to head the PA), Oleg Deripaska (who 
was married to Yumashev’s daughter from his fi rst marriage), the chief of staff  
Alexander Voloshin, the head of security Alexander Korzhakov, and the oligarchs 
Boris Berezovsky (who later discovered a passion for democracy) and Roman 
Abramovich. Th e family stepped in to fi ll the vacuum as Yeltsin’s physical capacities 
waned. Chubais took over as head of the PA and together with Kudrin sponsored 
Putin’s move to Moscow in 1996 and helped smooth the ascent of the ‘enlightened 
securocrats’ later in the decade. Th is era lasted until Putin consolidated his power 
in the early 2000s. 
 Under Putin, the  siloviki fl aunted themselves as the guardians of Russian state 
interests, and their infl uence seeped out of narrowly defi ned security matters into 
business relations and the information sphere, as well as into foreign policy.  30  
Viktor Cherkesov, the veteran security offi  cial at the head of the Federal Anti-
Narcotics Service, in 2004 published the manifesto of contemporary ‘Chekism’ 
(from  Cheka , the original name for what later became the KGB and FSB). He 
asserted that their duty was to prevent the disintegration of the country, hailing 
their role in defending the country from internal and external ‘enemies’, and in a 
postscript argued that ‘there is no such thing as a former Chekist’. He asserted that 
it was not their fault that ‘history ordered that the burden of maintaining order fell 
mainly on our shoulders’. He described the Chekists as the ‘hook’ that had stopped 
Russia’s fall.  31  Russia spends some $60 billion a year, about 3 per cent of the gross 
domestic product (GDP), on the security services, and roughly the same amount 
in addition on regular military forces. Th e overblown security apparatus generates 
interests of its own, with department piled upon section, each of which fi ghts for 
its own perpetuation, slice of the budgetary pie, access to the rent management 
system, ability to intercept cash fl ows and its perceived right to advance its vision 
of the world. 
 Th e regular military has long resisted becoming politicised, especially aft er the 
bitter experience of being drawn into political battles in 1991 (the attempted coup 
against Gorbachev) and 1993 (Yeltsin’s shelling of the parliamentary insurgency 
in the Russian White House). Today, the armed forces have regained respect and 
professionalism, and following the major reforms launched in late 2008 have been 
re-equipped and reorganised. Th is counts as one of Putin’s major achievements. 
However, typical of his rule, the regular armed forces are complemented by 
other military structures. Th e Ministry of Internal Aff airs (MVD) and other 
security agencies have armies of their own who act as the praetorian guard of 
the regime. Th e creation of the National Guard (NG,  Rosgvardiya ) in April 2016 
represented a further step in the creation of armed forces under the direct control 
of the president. Th e NG combined several paramilitary units to create a massive 
new force numbering some 350,000, with the bulk of the MVD’s armed forces 
(including the special-purpose riot police, OMON) transferred to the new body. It 
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was formed to deal with possible internal dissent and public unrest, but it was also 
an attempt to bring the irregular forces in Chechnya under national command. 
Th is is another act of balancing under Putin intended, according to one analyst, 
‘[not only to] be a force to keep the masses in check, but also the elite’.  32  Putin 
appointed his trusted chief of security (2000–13) Viktor Zolotov, who since May 
2014 had commanded the MVD’s internal troops, to head the NG. Zolotov was at 
the centre of factional intrigue in the Putin years, consolidating the power of his 
group and the institutions with which he has been associated within the  siloviki . 
His appointment signalled that his power and that of his group was on the rise. 
 Nikolai Patrushev is one of the leading fi gures of this sub-faction. He took over 
as FSB director from Putin in 1999 and served until 2008, aft er which he became 
head of the Security Council. He is one of the inner group of Putin confi dants 
who authorised the action in Crimea in early 2014 and remains one of Putin’s key 
associates. His views are representative of the  siloviki as a whole, believing that 
Russia is locked in an existential struggle for survival, with the West intent on 
reducing Russia’s status and power in the world. In his view, 
 Th e Ukraine crisis was an entirely predictable outcome of the systematic activity 
by the United States and its closest allies. For the past quarter century this 
activity has been directed towards completely separating Ukraine and the other 
former Soviet republics from Russia and totally reformatting the post-Soviet 
space to suit American interests. Th e conditions and pretexts were created for 
colour revolutions, supported by generous state funding.  33  
 Th e  siloviki are obsessed about the need to avert a ‘colour revolution’ in Russia. 
Th e term comes from the sequence of popular uprisings in the former communist 
world against corrupt and repressive regimes, notably the November 2003 Rose 
Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in the autumn of 2004 
and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in the spring of 2005. Rather than seeing 
them as genuine movements for civic dignity and governance renewal, they are 
perceived as US-supported attempts to overthrow regimes not to Washington’s 
liking. Th is is how Putin interpreted the December 2011 ‘white ribbon’ protests 
against electoral fraud. He accused Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of setting ‘the 
tone for some actors in our country and gave them a signal. Th ey heard the signal 
and with the support of the US State Department set to work.’  34  In Patrushev’s 
view, the ‘coup d’etat’ in Kiev in February 2014 followed the classical pattern of 
US interventions in Latin America.  35  Patrushev went so far as to claim that the 
United States sought to dismember Russia ‘to open up access to rich resources that 
they think Russia unfairly controls’. He warned against the increasingly aggressive 
behaviour of NATO and claimed that the EU’s foreign policy was dictated from 
Washington. Russia’s alarm about NATO’s push into the Balkans (Montenegro 
joined NATO in 2017) is revealed by Patrushev’s informal assignment to deal with 
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the region, amid which he warned that NATO was looking to persuade Bosnia 
as well as what is now called the Republic of North Macedonia to join the bloc.  36  
 Alexander Bortnikov took over from Patrushev as head of the FSB. In an 
interview in December 2017, he reported that since 2012, the FSB had convicted 
137 foreign intelligence agents, and the work of 120 foreign and international 
NGOs had been halted. He stressed that a central part of the agency’s work 
was the struggle against terrorism. Th e joint work of the National Antiterrorist 
Committee and the Federal Operations Staff  led to a ten-fold fall in the number 
of terror crimes aft er 2011, and in 2017 alone they prevented twenty-three acts of 
terrorism, and since 2012, 9,500 people had been convicted of crimes associated 
with terrorism and extremism. Some 4,500 Russians who had gone abroad to take 
part in insurgent activities had been identifi ed. Th is work was accompanied by 
the struggle against economic crimes and corruption, and over the course of the 
previous fi ve years, nearly thirteen thousand people had been convicted. Since 
2012, some three hundred organised crime groups, some headed by high-ranking 
offi  cials, had been broken up and over seven thousand drug traffi  ckers convicted. 
Th e protection of cyberspace was now one of the FSB’s main priorities. Since 2013, 
what the Russians call ‘information security’ had been managed by the FSB’s State 
System for the Detection, Prevention and Elimination of the Consequences of 
Computer Attacks (GosSOPKA), which had proved its worth during the massive 
distributed (DDoS) attacks in 2016 and the large-scale virus infection in May 
2017. Every year, there are tens of thousands of targeted attacks on offi  cial websites 
and the IT systems of state agencies, including the presidential website. Amid all 
this work, Bortnikov was proud of the traditions of the Russian secret services and 
insisted that although there was ‘massive fabrication of accusations’ under Stalin, 
there really were active conspiracies (led by Trotskyists) designed to overthrow the 
country’s leadership.  37  Th e report identifi ed the genuine threats facing the country, 
but it also revealed a security apparatus steeped in Soviet attitudes that were both 
cause and consequence of the new era of confrontation with the West. 
 Th is group dominates domestic security policy, although in keeping with the 
factional model, it does not entirely own it. Th us, plans to impose harsh controls 
on the internet have been blocked, although a range of restrictive measures  – 
usually couched in terms of the struggle against terrorism and child abuse – have 
been adopted. In July 2017, a law banned the use of any technology or soft ware 
that allowed access to websites that had been offi  cially blocked on Russian 
territory, targeting in particular so-called web anonymisers and virtual private 
networks (VPN).  38  Th e goal was access to extremist or dangerous information, 
and although the law allowed operators to contest the ban in court and did not 
apply to corporate users if they needed VPN services for their work, the law was 
yet another brick in the information wall. In Putin’s third term, the  siloviki enjoyed 
increased infl uence over foreign policy but only because Putin allowed them to 
do so as his own views moved towards neo-revisionism. Th e assertive shift  was 
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accompanied by condemnation of the cultural degradation of the West, above all 
defi ned by its alleged repudiation of traditional values (the family and traditional 
gender patterns). In terms of policy and political development, the  siloviki are 
a two-edged sword:  they give muscle to Putin’s vision of statehood, eradicating 
alternative sources of criminal power and combating external enemies; but at the 
same time are themselves a factor in the degradation of the constitutional order 
to something even worse than a regime system, namely a semi-criminalised 
kleptocracy. Although there is much talk of the militarisation of the Russian elite 
(or, more precisely, its ‘securitisation’), the evidence is, at best, weak. Although 
those with a security background are prominent among the Russian leadership, 
the professional career patterns are diverse, and the ‘militocracy’ paradigm simply 
does not stand up to scrutiny.  39  
 Th e cultural and political struggle against the West is the concern of the 
third faction, a diverse bloc of neo-traditionalist conservatives ranging from 
monarchists, neo-Stalinists to Russian nationalists. Monarchist groups look to 
the tsarist era for inspiration, others defend the perceived glory of the Stalinist 
years, while some are simply neo-imperialists, who believe that the whole Russian 
nation (and oft en quite a lot more) should be reunited under Moscow’s stern but 
supranational rule.  40  In the immediate aft ermath of the Soviet collapse, this group 
constituted itself as a major actor in Russian politics and were known as ‘national 
patriots’. Th ey combined a double rejection of Soviet ‘totalitarianism’ (although not 
all shared this view) and of Western-style liberal democracy. In his study of what 
he called the ‘Russian new right’, Th omas Parland stressed the deep historical roots 
and anti-Semitic character of much neo-traditional thinking.  41  In the confrontation 
with Yeltsin in 1993, the ‘red-brown’ alliance, bringing together neo-communists 
and nationalists, used the CPD as the base for their resistance to Yeltsin’s ‘shock 
therapy’ and his plans for constitutional change. Th e CPRF was reconstituted in 
February 1993, and its surprisingly strong showing in the fi rst elections to the State 
Duma in December 1993 (in which they won 11.6 per cent of the vote), together 
with the 21.4 per cent won by Zhirinovsky’s populist-nationalist LDPR, indicated 
the deep social roots of neo-traditionalism. In the second parliamentary election 
in December 1995, the CPRF took fi rst place with 22.3 per cent of the vote. By 
contrast, the liberal vote was never able to come close to a plurality, let alone a 
majority, winning some 22 per cent in 1993 and declined to half of that in 1995. 
Th e creation of United Russia (UR) in 2001 allowed this centrist formation to 
absorb and tame much of the soft  neo-traditionalist vote, winning an astonishing 
37.6 per cent in 2003, and since then it has been the hegemonic regime party, 
although the CPRF and LDPR continue to enjoy representation in parliament. 
 Beyond the party system, there is a roiling neo-traditionalist public sphere, 
with a strong media and public policy presence. Alexander Prokhanov initially 
edited a neo-traditionalist weekly paper called  Den’ ( Th e Day ), which was closed 
down aft er the October 1993 confrontation but was reborn as  Zavtra ( Tomorrow ), 
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warning of things to come. Th e paper continues to provide a platform for national 
patriotic sentiments. To challenge the liberal-statist Valdai Discussion Club, 
established in 2004, the neo-traditionalists in 2012 founded the Izborsky Club 
to preserve Russia’s ‘national and spiritual identity’ and to provide an intellectual 
alternative to liberalism.  42  Th e club brought together a broad range of neo-
traditionalist thinking, not only encompassing Prokhanov but also stretching as 
far as the Eurasianist Alexander Dugin as well as the economist Mikhail Delyagin 
and the scientist Sergei Kurginyan, and media commentators Mikhail Leontiev 
(strongly pro-Putin) and Maksim Shevchenko (advancing a critique of Putinism 
from the left ) together with the neo-Stalinist publisher Nikolai Starikov and other 
critics of liberalism. Th ey draw on the thinking of ‘new right’ thinkers such as 
Alain de Benoist to press home the attack. Th eir website carries the eponymous 
near-monthly ‘thick’ journal  Izborskii Klub , as well as a rich range of interviews 
and discussions.  43  In January 2018, for example, Delyagin, the head of the Institute 
of Globalisation Problems, provided an interview under the title ‘Th e Liberal Elite 
[meaning the group of socio-economic ministers in Medvedev’s government] Is 
Destroying Russia for the Benefi t of the West’.  44  
 Th e fourth and fi nal epistemic-interest faction is made up of Eurasianists. Its 
members are as divided as the others, but all believe that there is a fundamental 
incompatibility between Russia and the West.  45  Th is draws on the tradition 
inaugurated by Nikolai Danilevsky in his book  Russia and Europe (1869), which 
argued that Romano-Germanic culture would inevitably be opposed to Russia’s 
Slavic civilisation. Danilevsky outlined issues of universalism, particularism and 
geopolitical thinking that have an enduring relevance to this day.  46  Following the 
Bolshevik revolution, Eurasianism underwent signifi cant intellectual development. 
Nikolai Trubetskoi had been a professor at Moscow State University and a strong 
critic of Eurocentrism, which he denounced in his book  Europe and Humanity 
(1920). His condemnation of European universalism and defence of a ‘multiplicity 
of civilisations’ has strong resonance in Russia today. Th is diversity of cultures 
meant that attempts to ‘catch up’ with the West would entail borrowing elements 
that were incompatible with Russian culture. In their 1921 manifesto  Exodus to the 
East , the Eurasianists argued that the centre of cultural gravity had moved to the 
East, and this would give Russia a special place in the new order, neither European 
nor Asian but Eurasian. Th e colonised people of the East, dubbed ‘real humanity’, 
would rise up against the European colonisers, supported by the Bolsheviks as the 
defenders of ‘national liberation’. 
 Geopolitical thinking enjoyed a renaissance in Russia aft er 1991 to replace 
Marxist-Leninist universalism. Issues of Russia’s civilisational identity, the 
relationship between competing world orders and the importance of space 
and territoriality came to the fore. Th is faction has extensive links with groups 
across Europe with similar sentiments, although couched in national idioms, 
but it is an exaggeration to suggest that the links between Russian Eurasianists 
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and the European far right is reframing the entire relationship between Russia 
and Europe.  47  Th ere have long been links between the Russian (and, before that, 
Soviet) authorities with West European right-wing movements, but these are 
typically instrumental rather than based on ideological contiguity.  48  Th ey share 
a common concern for sovereignty and tend to oppose Atlantic integration, but 
Moscow’s policy appears to be to ally with friends wherever they can be found, 
and this includes numerous left ist groups, notably Die Linke in Germany. 
 Th e Eurasianist tradition is capacious and not a little contradictory, with 
four main streams giving rather diff erent answers to questions of identity 
and development.  49  Th e fi rst is the classic Eurasianism of the 1920s, with roots 
stretching back into the nineteenth century to encompass Danilevsky as well as the 
conservative monarchist Konstantin Leontyev. Th is is the Eurasianism developed 
by Russian  é migr é writers in the 1920s and 1930s, stressing Russia’s combined 
European and Asian identity that created a new social formation distinct from 
Europe. Lev Gumilev (1912-92) has become part of the classical tradition, even 
though he was writing in a later period and responding to diff erent challenges.  50  
Gumilev argued that the Mongol invasions, the mixture of peoples and the 
distinctive pattern of cultural development meant that ‘ethnogenesis’ had created 
a new people, in which Russia as a nation was eff ectively dissolved. In his view, 
Eurasia represented a distinct civilisation, sharply delineated from the West.  51  
Russian nationalism from this perspective is a Western import, and a pan-Eurasian 
supranational civilisational identity is advanced instead. 
 Th e second group comprises the neo-Eurasianists, who emerged in the wake 
of the Soviet collapse and who were strongly represented in Russian public life in 
the 1990s.  52  Th e president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, spoke favourably 
of Gumilev’s ideas about the geographical and cultural-historical ties that bring 
together the peoples in northern and central Eurasia. As for Putin, even though 
he mentioned Gumilev at the 26 August 2005 celebration of the city of Kazan’s 
millenary anniversary, this does not make Putin a neo-Eurasianist. In numerous 
speeches and writings, Putin pronounced Russia a Eurasian power, but this usually 
meant that Russia should diversify its foreign policy orientations by turning 
towards Asia and the Pacifi c region. Putin’s Eurasianism is of a severely pragmatic 
geographical sort, although this is necessarily tinged with geopolitics. He does not 
share the transnational infl exion and virulent anti-Westernism that is characteristic 
of classical Eurasianism. For Putin, Russia comprises many diff erent and separate 
nations, which together represent the larger Russian nation as a cultural formation 
rather than an ethnic category. Th us, Putin eschews the civic term  Rossiiskii , favoured 
by Yeltsin, and instead advances a denationalised formulation of the term  Russkii . 
As for ethnic Russians, who now make up 80 per cent of the total population, Putin, 
like Yeltsin before him, is torn between ‘nationalist’ formulations that would make 
Russians the ‘system-forming’ nation and pluralist representations of Russia as a 
pluricultural community comprising 146 autochthonous peoples. 
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 New Eurasianists make up the third group. Th ey assume a strongly geopolitical 
reading of the concept that ties in with various anti-liberal movements across the 
continent. Th e leading exponent of this current is Alexander Dugin, who has recently 
become more of a Russian nationalist than a genuine partisan of pan-Eurasianism. 
His complex mix of metaphysics, geopolitical analysis and Fourth Political Th eory 
should be distinguished from the bulk of contemporary neo-Eurasianism and 
thus deserves a category of its own.  53  Dugin’s best-known work is  Foundations of 
Geopolitics ( Osnovy geopolitika ), written in 1996–7 and thereaft er published in 
numerous editions, in which he argues that geopolitics is the supreme methodology 
and that Russia is the natural hegemon in Eurasia. New Eurasianism repudiates 
the rather more pluralistic and Westphalian approach of most neo-Eurasiants 
and instead advances nationalist themes. To counter Atlanticism, Dugin proposes 
making Eurasia an alternative  Grossraum (greater space, using the term popularised 
by Carl Schmitt), which envisages some sort of ‘strategic centre’ accompanied by a 
number of ‘autonomies’. Dugin’s Fourth Political Th eory connects him to some of 
the radical currents in twentieth-century European political philosophy. He draws 
on Martin Heidegger’s argument that ‘modernity is a kind of scientifi c objectifi cation 
of the world which only accepts cultural or traditional knowledge as long as it 
remains secondary to any objective enquiry’, a paradigm which in Heidegger’s view 
is central to the three great insurgent creeds of modernity: communism, fascism and 
liberalism.  54  He rejected all three in favour of his Eurasianist philosophy, but they 
each contribute something, hence the Fourth Political Th eory. 
 Dugin saw Putin’s Russia as the natural leader of the recreated Eurasian 
 Grossraum , challenging the hegemony of Atlanticism, although that does not make 
Putin a Duginite, let alone render Dugin ‘Putin’s brain’.  55  Putin did not move into 
Crimea in 2014 because of Eurasianist ideas but because of the structural failures 
of the European security system. He certainly sought to imbue the action with 
larger cultural signifi cance, above all the sacralisation of the contested territory 
as part of the reunifi cation of a divided people, the  Russkii Mir (Russian World), 
but this sort of myth-making usually left  Putin cold – it was used to justify an 
action that was prompted by structural factors and security concerns.  56  It can be 
questioned whether Dugin is a Eurasianist at all, since Eurasianism is a philosophy 
of isolationism, whereas Dugin’s thinking, although radically anti-Western, is 
‘not an adaptation of classical Eurasianism to the post-Soviet period, but rather a 
peculiarly post-Soviet and essentially European “new right” ideology of its own’.  57  
In other words, it is not neo-Eurasianism but a new Eurasianism. 
 Th e fourth model of Eurasianism is the one that was adopted by the Putinite 
elite, namely pragmatic Eurasian integration. Th is is oft en accompanied by 
the rhetoric of neo-Eurasianism and even absorbed some of the themes of the 
new Eurasianism, notably in the speeches and writings of Putin’s advisor on 
international cooperation, Sergei Glazyev, but this only obscured the rational and 
pragmatic core of the project. At the heart of the current Eurasian integration drive 
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is the belief that at some profound level, a number of post-Soviet countries form a 
natural economic, and potentially political, community separate and distinct from 
the EU and other comparable integration projects. At the same time, Eurasian 
integration was proposed not simply to counter the advance of the EU but was 
intended to act as a mode of advancing the greater Europe project that would 
ultimately encompass the EU while allowing the various parts of Europe to retain 
their identity. Th e claim that there is some sort of pre-political unity to much 
of the Eurasian land mass is an important one and is typically rooted in some 
combination of the fi rst three variants of Eurasianism, with the crucial addition of 
a strictly economic rationale. Th is is why the very notion of ‘Eurasia’ is considered 
a backward-looking and repressive ideology in much of the post-Soviet world, and 
represents the dark opposite of the progressivism associated with ‘Europe’. Classical 
Eurasianism had always advocated the need to create suprastate institutions, but 
this was combined with a  dirigiste infl exion that strove to regulate all of social life. 
It is this mix of motives and intellectual tributaries that alarms those who argue 
that Eurasian integration is an anti-liberal geopolitical project that would restore 
Russian hegemony over the region. In practice, defenders of the project argue that 
the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is the functional equivalent of the EU, is not 
incompatible with liberal economies and responds to the needs and traditions of 
the region. 
 Putin himself is not recognisably Eurasianist in any of its ideological guises, 
even in its democratic neo-Eurasian form, but he is a pragmatist in international 
aff airs and a (statist) liberal in economic matters. It is for this reason that new 
Eurasianists criticise him for his  Realpolitik approach to international aff airs, his 
excessive liberalism in economic matters and for his continued commitment to 
the liberal transformation of the Russian economy and society (to be achieved 
through the  dirigiste monopoly over the polity). Putin’s support for Eurasian 
integration is in part a response to the failure of pan-European unifi cation (the 
greater European idea) and the stalemate in Russo-EU relations, although despite 
the setbacks, the regime does not repudiate its European and pan-continental 
aspirations. Putin’s pragmatic Eurasianism stresses the economic functionality of 
integration, and while he refers to the common cultural legacy, only rarely does he 
mention civilisational factors. However, his ‘cultural turn’ aft er 2012 accentuated 
some Eurasianist themes, notably the need for spiritual renewal and the alleged 
exhaustion of the civilisational values on which the West had once been built. 
Th e ideology of Russia’s ‘special path’ ( Sonderweg ) began to be smuggled back in, 
although now framed in terms of the West having repudiated its own values. From 
this perspective, the ‘true West’ has now moved to the East, and its values are being 
defended by Russia’s conservative elite.  58  
 In sum, Russian public life is divided into four major epistemic meta-factions, 
each of which has social and institutional roots. Putin’s genius as leader is to draw 
strength from them all but to become dependent on none. Th is meta-factional 
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model confi rms the argument advanced by Elena Chebankova that Russia has 
‘paradigmatic pluralism’.  59  None of the groups or political tendencies can become 
hegemonic, rendering Russian politics fundamentally pluralist. To use Gramsci’s 
term, there is no ‘historic bloc’, the basis of consent to a given social order. Th e 
absence of societal or policy consensus gives Putin scope for manoeuvre, while 
limiting his ability to shift  the country decisively in one direction or another. 
Th e administrative regime compensates for the absence of a hegemonic social 
formation. It also limits the need for coercion since Putinite statecraft  ensures that 
these elite groupings, each with deep societal roots, retain a stake in the system. 
Coercion in that context is selective and limited. 
 Each of the meta-factions is torn by internal factionalism, and micro-
factionalism is characteristic of post-communist Russia. Th e  siloviki bloc is 
particularly prone to such rivalry, since they are the ones closest to the struggles 
for ownership and access to resources. Th is means that far from being monolithic, 
the Putinite system is the composite of the four great meta-factions and the shift ing 
tides of the battles between micro-factions. Mikhail Zygar’s account of the Putin 
years does a good job in describing the various shift s, as allies and offi  cials are 
brought in to the core and then shuffl  ed out.  60  Zygar confi rms the view outlined 
in this book that Putin is a broker, balancing the interests not only of rival ‘clans’, 
including business oligarchs, security offi  cials, regional bosses and ministries, 
but also of the major ideational-sociological ‘factions’ structuring the country. 
Th e shift ing fortunes of the meta-blocs determine the overall direction of policy. 
At the same time, there is a generational aspect to the factionalism. Zygar shows 
how three generations of Russian politicians interact and compete. Th e vestiges of 
the Soviet generation still cling on to power, in particular among the  siloviki and 
neo-traditionalists, while the liberal camp is strongly represented by the Yeltsin 
generation, with Putin’s own group of leaders, many of whom initially began their 
careers in Putin’s native St Petersburg, spanning the generations. As Putin came 
to the end of his third term, there was an active attempt to rejuvenate the elite by 
creating a younger fourth generation of Putinite technocrats, and to this end there 
was a major reshuffl  e of regional leaders. In ideational terms, the Putin system is 
predicated on a cross-generational discourse and the assimilation of the various 
periods of Russian history into a single narrative of endurance, although not 
unifi ed into a single model of power or development. 
 Serhii Plokhy is wrong to argue that Putin is attached to some sort of 
conservative nationalist utopia through the imperial reconstitution of the various 
East Slavic nations (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus).  61  Equally, it would be going too 
far to suggest the formation of some sort of ‘collective Putin’, since Putin’s political 
personality is far from dissolved into any amorphous entity, although there is 
a shift ing collective face to the regime. Th e former Kremlin spin doctor, Gleb 
Pavlovsky, argues that the hundred or so strong group around Putin use the term 
to describe the Kremlin’s decisions, and Zygar’s study confi rmed the element of 
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collective decision-making. Th e predominance of the ‘family’ in the late Yeltsin 
years gave way to a disparate group of St Petersburgers in the early Putin years. 
Some of the more hard-line fi gures from this group, in turn, gave way to liberal 
modernisers in the Medvedev years. With Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, 
the foreign policy hawks and statist developmentalists regained the upper hand. 
In all of this, Putin remained the central decision maker. Within the regime, he is 
referred to as ‘the body’, the informing spirit that animates the whole collective. 
Th e collective in turn seeks to anticipate the direction that Putin will take. Th is was 
vividly in evidence when the Kremlin was planning its response to the Magnitsky 
Act, a bipartisan bill passed by Congress in December 2012 that banned entry into 
the United States and the use of the US banking system by listed Russian offi  cials 
held responsible for the death of the tax accountant working for Bill Browder’s 
Hermitage Capital, Sergei Magnitsky, in November 2009. Vyacheslav Volodin, 
the deputy head of the PA responsible for domestic political aff airs, prepared two 
versions of a bill regulating American adoptions of Russian children, one taking a 
hard line with a ban and one only imposing greater restrictions. Putin was taken 
ill, and with him out of circulation, the framers of the legislation prepared the two 
versions, with Putin fi nally deciding on the outright ban.  62  
 The dual state and neo-patrimonialism 
 Duality is a feature of all political systems, but as a recent study of Silvio Berlusconi’s 
Italy suggests, the question of degree is crucial: ‘All Western governments, more 
or less, are marked by the gap between the poetry of constitutions and the prose 
of power as it is exercised. What is decisive, however, is precisely the degree of 
this “more or less.” ’  63  Italy from this perspective has endured a long-term creeping 
coup that subverts the independent functioning of institutions, and the response 
lay between the radicalisation of democracy and the imposition of technocratic 
rule. In Russia, Putin’s administration claims to stand above the historic divisions 
of the modern era and seeks to reconcile the forces that tore Russia apart in the 
twentieth century. Th e democratic process is managed by a force standing outside 
democracy, co-opting elements of political society willing to compromise and 
marginalising the rest. Th is is a type of passive revolution, which for Antonio 
Gramsci entailed ‘an abortive or incomplete transformation of society’. Th is 
can take a number of forms, including one where an external force provokes 
change, but this lacks a suffi  ciently strong domestic constituency and runs into 
the resistance of entrenched interests. When the forces are equally balanced, 
a stalemate emerges, giving rise to a situation of ‘revolution/restoration’.  64  In 
contemporary Russia, there is a neo-Bonapartist situation where class forces are 
equally balanced, with the entrenched bureaucracy of the administrative regime 
resisting the rise of an independent bourgeoisie or middle class. Th is provides 
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space for the regime to act as the supreme balancer, the essence of my factional 
model of Russian politics. 
 Th e ‘dual state’ model is at the heart of the analysis presented in this book.  65  
In contemporary state theory, the constitutional state exists separate from 
the government and the ruler of the time, and endures beyond the lifespan of 
a particular administration. Th e constitutional state is rooted in defending law 
and statute to advance a certain idea of the general public good. It is regulated by 
impartial norms of law and managed by a disinterested bureaucracy. In Russia, 
this Weberian ideal has been subverted by the emergence of an administrative 
regime, which draws its legitimacy from claiming to apply the principles of 
the constitutional state and derives its authority from its representation of the 
common good but in practice exercises power in ways that subvert the impartial 
and universal application of constitutional rules. Th e polity and the state eff ectively 
became the property of the regime and increasingly of the leader himself – the 
classic defi nition of patrimonialism. In this context, the rhetoric of strengthening 
the state eff ectively means enhancing the prerogative powers of the regime. In other 
words, a new type of neo-patrimonialism was consolidated – a system in which 
the political authorities stand outside the constraints of the constitutional state, 
although drawing on its legal, coercive and disciplinary resources to maintain their 
rule.  66  Neo-patrimonialism combines patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucracy. 
Put diff erently, Walter Bagehot’s theory of dual institutions can be applied with 
particular force here. Bagehot, the mid-nineteenth century commentator on the 
British constitution, distinguished between ‘effi  cient’ institutions, those which 
actually run a country, and ‘dignifi ed’ institutions, which are largely decorative 
when it comes to making the hard choices.  67  Th is is the ‘double government’ of the 
dual state that is at the centre of my analysis of the Putin phenomenon.  68  
 Already under Yeltsin there was a divergence between the culture of power 
of the administrative regime and the rules-based constitutional state. Instead of 
consolidating the rule of law, the authority of constitutional institutions such as 
parliament and the formal procedures of modern governance, ‘regime’ practices 
predominated, characterised by arbitrary interventions, the management of 
elections (notably Yeltsin’s re-election campaign in 1996)  and in his later years 
by the direct infl uence of economic magnates (known colloquially as oligarchs), 
who had made their billions through access to political infl uence. Th e presidency 
emerged to dominate all other institutions and gained unprecedented authority 
to intervene and manage political process. Th is is what Henry Hale calls ‘patronal 
politics’, a social equilibrium in which people pursue their collective and economic 
goals mainly through concrete, personalised rewards or punishments achieved 
through extended personal networks rather than impersonal institutions.  69  Hale 
provides the example of a local offi  cial seeking to entice a hospital to locate in 
their area and, thus, authorises ‘facilitation’ payments. Th is is corruption by any 
other name, but if the offi  cial takes the moral high ground, another district would 
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get the hospital. Th is self-reinforcing system is what constitutes the equilibrium.  70  
However, while this sort of behaviour is prevalent across Eurasia, it operates in 
Russia in distinctive ways because of the counterbalancing eff ect of the legal 
and behavioural norms embedded in the constitutional state. Th e corruption is 
systemic (in other words, it is ‘meta-corruption’) but at the same time (in this case 
at least) developmental. 
 Th e overall model is that of a reinvented ‘enlightened despotism’, with an 
administrative rationality endowing the moving force in the state (the presidency 
and its support mechanisms in the administrative regime) with the power to 
achieve ‘reform’ in the Yeltsin years; and to restore ‘order’ and ‘stability’ in the 
Putin period. Th e cultural practices of pragmatic goal-oriented rationalism 
run against the nascent culture of constitutionalism, with its rule-oriented 
legalism and accountability mechanisms. Another way of formulating the dual 
state paradigm is to apply Irvin Studin’s distinction between two paradigms of 
governance. On the one hand, there is the democratic tradition, which represents 
what he calls ‘argumentative governance’, and on the other hand, there are 
various types of managed systems, which he calls ‘algorithmic governance’.  71  Th e 
administrative regime became more sophisticated under Putin, and its ‘despotic’ 
features were tempered by the ‘enlightened’ incorporation of elements of the 
constitutional culture, although subordinated to the ‘algorithmic’ logic of regime 
survival. Th is can be couched in Weberian terms as the distinction between 
formal and substantive rationality. Th e primary concern of formal rationality is 
to achieve outcomes within the rules determined by the logic of profi tability (of 
whatever sort), whereas in substantive rationality, the choice of means is guided 
by a set of human values, which in our case are the principles enunciated by the 
constitutional state. 
 Weber also wrote about the bureaucratic apparatus, and Putin is the perfect 
product of such a system. Th ere is no need for charisma or exceptional talents, 
but mastery of departmental intrigue is essential. Personnel appointments are 
made to ensure factional balance, and policy is tailored to satisfy the needs of 
the administrative system. Th e institutional innovations of the Putin period 
reinforced the technocratic rationality of apparently enlightened governance, 
and that was why they encountered so little resistance from the existing elites. 
Th e creation of para-constitutional bodies, such as the seven (later eight) federal 
districts, the State Council and the Civic Chamber, did not repudiate the formal 
framework of the constitution but weakened public accountability mechanisms 
in favour of administrative rationality. Th e sphere of executive discretion exists 
in all political systems (discussed in  Chapter 3 ), but in Putinite Russia, it became 
extraordinarily wide. Th is encouraged the practice of what is called ‘legal populism’, 
the pursuit of political goals through judicial means. Th e notable example of this 
was the prosecution of Khodorkovsky, who had turned the Yukos oil company 
into one of the most dynamic corporations in the country. Khodorkovsky nursed 
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the ambition to transform the buccaneering capitalists of the 1990s into an 
independent bourgeoisie, who would defend the nascent capitalist order from 
becoming subject to what he considered were the whims, venality and corruption 
of the administrative regime, the so-called  sistema . Following his arrest in October 
2003, Yukos was eff ectively expropriated through the use of legal and exaggerated 
tax recovery measures, and Khodorkovsky spent ten years in jail.  72  
 Two political systems operate in parallel. Because the administrative regime 
is embedded in the constitutional state, direct extrajudicial coercion is kept to a 
minimum. Th e law is used to advance regime policies, which in many cases while 
not formally in contravention of the constitution run counter to the spirit of genuine 
constitutionalism. Th e legal system is subordinated to political authority and in 
certain cases, such as in the Yukos prosecutions, undermines independent courts 
and the rule of law in general. Th e result is an erosion of trust in the institutions of 
the constitutional state. Th ese include the conventions and instruments of public 
politics encompassing political parties, elections and parliamentary politics. 
Components of the constitutional state neither form nor control the administrative 
regime, which stands outside of and above public political institutions. Th is is a 
parapolitical sphere based on informal groups, factions and personal networks. 
Th is is the world based on the inner court of the presidency, over which Putin 
rules not as a dictator but as arbiter. Th is second level is more than simply 
‘virtual’ politics, the manipulation of public opinion and the shaping of electoral 
outcomes through manipulative techniques and  dramaturgiya .  73  Th e institutions 
of the constitutional state are real and work with regular precision, and thus the 
notion of ‘virtual politics’ is misleading. Instead, the parapolitical sphere acts as 
a substantive alternative arena of policy contestation where the interest groups 
and epistemic communities structuring Russian society and thinking feed into the 
policy process. Th e presidency acts as the essential link between the two levels, 
exercising a whole range of ‘patronal’ techniques to maintain both the public and 
factional sphere in balance. 
 Th e administrative regime takes the form of a dominant power system but 
is balanced by the constitutional state. Th e administrative regime is careful not 
to step outside the bounds of the formal letter of the constitution but constantly 
presses against its spirit. Th e para-constitutional institutions undermine the 
formal constitutional body designated to fulfi l that role. Para-constitutionalism 
refers to the creation of institutions that are not specifi cally anti-constitutional 
but which are not mentioned in the constitution.  74  Th us, the Civic Chamber 
duplicates in certain respects the consultative work of the State Duma, while the 
State Council complements the work of the upper house, the FC. Th e seven (now 
eight) federal districts established in May 2000 were designed to monitor the 
work of regional authorities but undermine federalism, and the creation of the 
State Council later that year brings together regional leaders on a selective and 
partial basis. Th e Civic Chamber was formally established on 1 July 2005 as a type 
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of ‘collective ombudsman’ with purely consultative powers.  75  Its duties include 
the review of draft  legislation and the work of parliament, and the monitoring 
of federal and regional administrations. It off ers non-binding recommendations 
to parliament and the government on domestic issues, comments on legislation, 
instigates investigations into possible breaches of the law and requests information 
from state agencies.  76  Th e fi rst Chamber had 126 members: one-third was selected 
by the president, intended to be authoritative individuals who would be neither 
politicians nor business people; the second group was nominated by the fi rst from 
national civic and voluntary associations; and once in offi  ce, these two groups in 
turn chose the remaining third, representing regional NGOs. Th e body’s funding 
and offi  ces are allocated by the PA. By the time the sixth convocation was selected 
in 2017, the body had grown in size. Forty members were chosen by the Kremlin, 
84 were delegated by regional civic chambers and 43 were selected in a vote from 
403 NGO nominations. Th e chair to 2020 was the journalist and public activist 
Valery Fadaev. At its fi rst meeting, Putin insisted that the Civic Chamber ‘should 
not replace the government or parliament’ but should fi nd a niche of its own 
including ‘public oversight over executive and representative bodies of authority, 
expert analysis of immediate and more distant plans, assessing how these plans are 
implemented, and directly communicate with the people who are on the receiving 
end of the authority’s eff orts to improve life in our country’.  77  Hearings are live-
streamed on the chamber’s website, and witnesses have overwhelmingly been 
experts in their respective fi elds and are far from toadies. Some of the Duma’s more 
outlandish legislative ideas, such as the plan to create a cyber militia to control 
illegal and extremist activity on the web, were subject to severe criticism, although 
a law blocking untrue or distorting information (‘fake news’) was adopted in 
March 2019. 
 Para-constitutionalism is accompanied by the development of a range of 
parapolitical bodies. Parapolitics is the process whereby entities are created in the 
public realm to stymie and shape the conduct of free and open pluralistic politics 
but which lack the autonomy to act as independent subjects of a competitive 
political sphere. Following the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in the autumn 
of 2004, the creation of the Nashi youth organisation was an exemplary case, 
designed to occupy the streets to prevent colour-style popular rallies against 
the regime.  78  Later, faced by sustained attack and irredeemably tarnished by the 
moniker ‘party of thieves and swindlers’, the regime looked to an alternative 
instrument to UR, its pedestal party, to mobilise the electorate and to associate its 
supporters. Instead of allowing UR to develop as an autonomous political force, 
facing up to its own weaknesses, lack of coherent programmatic development and 
overwhelmingly bureaucratic character, Putin in May 2011 created the Russian 
Popular Front ( Obshcherossiiskii narodnyi front , ONF) as a popular vehicle for 
Putin’s re-election bid. It was registered as a public movement in June 2013, and 
at its inaugural congress in that month, Putin was elected its head. Th ereaft er, 
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ONF acted as an auxiliary parapolitical organisation in the various campaigns 
launched by the regime. Putin’s statecraft  creates para-constitutional bodies 
subordinate to the regime to constrain and compensate for the shortcomings of 
offi  cial constitutional bodies, which his own policies had eviscerated. Th e ONF 
was designed to broaden the fl agging appeal of UR by co-opting civic associations, 
and some 185 Front members were included on UR’s 600-strong candidate list 
for the December 2011 Duma election to increase parliamentary turnover.  79  Th is 
was also the case in the September 2016 Duma elections, in which ONF members 
competed in primaries against more established UR nominees. Putin reviewed the 
various activities at the ONF Action Forum on 19 December 2016. Th ere was the 
ONF Cleaning Project, dealing with the problem of illegal landfi lls, and the ONF 
Youth Project which participated in Russia’s Future Image project in the run-up 
to the 2018 presidential election.  80  Th is is a classic instance of the bifurcation 
between offi  cial government bodies and the formalised voluntary work of para-
constitutional bodies. Formal channels were both undermined and transcended 
by this parapolitical form of civic engagement. 
 At the same time, the regime assiduously manages the informational sphere, 
especially the electronic mass media, but in keeping with its dual character, the 
system did not restore anything like the Soviet system of censorship. Th e internet 
is increasingly monitored by the security services but by and large remains 
free. Equally, the regime monitors the pulse of public opinion and is careful to 
remain within the bounds of its preferences, although tempering some of its more 
extreme and vengeful moods. Th is has been called an ‘informational autocracy’, 
although the term ‘autocracy’ exaggerates the despotic elements in what is a 
sophisticated managerial model. Th is alleged autocracy uses traditional methods 
of informational manipulation (propaganda) as well as the new social media 
in which ‘fake news’, hackers and trolls seek to shape debates.  81  Th e view that 
Russian public discourse is substantively shaped by fake media troll farms and 
manipulation is exaggerated.  82  Political institutions are far more than an arena 
for bargaining between elites, and the public sphere is more autonomous than 
the ‘informational autocracy’ model would suggest. Institutions and the public 
sphere work in interaction with the technocratic rationality of the regime (mostly 
within the framework of presidential power) and, thus, remain limited, and they 
are also subverted more fundamentally when it comes to elections and practices of 
accountability; yet both have a life and dynamism of their own based on a vitality 
derived from the normativity of the constitutional state. 
 Th e dual state model and neo-patrimonialism both examine the dynamics of 
regime-society relations, although the dual state approach has a greater emphasis 
on institutions, in particular those associated with the constitutional and legal 
order. Th e neo-patrimonial approach moves away from the largely personal ties of 
the classic patrimonial model, with the focus on the bureaucratic structures that 
endow power relations with a degree of anonymity and permanence. It is in the 
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realm of political economy, however, that neo-patrimonialism comes into its own, 
with its examination of the formal and informal ties between power and property, 
intended to create a system in which the dominant regime can perpetuate itself. As 
in the dual state model, two operative systems of domination and rule combine, 
imbuing the whole edifi ce with uncertainty as to which system will apply at 
any particular time. As in the dual state model, there is constant tension in the 
triangular relationship between the regime, the state and society. Th is gives rise 
to an inherent instability, which in the dual state system in countered by a whole 
range of specially designed stability mechanisms. In fact, as Neil Robinson points 
out in his discussion of neo-patrimonialism, ‘regime stability has been able to 
pose as a substitute for state building’.  83  Th is is precisely the point at the heart 
of the dual state model. In the Putin years, the strengthening of the regime has 
been taken as synonymous with rehabilitating the state, but in fact these are two 
parallel, although deeply interconnected, processes. Th e situation is paradoxical, 
because in the Putin years the state has been consolidated, the institutions 
function as prescribed, new courthouses have been built and democratic politics 
is formally practiced through a competitive party system and elections. However, 
the autonomous functioning of these institutions is circumscribed by the tutelary 
powers arrogated by the regime. In this second system, relations are fl uid and 
unregulated, although the operative norms are fi ltered through various cultural 
practices, including the Russian notion of ‘understanding’ ( ponyatie ) itself. It is 
the regime that manages elite relations, although the legitimating discourse of 
restoring eff ective governance and pursuing rational public policy concerns at 
home and abroad is couched in the language of state power. 
 Th e regime governs by exploiting uncertainty, since at any particular time it is 
unclear whether the routines of the constitutional state or the exceptional politics 
of the administrative regime will be applied. In such a system, there tends to be 
few permanent winners or losers, since all are subject to the arbitrariness of the 
administrative system, although this arbitrariness is limited by formal allegiance to 
the constitutional state. Th e dual character of the system is more than the ‘hybridity’ 
characteristic of political systems in post-Soviet Eurasia but represents a ‘historic 
bloc’ that is unique to Russia and which refl ects its social structure, political 
economy and legacy features from the Soviet and even the imperial past. Putin’s 
authority derives from his ability to keep the various historical manifestations 
of Russia and the factions balanced against each other while drawing on each to 
the degree that they all have a stake in the system but not to the extent that any 
one of them can eclipse the others. Putin’s statecraft  deft ly mediates between the 
constitutional state and the administrative system, drawing normative authority 
from the former while gaining real power from the latter. Th is endless balancing 
and counterbalancing reproduced elements of the old Soviet ‘stability system’. As 
in the earlier period, the permanent politics of stabilisation leaves little room for 
radical innovation and, thus, encourages political stalemate and inhibits dynamic 
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economic development.  84  Political stasis prevents Russia becoming an outright 
dictatorship, but it also blocks moves towards greater democratisation. Experience 
suggests that such stalemates or blockages are overcome either by revolution or 
collapse. However, the distinctive features of Russia’s dual state may allow an 
evolutionary transcendence of the stalemate by strengthening the constitutional 
state; but by contrast, if the more authoritarian elements are consolidated, then 
the compromises and balances of the dual state will give way to a more overtly 
autocratic system. 
 Reform, transition and beyond 
 Reform denotes dissatisfaction with the existing order of things and suggests 
ameliorative improvements, while reform delayed too long, as Russian experience 
repeatedly demonstrates, can precipitate revolution and systemic collapse. Reform 
induced the end of the Soviet Union, and this is why the concept is anathema in 
Russia today, yet reform necessarily remains on the agenda. Th e newly independent 
country had to create a new polity, fundamentally reshape the economy, recast 
the contours of national identity and fi nd a new place in the world. Equally, 
commentators on Russia are faced by some very hard methodological choices – 
how do you study a country that is so diff erent, yet which aspired to become 
part of the existing ‘historical West’? Th e classic language of transitology barely 
begins to grasp the multiple layers of Russia’s ‘transition’, yet what other language 
is there to analyse the complexity of Russia’s attempt to ‘modernise’ its economy 
and polity? Th e Russian political system is indeed unique, but so are all the others. 
Even countries that share the same basic political institutions diff er widely in the 
ways that they operate. Edwin Bacon is right to question the ‘othering’ of Russia, 
the idea ‘that Russia somehow defi es logic’, and insists that neither the people 
nor the country should be constructed as a ‘country and people whose actions 
and attitudes are too alien to ours to warrant considered analysis’.  85  Instead, he 
stresses that there is no great chasm between the attitudes of people in Russia and 
the West, and that Russia’s international behaviour is neither uniquely disruptive 
nor exceptionally unusual but fi ts into the logic of Russian history and normal 
patterns of international relations. Th is is true, but the problem in studying the 
country is how universal categories can be applied in a manner sensitive to Russia’s 
uniqueness. 
 An example of this is the idea of ‘civil society’. Th e twilight period of the 
Soviet system was accompanied by an extraordinary focus on the concept. Th e 
fundamental argument was that the Soviet system had become its own gravedigger 
by modernising society and creating a nascent middle class (or bourgeoisie), 
demanding civil rights and equal citizenship.  86  Civil society was considered the 
foundation for democratisation and a way of embedding constitutionalism into 
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societal mores.  87  Th is Tocquevillian view is challenged by those who argue that 
the fall of communism represented not the triumphant upwelling of a society 
in waiting, ready to assume the task of state-building and modernisation, but 
in fact refl ected little more than the implosion of an exhausted and increasingly 
ineff ectual communist establishment. Rather than representing the victory of 
a nascent civic society and the maturation of a responsible citizenry, the anti-
communist revolutions expressed unsatisfi ed consumerist demands (dubbed 
by Stephen Kotkin as an ‘uncivil society’).  88  Th e collapse of communism was 
followed not by the emergence of an active citizenry and responsible market 
players but by the rampant manifestation of society’s own pathologies. In the 
semi-anarchic 1990s, citizens forfeited a number of social rights and above all the 
right to security, while in the 2000s Putin delivered basic social rights (including 
getting paid on time) and restored elementary security to the streets, for which 
he received the thanks of a grateful population. But what he was not able to do 
was to create the conditions for the exercise of democratic rationality, in which 
diverse and confl icting popular interests and preferences are mediated through 
representative institutions. Liberal democratic theory suggests that this should 
result in good government, where corruption is low and public servants act with 
probity for the public good. 
 Th e regime system, already under Yeltsin and intensifi ed by Putin, operates 
according to an algorithmic managerial and technocratic rationality. Both derived 
their legitimacy from the formal application of democratic procedures within 
the framework of a liberal constitution but increasingly carved out a sphere of 
political action free from constraints within the framework of the dual state. To 
explain this unexpected outcome of Russia’s ‘transition’, discourse shift ed from 
civil society to social capital theory. Robert Putnam’s landmark study of Italian 
regional government identifi ed certain forms of social solidarity and eff ective 
governance in the north of the country, drawing on traditions of civic governance 
in the city states of the medieval and early modern periods, whereas in the south, 
he argued, ‘amoral familism’ predominated, accompanied by poor governance and 
a fragmented society.  89  Th e term ‘amoral familism’ comes from Edward Banfi eld’s 
famous study of an Italian village in the 1950s.  90  Although the forms of civic 
alienation may not take such culturally determined forms in post-communist 
Russia (and the Italian fi ndings, not surprisingly, have also been hotly contested), 
the relationship between civic subjectivity and political outcomes is clearly an 
important one. Harry Eckstein devoted his long academic career to studying 
the relationship between societal mores and political democracy. Although he 
gave a convincing explanation about why democracy fl ourished in Norway’s 
isolated and self-governing fi shing and farming communities, there were less 
convincing answers about why the long tradition of popular participation in 
village communities in tsarist Russia, in soviets, trade unions and other social 
organisations in the Soviet Union, and the upsurge in civic engagement during 
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perestroika, ended up reproducing an authoritarian system in the post-communist 
period.  91  
 Th e concept of  anomie helps chart aspects of Russia’s post-communist mentality. 
Th e sociological concept of anomie describes disorientation and alienation from 
one’s surroundings. Th e phenomenon today shapes the political culture of the 
elite, with shallow loyalties to institutions and even the ruling regime, although 
balanced by perhaps an exaggerated veneration of the past and traditional cultural 
patterns. In a country where three regimes have crashed in less than a century, 
it is hardly surprising that there is greater affi  liation with what is enduring and 
timeless, rather than a political construction that may prove as ephemeral as its 
predecessors. 
 Others talk in terms of path dependency, the view that earlier institutional 
or political choices foreclose later options. Th ere is a long tradition in Russian 
academic writing (itself probably path-dependent) arguing that a so-called Russian 
system ( Russkaya sistema ) reproduces itself in diff erent formats but with the 
consistent exaggeration of the prerogatives of an insulated and demanding power 
system, accompanied by the acquiescence of a passive citizenry.  92  Stefan Hedlund 
frames the argument in terms of socio-economic structural constraints.  93  Th ere 
is also a version of path dependency based on cultural factors. Alexander Yanov 
argued that the West would have to move fast to support Russian democracy aft er 
the change from the Soviet system, but the window of opportunity would soon 
snap shut. His analysis of the cycles of reform and counter-reform in Russian 
history led him to predict that unless strongly supported by the West, the period 
of liberalisation would be short.  94  By the 1990s, he was already talking of ‘Weimar 
Russia’, thereby suggesting that post-communist Russia was comparable to pre-
Nazi Germany, ripe for some virulent new authoritarian consolidation. Putin’s 
critics argue that this is indeed the case, but at most Russia remains stuck in an 
extended Weimar syndrome where democracy is not consolidated but so far no 
outright revanchist and revisionist power has been established. Putinite Russia is 
not out to destroy the foundations of the liberal constitutional state or to subvert 
the existing world order. Th is misunderstanding provoked Putin’s demonization.  95  
 It is too easy to blame the people for the sins of their leaders. Russian civil 
society from the fi rst took distinctive forms. As Chebankova convincingly argues, 
observers tend to look for Western patterns of citizen engagement and participation, 
whereas in Russia, civic activity takes specifi c forms.  96  Th e state typically exercises 
close supervision, but this does not mean that voluntary civic activism and 
engagement does not exist.  97  Th is is certainly the case when it comes to the work of 
the Civic Chamber, which although detracting from what should properly be the 
monitoring work of elected representative bodies nevertheless contributes to the 
exercise of accountability over regional and central executive bodies. Th is public 
control body is in keeping with the Soviet tradition of social  kontrol’ (supervision) 
bodies.  98  More broadly, although the foreign agents law of July 2012 restricted the 
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Western funding of Russian civil society, most Russian NGOs had never received 
such support, peaking at about 7 per cent in 2009. Since 2012, Russian NGOs have 
to register as foreign agents if they receive overseas funding, forcing the closure 
of many organisations. Th e 162 organisations registered as foreign agents by 2017 
have to submit detailed fi nancial accounts and undergo frequent review, and are 
prevented from pursuing activities that are considered political, such as election 
monitoring. Environmental groups have been the prime casualties of the law, 
forcing at least a dozen to close.  99  
 Th e decline in foreign funding is off set by an enormous expansion in the sources 
of domestic funding. Th ese include federal and regional grant-awarding bodies, as 
well as corporate donors and private foundations, notably the Potanin Foundation, 
the Sistema Foundation and the Timchenko Foundation, as well as direct awards 
by such companies as Norilsk Nickel, Gazpromneft  and Metalloinvest. Although 
foreign sources of funding have decreased sharply (although it still continues 
despite the bureaucratic hurdles), ‘the bigger story, however, is that Russian civil 
society has persevered with the growth and diversifi cation of indigenous funding 
sources’.  100  In fact, according to one civil society activist, the Western narrative 
that Russia is unfree is far from the whole truth.  101  However, the character of this 
freedom is ambivalent, and some of the anarchic elements of the 1990s have been 
incorporated into the Putinite system of rule. Th e view of an all-seeing and all-
powerful Putin presiding over a well-oiled power  vertikal is nonsense. Instead, ‘the 
proliferation of grey zones that are neither totally grassroots nor state-sponsored 
should be comprehended as a fundamental feature of the regime and its adaptive 
nature’, as in the emergence of various militia groups.  102  In fact, adaptation was a 
dual process – not only to the exigencies of the law and international norms but 
also to the needs of the regime and the pressures of society. 
 Th e Soviet system created a distinctive pattern of class and social power, as 
well as a specifi c form of relationship between intellectuals and the power system. 
Not surprisingly, society responded to the challenge of ‘transition’ to capitalist 
modernity in unique ways. Th e engagement of social groups in the structures of 
authority and the power system was shaped not only by Soviet legacies but also 
by some pre-Soviet traditions and post-communist realities.  103  Th e Tocquevillean 
myth of a benefi cent civil society ready to take advantage of the anti-communist 
revolution proved to be false. Instead, the more appropriate model appeared to be 
the Hobbesian one describing the brutality of the state of nature. If that is indeed 
the case, then Putin’s creation of a Leviathan state makes theoretical sense. Th e 
Hobbesian model of just authority lies at the heart of modern liberal democracy 
(although tempered by Lockean legalism and pluralism) and is ultimately 
concerned with the pacifi cation of social confl ict and pathologies through the 
establishment of a dominant power system. Th e Hobbesian ‘social contract’ can be 
terminated if the power system fails to deliver what it promises in terms of security 
and, today, in social welfare, and thus is not outright despotism. Writing during 
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the English Civil War, Hobbes was obsessed by security and the fear of disorder, 
and these concerns became paramount in post-communist Russia.  104  It is striking 
how the dilemmas of early modern state-building in England have been repeated 
in post-communist Russia, confi rming the view that Russia’s historical time is not 
necessarily synchronised with others. 
 Whereas the contemporary West stresses Lockean liberty, Russia highlights 
Hobbesian security. Th e Leviathan emerges as the benevolent despot who can 
restore order and stability but whose power is far from unlimited and is bound 
by a new ‘social contract’:  in the Soviet and Russian cases, security and rising 
prosperity in exchange for political passivity. More than that, in contemporary 
Russia, neo-traditionalists endow authority with a sacred dimension, seeing it 
as the  katechon , a power keeping at bay the destructive forces of the Antichrist. 
Moscow is considered the Th ird Rome, imposing order on a sea of chaos and 
holding back the apocalypse. Th us, the Leviathan is endowed with a sacral aspect, 
reinforced by close alignment with organised religion. Th e ideology of ‘normality’ 
espoused by Putin, in fact, has many layers, reaching deep into the spiritual heart of 
the nation. Th is is why Putin, who is a far from a charismatic personality and who 
deliberately understates his rhetoric (apart from the occasional verbal fl ourish), 
has become structurally charismatic. Th is in part is derived from his institutional 
position, as president of a country with a neo-monarchical constitution. As in the 
United States, the president is both head of state and chief executive at the same 
time, but there is more to it than this. Th e culture of power in Russia tends towards 
personalisation, a feature that despite its grounding in Marxist materialism reached 
delirious heights in the Stalin years. 
 Putin’s persona is a pragmatic one, and despite certain pictorial excesses (for 
example, horse-riding bare-chested and diving for amphorae in the Black Sea), 
the overwhelming portrait presented in countless press conferences and meetings 
is that of the effi  cient and authoritative chief executive. Th e historian in Putin 
understands that the greatest victim of a ‘cult of personality’ is the personality 
itself. Th e sad end of most modern tyrants remains a salutary warning. Th e 
strutting and posturing of a Napoleon III or Benito Mussolini would be quickly 
lampooned in the age of the internet. Putin is thin-skinned and intolerant of the 
cruel satire that characterised his portrayal in the  Kukly political puppet show 
on NTV in the early 2000s (the latex representations of politicians similar to the 
 Spitting Image programme in the UK), and the programme was duly taken off  air. 
Putin has a rather prim 1950s view of the dignity of political offi  ce, but there is 
no shortage of public criticism of his policies in the serious press and some radio 
stations, although none is shown on the main nightly TV news programmes and 
the Sunday evening political chat shows (although some of the weekday ones can 
contain some sharply critical discussion). 
 Strong leadership remains in demand in Russia but is framed in a particular 
way. Putin’s model of cultivated modesty refl ects his personality, but it is also 
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a requirement of the character of his leadership. Putin is a broker between the 
various entrenched factional blocs, and his power derives from his ability to achieve 
consensus within the elite while satisfying basic social demands. Th is gave rise to the 
‘stability system’ described above, in which stability became the overriding concern, 
suppressing organised political struggle between diff erent visions and models of 
national development and reducing party and electoral competitiveness. Th is was 
mechanical (imposed) rather than organic self-sustaining stability. Democracy 
became the legitimating ideology, but already under Yeltsin it assumed features of 
what the Russian political scientist Dmitry Furman called ‘imitation democracy’, 
copying the forms of a democracy such as regular elections, a parliament with 
competing parties, and a free press, but these institutions reproduced the form, 
not the spirit, of their models.  105  Democracy is ‘managed’ by the administrative 
regime, the power system standing outside of democratic competition, creating 
what was very quickly dubbed ‘managed democracy’. Managerial practices very 
soon gained a high degree of autonomy. In the mid-2000s, the deputy head of the 
PA responsible for political aff airs, Surkov, as noted, devised the term ‘sovereign 
democracy’ to describe the phenomenon.  106  For him, sovereignty was the central 
political value, providing a framework to resist the normative hegemony of the 
West and to allow Russia to become more competitive in the global competition 
of ideas and values – as well as to compete more eff ectively in the global market.  107  
Surkov was associated with a ‘democratic statist’ orientation, in which sovereign 
democracy sought to combine the universals of democracy (as they understood 
the term) and the particular challenges facing Russia. 
 Surkov and his allies argue that ‘normality’ in Russia cannot simply adopt 
the institutional and cultural experience of the West but instead requires a new 
synthesis of Russian traditionalism with the norms of modernity. Contradiction 
and competition are not suppressed, as would be the case with the formal 
imposition of a state of emergency or martial law, described by the notion of 
‘autocracy’ in the democratisation literature to denote non-democracies. Instead, 
the Putinite system seeks to manage these contradictions while constraining 
competition. Th e electoral and party systems in mature democracies are also 
tailored to achieve certain desired outcomes, such as parliamentary majorities 
to provide stable government. In post-communist Russia, these constraints 
inhibited the emergence of a genuinely pluralistic system that could give voice 
to political contradictions and substantive alternative programmes. It is not so 
much that alternatives are not on off er – they are, with the CPRF and the LDPR 
at the neo-traditionalist end of the spectrum, and the Yabloko party off ering a 
social liberal perspective – but a variety of manipulative techniques reduce their 
impact, ranging from outright electoral fraud and ballot stuffi  ng to the exclusion 
of candidates. Democratic theory suggests that by containing contradiction 
within the formal rules of political competition, with political parties acting as the 
aggregators of social interests accompanied by the free expression of civil society, 
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societal tensions lose some of their system-destroying potential. By contrast, 
Putin appears to have been haunted by the fear of systemic breakdown and the 
potential for democracy to spawn forces that would destroy even the freedoms 
available within the framework of the managed system. Th is is the heart of the 
Putin paradox: a system that derives its legitimacy from democracy is unable to 
allow the free exercise of democracy for fear that democracy will destroy itself. Th e 
democracy paradox and Weimar Germany haunt post-communist Russia. 
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 Th e 1993 constitution explicitly repudiated Soviet principles and practices, but 
in the end, a monist power system was reproduced  – that is, a system that is 
concentrated rather than internally pluralist, in which competitive elections are 
managed by a force standing outside of the elections themselves and in which 
exceptional and arbitrary authority can be exercised. Th ese processes are governed 
by a single implacable rationality  – an idealised and reifi ed notion of ‘stability’. 
Th is is a stability generated not by the relatively harmonious interactions between 
political institutions and society, regulated by the law and norms enshrined in the 
constitutional order – what we call organic stability – but through the managerial 
capacities of an agency exogenous to that constitutional system – which can be 
called mechanical stability. Th is is the great paradox of the Putinite dual state: the 
administrative regime is committed to the perpetuation of its power as a way of 
maintaining the constitutional order, but the preservation of the power of the 
regime does not allow constitutional order to become endogenous (organic), a 
self-controlling and regulating mechanism of governance. Th e neo-patrimonial 
features of the system allowed a range of extraconstitutional forces and ‘factions’ 
to structure political space. When it came to the reform of the federal system, the 
struggle to overcome the segmented regionalism that had developed in the 1990s 
employed a range of administrative measures. Instead of using law to deal with the 
problems of legal deviance, managerial or administrative methods were applied. 
Th is is characteristic of the paradoxes of the dual state: attempts to strengthen the 
constitutional state end up only reinforcing the administrative character of the 
regime. 
 The state of exception and regionalism 
 Putinism is the politics of the exception and thereby in Schmittean terms reasserts 
its fundamentally political character. Carl Schmitt argued that sovereignty is the 
prerogative of the authority to decide on the exception. As he famously put it, ‘Th e 
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specifi c political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced 
is that between friend and enemy.’  1  Schmitt tied the concept of the ‘sovereign’ to 
the state of emergency; with the sovereign determining whether there was an 
emergency situation allowing the authorities to govern outside of the rules. In his 
 Political Th eology , he argued that ‘the exception is more interesting than the rule’. 
‘Th e rule proves nothing, the exception proves everything; it not only confi rms 
the rule, the rule itself exists only thanks to the exception.’  2  Th e sovereign acts 
outside of constitutional constraints in response to existential threats. In Russia, 
the permanent state of emergency has become the standard for post-communist 
normality, while normality is imbued with a permanent sense of the exceptional 
where it is never clear whether constitutional or regime rules will apply. Th is logic 
informs the dual state. 
 Th e Putin synthesis represents a distinctive reformulation of the political, in 
which the state of exception becomes permanent. Th e regime absorbs the entirety 
of the political, removing agonistic choices from society and resolving them within 
the regime. Th is reduces elections to little more than choices between diff erent 
facets of the hegemonic regime bloc (whether these are called UR, the CPRF or 
LDPR). Genuinely independent forces were eff ectively neutralised in the early 
2000s, either by co-optation or by depriving them of political space to develop. 
For example, the Yabloko party and its counterparts enjoy political and ideational 
independence, but the all-encompassing character of the Putin hegemonic system 
deprives them of political oxygen and resources. Th e characteristic squabbling and 
factionalism of the opposition is epiphenomenal to the broader context in which 
they work. It would take a monumental act of leadership to exercise independent 
agency in a system designed to stifl e such independence. 
 Naomi Klein argues that the destabilisation, disorientation and economic 
disaster of shock therapy in the early 1990s was exploited to force Russia’s turn 
towards neoliberal capitalism, one that undermined organised social interests 
(such as trade unions) and opened the Russian economy to predatory forms of 
international capitalism.  3  In a later work, she describes how the politics of the 
exception, what she calls the ‘shock doctrine’, especially in the wake of natural 
disasters such as Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and environs, weakened 
resistance to urban displacement and the lucrative gentrifi cation of what had 
previously been low-income neighbourhoods.  4  Klein’s work roots the politics 
of the exception in the use of crises to transform social relations and economic 
power. Th e Putin system is, thus, part of Russia’s extended social and political post-
communist social transformation, and there are deep continuities between the 
Yeltsin and Putin years. Th e year 2000 did not represent a major turning point. Th e 
diff erence is that what was immanent in the 1990s became real in the 2000s. With 
remarkable speed Putin eliminated genuine sources of autonomy in society: the 
governors in Russia’s regions, the ‘oligarchs’ in the economy and independent 
parties with the capacity to achieve governmental turnover in political society. 
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 Th e politics of exception is particularly stark in the sphere of human rights. Th e 
category of ‘political prisoner’ is obviously contentious, but Russia today is alleged 
to hold some 300 political and religious prisoners. Political activists or others who 
have fallen foul of the system tend to be prosecuted for criminal off ences, unlike in 
the Soviet period where the criminal code contained at least two overtly ‘political’ 
crimes, including the catch-all category of ‘anti-Soviet activity’. One of the longest-
serving prisoners in this category is Alexei Pichugin, a mid-level security offi  cial 
in Yukos who was the fi rst to be arrested in connection with the attack on the oil 
company. He was arrested on 19 June 2003 and aft er a series of trials was given 
a life sentence for ‘organising murders’, although the evidence is deeply fl awed. 
Th e European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has twice ruled that the Russian 
authorities have violated Pichugin’s right to a fair trial and his presumption of 
innocence. 
 Th e main target of oppression, contrary to the mainstream Western view, is not 
the liberals but radical Russian nationalists (as opposed to Putin-style moderate 
nationalism, which is better described as state patriotism). In the 1990s, Alexander 
Barkashov led the 15,000-strong far-right Russian National Unity ( Russkoe 
natsional’noe edinstvo , RNE) militia, but it was closed down by Putin (although 
remnants fought in the Donbas in 2014). Th e nationalist Ivan Mironov was accused 
of an assassination attempt against Chubais, and he vividly describes his time in 
jail.  5  Members of the far-right RNE were regularly jailed, while the Movement 
Against Illegal Immigration, who advanced the slogan ‘Russia for Russians’, was 
regularly condemned. Russian ethnic nationalism has the potential to mobilise 
popular opinion in a fundamentally anti-regime direction, above all by tapping 
into the powerful currents of neo-traditional and Eurasianist thinking. Russian 
ethnic nationalism has the power to destroy the state. Th is is why it is a mistake to 
call Putin a nationalist, if that is meant to be a commitment to ethnic Russians over 
those of the other people constituting Russia. He is instead a  derzhavnik (great 
power defender), with legitimacy derived not from the ethnic nation but the state.  6  
Putin is a statist rather than a nationalist. Th is entails the supremacy of the state 
over citizens, from whence in part the authoritarianism of the system is derived; 
however, typical of the Putinite paradoxes, it also guarantees relative interethnic 
peace and social inclusivity. 
 As for the regions, on coming to power, Putin launched a drive to reduce anti-
constitutional diversity but at the same time undercut the independence of regional 
executives. Many had adopted charters or constitutions that in one way or another 
breached the provisions of the 1993 national constitution. Some republics declared 
the right to declare war, to change the conditions for military service, to establish 
their own procedures for declaring a state of emergency, to conclude international 
treaties or to declare ownership over the natural resources in the region. Th ey were 
now forced to bring these documents into conformity with the federal constitution 
and to ensure that regional legislation was in accord with national provisions. 
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Putin terminated the forty-six bilateral treaties signed between Moscow and the 
regions between 1994 and 1998, forty-two of which contained provisions contrary 
to the constitution. Th e one signed with Tatarstan in February 1994, for example, 
granted the republic economic and political sovereignty, including control over 
foreign trade and foreign policy. Yeltsin in June 1999 already issued a decree 
calling for these treaties to be brought into conformity with national norms, but it 
had little eff ect until Putin enforced the policy. 
 Putin’s strategy is based on ‘desegmentation’  – the attempt to introduce 
legal uniformity across the country and to enhance the authority of the central 
authorities. In a typically paradoxical fashion, Putin reasserted the power of the 
constitution by introducing a range of para-constitutional bodies and practices, 
ones which did not infringe the letter of the constitution but which were not 
specifi ed in the text, and thus established a set of governance practices that ran 
alongside it. Putin’s fi rst major institutional innovation was the creation of seven 
federal districts (one of the para-constitutional institutions discussed above), 
each headed by a presidential envoy, with the task of imposing legal uniformity. 
Th e envoys reimposed central control over federal ministries and agencies in 
the regions, and monitored (the word  kontrol’ in Russian means supervision 
rather than control) the work of regional governors and republican presidents. 
A second innovation was the reform of the upper chamber of Russia’s bicameral 
parliament, the FC. Th e constitution stipulates that each subject of the federation 
sends two members, one from the legislative and one from the executive branch, 
but the method of selection is not specifi ed. In the fi rst convocation, senators 
were elected, but from 1995, the heads of the regional executive and legislative 
branches personally attended the FC. Putin removed  ex offi  cio membership, 
and each branch delegated someone to represent them. At a stroke, the status of 
the regional heads was reduced and the FC became a forum for placemen and 
women. Th e third reform compensated regional leaders for their loss of status by 
creating a State Council (for the governors) in September 2000 and a Council of 
Legislators the following year for the heads of regional legislatures. Both bodies are 
advisory and lack constitutional authority but allow governors and legislators to 
deliberate on matters of national policy. Th ese changes were accompanied by fi scal 
centralisation and federal interventions in regional aff airs.  7  
 Th e abolition of the direct election of governors in December 2004 was perhaps 
the most radical of all Putin’s federal reforms. Already in May 2000 the president 
had been granted the right to dismiss governors and disperse regional assemblies, 
although these powers were very hard to implement. Now, the president was 
granted the right to appoint governors, and thus one of the foundational principles 
of federal autonomy was breached. Regional assemblies were to vote on the 
presidential nominee, but if rejected twice the regional assembly could be dissolved. 
An amendment of December 2005 allowed the party that won most seats in regional 
assemblies to nominate candidates, a measure that was implemented during 
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Medvedev’s presidency, by which time UR enjoyed a majority in most regional 
assemblies. Th e struggle against regional segmentation constrained the autonomy 
of the subjects to the point that it became common to talk of defederalisation. Th is 
view is exaggerated, since the federal system remains in place and the centre cannot 
govern by fi at as in a unitary state but has to engage in permanent negotiation as 
part of a two-level system of governance. Nevertheless, the federal system moved 
from one extreme to another, from segmentation to centralisation, and a genuine 
balance incorporating the spirit of federalism is still to be established. Th is was in 
part rectifi ed by the restoration of gubernatorial elections following the resurgence 
of contentious politics in 2011. An unprecedented protest movement demanded 
political reform, to which Medvedev responded in his annual address to the 
Federal Assembly on 24 December by promising a broad package of political 
reform (see ‘regime reset’ in  Chapter 4 ). 
 Th e politics of the exception was practiced most spectacularly in Chechnya. 
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the republic had ambitions to become 
a sovereign state like the other fi ft een former Soviet Republics, but its status as 
an autonomous republic in the old federal system did not allow this. Instead, the 
republic granted itself unconstitutional powers and swift ly descended into civil 
confl ict, banditry and fi nancial manipulations, including raids on the federal 
treasury. A  negotiated solution may well have been possible, but urged on by 
hardliners in December 1994, Yeltsin launched a military operation that turned 
out to be disastrous for the republic and for Russia. Aft er two years of war, in 
which the capital, Grozny, was turned into rubble, a peace agreement was fi nally 
achieved at Khasavyurt in August 1996. A fi ve-year transition period was agreed, 
aft er which the republic’s fi nal status would be decided. Chechnya had achieved de 
facto independence, but instead of building a stable state, the republic, as we have 
seen, descended into lawlessness accompanied by the imposition of harsh Sharia 
laws and became a threat to its neighbours. By 1999, the situation was spinning 
out of control, and following two armed incursions into neighbouring Dagestan in 
August and the apartment bombings in Moscow and elsewhere, with responsibility 
attributed to Chechens, Putin in late September launched a second war. Learning 
from the disastrous experience of the fi rst, the military campaign was more 
successful, although attended once again by massive destruction and death. 
 By 2001, the worst of the fi ghting was over, and a political settlement was 
imposed in which one of the insurgent leaders of the fi rst war, the chief muft i 
of the so-called Republic of Ichkeria, Akhmad Kadyrov, took over and formally 
became president in October 2003. He was assassinated in May 2004, and when 
he became eligible, on reaching the age of 30, his son Ramzan became president. 
Th e Chechen compromise is a classic case of Putinite exceptionalism. Th e region 
formally remains part of the Russian Federation, but the policy of ‘Chechenisation’ 
created a constitutional and political black hole in which Kadyrov exercises almost 
unchecked power.  8  Federal agencies provide the bulk of funds for the republic, 
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but even the security agencies exercise little authority. Kadyrov expresses virulent 
loyalty to Putin personally but not to the Russian state. At the same time, Kadyrov 
sent his armed forces to Georgia in 2008, the Donbas in 2014 and Syria from 2015. It 
is alleged that Kadyrov’s forces were responsible for the murder of the investigative 
journalist Anna Politkovskaya on 7 October 2006 (Putin’s birthday), the human 
rights activist and board member of the human rights organisation Memorial, 
Natalia Estemirova, on 15 July 2009 and the leading oppositional politician Boris 
Nemtsov on 27 February 2015. Following the latter murder, Putin disappeared for 
two weeks, and (as Gleb Pavlovsky notes) ‘he spoke about how we in the future will 
heroically overcome the diffi  culties which we ourselves have created’, representing 
‘a public rebuke [to those who had killed Nemtsov]: you perhaps had state goals 
but you did not please me’. As Pavlovsky, a presidential advisor in Putin’s fi rst 
presidential decade and head of the Eff ective Politics Foundation, notes, ‘it became 
clear that the system was not completely under control’, with more indications of 
that sort ever since.  9  In other words, Putin’s permanent state of exception became 
victim to exceptional acts. 
 Th ere remains a high level of state repression in the republic, and contrary 
to the Russian constitution’s defence of religious freedom, women have to cover 
their heads in public with hijabs, a rule enforced with characteristic brutality 
by Kadyrov’s militia, while men have to wear beards. Th e application of Sharia 
law defi es Russia’s secular constitutional order. In the spring of 2017, it was 
reported that Kadyrov had launched a pogrom against gays, with over a hundred 
allegedly arrested, tortured or killed.  10  Th e repression continues. Kadyrov also 
had ambitions to conduct an independent foreign policy, especially in the Islamic 
world, where he considered himself the leader of Russian Muslims far beyond the 
Caucasus. Kadyrov pacifi ed Chechnya through the destruction of international 
radical Islamic forces, and the republic has now been rebuilt, with the help of 
generous funds from Moscow. Th ere are even plans to turn Chechnya into a 
tourist destination, with a ski resort being built not far from Shatoi, a highland 
town that was repeatedly the site of terrible fi ghting in the two wars.  11  Kadyrovite 
Chechnya exposed the harsh limits of the Putinite stability system. Where the 
constitutional order gives way to personalism and even to sultanism, the situation 
becomes anything but stable and ultimately undermines the coherence of Russia.  12  
Kadyrov remains defi antly independent of Russia’s constitutional state, but his 
loud loyalty to Putin damages the integrity of the regime of which Putin is head. 
In the post-Putin era, this personalistic semi-feudal construct may well give way 
to renewed confl ict. 
 Th e Chechen case is exemplary when analysing Putin’s politics of exceptionalism. 
Although calling for uniformity and subordination to the constitution, Chechnya 
represents an extreme case of deviation from these principles. Th e long-term 
goal of Moscow is to ‘normalise’ Chechnya and to make it just another region, 
but as long as Kadyrov rules, there is little prospect of this being achieved.  13  
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Russian security services had long sought to cut Kadyrov down to size, but the 
cost would be exorbitant. Aft er a confrontation between federal agency offi  cials 
and Kadyrov’s forces in early 2015, Putin came under enormous pressure to put 
an end to Chechnya’s ‘legal separatism’. As Amy Knight notes in her study of 
‘Putin’s monster’, ‘If Putin moved against the Chechen leader he would have to 
eliminate Kadyrov’s large extended family and the loyal troops who form part of 
his notorious private army, the so-called Kadyrovtsy.’  14  In eff ect, he would have to 
launch another Chechen war. Instead, it is argued that Nemtsov’s assassination – 
on the Bolshoi Moskvoretsky Bridge at its closest point to the Kremlin walls – on 
27 February 2015 was designed to warn Putin of the consequences. Following the 
killing, Putin cancelled all meetings, and it is assumed that during his absence, 
Putin was considering the options:  to launch what would in eff ect be the third 
Chechen war, with all of its destructive consequences, or to acquiesce in Kadryov’s 
anomalous status. In the end, Putin opted to maintain the status quo. Both options 
were invidious (as Russians say,  obe khuzhe ) and refl ect the harsh realities of trying 
to manage Russia’s unruly regions and fragmented political sphere. 
 Putin and the past 
 Th e Putin phenomenon represents a distinctive response to the problem of 1917 
and Marxism–Leninism in the country. While Gorbachev initially tried to salvage 
something from Leninism, and Yeltsin simply denounced the whole communist 
experiment, Putin forged a new synthesis that recognised the modernising impulse 
of the Soviet experiment, although acknowledging the enormous price that was 
paid. At no time has Putin evinced any sympathy whatsoever for Lenin and has 
indeed accused him of having placed an ‘atomic bomb’ under Russian statehood 
by devising the system of ethno-federalism with arbitrary borders. He cited the 
example of the Donbas, which in his view had been transferred to Ukrainian 
jurisdiction to increase the proportion of proletarians in the country, a decision 
that Putin categorised as ‘delirious’.  15  In his view, Lenin’s creation of a federal state 
in which the entities enjoyed the right to secede provoked the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. 
 Putin draws on an heterogeneous range of ideas, and the synthesis modifi es 
over time to refl ect changes in society and the factional balance. As noted, 
Putin in 2005 lamented the break-up of the Soviet Union, but this did not mean 
that he sought to recreate the USSR. Putin’s repertoire of historical fi gures has 
changed over time but indicates an eclectic list of incompatible elements. Putin 
rehabilitated the religious philosopher Ivan Ilyin, deported by the Soviet Union 
in 1922, but this does not make him ‘Putin’s philosopher of Russian fascism’.  16  
Ilyin believed that Russia was naturally Orthodox and authoritarian, with a 
destiny separate from the West, which he saw as dangerous and out to destroy 
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Russia’s Orthodox civilisation. Th e sentiment is widely shared in post-communist 
Russia, but this is far from fascism. Th ere remains an enormous well of imperial 
resentment, born of the dissolution of the powerful communist system in 1989 
and the disintegration of the country in 1991. Unlike the other Soviet republics, 
Russia did not gain independence from an alien empire but from its other 
self. Not surprisingly, the ‘transition’ to democracy in these circumstances was 
traumatic, and the two Russias – the old imperial power with global reach and 
the representative of a universal ideology, and the slimmed-down post-imperial 
democratising country in search of adequate forms to institutionalise its cultural 
and historical specifi city – are not easily reconciled.  17  
 Putin’s strategy when it comes to history is the same as in politics: to draw on 
all historical epochs but to let none dominate. In his annual address to the Federal 
Assembly in 2012, Putin argued, 
 To revive national consciousness, we need to link historical eras and get back 
to understanding the simple truth that Russia did not begin in 1917, or even 
in 1991, but rather, that we have a common, continuous history spanning over 
one thousand years, and we must rely on it to fi nd inner strength and purpose 
in our national development.  18  
 Th e issue of historical appraisal came to a head when it came to mark the 
hundredth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution in 2017. In the end, the event 
was acknowledged rather than commemorated.  19  For liberals, the communist 
seizure of power in October 1917 represented the repudiation of everything that 
the ‘Russian revolution’ had aspired to ever since the Decembrists went on to 
Senate Square in St Petersburg in 1825 calling for a constitution and accountable 
government. Th e 1905 revolution fi nally gave birth to a constitutional monarchy 
of sorts, although Nicholas II never fully reconciled himself to parliamentary 
democracy. Following his abdication in February 1917, for a time it looked as if 
the Provisional Government would fi nally give constitutional form to democratic 
aspirations, and hence the plans for a Constituent Assembly to hammer out the 
details. Th ese plans were overwhelmed by the continuing war, the dynamics of 
‘dual power’ as workers and peasants organised in ‘soviets’ (councils), and then 
the overthrow of the Provisional Government in what some now call a ‘coup’ by 
the Bolsheviks in October.  20  When it came to the centenary, not only was there 
very little offi  cial commemoration but also the broader debate among public 
intellectuals was remarkably muted. Discussion of historical issues has long 
been a surrogate for political debate in Russia, but the enormity of the Soviet 
revolution and its complex legacies in conditions of renewed confl ict with the 
West undermined the foundations for such a discussion. Th e old certainties had 
gone, and offi  cial discourse lacked a master narrative to provide a framework 
for new orientations. Putin’s convictions are anti-revolutionary, and this set the 
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tone for the year. Apart from some academic conferences and minor events, the 
anniversary passed unmarked and largely unlamented. 
 As early as 1996, the post-communist authorities distanced themselves from 
1917, renaming what had earlier been the 7 November (25 October in the Old-Style 
Julian calendar) Day of Accord and Reconciliation, and in 2004 it was renamed 
Unity Day and shift ed to 4 November, the day of Moscow’s liberation from the Poles 
in 1612. Despite calls for unity, there remain passionate contending views. For the 
Russian Orthodox Church, the Bolshevik revolution is an unmitigated evil. Th e 
tsar himself suff ered before being murdered, along with his family and retainers, 
in Ekaterinburg on the night of 16–17 July 2018. Nicholas II was canonised by 
the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA) in 1981 and by the Moscow 
Patriarchate in 2000. For the CPRF and its supporters, the events of the fateful 
years are still described as the ‘Great October Socialist Revolution’, and hymns are 
sung in its praise. For the people, the memory of the Bolshevik repressions is now 
remembered in the Immortal Regiment movement. Th is began in Tomsk in 2011 
where citizen investigators discovered the names of the People’s Commissariat of 
Internal Aff airs (NKVD) operatives who had killed their family. Th e movement 
has grown, and now millions march on 9 May (Victory Day), holding portraits of 
grandparents and relatives who had suff ered in one way or another.  21  Th is is part of 
a living history in which people immortalise the suff ering of previous generations. 
It also humanises what has become pompous Victory Day celebrations over Nazi 
Germany. It is worth remembering that following the fi rst Victory Parade in 1945, 
the second only took place in 1965, the third in 1985 and the fourth in 1990, and 
the parade only became an annual event and a public holiday in 1995, at the nadir 
of Russia’s fortunes and in some way compensating for current failures. Th ere 
remains the problem of distinguishing between the people’s triumph over Hitler 
and Stalin’s role in that victory. Th e path to historical reconciliation, in this and 
the revolution as a whole, remains contested. Some recent publications suggest 
that the enduring divisions of the revolutionary era are being transcended. As 
the Russian historian Alexei Miller puts it, ‘Th e point is not that we need to fi nd 
out which side was right or wrong in the revolutionary confl ict. Rather, we must 
accept that remaining humane is much more important than being red or white.’  22  
 Like his predecessors since Stalin’s death in 1953, Putin has faced the challenge 
of coming to terms with the enormity of the phenomenon of mass terror. Since 
the perestroika years and the establishment of Memorial, created in the heat of 
perestroika in January 1989 by Arseny Roginsky, Lev Ponomarev and others to 
preserve the memory of the victims of Stalinist repression and to conduct research, 
activists have been working to rediscover the historical truth, including the 
discovery of burial sites and who was buried in them. One of them, Yuri Dmitriev, 
discovered the Sandarmokh site in northwest Russia by the White Sea canal. He was 
explicit about the political signifi cance of his work: ‘For our government to become 
… accountable, we need to educate the people.’ Th is maxim was particularly true 
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in his case, because in December 2016, he was arrested and accused of taking 
indecent pictures of his 12-year-old adopted daughter, when in fact he had been 
recording her development since he and his wife had taken her into their family as 
a malnourished child of 3. For a brief period in the early 1990s, the secret police 
archives had been open, and Dmitriev read thousands of execution orders into his 
tape recorder, which he then used to match with the skeletons he unearthed. In 
January 2018, Dmitriev was released from detention, and in April, he was acquitted 
by the Petrozavodsk District Court, a decision overturned in June by the regional 
Supreme Court and new charges were brought.  23  Memorial has also come under 
attack, with several of its branches being declared ‘foreign agents’.  24  Nevertheless, 
Memorial fi ghts on to record the repressions of the Soviet years and to monitor 
the abuses in Chechnya and elsewhere in Russia today. As long as it survives, the 
spirit of freedom and genuine democracy, long nurtured in the recesses of Russian 
and Soviet society and which fl owered in the perestroika years, will remain alive. 
Memorial is a living monument to the hopes of the Soviet underground and the 
optimism of the perestroika years. 
 Evaluation of Stalin is a surrogate debate over Russia’s past and a struggle over 
models of the future. Th e fundamental divide is between those who consider 
Russia, in broad terms, part of Western modernity and those who would like it 
to become the rampart of a struggle for civilisational alternatives.  25  Th e contest is 
fought over the terrain of liberal values, tolerance and inclusivity, which too oft en in 
Russian parlance are dismissed as no more than ‘political correctness’. Th e ‘cultural 
turn’ in Russian politics aft er 2012 was accompanied by a hardening of attitudes 
against human rights campaigners in general and Memorial activists in particular. 
Russian TV attacked Memorial in November 2016 aft er it published information 
on forty thousand Soviet secret police offi  cials, accusing it of helping ‘those who 
aim to destroy the Russian state’. Earlier that year, in June, Putin warned that the 
‘excessive demonisation’ of Stalin was a ‘means of attacking the Soviet Union 
and Russia’.  26  Th ere are reports that statues of Stalin have been erected in some 
towns. However, all this does not mean the rehabilitation of Stalin. Th e regime 
has refused to adopt a policy of historical homogeneity and instead has allowed 
alternative narratives to compete. Th is is a politics of  bricolage , bringing together 
incompatible elements.  27  Th is fragmented approach to history is in keeping with 
the generally ideologically eclectic character of the regime, which itself refl ects the 
moods and concerns of society. 
 Th e hybrid approach applies to the study of Stalinism and above all to the 
teaching of history. Although one notorious textbook by Alexander Filippov, 
 A History of Russia 1945–2006 , published in 2007, argued that Stalin was an 
‘eff ective manager’ and emphasised his role as a war leader, other texts have been 
approved for use in schools that take a more critical stance. A condensed version 
of Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s  Th e Gulag Archipelago remains compulsory reading 
for secondary school pupils. Although some infl uential offi  cials have favoured 
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relatively positive evaluations of Stalin, notably the Minister of Education Olga 
Vasileva and the Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinsky, their views are not 
dominant or uncontested. As a recent study argues, 
 Despite the behaviour and statements of Medinsky and frequent eff orts by 
the regime to ignore the crimes of Stalin, the assessment that the Kremlin 
uniformly burnishes and simplifi es the Soviet past is itself a simplifi cation. 
Although Medinsky clearly enjoys support among various strata of incumbent 
elites, his statements do not command  ex cathedra status; his perspective on 
the Soviet past is far from hegemonic, whether in the ranks of the regime or in 
Russian society.  28  
 Th e evaluation of Stalin, like the assessment of the Bolshevik revolution itself, 
remains the subject of bitter controversy, and the issue divides the regime as much 
as society. While Stalin statues have been erected, an impressive Gulag museum 
has been opened in Moscow, a monument to the victims of the Gulag was unveiled 
by the Admiralty building in St Petersburg and the former Gulag camp Perm-36 
has become a museum of Stalinist repression. 
 Memorial came under sporadic attack by the  siloviki and in 2014 was forced to 
register as a ‘foreign agent’. In 1991, Memorial succeeded in replacing the statue of 
Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the Cheka (the precursor to the KGB and FSB), 
outside the Lubyanka (the headquarters of Russia’s police from its foundation in 
December 1918) with a massive stone from the Solovetsky Islands, the site of the 
fi rst Soviet prison camps established by Lenin. Memorial’s attempt to establish a 
publicly funded library and archive of state repression and the secret police failed. 
In 1998, Roginsky became the head of the Memorial board and remained a symbol 
of integrity and steadfastness. Despite criticism from some human rights activists, 
he joined the presidential commission overseeing the building of the Wall of 
Sorrow, arguing that ‘a monument on behalf of the state is necessary because the 
state must clearly say terror is a crime’.  29  Th e wall joined other monuments to the 
terror inaugurated in 2017. A wall bearing the names of about twenty thousand 
victims opened in September at the Butovo fi ring range, and a memorial at the 
Sretensky Monastery commemorates the 750,000 people executed during the 
Great Terror in 1937–8. Th e Gulag Museum moved into larger premises and 
presents moving testimony to the crimes of the Soviet regime. 
 It is important to distinguish between decommunisation and destalinisation. 
Th e former rejects the whole legacy of the Soviet period, including its social and 
modernisation achievements, whereas the latter focuses on the crimes of the 
political system. Confl ation of the two has provoked an upsurge in grass-roots 
Stalinism, which typically has little to do with the man himself but seeks to defend 
the gains of the Soviet period. Indeed, in certain respects, decommunisation has 
impeded eff ective destalinisation.  30  As far as Tony Wood is concerned, the survival 
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of Soviet welfare institutions provided Russians with some sort of a social safety 
net aft er the fall of communism, including low rents, free medicine, the pension 
system and access to free healthcare. Th e attempt to dismantle the Soviet social 
security legacy by liberal reformers provoked sustained resistance.  31  
 As for Putin himself, as in so many issues, his views are as divided as those of 
the country. He acknowledged the achievements of the Soviet period (in particular, 
through the sacrifi ces of the Second World War, in which his parents had nearly 
died) while decrying the savagery. Putin condemned the superfl uous sacrifi ces 
in the name of a fl awed modernisation project, although he recognised the 
achievements of the period. Opening the Wall of Sorrow (located, appropriately, 
on Sakharov Prospect) on 30 October 2017 (the national Day of Remembrance of 
Victims of Political Repression), he argued, 
 It is very important that we all and future generations  – this is of great 
signifi cance  – know about, and remember this tragic period in our history 
when entire social groups and entire peoples were cruelly persecuted, including 
workers, peasants, engineers, military commanders, clergy, government 
employees, scientists and cultural fi gures. Neither talent, nor services to the 
Motherland, nor sincere devotion to it could help avoid repression, because 
unwarranted and absolutely absurd charges could be brought against anyone. 
Millions of people were declared ‘enemies of the people’, shot or mutilated, or 
suff ered in prisons, labour camps or exile. Th is terrifying past cannot be deleted 
from national memory or, all the more so, be justifi ed by any references to the 
so-called best interests of the people.  32  
 Th is was an unambiguous condemnation of Stalinism, while hinting at the 
achievements of the Soviet period. 
 Anti-revolution as a political practice 
 Contrary to the common assertion that he is a ‘counter-revolutionary’,  33  Putin, in 
fact, is ‘anti-revolutionary’, condemning not just the Bolshevik revolution but also 
the idea of revolution as a form of political change. He argued, ‘We did not need a 
global revolution’, referring to 1917, but is consistent in his view that revolutions 
infl ict more damage than good.  34  He applies this not only to perceived Western 
attempts to achieve regime change through ‘colour revolutions’ in post-Soviet 
Eurasia but also to what Moscow came to see as Western ‘revisionist’ attempts 
to reshape the global order in its image. Th is stance is obviously generated by 
concerns over regime preservation, but it is also rooted in the perceived deleterious 
consequences of revolutions in general and most immediately by the revolutionary 
although relatively peaceful ‘bourgeois democratic’ revolution of 1991, which 
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precipitated the disintegration of the USSR and inaugurated a decade of social and 
economic cataclysms and perceived national humiliation. 
 Although he is an anti-revolutionary, Putin has accepted regime change 
when it does not challenge the geopolitical balance. Th is was the case repeatedly 
in Kyrgyzstan, in Armenia in mid-2018, and Moscow even brokered Eduard 
Shevardnadze’s removal in the Rose Revolution in Georgia in December 2003 
when it looked as if Mikheil Saakashvili was amenable to a deal with the Kremlin. 
When it came to Ukraine, however, every change of government became bound 
up with a senseless and ultimately catastrophic struggle between Eastern and 
Western geopolitical orientations. Th e standard liberal view here has matters 
precisely upside down:  a democratic, thriving and Europe-associated Ukraine 
poses no threat to Russia or even ‘Putin’s regime’ and would even be welcomed, 
but the radicalism of the Atlanticist geopolitical reorientation and the monist 
interpretation of Ukrainian history did represent a threat to established ties and to 
Russian security. Successive post-communist Russian leaders sought to obviate the 
potential confl ict through the creation of sturdy and independent pan-European 
structures. Instead, enlargement of the Atlantic system denoted the expansion 
not only of a normative and economic order, which Putin initially was ready to 
embrace, but also of a power system, which Putin again was initially ready to 
accept, albeit reluctantly, until the price of that acceptance was perceived to be 
too high. 
 Despite his anti-revolutionary beliefs, Putin is cautious in criticising Soviet 
leaders, for fear of alienating the older generation. Although a consistent critic 
of Lenin, he left  Lenin’s body in the mausoleum on Red Square, well aware that 
his removal would provoke confl ict and divide society. As for Stalin, Putin, as we 
have seen, is as torn as the rest of society, with some 54 per cent in March 2016 
considering that the Soviet leader had played at least a somewhat positive role in 
history. Th e percentage believing that Stalin’s cruelty was ‘historically justifi ed’ and 
his repressions were a ‘political necessity’ rose from 9 per cent in August 2007 to 
26 per cent in March 2016, while over the same time period, those condemning his 
political crimes fell from 72 per cent to 45 per cent.  35  Putin acknowledges that in the 
Soviet years, the country was transformed as it industrialised, urbanised, became 
more literate, educated and defeated Nazi Germany in the terrible war between 
June 1941 and May 1945, exploded its fi rst atomic device in August 1948, launched 
the fi rst sputnik to orbit the earth with the dog Laika in November 1957, put the 
fi rst man in space (Yuri Gagarin) in April 1961 and the fi rst woman (Valentina 
Tereshkova) in June 1963, and went on to become a nuclear superpower. Equally, 
the cost in human lives and the stifl ing of autonomous creativity was enormous. 
 Putin is an organic traditionalist, understanding that the broad river of Russian 
experience, both good and ill, cannot be simply repudiated or stopped; but neither 
can it form the basis of contemporary government or policy, as demanded by an 
assorted phalanx of neo-traditionalists and  okhraniteli . Putin sought to devise a new 
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synthesis, fi nding elements of a ‘useable’ past, while condemning the excesses. Th is, 
of course, satisfi ed neither extreme and left  the problem of Stalinism unresolved. 
Th e victims of communist repression have been memorialised and Stalin has not 
been rehabilitated, but Soviet-style authoritarianism still taints the body politic 
and social life. Stalin’s achievements as a ‘good manager’ in industrialisation and in 
presiding over the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War are recognised, but the 
mass repressions are no longer centre stage in offi  cial representations of the Soviet 
past. Th is is why the regime found it so diffi  cult to shape a coherent narrative on 
the hundredth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. 
 In October 2017, Putin summed up his negative view of revolution as a way of 
resolving social and political contradictions. At the Valdai Club gathering, he noted 
the eff ects of technological change and the costs of not responding adequately in 
a timely manner: 
 Successful technological, industrial breakthroughs were followed by dramatic 
upheavals and revolutionary disruptions. It all happened because the country 
failed to address social discord and overcome the clear anachronisms in society 
in time. Revolution is always the result of an accountability defi cit in both those 
who would like to conserve, to freeze in place the outdated order of things that 
clearly needs to be changed, and those who aspire to speed the changes up, 
resorting to civil confl ict and destructive resistance. 
 He then made the crucial argument that in many ways lies at the heart of the Putin 
phenomenon: 
 Today, as we turn to the lessons of a century ago, namely, the Russian Revolution 
of 1917, we see how ambiguous its results were, how closely the negative 
and, we must acknowledge, the positive consequences of those events are 
intertwined. Let us ask ourselves: was it not possible to follow an evolutionary 
path rather than go through a revolution? Could we not have evolved by way of 
gradual and consistent forward movement rather than at a cost of destroying 
our statehood and the ruthless fracturing of millions of human lives. However, 
the largely utopian social model and ideology, which the newly formed state 
tried to implement initially following the 1917 revolution, was a powerful 
driver of transformations across the globe (this is quite clear and must also be 
acknowledged), caused a major revaluation of development models, and gave 
rise to rivalry and competition, the benefi ts of which, I would say, were mostly 
reaped by the West.  36  
 Putin’s condemnation of Stalinism here came close to decommunisation as a 
whole. It certainly represented strong condemnation of revolution as a mode of 
political change. 
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 Revolution means public activism and mobilisation, whereas depoliticisation is 
at the heart of the Putinite culture of power. Th e system demobilised spontaneous 
and independent political activity, but at moments of stress it called on the people. 
Th is was the case in the mid-2000s when a number of youth groups (notably,  Nashi 
and  Molodaya Gvardiya  – Young Guard) were mobilised against ‘colour revolution’ 
and again in early 2012 in response to the protests against electoral fraud. A mass 
meeting was held on Poklonnaya Hill on the eve of the March presidential 
ballot. Putin for a time licenced the neo-traditionalists to mobilise, and they did 
so with gusto. With the election out of the way, the regime once again clamped 
down. Similarly, in 2014 during the Ukraine crisis, Putin once again allowed 
neo-traditionalists, and in particular Russian nationalists, to become politically 
(and even militarily) active, but once the crisis had passed, the genie of Russian 
ethnonationalism was fi rmly returned to the bottle.  37  While the West complains 
about the liberal political prisoners in Russia, the great majority, as mentioned, 
throughout Putin’s rule have come from the nationalist wing. Any attempt to 
impose a liberal order on Russia through ‘regime change’ would be met by a hard 
nationalist response, including the unleashing of modern-day Black Hundreds 
amid renewed pogroms and purges. Th is is why the Putinite stabilisation, while 
entirely satisfying few, is recognised by the great majority as a lesser evil than 
renewed revolutionary convulsions.  38  Putin understood that the greatest danger 
to the regime comes from the nationalist and neo-communist right rather than 
the liberal ‘left ’. 
 Th is is why the bounds of ‘permitted dissent’ (to use the Soviet-era term) are 
drawn so tightly. Putin has an abiding fear of popular mobilisation and, thus, 
sought to ensure control of the streets and squares. Th e ‘anti-Maidan’ groups 
include the National Liberation Movement (NOD), the revival of the Young Guard 
from 2018 and the creation of the Young Army, a military-patriotic movement 
for schoolchildren.  39  While Putinism is not a coherent ideology, it does represent 
a consistent set of political practices. Earlier, we discussed the concept of a 
‘stability system’, and the defence of this stability was maintained by a range of 
‘manual’ interventions into political processes. Putin’s authoritarianism sacrifi ced 
institutional checks and balances enshrined in the constitutional order on the 
altar of political expediency and political stability. Th is generated a set of political 
practices, which we will now examine. 
 First, the struggle against external and domestic enemies, real and imagined, 
and threats to political stability underpinned and justifi ed the regime system of 
power. External threats were designated as ‘colour revolutions’. Th is was reinforced 
by the struggle against democracy promotion, which was considered little more 
than a synonym for attempts to delegitimate the administration and ultimately 
to achieve ‘regime change’, in the parlance of Anglo-American interventionism 
of the 2000s. Th e foreign agents’ law of 2012 clamped down on foreign funding 
for broadly defi ned political activities, with repression strengthened following the 
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Ukraine crisis. One of the most prominent critics of the annexation of Crimea, the 
philosophy professor Andrei Zubov, lost his position at the MGIMO University, 
while the head of the state archive service, Sergei Mironenko, was also dismissed. 
Th e director of INION (a social sciences research institute), Yuri Pivovarov, was 
subject to legal trials. In 2016, a number of institutions were categorised as ‘foreign 
agents’, including the Levada Centre for public opinion research, the Centre for 
Independent Social Research in St Petersburg, the Saratov Centre for Gender 
Studies and, as noted, the human rights organisation Memorial. Th e autonomy of 
higher education institutions was undermined by restrictions on the election of 
rectors, and they became in eff ect appointees of the education ministry. 
 While repression is relatively soft , it is real and highly destructive of Russia’s 
aspirations to become a dynamic modern and open society. An example of the 
porosity of the system was the repeated attempts to close the European University 
in St Petersburg (EUSP). Th is is a private independent postgraduate institution 
with 100 staff  and 260 students initially established with foreign funding. Th e 
EUSP quickly established itself as one of the best social science and humanities 
universities in the city with a world-class research record. Th e university survived 
several attempts to close it down, notably aft er it received a  € 700,000 grant from 
the European Commission in 2007 to fund election monitoring, when it was 
charged with infringing fi re code regulations. Th e attack was renewed in 2016, with 
accusations of up to 120 infringements, including the absence of adequate sporting 
facilities. Kudrin, one of the patrons of the university, repeatedly spoke with 
Putin about the attack, and Putin apparently ordered that the matter be resolved 
positively, that is, in favour of the university. Despite this, the attack continued, 
and on 28 September 2017, the university’s educational licence was withdrawn.  40  
It was not clear at what level in St Petersburg the assault was launched and what 
the motives were: Was it an ideological attack on a known and respected centre 
of Western educational norms; a conservative backlash against liberal ideas, with 
the St Petersburg UR deputy Vitaly Milonov complaining about the teaching of 
gender studies at the institution; about property, with the university occupying the 
highly desirable and centrally located Small Marble Palace; or far more petty, with 
neighbours fearing the noise and disturbance that would accompany the planned 
modernisation of the building? It could have been some or all of the above, but it 
is clear that some sort of coalition came together to crush the university, despite 
Putin’s ostensible attempts to save the institution. Th e university was subject to a 
procession of inspections by state control agencies, and in the end, it was forced to 
close its doors to new students and become a research-only institution.  41  However, 
in August 2018, the EUSP received a new educational licence and reopened in a 
diff erent premises soon aft er for a new cohort of taught students. Th e incident 
exposed the ability of ‘horizontal’ forces to stymie the presidential ‘vertical’. 
 Th is testifi es not to the strength of the system but to its weakness. Th e 
institutions of the constitutional state, even when mobilised by the president, 
9781788318303_pi-306.indd   74 15-Oct-19   12:25:35
75
PUTIN AND POLITICS 75
appeared powerless in the face of spontaneous arbitrariness. Th is was given 
legislative form in the ‘patriotic’ legislation adopted by parliament, which in many 
cases was too restrictive even for the Kremlin. Th is is why Volodin was despatched 
to the Duma following the September 2016 election. He swift ly introduced new 
rules designed to stifl e independent legislative initiative, which at fi rst sight 
appears as an infringement on the rights of parliament, but its deeper purpose 
was to constrain the fl ood of restrictive and ideologically motivated repressive 
measures  – to turn off  the ‘mad printing press’. Volodin aimed to reinvigorate 
the Duma and to enhance its prestige while improving its internal procedures.  42  
Volodin hosted the fi rst International Forum on Parliamentarism on 4–5 June 
2018, which later became an annual event. Delegations attended from around 
the world, although notably very few from the West. Irina Olimpieva correctly 
notes the paradox:  ‘Th e increasingly common injection of “political logic” into 
governance processes in fact works against the state’s own agenda of improving 
the situation in science and education, resulting in a policymaking process that is 
ineffi  cient and contradictory.’  43  
 Second, the maintenance of a dominant political party marginalised other 
organised political forces. UR dominates the party, electoral and legislative 
spheres, and although other parties survive, the ‘systemic opposition’ is eff ectively 
forced to align with UR. Like Mexico’s Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) 
between 1929 and 2000, UR unites the various elite factions and aggregates their 
interests. Th e party also became the vehicle for bureaucrats and the channel for 
advancement. Even Putin was aware of the party’s limitations, and this is why in 
2011 he created the ONF to act as a check on the bureaucratic degeneration of the 
pedestal party and as an alternative vehicle for monitoring the bureaucracy and 
for political mobility. UR is not the ruling party but the dominant party, a very 
diff erent political model. Th e experience of Armenia in 2018 shows how quickly 
such a pedestal party can evaporate (see below). 
 Th ird, unlike in the Soviet years, there is no need for total media control, 
and, thus, websites and newspapers are largely left  alone. Derk Sauer, the head 
of Sanoma Independent Media which owns 60 per cent of the Russian magazine 
market, argued that Putin modelled himself not on Brezhnev but on Silvio 
Berlusconi: ‘It’s not for nothing that they are such good friends. Th ey understand 
that if you control the main TV stations and make propaganda there, you’ll go far.’ 
Th is led to the paradoxical outcome that ‘there’s complete press freedom for the 
informed but none for the uninformed’.  44  State-owned or supported publications 
have deep pockets and continue to operate in a Soviet-style manner, although they 
have adapted now to the advertising market while wishing to be seen as serving 
the public. Th e overweening presence of the government in the media sphere 
is a Soviet legacy. ‘But it’s also the result of creative engineering by Putin-era 
authorities, aimed at stimulating the growth of a broad spectrum of media voices 
while also keeping them all on a leash.’  45  On 15 November 2017, the State Duma 
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adopted a new media law that forced foreign media to register as ‘foreign agents’, a 
response to a similar law which forced the RT (formerly Russia Today) TV station 
in the United States to register as a foreign agent. 
 Fourth, student activism in Russia is very weak, refl ecting the state-dependent 
structure of the higher education sector as well as the general scepticism of radical 
engagement in a society still in the throes of post-revolutionary demobilisation, 
although that is weakening. Demobilisation is not the same as apathy, and is 
reinforced by complex structures of coercion, including disciplinary practices 
within institutions and the threat of expulsion. Some institutions still practice 
Soviet-style exercises in getting out the student vote at election time. Tomsk State 
University has been in the forefront of such practices, accompanied by threats 
against student participation in anti-corruption protests. Local FSB offi  cials 
returned to the personnel department, eff ectively recreating the old Soviet ‘fi rst 
department’, the KGB offi  ce overseeing personnel matters. Th ere was considerable 
passive resistance among staff  and students to the recreation of Soviet-style 
surveillance and mobilisation, as well as open condemnation of attempts to 
monitor staff  travelling abroad for conferences and research. An order issued by 
the education ministry in February 2019 urged scientists to inform their superiors 
fi ve days in advance of any plans to meet foreign colleagues, a move that, if 
implemented, would kill the internationalization aspirations of Russian research 
institutions. Already Putin’s goal set in 2012 to get at least fi ve Russian universities 
into the top-100 lists by 2020 was far from being achieved. It was this sort of Soviet-
style repressions that brought tens of thousands of young people onto the streets in 
the summer of 2019 to protest against the exclusion of opposition candidates from 
the Moscow Duma elections of 8 September. Th e era of demobilisation appeared 
to be over. 
 Putin’s statecraft 
 In his 2008 press conference, Putin assessed his performance:  ‘I have worked 
like a galley slave throughout these eight years, morning till night, and I have 
given all I  could to this work.’  46  He was ready for the ‘opportunity to be 
useful’ to his country in another post, and for the next four years, he served 
as prime minister before returning in 2012. Th e time horizon now shift ed to 
2024 when Russia would possibly have to learn to live without Putin. A  long 
era in Russia’s history is associated with his name and his unique style. Putin 
became a consummate politician, although he never hid his contempt for 
competitive politics. Already in March 2000 Putin said, ‘All these modern 
election technologies are a pretty dishonest thing. Th ey always involve looking 
into the eyes of millions of people and giving promises you know are impossible 
to fulfi l. I cannot bring myself to do that. And I am very glad that so far I have 
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not had to.’ Th is later bloomed into a general policy of non-committal, in which 
he rarely pins himself down with specifi c promises.  47  Th is signals a deeper issue. 
In his ‘Politics as a Vocation’, Max Weber argued that leadership requires the 
acceptance of ‘ethical paradoxes’, compromises that allow a leader to bend with 
the wind rather than break in the storm. Th e ‘ethics of responsibility’ recognises 
the dangers inherent in ‘a pure ethic of absolute ends’.  48  However, there has 
to be a balance between compromise and principle (what Weber calls ‘the 
ethics of conviction’, enduring core beliefs). Th e Putinite leadership strategy of 
permanent compromise eroded the enunciation and implementation of long-
term objectives based on convictions. 
 Th ese are important facets of Putin’s statecraft , a concept rather diff erent from 
the broader notion of leadership. Statecraft  refers specifi cally to the discourse 
and practices of managing the aff airs of state, whereas leadership encompasses 
the many facets of the activity of a leader.  49  Th e greatest manual on statecraft  
is provided by Niccolo Machiavelli’s  Th e Prince , where he outlines alternative 
strategies for a leader to achieve their goals. Machiavelli’s name is now associated 
with a distinctive form of cynical statecraft  and raises the question of whether 
Putin’s leadership style can be so designated. Th e style of rule is only part of 
the question, since Machiavelli stressed a rational and pragmatic approach to 
deciding fundamental questions, and in substance, this is Putin’s approach. 
Machiavelli distinguished between  fortuna , which in common parlance is called 
luck, and  virt ù , the qualities of leadership emanating from character and ability 
‘to achieve great things’. Putin was certainly ‘fortunate’ for a large part of his 
period in offi  ce, with rising commodity prices in his fi rst two terms and with his 
bold moves in his third term achieving remarkable success, like the retrocession 
of Crimea and the intervention in Syria, although such moves came with 
enormous costs. Putin’s obfuscations if not outright lies in denying the presence 
of Russian forces (the ‘little green men’ without insignia) in the takeover of the 
peninsula in the spring of 2014 are frequently cited against his bona fi des.  50  As 
for  virt ù , this for Machiavelli had nothing to do with virtue as conventionally 
understood but was connected with raison d’ é tat: what is good for the state in 
this defi nition is virtuous. But who is to decide what is in the long-term interests 
of state, and how can these interests be separated from the mere survival of the 
regime? 
 Th ese questions become sharper in light of Putin’s role as the great faction 
manager. At the metalevel, Putin draws on the four great factions but allows none 
to dominate, while giving each a stake in the system. Th is is the defi nition of 
Putinite centrism, but it is a centre that changes with the ebb and fl ow of factional 
strength, which in turn refl ects popular attitudes and the international situation. 
While the regime tries to shape popular sentiments, there are natural limits to 
how far state-sponsored propaganda (put out above all through the main TV 
channels) can shape the views of its audience. It is relatively easy to change popular 
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opinions, but it is much harder to change views, let alone attitudes. Th us, Putin’s 
statecraft  requires permanent engagement with its fundamental constituencies. 
Putin is the ultimate decider, but decisions are not taken in a vacuum, and regime 
survival means that he cannot consistently go against the majority. Th is inevitably 
means that Putin’s leadership  – irrespective of its durability and impressive 
ability to maintain consensus for so long – is ultimately transactional rather than 
transformative. Horizontal pressures push in at all levels, from the great meta-
factions to the micro-factionalism that swirls around the towers of the Kremlin. 
Policymaking in the Putin court has been likened to Byzantine intrigues and 
Game of Th rones back-stabbing. 
 Th e ‘postmodern’ image-making of Putin’s personality cult predominated 
when Surkov was responsible for domestic political aff airs, with Putin shaped as a 
‘celebrity and cultural icon’.  51  Th e Kremlin spin doctors bear much responsibility 
for some ill-judged public relations (PR) stunts. While fl ying with cranes may have 
some justifi cation and satisfi ed Putin’s hankering for adventure and ostensibly 
burnished his environmental credentials, some of the other stunts were poorly 
judged. A  dive in the Black Sea to fi nd Greek amphorae was obviously staged, 
but to what purpose it is not clear. Above all, the pictures of a bare-chested 
Putin riding a horse, fi shing and climbing trees have launched an avalanche of 
commentaries about ‘Putin’s macho personality cult’. Th is is mostly well observed, 
since Putin does assert a particular type of traditional masculinity. As Sperling 
notes, ‘While some of Putin’s displays of muscles and bravery may have been 
intended to appeal to the female population, a male politician’s “manly” image 
can also be enhanced by portrayals of attractive young women’s support for him.’  52  
However, when this is taken as a driver for foreign policy, the links become rather 
more tenuous. Putin acted decisively in the autumn of 1999 when he launched the 
second Chechen war and in approving the assault against Yukos in the autumn of 
2003, and then in intervening in Ukraine in 2014. It is far-fetched to suggest that 
these decisions were in some way ‘gendered’, and to suggest that Russian foreign 
policy is driven by ‘macho’ braggadocio is just another way of denigrating what 
may well have been legitimate concerns (whether they were the right policies or 
not is another issue). With Surkov’s departure from the PA in December 2011 and 
replacement by the dour Volodin, the macho stunts mostly disappeared, a policy 
of reticence that continued when Sergei Kirienko took over the management of 
domestic politics in September 2016. Nevertheless, Putin did emerge as a cultural 
icon, and inevitably the Kremlin has been concerned to portray certain images 
of him, notably as a wise, thoughtful and resolute leader.  53  Th is helps explain his 
extraordinary and enduring popularity, although his popularity cannot be reduced 
to PR manipulations. 
 Th e typical vagueness of Putin’s rhetoric refl ects the broader developmental 
impasse in which the country fi nds itself. Although the Kremlin spin doctors 
carefully nurture an image of Putin as decisive and resolute, in the normal course 
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of events, he is cautious and consensual. Factional balance inevitably means that 
on mundane issues Putin seeks to maintain the broadest consensus. Th e aim is 
to ensure that none of the main factions are alienated, while all can acquiesce to 
the policy. Th is is a recipe for policy stagnation, although it does avert some of 
the worst excesses of short-term decision-making governed by the electoral cycle. 
Th e Putin system, however, cannot stand outside of its era, and the absence of a 
deep commitment to any particular programme, other than the general ambition 
to restore Russian greatness and its status as a great power, means that it can be 
shaped by prevailing forces. Th ree key issues are relevant here. 
 Th e fi rst deals with the problem of ideology, and in particular the degree to 
which the Putin system applies neoliberal economic policies. Th e Putin system 
eschews grand ideological formulations, but in the end, its pedestal party, UR, 
explicitly declared itself a conservative party. Th is was in keeping with the broad 
social conservatism of the Putin system, rejecting the social liberalism sweeping 
the West. When it comes to social policy, the administration supported traditional 
social democratic welfare policies – an extensive welfare state, a state-sponsored 
pension system (which as the population aged became increasingly stretched) 
and the provision of public goods such as further and higher education and 
support for the Russian Academy of Sciences and its regional affi  liates. Some of 
these functions were devolved to the regions, where there was also a crisis due 
to increased responsibilities without an adequate tax base, except in the dozen 
resource-rich regions and the big cities. But even Russia was not immune to neo-
liberal solutions, meaning the marketisation and consumerisation of hitherto 
freely available public goods. In education, this means that salaries in many cases 
are tied to performance indicators, while institutions as a whole have to adapt to 
the stringencies of international league tables and the like. In education, health and 
other fi elds, a commercialised sector operates alongside the state-subsidised part. 
Th e result has been dubbed ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’.  54  Th is combines heavy-
handed political management, with the market penetrating into areas where other 
rationalities, such as altruism and public service, have traditionally predominated. 
Th e outsourcing phenomenon, in which various layers of administration take their 
cut while those actually delivering the goods see their salaries and employment 
conditions eroded, began to displace neo-Soviet practices of direct employment 
and guaranteed conditions. One of Putin’s fi rst acts was a new labour law which 
weakened trade union rights and restricted labour activism. 
 Th e second and associated issue is Putin understanding of politics. ‘Th e 
political’ is defi ned as the agonistic and open-ended debate over issues of 
public concern. From his very fi rst activities in public administration, Putin 
demonstrated a proclivity for a technocratic and non-transparent managerial 
style. Th is is evident in his work in the St Petersburg mayor’s offi  ce in the Sobchak 
years, and his experience of competitive elections was rather painful. He headed 
the staff  for Sobchak’s re-election in 1996 and lost out to the challenge from the 
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other vice-mayor, Yakovlev. Th e experience seems to have traumatised Putin and 
turned him against elections in which the outcome is not known in advance. 
Discretion was part of the job descriptions in the various posts he held in the late 
1990s in Moscow, notably when he headed the FSB. He took this closed attitude 
with him when he fought his fi rst presidential campaign in early 2000. Instead 
of participating in public debates, he preferred to issue missives from on high, 
notably a campaign article in  Izvestiya .  55  In the 2012 campaign, Putin issued half 
a dozen articles on fundamental issues such as nationality, economic or foreign 
policy. Each represented a fascinating dissection of the issues, but in his typical 
manner he stayed in control, and the public debate on the issues was very limited 
and there was little follow-up. 
 Th e technocratic style is accompanied by a brisk and businesslike way of dealing 
with subordinates, offi  cials and citizens. His typical style is to be well informed 
on any particular issue while issuing  ratio decidendi , as in the English common 
law tradition. In other words, instead of parliament and public forums deciding, 
Putin set himself up as the supreme judge, issuing judgements, leavened by  obiter 
dicta , but focused on his personal preferences and inclinations. A large proportion 
of the population clearly approves of his judgements, but this has nothing to do 
with ‘the political’ and clearly undermines the essence of democracy, in which 
the people are assumed to exercise free choice to decide on who will decide for 
them (except in the case of referendums, where the decision is direct-acting unless 
clearly stated to be consultative). Democracy assumed personifi ed forms: Putin 
was elected directly by the people, and he then acted in the classic democratic 
manner in judging according to his own conscience about what was in the best 
interests of Russia. But democracy also entails a certain quality to ‘the political’, a 
conversation with and between the people, and it is this quality that is lacking. Th e 
system with justifi cation has been called ‘post-political’.  56  
 Th e third issue returns us to the paradoxes of the stability system, which has – 
paradoxically  – destabilising eff ects. Th is is reminiscent of the Brezhnev years, 
when mobilisation gave way to stabilisation and then stagnation. Th e more a 
regime mechanically tries to impose stability, the more the factors contributing 
to long-term organic stability are eroded. Th e conservative-guardianship strategy 
undermines what in contemporary neo-liberal parlance is known as ‘resilience’: the 
ability of a system to withstand shocks and to manage periods of turbulence. Th e 
stability system in Russia today refl ects Putin’s preferences, but these preferences 
in turn are generated by the profound sociological and political reality of four 
roughly balanced epistemic-interest groups, none of which is ‘hegemonic’ but 
each of which is exploited by Putin for ideas and personnel. Th e ideology of 
stability is also a generational issue, with those who endured and lost so much 
in the transition from communism unwilling to countenance another period of 
turbulence inevitably generated by proposals for structural reform. 
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 Stasis , or the developmental impasse 
 Th ere is a profound  stasis in Russian political and economic development. 
Stasis is defi ned as a state of equilibrium or inactivity caused by opposing equal 
forces. Th e concept of stasis is more than a synonym for stagnation but contains 
the potential for a ‘sudden interruption of the hectic inertial motion, in a move 
of refl ection and contestation’.  57  As my factional model suggests, the four great 
factions in contemporary Russia balance each other, and each has a stake in the 
present system, but none can predominate. Th e four great ‘blocs’ have entrenched 
their position in the polity, but none can establish its hegemony over society as a 
whole. Each has a suffi  cient stake in the situation to ensure its loyalty, but fear of 
defection remains an abiding concern of the power centre. Th e liberals remain 
responsible for overall macroeconomic policy, but state capitalist, if not outright 
corporatist, concerns typically prevail when it comes to industrial policy and 
support for the state corporations and leading enterprises. Th e  siloviki are oriented 
towards security and in domestic aff airs stress the need for the maintenance of 
Cold War-style controls and in foreign policy have never entirely given up on the 
Soviet conception of the West as a threatening and dangerous force, and hence 
are ready once again to take up the cudgels (like their counterparts in the Atlantic 
system) to renew Cold War policies and practices. Th e heterogeneous bloc of neo-
traditionalists, encompassing monarchists, neo-Stalinist communists, neo-Soviet 
imperialists and Russian nationalists, are united by little other than their tradition-
based reading of Russian exceptionalism. For them, the West represents as much 
a danger of cultural degradation as it does a security threat. Th e fi nal group, the 
Eurasianists, despite their many divisions, are united in their view that there is a 
fundamental and irreconcilable gulf between ‘Romano-Germanic’ (as they put it) 
civilisation of the West and Russia. 
 Th is is a position of radical uncertainty, in which any one of these positions could 
make a break and try to impose hegemony over the others. Th ere is a lot of hectic 
activity, but ‘inertial motion’ predominates. Th is is the key to the Putin system, 
where the energy is drawn from others while Putinism itself represents an inert 
centre. Its appeal is precisely as the counter of the untrammelled predominance 
of one of the substantive factions, where real constituencies and passionate 
ideologies are to be found. Th is is anti-politics with a vengeance. Putinism is the 
negation of this passion and works by limiting the sociological predominance 
of a single group. Part of Putinism’s attraction is that it represents an external 
limitation on the potential radicalisation of the factions and is indeed in part 
welcomed by most of the groups as a way of limiting the potential damage that 
would be caused by the predominance of another group. Just as in international 
aff airs a multipolar system keeps the ambitions of each of the states in check, so 
too in domestic politics the system of internal factionalism acts as a system of 
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para-constitutional checks and balances. Th e diff erence is that in domestic aff airs, 
the system is not anarchic, but there is a force standing above the constellation 
of individual powers to act as the integrator and suppressor, namely the state. 
In the Russian context, the dual state means that two operative codes manage 
factional confl ict at the same time, the impartial rule-governed principles of the 
constitutional state and the arbitrary and selective practices of the regime. Th ere 
is stasis at three levels: the basic ‘social contract’ between the state and society, 
which in the Putin years meant ensuring relatively stable living standards and 
social security; keeping the various factions in rough balance; and maintaining 
a relatively stable equilibrium between the two wings of the dual state. In such a 
construct, there is not much room for radical reform, let alone of a government 
committed to revolutionising the social order. Th e Putinite political platform 
is conservative in both the direct sense of the word and also in its ideological 
manifestation, aiming to preserve not so much the status quo as the complex 
political construct that underlies the status quo. Th e merits of such a system can 
hardly be presented to the public in political terms, and instead the symbolic level 
is accentuated, including the notion of Russia as a great power, as the defender of 
traditional values and, paradoxically, as the defender of the international status 
quo and international law against the revisionism of the West. 
 Putin avoids the use of words such as ‘reform’ and ‘modernisation’, both of which 
are drenched in ideological baggage. ‘Reform’ is what Gorbachev did, and the 
result, from Putin’s perspective, was disastrous. Th us, he was sceptical about those 
who tried to resurrect the concept and the idea of ‘modernisation’ in the Medvedev 
years. Instead, the supreme form of Putin’s managerial role is as faction manager. 
Th is is a recipe for a politics of consensus, but since no single policy is pursued 
with consistency and to the full extent of its logical development, it becomes a 
recipe for policy stagnation. While a breakthrough to a genuinely competitive 
democratic system is impeded, the consolidation of an outright authoritarian 
system is also inhibited. Th e factional model helps explain the character of Putin’s 
centrism. Putin positions himself at the centre of the factional network, and, thus, 
it is not so much the hierarchical verticality of his position as president that shapes 
policy but the horizontal structuring of the political fi eld. Th e so-called vertical of 
power is blunted by powerful horizontal networks and remains more a metaphor 
than an accurate representation of how the system really works.  58  Although the 
centre generates policy initiatives and provide leadership, in domestic politics, 
any radical departure from centrist positions threatens factional balance and with 
it the stability of the entire political system. In the United States, a comparable 
framework operates, in the sense that the constitution has established a system of 
checks and balances designed to temper extremes but which also makes domestic 
policy innovation, except in times of crises, exceptionally hard. In both the United 
States and Russia, the executive has much greater leeway and room for manoeuvre 
in foreign policy, although in both cases the presidencies usually seek to act within 
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the framework of the domestic consensus. In Russia, perhaps also as in United 
States, the overall outcome is stasis. 
 Th e concept of stasis helps delineate the social roots of the situation, indicating 
the equilibrium between relatively equal contending forces. Joel Hellman in 1998 
identifi ed the ‘partial reform equilibrium’, where the winners in the early stages of 
the transition from communism lock in their gains to prevent further reform that 
could threaten their position.  59  In the 2000s, Putin broke the independent power 
and authority of the early winners (oligarchs and red directors), notably in the 
Yukos aff air, and created a dual economy where market relations operate in certain 
sectors while in others a state corporatist model was developed in which market 
forces are trumped by administrative interventions.  60  As in the political sphere, 
two orders operate simultaneously, the profi t-seeking and the rent-extraction 
models. Th ese are analogous to what have been described as open-access orders 
and limited-access orders (see below). It is tension along this spectrum that shapes 
the current Russian political economy. A complex rent-management system has 
been created that circulates resources across the population as part of the ‘social 
contract’. Economic stasis is reinforced by political considerations. In an era where 
the great structuring ideologies of the past have dissolved, political formlessness 
is fi lled by an accentuation of identity politics. Fear that identitarianism, in 
particular, ideas advanced by the nationalist part of the neo-traditionalist bloc 
would fragment society and intensify antagonisms in public discourse reinforces 
the regime’s justifi cation for its own predominance. Its goal is to pacify social, 
class and ethnic divisions, while ensuring a modicum of co-optive representation. 
Pacifi cation, of course, is not the same as resolution. Th e regime’s eff orts created a 
‘stability system’ rather than one in which some sort of democratic consensus has 
been achieved on the basis of law and constitutional regulation. 
 Th e prevalence of stasis and stabilisation politics does not mean that there 
is no change in politics or that the economy has not registered some notable 
achievements. However, economic growth rates and the structure of the economy 
as a whole lack the dynamism expected of a country at Russia’s level of development 
(a variant of the World Bank’s ‘middle income trap’). Th e tutelary system and 
the stabilocracy’s fears that radical policies could provoke instability through 
extensive job turnover and unemployment inhibited structural reform. Instead, 
it maintains elements of the Soviet social contract, whereby basic social welfare, 
job security and public infrastructure are provided in exchange for constraints on 
political expression and social contestation. Russia fi nds itself in a developmental 
impasse.  61  
 Th e power of the horizontal in domestic aff airs tempers the regime’s ability 
to launch radical policy initiatives. Th e system expends great eff orts to maintain 
its power, while in international aff airs the regime also seeks to reproduce a 
horizontal structure to international politics through multipolarity and the 
creation of an anti-hegemonic alignment. In domestic politics, stasis is maintained 
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by the balance between the epistemic-interest blocs described above, and this 
generates an inherent pluralism in which no developmental programme can 
become hegemonic. Zweynert and Boldyrev describe the ‘relative failure of 
Russia’s transition’ as a ‘failure of ideas’, although it was not so much an ideational 
failure as the inability of any one to become hegemonic. As they argue, ‘the main 
problem lies in the fact that elites still seem to be vacillating between confl icting 
patterns of thought’.  62  Th ey are right to note the parallels with the Brezhnev years, 
with analysts and scholars agreeing that ‘fundamental change is needed to prevent 
a further breakdown of the Russian economy’, but the entrenched elite structure, 
as in the 1960s’ and 1970s’ Soviet Union, means the leadership groups are ‘not 
interested in fundamental change which would endanger their power positions 
and the rents based on these’.  63  Th ey characterise post-Soviet Russian debates 
about economic reform as trapped by tensions between ‘two opposing camps, 
liberals and “ gosudarstvenniki ” ’, the statists.  64  In fact, there are more players, and 
each of the four blocs has more liberal elements and those who believe in an 
activist state. Nevertheless, they are right to argue that overwhelmingly the various 
factions regard modernisation as a means to an end and not an end in itself; thus, 
Russian debates have an instrumental character that undermines the possibility 
of a coherent policy outcome.  65  While there may be a consensus on the need for 
change, there is no agreement on the necessary changes. 
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 Rising commodity prices in the 2000s allowed Russia to strengthen its positions. 
Putin restored the autonomy of the state, but within the state, the regime centred 
on his personal networks became relatively independent of the constraints of the 
constitutional order. Th e dissatisfaction that Yeltsin had articulated earlier now 
became the predominant mode of interaction with the West. Th e post-Cold War 
international order did not suit Russia, but its attempts to revise it were inchoate 
and inconsistent. Russia had a weak material basis to sustain its ambition to 
become a separate power in the multipolar international system. At home, 
although Medvedev may not have achieved much, he nevertheless defi ned an 
intra-systemic alternative and indicated an evolutionary path away from managed 
democracy and towards a more open and competitive system. Th e 24 September 
2011  rokirovka (swap or castling move) between Putin and Medvedev delivered 
a shock to elites and the political society as a whole. Th e ensuing mass protest 
exposed not only the vulnerability of the regime but also its ability to recover. 
 Regime reset 
 Medvedev’s team at INSOR issued a range of papers and ideas about how to make 
the system more competitive and open. Medvedev and Putin openly clashed over 
the West’s intervention in Libya in 2011, but even then some in the elite believed 
that Medvedev could run for a second term. Gleb Pavlovsky, Igor Jurgens and 
even, apparently, the arch-manipulator, Surkov, aligned with the Medvedev 
second-term project despite the threat that this could have on their careers. Th is 
was the fi rst indication of intra-elite splits that could lead to regime change. 
However, Putin appears to have come under pressure from the guardianship-
security bloc to foreclose what they feared was Medvedev’s excessive liberalism 
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at home, neo-Gorbachevite complaisance abroad and lack of political gravitas. 
Th is group was apparently spearheaded (as in 2007–8) by Igor Sechin, a deputy 
head of the PA to 2008 and then a deputy prime minister, who warned Putin of 
the dangerous consequences of a potential second perestroika. Th e original had 
reformed the Soviet system out of existence, and the ‘securocrats’ were intent on 
preventing this happening again. On a famous fi shing trip to Siberia in August 
2011, Putin allegedly told Medvedev that he planned to return to the presidency. 
By all accounts, Medvedev bargained hard and in the end was assured that if he 
acquiesced, then he could become prime minister and hold this post until the end 
of Putin’s third presidential term. Th is is what was announced in brutal terms on 
24 September; and to add insult to injury, Medvedev declared that this is what had 
been decided when Medvedev assumed the presidency in 2008. Th e managed and 
manipulative character of the system was laid bare. 
 Th is was the period of the ‘Arab Spring’, with regime change in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya, Yemen, and the disturbances in Syria that burgeoned into outright civil 
war. Th ere was also a spirit of protest in the air that betokened what some called 
a ‘Russian spring’. Th e white ribbon became the symbol of aspirations for a 
more open and law-bound system, in which corruption would be exposed, the 
arbitrariness of the regime would be constrained and the pressure on businesses 
from administrative bodies (as well as corrupt law enforcement agencies) would 
ease. Even some offi  cials took to wearing the ribbon as a sign of a nascent intra-
elite split between those aligned with the aspirations vested in the Medvedev 
programme of moderate reform (if not in the man himself) and the partisans 
of the restoration of Putinite order and stability. Th ere were also signs that the 
population was restive, with Putin openly booed at a sporting event and some 
leading cultural fi gures speaking out in favour of change. Th e plan by Gazprom to 
build a giant skyscraper in the centre of St Petersburg mobilised broad opposition, 
a struggle that was ultimately successful. Th e Lakhta Centre in the end was built on 
the city’s north-western outskirts, and at 462 meters (1516 feet) became Europe’s 
tallest building. 
 Even before the Duma election on 4 December, the country was stirring. In 
the event, clumsy mismanagement and the widespread fraud and ballot stuffi  ng 
provoked the largest political protests of Putin’s time in offi  ce.  1  Th e cack-handed 
 rokirovka followed by heavy-handed electoral interventions when political society 
was demanding free and fair elections brought tens of thousands onto the streets. 
Some 60,000 took part in the demonstration in Bolotnaya Square on 10 December 
and up to 120,000 on Sakharov Prospekt on 24 December. Th e ‘democratic 
opposition’ in Russia has exhibited a persistent inability to unite, but the protests 
brought together disparate movements allied in their condemnation of electoral 
fraud. However, when it came to advancing a programme of substantial political 
change, other than ‘down with Putin’ and ‘for fair elections’, they were divided 
between liberal, statist populist and nationalist positions. Th e regime quickly 
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regained the initiative, and already in his fi nal state-of-the-nation speech on 22 
December, Medvedev outlined a programme of political reform, including the 
restoration of gubernatorial elections and changes to the party and electoral 
systems.  2  Th ese reforms were implemented in the following year with various 
modifi cations. 
 Th e unprecedented political mobilisation provoked a combination of 
concessions and coercion accompanied by changes to the regime itself. Putin’s 
return to the presidency proved a watershed moment in Russian political 
development. On the one side, contentious politics returned with a vengeance, 
although that particular wave of mobilisation soon ebbed. On the other side, the 
regime sought new forms of legitimacy, and to this end a number of stratagems 
were adopted. First, politics underwent a ‘cultural turn’, with a greater emphasis on 
identity issues and conservative social motifs. It was in this period that the Duma 
adopted a range of repressive and socially conservative legislation, including the 
ban in 2013 on homosexual propaganda among minors. Although homosexuality 
remains legal and a lively gay scene continues, the legislation encouraged 
homophobic attitudes. Discussions of LGBT issues tend to impose Western 
temporalities on Russian problems, and as Dan Healey notes in his sophisticated 
study of Russian homophobia, ‘our own histories cannot dictate pathways to 
progress elsewhere’.  3  Th is cannot disguise the intolerance manifested by the neo-
traditionalist part of the Putinite elite, refl ected in the condemnation of the social 
liberalism of the West, including the tired trope of ‘gayropa’. A  law protecting 
the dignity of religious feeling was also adopted, apparently at the prompting 
of the Russian Orthodox Church. Th is was the period when parliament acted 
as a ‘crazy printing press’, rushing out ill-considered and intolerant laws, not all 
sponsored by the Kremlin but refl ecting the empowered conservative sentiments 
of the assembly. 
 Second, the concessions included a range of political reforms, which can be 
described as a ‘regime reset’ rather than democratisation. Voting was made, literally, 
more transparent with the installation of cameras in polling stations and the 
introduction of clear plastic ballot boxes, but this was balanced by the introduction 
of various ‘fi lters’ for the nomination of candidates. Th e political reforms outlined 
by Medvedev were largely implemented, including the restoration of gubernatorial 
elections, the return of a dual election system to select the 450 members of the State 
Duma: half by fi rst-past-the post constituency elections and half by proportional 
PLs. Th is was the electoral system in operation until 2003, but the 2007 and 2011 
Duma elections had been purely proportional. It now became easier to register a 
new political party, and existing ones had less stringent requirements imposed on 
them in terms of minimum membership requirements. Legislation was changed 
to make it easier for parties to register for elections. Typical of Putinite statecraft , 
what was given with one hand was taken away with the other. Tight requirements 
were imposed on potential gubernatorial candidates, including what came to be 
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called the ‘presidential fi lter’ (the ultimate power of the president to choose who 
could run) as well as the ‘municipal fi lter’, the requirement introduced in 2012 for 
candidates for regional and local leadership posts to be backed by between 5 and 
10 per cent of legislators. 
 Th e changes were hedged in with limitations and restrictions that blunted 
their democratising character. Th e new Kremlin overseer of political matters, 
Volodin, sought to introduce greater competition into a managed political system 
as part of his relegitimation strategy. Th ese goals were obviously incompatible yet 
refl ected the Kremlin view that old methods of political management had become 
counterproductive. Th e regime was still out to win, but with less blunt – and, thus, 
delegitimising – instruments. Th e fear of being swept from offi  ce through some 
sort of popular movement prompted concessions, although accompanied by new 
forms of control. Th is was deconcentration rather than liberalisation. Th e veto 
powers of the president were regularly exercised to exclude potential challengers. 
Th e notable exception was allowing the anti-corruption campaigner and one of 
the leaders of the 2011–12 protests, Navalny, to stand in the Moscow mayoral 
election in September 2013. By allowing Navalny to run (by helping him pass the 
‘municipal fi lter’), the incumbent, Sergei Sobyanin, sought to endow his victory 
with greater legitimacy. In the event, Navalny fought a vigorous campaign as the 
candidate of the Republican Party of Russia-Party of People’s Freedom (Parnas) 
coalition. He applied an innovative crowdfunding and poster strategy, and won an 
astonishing 27.24 per cent of the vote. 
 Th e push for more competition saw the CPRF candidate, Sergei Levchenko, 
win the gubernatorial election in Irkutsk in September 2015, the fi rst competitive 
opposition victory since the return of gubernatorial elections, and in Or ë l, the 
incumbent CPRF governor, Vadim Potomsky, was re-elected by a large margin in 
September 2014. Between 2012 and 2014, oppositionists won mayoral elections 
in a number of cities. In Ekaterinburg in September 2013, Evgeny Roizman, a 
prominent campaigner against corrupt police and the illegal drug trade, and a 
practitioner of controversial drug rehabilitation programmes, won the mayoral 
contest running on Mikhail Prokhorov’s Civic Platform ticket. In April 2014, the 
CPRF candidate Anatoly Lokot became mayor of Novosibirsk, Evgeny Urlashov 
won in Yaroslavl and Irina Shirshina in Petrozavodsk. In Pskov, the journalist and 
leading Yabloko member Lev Schlosberg won a seat to the regional legislature in 
December 2011 before he was thrown out in September 2015 by a court and his 
fellow deputies. Schlosberg became famous aft er the publication of a letter on 25 
August 2014 about the deaths of soldiers in the 76th Guards Airborne Division, 
suspected of engagement in the war in the Donbas. Yabloko won 8.5 per cent of the 
seats in the Pskov City Duma election in July 2017. Th e patriotic upsurge following 
the transfer of Crimea (the so-called  Krym Nash  – Crimea Is Ours – movement) 
did not take the form of ethnic Russian nationalist mobilisation, and at the local 
level, social and political issues predominated. 
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 Th e regime reset was limited but serious and provided more opportunity for 
organised oppositional activity. However, even the modest deconcentration was 
derailed by the intensifi cation of confl ict with the West. Th e reform of municipal 
administration passed in May 2014 disempowered local government bodies. 
Elected mayors were replaced by city managers, chosen by UR-dominated 
city legislatures with the process overseen by regional governors.  4  In practice, 
concessions and exceptions were allowed, with Roizman remaining mayor of 
Ekaterinburg, although he was disqualifi ed from running as the Yabloko nominee 
for governor in September 2017 because he failed to pass the municipal fi lter. Th e 
incumbent governor, Evgeny Kuivashev, won re-election. Th is was a typical case in 
which strong candidates are not allowed to register. Roizman supported Navalny’s 
call for a boycott of the March 2018 presidential election, arguing, ‘Th ese are not 
elections. Th is is deception of voters and role-playing games. I think honest people 
should not take part in this. Th ese elections need to be boycotted.’  5  At the governor’s 
bidding, the regional legislature in April 2018 abolished mayoral elections, and 
Roizman resigned in protest. Even incumbent oppositionists were forced out of 
offi  ce. Soon aft er announcing that he would run for governor, Urlashov in Yaroslavl 
was accused of corruption and left  offi  ce in July 2013, and in August 2016, he was 
given an extraordinarily harsh twelve-and-a-half-year prison sentence. Shirshina 
was forced out in December 2015, although she continued to fi ght against the 
heavy-handed actions of the governor of Karelia, Alexander Khudilainen. By mid-
2018, what had earlier been the norm now became the exception, and only eight 
of Russia’s regional capitals retained directly elected mayors. 
 Th e regime tried to fi nd a way out of the political and developmental impasse by 
introducing elements of competition into a fundamentally uncompetitive system. 
Th is is why Navalny was allowed to run and why some other opposition fi gures 
won posts in regional mayoral elections. Th e events in Ukraine, however, stifl ed 
the stirrings of intra-systemic political reform. Th e spectacle of a legitimately 
elected (although deeply corrupt) president being chased out of offi  ce, with 
Western incitement, alarmed the Kremlin. Nevertheless, the regime reset was not 
entirely dead, and Volodin sought to make the September 2016 Duma election 
more competitive and transparent than the one in 2011. Th e goal was still to win 
a majority for UR but with less fraud and ballot-rigging. Th e task set for regional 
leaderships was to ensure the victory of regime representatives, but by legal means, 
to prevent another popular mobilisation on the scale of the earlier electoral cycle. 
In the event, the return to the dual electoral system paid handsome dividends. UR 
won only 54.2 per cent of the PL vote (giving it 140 seats), but in the single-member 
districts it won an overwhelming 202 seats, giving it a constitutional majority with 
76 per cent of the seats, a total of 343 UR deputies (see  Table 4.1 ). Th e CPRF ended 
up with only 42 deputies, the LDPR with 39 and Just Russia (JR) with 23. Th e 
representation threshold had been reduced from 7 to 5 percent, but once again 
none of the liberal parties came close, with Yabloko winning only 2 per cent, while 
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Parnas gained less than 1 per cent. Th e sheer scale of the regime’s victory appeared 
to take it by surprise and undermined its attempts to make elections look fairer 
and more legitimate. Th e turnout of only 48 per cent was the lowest of any national 
election in the post-communist years and eroded the legitimacy of the result. 
 Gubernatorial elections were restored in 2012, but the various fi lters meant 
that the Kremlin remained the decisive voice. Th e criteria for appointment 
combined political characteristics, above all loyalty to the regime, as well as 
administrative competence in delivering political and economic results. A  new 
cycle in gubernatorial appointments began in mid-2017, with changes in fourteen 
regions in the run-up to the presidential election in March 2018. Most were young 
technocrats, refl ecting a desire by the Kremlin to rejuvenate the system from 
within. Th is was not enough to address the deep-seated problems of regime power. 
 The third state and meta-corruption 
 Th e gulf between the visible part of politics and various subterranean processes 
became apparent from the start of Yeltsin’s rule. Th e ‘democratic’ revolution of 
1991 was quickly captured by the Yeltsin group, which despite, or even because 
of, its reformist agenda soon became transformed into a ‘regime’ system of 
manipulative politics, allied with oligarchs. In addition to the dual state described 
earlier, there is a subterranean ‘deep state’, operating according to a separate 
behavioural code. Th e journalist Maxim Trudolyubov argues that there are two 
states in Russia today, the ‘ordinary’ state and the private, invisible state. He likens 
the situation to that under Ivan the Terrible, the fi rst Tsar of Russia from 1547 
to 1584, when the ‘outside’ or ‘separate’ system stemmed from the  oprichnina , a 
militarised state outside the ordinary,  zemshchina state.  6  Th e  oprichnina , with its 
dreaded  oprichniki , was a militarised formation riding black horses and wearing 
black uniforms that terrorised the population between 1565 and 1572, receiving 
wealth and loyalty for service to the tsar. Th e analogy works only as a metaphor for 
contemporary Russia. In fact, changes in criminal law sharply reduced the number 
of prisoners, with the number dropping by 200,000 between 2000 and 2018 to 
484,000. In the seven years from 2011, ninety-three prisons were closed and the 
others reorganised.  7  
 Dualism undermines the autonomy of the institutions of the constitutional state 
and the practices of competitive open politics, but in its Putinite formulation it 
also articulates an alternative rationality which aspires to transcend the limitations 
of classic Western practices of capitalist democracy. Para-constitutionalism and 
its associated parapolitics were already evident in the Yeltsin period through 
various forms of institutional duplication, although it became more explicit as 
an instrument of political management in the Putin years. More specifi cally, the 
power system that took over the democratic revolution quickly developed needs 
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of its own. Already in the 1990s, the security apparatus, above all the FSB, began 
to ‘feed off  the land’, in a manner reminiscent of the ancient custom of  kormlenie , 
or feeding (tax farming), whereby offi  cials on low salaries extorted resources from 
the population over which they governed.  8  A quasi-feudal relationship between 
business and power had taken shape long before Putin came to power.  9  Although 
he changed the terms of the relationship between the state and the top oligarchs, 
he inserted himself into the system and was unable, or unwilling, to challenge 
the underlying archaic culture of power and property driven by codes of loyalty 
and motives of personal profi t. In fact, the security apparatus was emboldened by 
Putin’s accession and considered itself ‘the new nobility’.  10  
 One of Putin’s fi rst moves was to defang the oligarchs and in eff ect to block their 
development into an independent bourgeoisie (Khodorkovsky’s ambition). Instead, 
he turned them into a type of service class. In the new ‘social contract’ imposed at 
a famous meeting in July 2000, business leaders could keep their wealth, but they 
were to desist from active intervention into politics and their resources were to 
be at the service of the state. Th is is an example of the neo-patrimonial approach, 
where property and power merge. Early examples of oligarchs who thrived in the 
new dispensation include Roman Abramovich and Oleg Deripaska, while a large 
category had always kept out of politics and continued to do so, notably Vagit 
Alekperov at the head of Lukoil and Alexei Mordashov of Metallinvest, and various 
other steelmakers. However, in Putin’s third term, even loyal servants of the state 
could be threatened, as Vladimir Yevtushnkov, the head of the AFK Sistema 
investment conglomerate, discovered when his interests apparently ran athwart 
those of Sechin, by now head of the largely state-owned Rosneft  oil company 
and historically one of Putin’s closest confi dants. One of the benefi ciaries of the 
new dispensation was Arkady Rotenberg, one of Putin’s childhood friends, who 
developed the Stroigazmontazh (SGM) construction conglomerate focusing on 
gas pipelines and electrical power supply cables. His links with Putin served him 
well but not so much because of corruption – defi ned as stealing without doing 
anything – but as part of the system in which companies are granted contracts 
in a non-competitive manner because they will actually deliver. Rotenburg’s 
company completed some major infrastructural projects before being granted the 
contract to build the Kerch Strait Bridge from Russia to Crimea, a massive and 
complex engineering challenge. Th e project was undoubtedly controversial, but 
the combined road and rail link was completed on time by early 2019.  11  
 Putin is a centrist, balancing the various factions to ensure that they all have a 
stake in the system but none can dominate. In this context, the idea that ‘Putin’s 
cronies’ hold some sort of hold over him is mistaken, and ‘even Putin’s friends 
cannot always infl uence decisions’.  12  Putin is also at the centre of another model, 
balancing the competing demands of the rent consumers (whose top level has been 
identifi ed by US-sanctioning bodies as a ‘kleptocracy’), industrialists, the energy 
sector and other interest groups. Th e Soviet legacy of a managed economy has been 
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reproduced in the form of a vast rent management system based on hydrocarbon 
fi nances, running through an extended capillary system of dependencies.  13  Th e 
whole population gains, but the ruling elite spawned out of the debris of the Soviet 
system benefi ts incommensurately. Th e rent management system insulates itself 
from popular control and public accountability, and instead the logic of mutual 
dependency trumps the logic of democracy. Th is is a distribution system that 
reinforces the power of the distributor.  14  Kordonsky goes so far as to argue that 
the whole mechanism, notably in its regional dimension, has reproduced some 
sort of neo-feudal system.  15  Th is long predates the present era, but ‘Putin, having 
come from it himself … failed to transcend it’.  16  Th is is not classic patrimonialism, 
where political authority and property ownership are entwined and eff ectively 
become the same, but a more sophisticated neo-patrimonial system, in which 
both politics and property are elements in the bargaining between factions and 
confl icting systemic imperatives. For Putin, development and modernisation 
remain priorities (derived from the rationality of a developmental constitutional 
state), but this is tempered by the logic of rent extraction associated with the 
administrative system. Th e administrative regime thus also has two faces  – the 
developmental and the exploitative. 
 Th e dual state inevitably generates continuous dissonance between its two 
operative principles, the constitutional and administrative, but in conditions 
where there are permanent warring factions, this disjunction between principle 
and practice creates an aporia that ruthless operators exploit. Factional balancing 
encourages business magnates, ministers and security offi  cials to jostle for access 
to the leader, but where normal constitutional rules are suspended, this becomes 
a struggle for access to ‘the body’ to shape policy as much as to gain property 
and power. Th is exposes a dimension that requires further elaboration. Th is is the 
socio-economic degradation of the regime-state into various forms of criminality 
and corruption. Th e power of the regime ( vlast’ ) becomes in certain respects 
the power of  avtoritety , the godfathers in the mafi a tradition. As Mark Galeotti 
demonstrates, already in the late Soviet years the  vory v zakone (thieves in law), 
the criminal subculture forged in the Stalinist Gulag, had eff ectively become a 
‘super mafi a’, a law unto themselves. In conditions of state weakness in the 1990s, 
they fi lled the vacuum with their own codes.  17  Putin pushed back against the 
 vory , jailing some of the more prominent ones who challenged the authority of 
the renascent Putinite state (oft en by using strong-arm tactics, as in the struggle 
against the Vladimir Barsukov [Kumarin] Tambov gang in St Petersburg), while 
incorporating others as economic actors, sometimes working in conjunction with 
the law enforcement and security establishment. In the process, as Galeotti notes, 
the boundaries between the underworld and the ‘upperworld’ became blurred, 
and it is not clear where the state ends and the criminal underworld begins. A law 
adopted in March 2019 fi nally took on this state within a state, making it a crime 
with harsh penalties to ‘hold a top position in a criminal hierarchy’. Th e simple fact 
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of leading a criminal organisation was enough to convict a crime boss.  18  Th e super 
mafi a were no longer untouchable. 
 Th us, the administrative regime and the constitutional state are joined by a 
third force, which in Italy, Turkey and some other countries is called the ‘deep 
state’. Th is is a subterranean nexus of bureaucratic power, security services and 
various types of criminal organisations. In Russia, this dense network of corrupt 
relationships is variously called ‘the mafi ya’ or some similar designation (such as 
 vory ), and it is assumed to shape foreign as well as domestic policy.  19  Th e exit 
from communism endowed Russia with powerful organised criminal groups 
(OCGs), who ran rampant in the 1990s. In the Putin era, the most independent 
and ambitious were destroyed (notably the Tambov gang), while the rest adapted 
to a new  modus vivendi with the regime. Th is does not make Russia a mafi a state, 
as some of the more lurid accounts would have it;  20  but the ‘mafi a’ is part of the 
complex ecosystem of the Putinite polity. In turn, Russian fi nancial fl ows became 
part of the global network of off shores and money-laundering operations.  21  Some 
of this was legitimate capital looking for a safe haven abroad (capital fl ight), while 
the rest was hot money looking to be laundered. Various expos é s, notably the 
Panama Papers of the Mossack Fonseca law fi rm in 2015 and the Organised Crime 
and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), revealed how fi nancial ‘laundromats’ 
worked. 
 Russia’s economic system is regulated by formal legal relationships, but these are 
complemented by a network of informal institutions (encompassing norms and 
informal practices).  22  Business people are vulnerable to offi  cials and competitors 
acting informally to achieve personal benefi ts, forcing businesses to adopt a 
range of defensive practices. Th e business environment is hostile, but businesses 
can thrive as long as they take into account the potential predatory behaviour of 
offi  cials.  23  In normal circumstances, the courts can be used to adjudicate disputes, 
and in many cases justice can be achieved.  24  Russian law, like the state, is dualistic, 
with a persistent tension between the law as it is and the law as it should be.  25  Th is 
was one of the central concerns of Medvedev during his presidency, and some of 
the worst abuses by predators of the judicial system were tempered, but ultimately 
no structural change was achieved. Th e arbitrariness of the force structures could 
not be restrained in the absence of a systemic overhaul. Businesses and their legal 
representatives are forced to exploit divisions between competing groups, fi nding 
protection with one against the predation of the other. Putin tolerates the situation 
not so much because he was a  silovik himself (despite his professional background 
in the security system, Putin is a pragmatist exploiting the ideological-interest 
divisions in society to maintain his supremacy) but because the  siloviki remain an 
important constituency and provide a power resource that no other group can.  26  
 Th is third state reaches into the very heart of government and is characterised 
by two types of corruption. Th e  venal sort is focused on classic bribe-taking and 
bribe-giving, donated in payment for services that are nominally free but which 
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assume a pecuniary character in a system where controls are weak, the public 
ethos underdeveloped, wages low and the opportunities for rent extraction 
rife. Th e scale of this of course is unknown but is refl ected in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) on which Russia has always 
scored very low. In the CPI for 2018, Russia continued its downward trend and 
found itself ranked 138th, below Ukraine in 120th place but above Bangladesh 
and Nigeria.  27  Whatever the fl aws in the methodology (based on perceptions and 
not empirical data), the result is far from the position in which a highly developed 
country should fi nd itself. Corruption is widespread and persistent, and according 
to a recent study is a holdover from the ‘Tsarist feudal system and Soviet social 
order’.  28  In his February 2008 annual press conference, Putin identifi ed corruption 
as one of the scourges of the country, and Medvedev made the struggle against 
it one of the cornerstones of his presidency. Th e problem ran deeper than the 
bribery of offi  cials but included the coercive and improper use of the judicial and 
regulatory system against businesses, and Medvedev adopted various measures 
to protect entrepreneurs, including removing some of the powers of the courts to 
impose harsh sentences and to reduce the opportunities for regulatory agencies to 
abuse their position. Medvedev also banned government offi  cials simultaneously 
serving as directors on the boards of state-owned companies, a move reversed by 
Putin on his return to the presidency in 2012. Putin had other priorities, including 
control over offi  cialdom. His ‘deoff shorisation’ campaign forced bureaucrats and 
politicians to declare foreign property and bank accounts, and included measures 
to encourage the repatriation of assets. Th e campaign against venal corruption 
was continued. According to the prosecutor general, between 2015 and 2017, 
corruption cost Russia some $2.5 billion, and in that period 122,000 corruption-
related crimes were registered, leading to 45,000 convictions, of whom 4,500 were 
law-enforcement staff , 400 were politicians and 3,000 were offi  cials.  29  Th ese fi gures 
included some oppositional politicians falsely accused of criminal off ences, with 
Navalny oft en considered one of them as well as some mayors and regional leaders. 
 Th ere is a second form which I call  meta-corruption , when the autonomy of the 
political system is eroded and administration is placed at the service of criminal 
and inappropriate activities, undermining the independence of the courts and the 
impartial management of social processes. Th e judicial system becomes degraded 
as the state security agencies and the courts merge. Meta-corruption describes 
the combination of political power and economic interests outside of the bounds 
of law and constitutional constraints. It describes systemic corruption in a neo-
patrimonial system where property rights cannot be adequately defended and, 
thus, become prey to powerful political or economic interests.  30  Th is gives rise to 
raiding ( reiderstvo ), the attack on the property of others by offi  cials, corrupt law-
enforcement offi  cers, collusive courts or business rivals working with some of the 
previous categories.  31  According to Alexander Lukin, the problem of corruption 
stems from the ‘mentality’ of the regime, believing that it has a sacred mission 
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to ‘save’ Russia from disintegration and collapse, and ‘saving the country is hard 
work and so those who carry it out deserve more than other citizens’.  32  Th is also 
helps explain the enormous pay diff erentials between administrative offi  cials, such 
as hospital directors, and rank-and-fi le workers (a pervasive feature of neoliberal 
capitalism). When it comes to politics, the ‘rent managers’ believe they deserve a 
generous share of the rents. Th is endows Russia with the archaic feel of a traditional 
estate-based society, with two-thirds of the population ‘outside of the market and 
modernity because it is immersed in an economy that is controlled by the state and 
based on unearned income’.  33  Th e 5 per cent of the population that distributes the 
rent takes a generous cut, while two-thirds are dependent in one way or another 
on the state for their income (earned and unearned), but only 15 per cent are 
engaged in business or commerce.  34  
 Th e problem of ‘administrative rents’, as the extortion of bribes and other 
kickbacks to various inspection offi  cials and corrupt bureaucrats is known, is 
only one aspect of the persistent pressure on businesses, small and large. Property 
rights cannot be secure when the rule of law remains weak and the courts can 
be suborned by powerful political fi gures.  35  Th is was recognised by Putin in his 
annual address to the Federal Assembly on 3 December 2015 when he described 
the way that business people are persecuted by the courts: 
 I would like to cite some fi gures supplied by one of our business associations. 
During 2014, the investigative authorities opened nearly 200,000 cases on 
so-called economic crimes. But only 46,000 of 200,000 cases were actually 
taken to court, and 15,000 cases were thrown out during the hearings. Simple 
maths suggests that only 15 percent of all cases ended with a conviction. At 
the same time, the vast majority, over 80 percent, or specifi cally, 83 percent of 
entrepreneurs who faced criminal charges fully or partially lost their business – 
they got harassed, intimidated, robbed and then released. Th is certainly isn’t 
what we need in terms of a business climate. Th is is actually the opposite, the 
direct destruction of the business climate. I ask the investigative authorities and 
the prosecutor’s offi  ce to pay special attention to this.  36  
 Th is was an astonishing admission by the leader of a country who had been its head 
for so long. He repeated the complaint in his 20 February 2019 address, suggesting 
that the situation has not improved. Th e courts almost always sympathise with the 
prosecutors, with only 0.36 per cent of criminal cases in 2016 ending in acquittal. 
While there are reckoned to be about 300 political prisoners in Russia today, tens 
of thousands of business people sit behind bars. Th e mass abuse of criminal law 
against business people is now openly admitted. 
 In his recent study of the phenomenon of raiding, Philip Hanson notes, 
‘ Reiderstvo means the acquisition of business assets by means that involve 
manipulation and distortion of the law, albeit oft en with the active involvement of 
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law-enforcement offi  cers and the courts.’ Th e implication is that this involvement 
is ‘corrupt’. He describes a characteristic case: 
 A typical story is that of a businessman who is charged with an ‘economic 
crime’, and who is arrested and put in pre-trial detention or at least faces the 
threat of pre-trial detention. Th e case may or may not go to trial, but one of two 
outcomes is likely: a deal is struck, the assets sought by the raider are handed 
over and the accused is released; or the accused goes to prison and the assets are 
acquired by the raider while the victim is, for practical purposes, out of action. 
It appears that only state-controlled entities and companies controlled by close 
associates of the leadership are safe from this.  37  
 As the lawyer and independent scholar Vladimir Pastukhov put it, ‘Th e FSB can 
dabble in any business it likes, but relies on the police to do the footwork. Serious 
police reform is therefore impossible if the masters are left  alone.’  38  In another 
study, he argues that Putin did not eliminate arbitrariness but gave it ‘a more or 
less organised character’.  39   
 Th e security forces have a special role, but even their illicit political and 
economic activities are balanced by other features of the complex organism that 
is the Russian power system. Unable to act as a state within the state, they operate 
as a sub-faction within the regime. Although Russia is a rent-based distribution 
system, this does not necessarily make Russia a rentier state – where the ruling 
group exists to extract value from the predominant commodity and the fi nancial 
system with which it is associated. In the neo-patrimonial system, the state 
remains the largest employer not just in public services but also in the economy, 
where bonds of mutual self-interest generate patterns of loyalty and dependence, 
accompanied by the expansion of the semi-authoritarian political sphere based 
on a dependent middle class and a crypto-bourgeoisie dependent on the state 
for its survival. In this hybrid system, the elite are allowed to enrich themselves, 
but the methods used to gain wealth are in turn a stick used to discipline the 
elite and to ensure their loyalty. As for business leaders, to survive, they become 
‘stoligarchs’ – state oligarchs. Th e small group of stoligarchs, typically the heads 
of state-owned companies, control around a fi ft h of Russian GDP. Th ey include 
Arkady Rotenberg, the head of Stroigazmontazh, Gennady Timchenko at the 
top of Gunvor and Novatek, Sechin at Rosneft  and Alexei Miller at the head of 
Gazprom. Most of these have a personal relationship with Putin going back to his 
St Petersburg days.  40  Putin tamed the nascent bourgeoisie and swashbucklers of 
the 1990s, but his model of state oligarchs also provoked widespread resentment. 
Th e business leaders of the Putin era have to deliver certain public goods as the 
fee for their enrichment, but this does not mean that their power is not resented. 
 Th e  siloviki , the security services and their allies, have a special place in this 
story. While their power to shape the regime is exaggerated (they are aft er all only 
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one of the four major factions in contemporary Russia), they remain a powerful 
force. Masha Gessen argues that Putin was the spearhead of a group of former 
security offi  cials who took control of Russia. For Gessen, Putin came to power 
with a conscious plan to install some sort of dictatorship, a view that ignores any 
complicating details such as policy confl icts over the economy or external relations 
and assumes some sort of perfect state of governability.  41  Karen Dawisha presents 
all the publicly available material on the various businesses and enterprises Putin 
and his associates have been involved with since the early stages of his career. Th e 
story begins with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the attempt by CPSU to 
prepare for the loss of its monopoly of power by shift ing resources abroad and 
underground, the so-called Party gold. Dawisha traces the story of the alleged 
hoard and argues that this shift  of resources to banks and other institutions outside 
the Soviet Union really did take place.  42  Th ese are the resources drawn on later 
by the security apparatus to consolidate its alleged hold on the nascent capitalist 
economy. Felshtinsky and Pribylovsky eloquently describe the rise of various 
security-force factions, including the way that the Korzhakov faction provoked the 
fi rst Chechen war. Putin was appointed head of the FSB on 25 July 1998 to reform 
the body and not simply as their emissary in the power system.  43  In other words, 
even in their sensationalist account, a political level remains outside the deep state, 
which retains decisional autonomy. Th is is also refl ected in the account of the ‘new 
nobility’ by Soldatov and Borogan, in which they note, ‘Putin opened the door to 
many dozens of security service agents to move up in the main institutions of the 
country, perhaps hoping that they would prove a vanguard of stability and order. 
But once they had tasted the benefi ts, agents began to struggle amongst themselves 
for the spoils.’  44  Th ere is no unity of purpose in Russia’s third state, and instead a 
mix of venal- and meta-corruption erodes the quality of governance. 
 Putin came to power in 2000 promising to strengthen the state, but in the 
end, the state remained brittle and undeveloped, while the administrative regime 
consolidated its hold over the constitutional state and society. Th e neo-patrimonial 
order brought institutions and political processes under the tutelage of the 
administrative regime. However, the power system was susceptible to the very 
forces on which it based its power and to subversion by its own meta-corruption. 
Th e old structure of oligarch power at least had the virtue of transparency in its 
venal corruption, but this was dismantled by Putin and a much more complex and 
opaque system of meta-corruption installed. Th e interpenetration of economic 
and political power means that the boundary between the two is constantly 
shift ing and arbitrary. Raiding is a symptom of this instability, with prosecutions 
to order and the selective exercise of coercive power stifl ing the development of 
an entrepreneurial culture and undermining the development of the economy as a 
whole. Th e stability system, as in the Soviet Union, seeks to constrain and control 
the pathological eff ects of its own behaviour, but the failure to move away from 
‘manual control’ prevents the emergence of a more self-regulating organic and 
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law-based system. Th e mechanical approach creates an order that is brittle and 
susceptible to an escalating breakdown. Dualism is in danger of degenerating into 
a triple system in which the merger of power and property jeopardises the viability 
of the system as a whole.  45  Venal corruption in an uncontrolled triple state is in 
danger of metastising into meta-corruption and the decline of order in its entirety. 
 The third state and micro-factionalism 
 Th e four ideational-interest groups – the liberals, the  siloviki , the neo-traditionalists 
and the Eurasianists – structure the political landscape of the country and provide 
contrasting understandings of Russian national identity and its place in the 
world. Th e four groups are abstract representations of what is a complicated and 
contradictory reality, and each is divided within itself. Given the disparate nature 
of the groups, the divisions within each operate diff erently. Th e liberals engage 
in debates on economic and foreign policy, as well as discussing the best way to 
shift  towards genuine constitutionalism and more competitive politics. Th e neo-
traditionalists pick their favoured version of the past, which they then project as a 
possible future. Th e various trends of Eurasianism enjoy a rare unity in believing 
that Russia’s destiny ultimately lies in the East and that attempts to become 
European have only undermined the country’s unique civilisation while bringing 
humiliation and an almost permanent regime of sanctions. As for the  siloviki , 
the military on the whole keeps out of factional confl icts (other than engaging in 
classic departmental demands for greater resources and investment), while the 
security services stress their unique mission to defend the country, even if that 
means limiting societal freedoms. 
 Th e security agencies have been racked by interminable confl icts. Th e Soviet-era 
struggle between the KGB (now FSB) and the Ministry of the Interior (the MVD) 
has been reproduced in new forms, now without the watchful eye of the Politburo. 
Th e tension is oft en provoked by the intersection of the struggle for power and 
property. Th is was the case with the Yukos aff air, when one of the putative leaders 
of the ‘guardianship’ faction resolved not only to destroy what was perceived to be 
the impertinent political status claimed by the last signifi cant independent oligarch, 
Khodorkovsky, but also to take over his oil company. Khodorkovsky was arrested 
in October 2003, and Yukos was hit by escalating tax demands that brought the 
company to its knees. Th e appropriation of Yukos assets laid the foundation for 
the state-owned Rosneft  to become Russia’s largest oil company and in due course 
one of the world’s top oil majors. Sechin appears to have masterminded the whole 
operation. In mid-2004, he became head of Rosneft ’s board of directors (a classic 
case of the mixing of politics and business), and over the years he steadily built up 
his power. During the Medvedev presidency, he followed Putin into government 
and became a deputy prime minister. Soon aft er Putin’s return to the presidency 
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in 2012, Sechin became the managing director of Rosneft , a post he retains to this 
day. When one day the archives are opened and we discover the inner workings of 
the Putin elite, we may well discover that the history of the period will have to be 
rewritten in terms of Sechin’s activities and ambitions.  46  
 As for the FSB, its Directorates, as in the Soviet period, collect  kompromat 
(compromising materials) on federal and regional offi  cials through a network of 
informants and phone tapping. In fact, the security apparatus acts as a second 
 vertikal of power, acting outside of the constitutional state and on occasions even 
threatening the administrative vertical. Th e security-judicial apparatus remains 
a powerful instrument of regime power, but it is as factionalised as the rest of 
the system.  47  Despite Medvedev’s calls for reform, the law enforcement agencies 
remain a law unto themselves. Th ere are reports that new recruits have bribes 
pushed on them by their colleagues, as a clean policeman represents a threat to 
the others. Th e head of the PGO, Yuri Chaika, was furious when on 1 January 
2011 the RIC was removed from the jurisdiction of the Prosecutor’s Offi  ce. Th e 
new free-standing RIC is answerable directly to the president, and the change was 
just one of the interdepartmental confl icts plaguing the power system. Headed 
by the pugnacious Mikhail Bastrykin, who became one of the most powerful and 
independent fi gures in Putin’s power elite, RIC was involved in the prosecution of 
some high-profi le individuals, including Sergei Magnitsky. Bastrykin stresses that 
one of RIC’s main tasks is to fi ght corruption among the elite.  48   
 A regime has emerged that can trump the stipulations of the constitution but 
which remains constrained by the constitutional framework. Its subversions of 
legality remain illegitimate as defi ned by the system itself, and there has been 
no legal invocation of emergency rule. However, the system of meta-corruption 
cuts across offi  cialdom, the factions and the security and judicial apparatus. In 
this third state, the regulatory framework of the constitution is irrelevant and the 
informal rules and ‘understandings’ ( ponyatiya ) of the regime do not operate. 
Th e enormous fi nancial and coercive power of the third state ultimately threatens 
both the constitutional state and the administrative regime, while undermining 
the legitimacy of both. Th e two have a common systemic interest in limiting 
corruption, yet the entrenched power of the third state means that that the 
structural entrenchment of the meta-corruption is hard to extirpate. Putin, unlike 
Medvedev, has never made the struggle against corruption one of his priorities, 
although he is well aware of the potentially signifi cant political advantage to be 
gained by demonstrating that even the elite is not immune to law enforcement. 
 Some high-profi le and sensational corruption prosecutions capable of 
capturing the public imagination would signal the regime’s commitment to the 
struggle against corruption, but these have been signally lacking. Instead, there 
have been isolated and instrumental corruption cases, usually the result of intra- 
and interservice factional confl icts. Th ere has long been an internal power struggle 
between Directorate M of the Economic Security Service (SEB) of the FSB and 
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the 6th Service of the Interior Security Department (USB) of the FSB. Th e latter 
is considered the most secretive section of the FSB and is even referred to as the 
‘Gestapo’ by some within the agency. In early July 2016, the head of Directorate 
M resigned (as did the head of SEB’s Directorate K, which oversees the sector) 
and Putin appointed the head of the 6th Service as his successor. Th e 6th service 
attacked the SEB in an attempt to gain control over the most profi table areas 
of business, namely the banking and fi nancial sectors.  49  Th e success of the 6th 
Service’s coup against Directorate M has been attributed to the patronage of 
General Viktor Zolotov – Putin’s long-standing and highly trusted head of security 
(2000–13). Zolotov is completely loyal to Putin and in spring 2016, as we have 
seen, was appointed to head the newly formed NG. 
 Th e 6th service of the FSB was created by Sechin when he was deputy prime 
minister, headed by his close associate Oleg Feoktistov. Th is was one of Sechin’s 
main ‘special forces’ units. Together, they convinced Putin to dismantle the 
Federal Service for Drug Control (FSKN), part of the ‘ silovik wars’ that attended 
the succession from Putin to Medvedev in 2007–8. Feoktistov would go on to be 
at the centre of major scandals in years to come, although by 2016 his position 
was weakening because of the many enemies he had created.  50  In February 
2014, the 6th Service apparently spearheaded the extraordinary attack on MVD 
general Denis Sugrobov, the head of the MVD’s Main Directorate for Economic 
Security and Countering Corruption (GUEBiPK), who himself was accused of 
corruption.  51  In fact, Sugrobov’s arrest and that of his deputy Boris Kolesnikov in 
February 2014 appears to have been part of inter-agency rivalries. In June 2014, 
Kolesnikov fell out of a window on the sixth fl oor of RIC’s headquarters while 
undergoing interrogation and died.  52  On 27 April 2017, Sugrobov was convicted 
of abuse of offi  ce and of creating a criminal group allegedly running a protection 
racket, and was given an extraordinarily harsh sentence of twenty-two years in 
prison. Th e Sugrobov case is particularly controversial, since by all accounts he 
genuinely sought to combat corruption, and for this he was given an exemplary 
punishment to deter anyone else who would threaten elite interests. Th e case was 
presented to the media as an instance of the struggle against corruption but in fact 
demonstrates the intensity of the various inter-agency and corporate confl icts. Th e 
fi ght against corruption in Russia is as much a political question as it is a legal one. 
Th e analysis of the case in the  New Yorker stressed the ‘power struggle between 
Russia’s rival security agencies’.  53  
 Th is is not to say there is not a struggle against corruption. In an extensive 
interview, Bastrykin noted that since the agency had become independent in 2011, 
it had launched 3,958 criminal cases for corruption, including against 1,256 heads 
of municipal agencies and local government bodies, 459 heads of investigative 
bodies, 369 lawyers, 94 procurators, 73 deputies of regional legislative assemblies 
and 26 judges. He urged that confi scation be introduced as a penal sanction.  54  
He also mentioned the controversial Sugrobov case, which appears to have had 
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little to do with anti-corruption but represented an inter-agency settling of scores. 
At the same time, there have been some brave social movements established to 
defend the rights of business people and to help those ensnared, expropriated or 
incarcerated by raiders. Notable among them is Russia Behind Bars, established 
by Olga Romanova when her husband’s business was stolen and he was jailed. She 
fought to implement Medvedev’s famous injunction of 2008 to ‘stop terrorising 
business’.  55  Romanova describes the Russian law-enforcement agencies (the police, 
prosecutors and the courts) as ‘a single, predatory institution that lives off  looting 
private capital’. During the recession, she argued that the predators had turned 
against each other as well as against her organisation – she fl ed to Germany in 
October 2017.  56  
 Anti-corruption issues also serve to set the relationship between the regime 
and the cultural community. Th e arrest in August 2017 of the avant-garde theatre 
director Kirill Serebrennikov on charges of fraud and embezzlement represented 
a warning that those in receipt of government grants and subsidies were expected 
to show loyalty to the regime. Th e case was launched by the FSB’s Department for 
the Defence of Constitutional Order, the successor of the KGB’s Fift h Directorate 
in which Putin had served. Th is same directorate appears to have taken the lead 
in trying to close down the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences 
(MSSES), known as the ‘Shaninka’ aft er its founder, Soviet-born British sociologist 
Teodor Shanin. It appears that the regulatory agency, Rosobrnadzor, came under 
pressure to remove the school’s state accreditation, in a case with clear parallels to 
the earlier one against EUSP. Th e Serebrennikov aff air signalled a growing confl ict 
between the regime and the creative elite, scripted rather like a dramaturgy of 
the Soviet period.  57  As the minister of culture, Vladimir Medinsky, put it in 2014, 
‘Th e one thing I don’t see the point of, is making fi lms with [state] funds that not 
only criticize but vilify the elected government.’  58  In fact, Serebrennikov’s arrest 
represented a major blow to the legitimacy of the government and undermined 
respect among the intellectual class. Th e political commentator Yulia Latynina 
argued that ‘nothing in recent times has damaged Putin as the “Serebrennikov 
aff air” ’.  59  In April 2019, Serebrennikov was released from house arrest, allowing 
him to return to work. 
 Some artists have exploited the contradictions in cultural policy and the porosity 
of the dual system to produce highly critical and internationally acclaimed work, 
like Andrei Zvyagintsev’s fi lm  Leviathan . As in Iran and China, there is a constant 
tension between independent cultural creativity and state controls. Following 
the release of  Leviathan , Medinsky devised a new set of guidelines targeting 
fi lms that ‘defi le’ Russia. Zvyagintsev noted, ‘Yes, Mr Medinsky was disappointed 
by  Leviathan . But I was being sincere. If I  show the mayor to be corrupt, that’s 
because these people exist.’  60  Zvyagintsev’s next fi lm,  Nelyubov’ ( Not Love , 2017), 
is a complex and bleak meditation on contemporary relationships, and shows 
how Russian civil society supplements the work of the authorities, in this case 
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the Liza Alert group, who search for a missing boy. Zvyagintsev did not ask for 
state funding, but it was nevertheless nominated for the Academy Awards by the 
Russian government. 
 In an extraordinary turn of events, in the morning of 19 July 2016, offi  cers of 
Directorate M of the SEB of the FSB burst into the offi  ces of the RIC armed with 
search warrants. Th e offi  ces of the department’s head, Alexander Drymanov, were 
searched, and three senior members of RIC were arrested and charged with the 
abuse of power and bribe-taking. Th e three RIC members were Denis Nikandrov, 
who in April 2016 had become deputy head of the Moscow RIC;  61  Mikhail 
Maksimenko, head of RIC’s department of internal security; and Alexander 
Lamonov, Maksimenko’s deputy. Large sums of money were confi scated from the 
detainees, as well as watches worth half a million euros. Th e authorities framed 
the case as part of the battle against corruption, including against its own offi  cials, 
but it was prompted by the high-profi le detention of the well-known alleged 
organised crime fi gures Zakhariy Kalashov (known as  Shakro Molodoi , ‘Young 
Shakro’), Andrei Kochuikov (known as ‘Th e Italian’) and the  Solntsevskaya Bratva 
(Solntsevo Brotherhood) OCG. Although couched in the language of the struggle 
against corruption, the case was used by the FSB to demonstrate that it was the 
real power in the land. RIC’s usually pugnacious spokesman, Vladimir Markin, 
waited twenty-four hours before commenting on the raid on his offi  ces and then 
uncharacteristically ate humble pie:  ‘What has happened to our colleagues is 
shameful and hard to take. Th is does, of course, cast a shadow over the investigative 
committee, but our self-purifi cation will continue.’  62  Nikandrov appealed to his 
boss, Bastrykin, to get the case transferred out of the FSB’s hands, arguing that 
the FSB would ‘not be objective’.  63  Nikandrov was certainly in a position to know. 
 Nikandrov’s spectacular rise and fall was indicative not only of the enormous 
powers granted to security offi  cials in the Putin era but also how these agencies 
could devour each other. Nikandrov had long been the regime’s legal hitman, using 
political cases to achieve rapid promotion, although many of the cases in which he 
was involved subsequently fell apart. He is reputed to have been unscrupulous in his 
methods; with repeated suggestions he pressured people to give evidence. One of 
his early victims was Yevgeny Ishchenko, the mayor of Volgograd in the mid-2000s, 
who was battered by accusations by Nikandrov, then a young local investigator, and 
spent a year in jail before being exonerated by the courts. As Ishchenko chillingly 
notes, ‘He [Nikandrov] was never interested in the truth. He followed a goal – in 
my case, to remove me from city hall.’  64  Having demonstrated his loyalty, although 
still only in his late twenties, Nikandrov was promoted to Moscow where he took 
part in gathering evidence against Khodorkovsky for the second trial against the 
bankrupted Yukos company executives. In 2008, he then took part in the case 
against investigator Dmitry Dovgy, who had fallen out with his seniors in the 
RIC. Dovgy was accused of having accepted a bribe, and most of his colleagues 
refused to take the case, but Nikandrov, still a rank-and-fi le investigator, jumped 
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at the chance. Nikandrov pursued the case with typical ruthlessness. Dovgy was 
thrown in jail in awful conditions, while Nikandrov looked for evidence against 
him. Although Dovgy was falsely convicted, Nikandrov’s career took off . When 
RIC became a stand-alone agency, Nikandrov became one of Bastrykin’s elite 
investigators. In April 2011, he was appointed senior investigator for particularly 
important cases.  65  
 It was only three months earlier, in January 2011, that RIC had been removed 
from the jurisdiction of the PGO and given autonomy under Bastrykin. Th e 
fury of the Chaika at this drastic reduction in his power, and the enmity that 
developed thereaft er between Chaika and Bastrykin, is well documented.  66  In 
subsequent years, Nikandrov gained a reputation as Bastrykin’s ‘attack dog’ and 
was oft en engaged in open confl ict with the PGO.  67  He took part in the casino case, 
considered a classic instance of inter-agency confl ict, but aft er four years the case 
fell apart. His remarkable rise culminated in April 2016 when he was appointed 
deputy head of RIC’s Moscow branch, apparently by Putin himself.  68  Nikandrov 
shows how the security and law-enforcement agencies can become a law unto 
themselves. Th e RIC arrests created a media sensation and demonstrated that 
factional confl ict between – and within – Russia’s law-enforcement agencies was 
back with a vengeance. Th e arrests were clearly a major blow to Bastrykin and RIC. 
Already in April 2016, two of his subordinates had been sacked by Putin as part of 
the reorganisation of the power system. Nikandrov and Maksimenko are reputed 
to have supported Bastrykin in the confl ict with one of the two ousted deputies.  69  
Factional confl icts between sections of the security apparatus as well as within 
specifi c organisations typically involve abusive means of attack including the 
misuse of the criminal justice system. Th ose who have fallen foul of these attacks 
have commonly lost their right to a fair trial, been held arbitrarily for an extended 
period in pretrial detention, usually in poor conditions, oft en accompanied by 
psychological and physical ill-treatment. In systemic terms, factional confl ict is a 
symptom of Putin’s balancing strategy to ensure that no single security agency or 
faction dominates over the others, and, thus, none is able to exert leverage over the 
president himself.  70   
 Other senior fi gures have also fallen victim to these moves. In 2016, three 
governors were arrested and several businesses were raided (the most prominent, 
and visible, being Mikhail Prokhorov).  71  In June 2016, the governor of Kirov Oblast 
and former head of the liberal Union of Right Forces (SPS) party, Nikita Belykh, 
was detained as he received $440,000 in marked cash in a Moscow restaurant. Th e 
prosecution argued that it was a bribe for him to include two local companies – a 
ski factory and a forest-management fi rm – in a federal investment programme 
as priority projects, whereas Belykh insists the money was a contribution to a 
charity. Belykh had been appointed in January 2009 by Medvedev and was one of 
the few liberal governors. It was under his watch that the Kirovles case unfolded, 
in which Navalny (and two local business people) in mid-2013 received a fi ve-year 
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suspended sentence aft er a local court found him guilty of embezzlement. Kirovles 
became part of the forest-management company now cited in the case against 
Belykh. On 1 February 2018, a Moscow court sentenced Belykh to an eight-year 
jail term. Another prominent governor to face corruption charges is Aleksandr 
Khorashavin, the former head of Sakhalin Oblast who was detained in March 2015 
and taken to Moscow. Searches of his various homes found millions in cash and 
expensive jewels. 
 In July 2016, Andrei Belyaninov, the head of the Federal Customs Service 
(FCS) since 2006, was unceremoniously sacked amid accusations of corruption. 
His dismissal and search of his house, in which a large sum of cash was found, was 
spearheaded by the FSB. In September 2016, Colonel Dmitry Zakharchenko was 
arrested and found to be in possession of $460 million and  € 300 million. Offi  cially, 
he was only the deputy chief of the MVD’s GUEBiPK but had clearly been in a 
position to extract rents on a massive scale. His family had also benefi tted, with 
his father, mother, sister, four ex-wives and one daughter also found to have 
hundreds of millions of dollars and euros in foreign bank accounts and owned 
twelve luxury fl ats in Moscow. Zakharchenko had taken bribes in return for 
warning business people about probes into their aff airs and for settling confl icts 
with the MVD. For example, Zakharchenko warned the owners of Nota-Bank 
that the government was planning to revoke its licence and helped them steal  ₽ 26 
billion from the commercial bank’s accounts.  72  Th e only reason Zakharchenko was 
brought down now was because of a reorganisation in the Lubyanka and the loss 
of his powerful patronage in the FSB. More than that, the FSB’s economic security 
service now attacked its rival MVD Main Directorate. As Alexei Shlyapuzhnikov 
of Transparency International Russia puts it, the case had ‘nothing to do with 
fi ghting corruption or corrupt individuals, but the latest round in the ongoing 
confrontation between Russia’s all-powerful secret services, which increasingly 
resembles a turf war between criminal groups’.  73  
 Th is appears to apply to Sechin’s robust business ethics and his implacable 
legal violence against opponents, earning him the moniker Darth Vader. In 2012, 
Sechin masterminded the TNK-BP deal and swap share between Rosneft  and BP, 
and in the same year Rosneft  signed an extensive exploration and production 
agreement with Rex Tillerson, the CEO of Exxon-Mobil. In the end, these plans 
were shelved because of the toughening sanctions regime. Sechin appears to have 
been behind the attack on Yevtushenkov, the head of the mighty Moscow-based 
business empire, AFK Sistema. Yevtushenkov is a classic case of a Yeltsin-era 
oligarch who adapted to the new conditions and kept out of politics, but this was 
not enough to save him once he fell foul of Sechin. He was placed under house 
arrest in September 2014 and was forced to hand ownership of the Bashneft  oil 
company back to the state at a steep discount. Th e company had long been coveted 
by Sechin. Facing intense budgetary pressures in an era of sanctions and relatively 
low oil prices, in 2016 there were plans to privatise Bashneft  and thus raise some 
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much-needed cash. Th ere were also plans, announced in July, to privatise 19 per 
cent of Rosneft . Th e privatisation programme had been launched by Medvedev 
on ideological grounds – to reduce the state’s share of the economy – but now the 
priority was revenue generation. Sechin had other ideas and decided that Bashneft  
should become part of Rosneft , while in the end blunting the part-privatisation of 
Rosneft . Rather than selling the Rosneft  stake in global markets, a deal was struck 
with a previously small trader, CEFC China Energy, based in Shanghai, which 
acquired a $9 billion stake in Rosneft . 
 Th e minister for economic development, Alexei Ulyukaev (a liberal who had 
occupied the post since 2013), opposed the takeover of Bashneft , arguing that 
the Rosneft  off er would not bring signifi cant funds into the treasury. From his 
technocratic perspective, the law on the privatisation of state and municipal 
property in any case forbade the participation of companies in which the state 
has a 25 per cent or greater share. Following a revised and more generous 
fi nancial package worth $5.5 billion, in mid-2016, Ulyukaev approved Bashneft ’s 
takeover by Rosneft . All of this had been settled when Ulyukaev went to Rosneft ’s 
headquarters late in the evening of 15 November 2016. As he left , Ulyukaev was 
arrested. Ulyukaev asserts that he received two gift s, a basket of sausages made from 
the meat of animals hunted by Sechin and a locked bag that he thought contained 
fi ne wines to go with the meat. Instead of wine, it held $2 million in marked neatly 
bundled cash. Th is was the highest-ranking serving minister arrested since Stalin’s 
death in 1953. On that day, Putin sacked him from his government post.  74  Th e 
whole case is strange, since on the face of it there seems little reason for Ulyukaev 
to go in person to Rosneft ’s headquarters to receive money for a deal that had 
clearly been approved by Putin. It would have been beyond reckless to extort a 
man with such a fearsome reputation. Th e incident smacks of a sting operation 
masterminded by Sechin personally. At the same time, Ulyukaev was a leading 
systemic liberal and, thus, the attack was taken as a sign that the  siloviki were 
moving against Medvedev’s government and the economic liberals in charge of 
macroeconomic policy. 
 Th e trial started in August 2017 in the Khamovnichesky District Court (where 
Khodorkovsky’s second trial had been staged) and continued until December. It 
was now alleged that Ulyukaev had asked Sechin for a bribe on a trip they took 
together to Goa in October 2016. On 16 August, Sechin was personally named and 
blamed by Ulyukaev, and later the judge made the surprise decision to allow the 
transcript of Sechin’s conversations to be written into the court record. It turned 
out that Ulyukaev had been wiretapped by Rosneft ’s security service, headed until 
August 2016 by the FSB general and Sechin’s long-term associate, Feoktistov, 
whom we have met before. Sechin was heard complaining that it was easier to do 
business with the Japanese and the South Koreans than with China and India, two 
key Rosneft  partners; he griped about paying more taxes than ExxonMobil and he 
criticised Putin’s deal with OPEC to stabilise oil prices.  75  Sechin had always been a 
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lone wolf, but now he was in danger of falling prey to the ‘Beria syndrome’, where 
the whole elite unites against the man they perceive to be a danger to them all. Even 
his management of Rosneft  was criticised by a Sberbank equity report in 2017, 
which suggested that Rosneft  was mismanaged and only kept growing because 
of discounted acquisitions. Sechin was requested four times to testify, but each 
time he refused on the grounds that he was too busy. Even Putin agreed: ‘Sechin 
should have come to court, what is the problem anyway? He could show up and 
repeat what he said during the preliminary investigations and interrogations.’  76  
On 15 December 2017, Ulyukaev received an eight-year sentence in a hard labour 
camp and a fi ne of $2.2 million, and had his property confi scated. Th e verdict was 
almost certainly agreed with the Moscow City Court but this was far harsher than 
most people had anticipated and the fi rst time since 1953 that a federal minister 
had been jailed. 
 Th e manner in which the criminal case was constructed became public, and it 
did not in the least look convincing. Ulyukaev insisted that the whole aff air was a 
‘monstrous provocation’ and refused to admit his guilt. His sardonic comments on 
the case rang true, while Sechin’s reputation was further damaged: ‘He started out 
as the omnipotent mastermind but turned into an off ended schoolboy, who gives 
rare and caustic comments and runs away from court appointments. … Ulyukaev 
is of course crushed, but the all-powerful Sechin does not look like a winner.’ In his 
fi nal speech, Ulyukaev spoke about the ‘gladiator with a cardboard sword’, noting 
that the bell ‘could begin tolling for any of you’ – a warning that not only liberals 
but also anyone who fell foul of the system was vulnerable.  77  Sechin appears to have 
opened the Pandora’s box of unrestrained elite competition, leading potentially to 
the system’s disintegration.  78  In the eyes of his enemies, Sechin had once again 
shown himself to be implacable, greedy and vindictive, and ready to use the law 
to achieve revenge and his personal ambitions. Even control of Bashneft  was not 
enough for him. He launched successive lawsuits against AFK Sistema, a London-
listed equity company, resulting in sharp falls in the value of shares in its highly 
successful Russian assets such as Mobile TeleSystems (MTS) and the children’s 
store Detsky Mir. Th e Ulyukaev case further tarnished Russia’s investment image 
and was hugely damaging for all concerned, and perhaps above all for the regime 
itself. Sechin appeared intent on crushing AFK Sistema, whatever the damage. 
Putin had always struggled to constrain intra-elite confl icts, but now it appeared 
that he was no longer interested in doing so. Th e elite appeared to be turning 
upon itself, with no one safe: ‘Sechin broke the unspoken rule of the competition 
between the Russian elite groups: to keep confl icts between them out of the public 
eye.’ Sechin humiliated a member of the group most antagonistic to him, namely 
the pragmatic and economically liberal circle around Medevedev, suggesting that 
‘Sechin’s ultraconservative elite group has gained the upper hand in Putin’s system 
and, thus, disrupted the balance within it’.  79  Th e case discouraged those who 
believed in intra-systemic change. 
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 At the same time, the man who managed the operation against Ulyukaev, 
FSB general Feoktistov, was dismissed in March 2017 as head of Rosneft  security 
(although he seems no longer to have worked in this capacity from August 2016), 
and no alternative post was found for him, even though he tried to claim the post 
of deputy head of the FSB’s SEB.  80  Th ere is speculation that the rising generation 
of ‘young technocrats’ were now claiming their share of top roles, forcing the old 
generation to give way.  81  Th e case of the arrest of Oleg Korshunov, the deputy 
director of Russia’s Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) in September 2017 is 
no less intriguing. On the face of it, this was just another case in the Kremlin’s 
struggle against corruption, but Korshunov was famous for his skills as a fi nancial 
intermediary. In fi nancial and bureaucratic circles, he was known as ‘Pukhly’ 
(Pudgy). Before gaining his post with the FSIN, he had been an adviser to the 
senator from Ryazan Oblast in the FC, a common cover for other activities. In this 
case, it appears that Korshunov was a ‘fi nancial operator’, whose function was to 
convert resources, including budget funds, into cash. With Putin’s ‘de-off shorisation’ 
campaign aft er 2012, it became harder for offi  cials and politicians to open foreign 
bank accounts or to buy real estate abroad, and it was far too risky to deposit the 
money in a Russian bank account, while spouses or children could not always 
be trusted. Financial operators take the money and invest as they see fi t but 
every month make interest payments in cash of some 2–3 per cent. Alexander 
Perepilichny, who died in London in November 2012, was allegedly one of these 
fi nancial operatives, reportedly managing money on behalf of the top managers 
of the tax inspectorate. When his pyramid collapsed, Perepilichny fl ed to London 
in 2009, but someone with a grudge at their losses may have taken their revenge 
(although the inquest suggested that he died of natural causes). As for Korshunov, 
he predicted that he would soon be out on parole: ‘Th e system, in other words, is 
still stronger than attempts to punish illegality.’  82  
 Th e demonstrative arrest of the senator from Karachai-Cherkessia, Rauf 
Arashukov, on 30 January 2019 served as a further warning that the impunity 
of the elite could no longer be guaranteed. He was detained during a live session 
of the FC on suspicion of ordering two murders. His arrest came aft er the upper 
house voted to revoke his immunity from prosecution. At the same time, his father, 
Raul, a senior manager in Gazprom, was arrested on suspicion of embezzling 
$400 million of gas supplies. Th e case showed the growing confi dence of the FSB – 
and, thus, of the  siloviki as a whole. It also damaged the reputation of parliament 
by raising the obvious question about how such a man could have represented 
the North Caucasian republic since 2010. At the same time, fi gures such as 
Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s long-time press secretary, became the subject of criticism 
from within the administration itself.  83  Competition within the regime could 
turn into an all-out intra-elite war, presaging the end of factional equilibrium, 
the overturning of the balance between the two wings of the dual state and the 
destruction of Putin’s power  vertikal . As high-ranking fi gures become uncertain 
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of the future, the temptation to defect will grow. It also shrinks time horizons for 
offi  cialdom, as intimations of the end of Putinite stability increased. Th is is why 
Surkov penned his rather strange article in February 2019 insisting on the long-
term future of the Putin system, which he had done so much to create. 
 Th e arrest of fund manager Michael Calvey, a US citizen, on 14 February 2019 
dealt another blow to Russia’s already perilous investment climate. Calvey set up 
the private equity partnership Baring Vostok Capital Partners in 1994 and by the 
time of his arrest had $3.7 billion under management from foreign funds such as 
Calpers and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 
It had invested $2.8 billion into eighty companies, including such spectacular 
successes as Yandex, Vimpelcom, Tinkoff  and Vkusville. Since 2016, the company 
had invested $900 million in the country, representing nearly half of total foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in 2018. Calvey and fi ve colleagues were arrested as part of 
a commercial dispute with Vostochny Express Bank, in which Baring had invested. 
A  minority shareholder now claimed to have been defrauded of $38  million. 
Calvey argued that the real motive was a dispute with Vostochny Bank’s largest 
minority shareholder, Artem Avetisyan, who apparently has close links with the 
security services. Calvey was kept in pretrial detention, although this ran against 
numerous injunctions by Medvedev and Putin not to jail business people involved 
in commercial disputes. He was the fi rst Western executive to face time in prison, 
at a time when over six thousand businessmen are held in pretrial detention over 
similar disputes.  84  Many of Russia’s 4.5 million entrepreneurs became subject to 
pressure from law-enforcement agencies, oft en in cahoots with business rivals.  85  
In his annual address to parliament on 20 February, as mentioned, Putin returned 
to the situation he had described in 2015, arguing that ‘honest businesses should 
not face the risk of criminal or administrative prosecution’, and he went on to note, 
 Today, almost half of all cases (45 per cent) opened against entrepreneurs do 
not get to trial. What does this mean? Th is means that they were opened in 
a slipshod manner or under some unclear pretext. And what does this mean 
in practice? As a result, 130 jobs are lost on average every time a business 
closes down as result of an investigation. Let us think about this fi gure; this is 
becoming a major economic problem.  86  
 Typical of the contradictions of Putin’s rule, the man charged by the Kremlin to 
tackle the problem of unfair prosecutions was none other than Avetisyan. He is 
chair of the ‘Leaders’ Club’, a Kremlin-sponsored group of entrepreneurs seeking 
to improve the business climate, as well as a leading member of the Agency for 
Strategic Initiatives, an organisation headed by Putin that sponsors investment 
projects. 
 On 26 March 2019, the former Open Government minister (2012–18) Mikhail 
Abyzov and fi ve accomplices were charged with stealing some $60 million from 
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energy companies in the Novosibirsk Oblast and hiding the money abroad. 
Abyzov was a close ally of Prime Minister Medvedev, suggesting that even he 
could be sacrifi ced if political necessity (such as a sharp fall in Putin’s popularity) 
demanded a scapegoat. Medvedev had been the subject of national humiliation up 
to 2013, but when forced to choose between sacking and supporting him, Putin 
chose the latter. It was clear that high-level administrative protection (his  krysha , 
or roof) had been withdrawn from Abyzov, leaving him to his fate. Th e perception 
that it was now open season for elite repression was reinforced by the detention 
by the FSB of Viktor Ishaev, who had been governor of Khabarovsk Krai in the 
Russian Far East (RFE) between 1991 and 2009, just days aft er Abyzov’s arrest. 
In the September 2018 gubernatorial election, Ishaev had supported the eventual 
winner, the LDPR candidate Sergei Fungal, against the incumbent, Vyacheslav 
Shport, and he was now paying the price. Th e signal was sent that even the mighty 
were not immune. Only three high-ranking offi  cials were prosecuted between 
2001 and 2005, whereas in 2018, thirty-fi ve senior members of the government 
and parliament were charged, with the investigations mostly led by the FSB.  87  Th e 
PGO reported that in 2018 1,303 offi  cials were sacked for corruption off ences, 
up from the 1,251 fi red in 2017.  88  Th e elite pacts on which Putinite stability was 
based appeared to be breaking down. Th e various arrests threatened to destabilise 
factional equilibrium. Th e Putinite balancing act was weakening, allowing 
the ambitions of the most powerful groups (notably the  siloviki ) to radicalise, 
potentially threatening the stability of the whole system. 
 Intra-systemic factionalism not only debilitates eff ective governance but also 
damages the business environment and imbues the whole system with a permanent 
sense of crisis. Th is micro-factionalism operates at many levels and acts as a 
subterranean basement beneath visible politics. Th is is compounded by what can 
be called meso-factionalism, the various alignments of business groups. Two rival 
factional meso-groups were identifi ed as shaping the 2018 presidential campaign, 
with far greater infl uence than the formal co-chairs of Putin’s campaign Elena 
Shmeleva, Sergei Kogogin and Alexander Rumyantsev. Th e actual campaign was 
run by the head of the PA, Anton Vaino. Earlier, such campaigns had been run by 
the deputy head responsible for domestic politics, namely Surkov, until his abrupt 
dismissal in December 2011 (following the botched parliamentary campaign), and 
then by his successor Volodin (although formally the 2012 presidential campaign 
was headed by the fi lm director Stanislav Govorukhin). Vaino’s father, Eduard, 
has long been associated with the business lobby headed by Sergei Chemezov (the 
head of Rostec, formerly Rostekhnologii, the state holding company established in 
2007). Chemezov became friends with Putin in Dresden, when they lived in the 
same building, and then followed Putin into the PA in the late 1990s and in the 
Putin years became one of the most infl uential fi gures. 
 Chemezov is reputed to have been behind the appointment of Denis Manturov, 
the minister of industry and trade, as well as of a new generation of ‘young 
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technocrats’ to replace the older, more ‘political’, regional governors. Th ese include 
the governor of Sevastopol, Dmitry Ovsyannikov (formerly Manturov’s deputy), 
Anton Alikhanov in Kaliningrad, Gleb Nikitin (another of Manturov’s deputies) in 
Nizhny Novgorod and Dmitry Azarov in Samara (the home of the giant Avtovaz 
car plant, where Eduard Vaino [Anton’s father] is one of the deputy directors).  89  
Kogogon, incidentally, is the director of the Kamaz truck plant, 49.9 per cent of 
whose shares belongs to Rostec. Th is is where Putin declared his candidacy on 6 
December 2017, and the industrial working class is the foundation of Putin’s social 
support. Chemezov is one of the most infl uential fi gures in Russia today, and his 
power base is growing. By early 2018, the state conglomerate Rostec encompassed 
more than seven hundred subsidiaries, ranging from arms manufacturers to 
motor plants, but its appetite had still not been sated. In February 2018, Chemezov 
conceded that with Trump’s election, Russia was ‘expecting normal relations to 
be re-established’, which would have allowed, for example, the partnership with 
Boeing to deepen to cover aircraft  sales not only in Russia but also in Asia and 
Africa. He stressed that while most of Rostec’s work was in the defence sector, the 
plan was to raise the share of civilian production to 50 per cent.  90  
 Th e Chemezov industrial lobby is balanced by the fi nancial interests represented 
by the Kovalchuk brothers. Yuri and Mikhail were old friends of Putin’s from his 
St Petersburg youth and since at least 2016 had been increasing their political 
infl uence. Yuri Kovalchuk, the chair and leading shareholder of Rossiya Bank, is 
oft en referred to as ‘Putin’s personal banker’ and in that capacity has been placed on 
various US sanctions lists. Th e brothers are considered to have come into confl ict 
with Volodin, who consequently aft er the September 2016 parliamentary election 
had been moved over to become Duma speaker. He was replaced by Sergei Kirienko, 
who is considered close to the group. Since 2005, Mikhail Kovalchuk has been 
head of the Kurchatov nuclear research institute, while Kirienko was appointed to 
head Rosatom in the same year and remained in this post until he became deputy 
head of the PA in October 2016. Th e Kovalchuks are reputed to infl uence the 
Russian media, with the head of the TASS news agency, Sergei Mikhailov, thought 
to be associated with them, and on the leading TV channels, which are run by the 
VGTRK state-holding company, including (through the National Media Group) 
the First Channel, REN TV and the Fift h Channel.  91  Factionalism works at many 
cross-cutting levels, demonstrating that the Putin phenomenon is a sophisticated 
mechanism to manage complex relationships, and one should be less surprised 
that it sometimes fails but that it works at all. 
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 Russia’s post-communist economy has always been a political endeavour and, 
thus, mimics with reverse intention the Soviet project itself. While the Communist 
Party sought to extirpate market relations to create a planned economy, from the 
late 1980s, the aim was to restore market relations to make the economy more 
competitive, dynamic and ‘modern’. In the absence of capitalists, this entailed 
the encouragement of a nascent class of ‘bourgeois’ entrepreneurs, who in the 
1990s consolidated their hold over the economy in the form of a peculiar type of 
state-sponsored oligarch capitalism. Th e methods employed have been described 
as ‘market Bolshevism’, which undermined the foundations of democracy.  1  Th e 
‘bourgeoisie’ that emerged was of a distinctive sort. In the Yeltsin years, this was 
‘political capitalism’ in the raw, with proximity to power the vital ingredient 
in gaining property, accompanied by features of ‘state capture’ by the newly 
empowered ‘oligarchs’. Putin threw the old-style oligarchs out of the Kremlin and 
in the famous roundtable between business and state representatives in July 2000 
imposed a new balance in relations. Th is was accompanied by elements of ‘business 
capture’ by the state, in which businesses could conduct their aff airs as long as they 
aligned their strategies with those of the state. Property rights remained weak, 
subject to predatory ‘raids’ by powerful interests in collusion with state offi  cials, 
law enforcement offi  cers and corrupt courts. Today in Russia, private property 
exists, but as Maksim Trudolyubov argues, ‘the problem is just that property and 
freedom in Russia are entirely separate: they occupy parallel universes’.  2  In other 
words, unlike in the Lockean Anglo-American experience, private property so 
far has not become the foundation of a rights-defending middle class. Property 
holders in Russia remain dependent and vulnerable, and have not yet been able to 
exercise class power of the sort envisaged by Barrington Moore when he asserted, 
‘No bourgeois, no democracy.’  3  
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 State and market 
 Managed capitalism is nothing new in Russia. Th e Russian state from at least 
the time of Ivan the Terrible in the sixteenth century was handing out licences 
for salt mines in the Urals, as well as granting concessions and monopolies, 
such as in the fur trade. In the late tsarist years, the state devised an ambitious 
industrialisation and infrastructure-building programme. Between 1891 and 
1916, the world’s longest railway, the Trans-Siberian, was built linking Moscow 
with Vladivostok 9,289 km and eight time zones away in its recently acquired 
territories in the RFE. Th e Soviet planned economy emulated this, building 
the 4,324 km Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) from the 1970s. Post-communist 
Russia thus inherited not only an enduring historical model but also the vast 
apparatus of a state-managed economy, and to this day economic relations 
are shaped by this legacy. Th e structure of economic relations has drastically 
changed, but Russia today retains the characteristics of a developmental state. 
Th e instruments of economic management are no longer centralised ministries 
but state corporations, state-aligned energy companies and state-owned 
holding companies of various sorts, as well as private companies headed by 
Putin’s associates. 
 Speaking fl uent German and having lived in East Germany, Putin has been called 
‘the German in the Kremlin’.  4  In this context, Putin clearly appeals to the theory 
of ordoliberalism, devised in the 1930s and 1940s and then applied to underpin 
the German ‘social market economy’ in the 1950s. Th e German ordoliberals of 
the Freiburg School, notably Walter Eucken, learnt from the bitter experience of 
 laissez faire capitalism of the 1920s to formulate a model of liberalism in which 
a strong state provides the framework for economic competition and market 
stability, accompanied by a social safety net (in Germany to counter the threat of 
socialism and in Russia to prevent a neo-communist resurgence). Ordoliberals 
consider themselves the true neo-liberals and view the Friedrich von Hayek 
school and his Mont P è lerin society as ‘paleoliberals’, loyal to nineteenth-century 
ideas of self-correcting markets.  5  However, post-communist Russia is far from 
achieving the central precept of ordoliberalism, the independence of the law and 
an impartial regulatory state, and instead is prey to elements of ‘crony capitalism’ 
while the legal system is abused to abet raiders rather than to protect the rights 
of entrepreneurs and other economic actors. Nevertheless, the Putinite emphasis 
on the regulatory role of the state and the maintenance of a developed (although 
inadequately funded) welfare state lies in the mainstream of post-war European 
social democratic thinking. Th e absence of strong and independent trade unions 
and of a serious social democratic party (JR at one point sought to fi ll this niche) 
only reinforces the regime character of a top-down social contract, built not on 
political consensus but on depoliticised techniques of stability-focused regime 
management. 
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 Russia is not exceptional in having a highly politicised economy, but the depth 
and intensity of the relationship between power and property is unusual. Despite 
some obvious distortions and the enduring eff ect of nominally non-economic 
agents in economic aff airs (notably the security agencies of various stripes), 
Putin’s economic policy has been remarkably consistent and well designed to 
achieve the regime’s key goal of restoring state power and authority. Conservative 
fi scal and monetary policies provided economic stability and growth, but the 
prevalence of personalised economic relations and unpredictable interventions 
(in the form of raiding and by monopolistic economic actors) stifl ed investment 
and dampened growth.  6  Characteristic of a stability system, radical structural 
reform was postponed to avoid social dislocation and protest, but the price (or so 
orthodox economics would suggest) was relatively low GDP growth rates and low 
productivity. With declining growth rates, already by 2013 it was clear that energy 
rents were no longer acting as the locomotive of economic growth, and a new 
model was required. 
 Th ere is a rich literature in the fi eld of institutional economics on the way 
that varying arrangements can foster diff erent types of economic and political 
behaviour. In their study, Douglass North and his colleagues contrasted extractive 
institutions (focused on deriving rents) with others that are inclusive and which 
promote development. What they call ‘open-access orders’ (contrasted with 
limited-access orders) allow the political and economic systems to develop and 
together constrain violence.  7  Similar points were later advanced by Acemoglu and 
Robinson, who argue that underdevelopment is a function not of geography but 
of political institutions, with more pluralist and open societies fostering education 
and initiative, whereas the focus on extraction by more closed systems stifl es 
innovation and development.  8  In this context, the leading Russian economist 
Alexander Auzan makes the important point that 
 it makes little sense for Russia to move full-steam ahead with institutional 
reform  – even if backed by political capital, and even if this reform is 
multipronged – until we have a fi rmer understanding of, fi rst, which type of 
institutions, extractive or inclusive, are at play in the country, and second, how 
these institutions relate to the sociocultural circumstances of the country, and 
therefore how they reproduce themselves with the help of informal practices.  9  
 He argues that the character of Russia’s transition has been misunderstood and 
that instead of creating a market economy and democratic society, it was directed 
towards overcoming the failings of the Soviet defi cit-burdened economy and 
creating a consumer society, and, thus, the institutions of a consumer market were 
created, not those of a democratic society. In the fat years of the 2000s, when raw 
material profi ts poured in, living standards rose dramatically and a consumer 
society was created, but ‘in essence, those institutions that contributed to the 
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structure of the demand economy became extractive institutions, based on the 
extraction of rents – not only rents from natural resources but also monopoly and 
administrative rents’.  10  
 Putin is acutely aware that without a dynamic economic foundation, his 
foreign policy ambitions and search for status in the world would prove illusory. 
Putin may not have read Paul Kennedy’s study of how economic, military and 
technological balances determined the fate of the great powers in the twentieth 
century, but he intuitively understands the notion of ‘imperial overstretch’.  11  
Russia inherited a heavy institutional legacy from the Soviet system, including 
the prevalence of indirect bureaucratic controls, an extensive second economy 
with the related corruption networks, negative value added in many industries 
and a ‘rent-management system’ through which the state redistributed, via formal 
and informal channels, the value gained from energy exports.  12  By the mid-1990s, 
Russia appeared to have a ‘virtual economy’, which simulated a market economy 
while the state redistributed energy rents to loss-making industries.  13  Th e system 
evolved in later years, but it remains a rent-distribution system combining the not 
always compatible goals of social stability and economic development. 
 Putin modifi ed the economic model he inherited, although in keeping with his 
evolutionary style he incorporated much of the oligarch system into a new state-
centred model of managed capitalist development. Th e most egregiously political 
of the old oligarch class were forced into exile (notably Boris Berezovsky and 
Vladimir Gusinsky), while the rest adapted to work with the regime. Th e Yeltsin-
era ‘oligarchs’ were tamed to become ‘stoligarchs’, and state capture was eliminated. 
Th e opposite process now took hold as the market state of the Yeltsin years gave way 
to the creation of a state market. Powerful business interests, oft en with personal 
ties to Putin, align with the regime to combine profi t maximisation with rent-
seeking. Th e combination opened the door to corruption and exposed businesses 
without adequate political support to ‘raiding’ by corrupt state offi  cials (oft en from 
the security apparatus) working in collusion with the courts, administrative offi  ces 
and law-enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, Putinite economic management 
cannot be reduced to any simplistic formula but instead has responded remarkably 
eff ectively to the challenges, and we can only speculate about the degree to which 
other responses would have been more eff ective. 
 Th e various reform plans issued in the Putin years are the functional equivalent 
of Soviet-era fi ve-year plans. Th e fi rst,  Strategy 2010 , was devised by German 
Gref in 2000, and many of the recommended tax and fi nancial reforms were 
implemented. Th e liberal proposals for the economy included the introduction 
of a fl at-rate (regressive) income tax of 13 per cent, which endures to this day. 
Mass tax evasion was ended and tax receipts grew, but so did inequality. Th ere 
were similar improvements in the corporate sector, including from the energy 
companies as new laws aft er the end of Yukos in 2004 allowed a large part of 
the profi ts from oil and gas exports to enter the federal exchequer. Th e greatly 
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enhanced rent-extraction model provided the regime with the fi nancial resources 
to shape the new model of ‘managed democracy’ and developmental capitalism. 
In that context, it became less urgent to modernise the economy, and only about a 
third of the proposals in this area were implanted and no more than a fi ft h of the 
ideas to reshape the bureaucracy. 
 From the mid-2000s, the model once again changed when it became clear that 
the impasse in international aff airs would not be soon overcome. Issues of state 
security became a priority, although in the relatively soft  form of ‘preparation’ 
( podgotovka ) for some putative future confrontation rather than ‘mobilisation’ for 
some specifi c and imminent confl ict. A  list was drawn up of security-sensitive 
industries and plants. Th is was not full-scale militarisation, but it did entail the 
‘securitisation’ of parts of the economy, in particular though elements of import 
substitution to reduce reliance on strategic foreign items accompanied by the 
imposition of restrictions on foreign infl uence. A  Putinite industrial strategy 
was formulated, drawing on some of the ideas he had formulated earlier in his 
academic thesis. Civilian aircraft  manufacturers were consolidated into the United 
Aircraft  Corporation (OAK), military jet manufacturers were rationalised into 
two major holding companies, shipbuilding companies were merged into the 
United Shipbuilding Corporation (OSK), while the two major sea-going shipping 
companies became one giant concern, Sovcomfl ot. Th e giant Rostec conglomerate 
works as a holding company for a vast array of manufacturing and engineering 
industries. By 2019, Russian internet companies accounted for about 4 per cent 
of the GDP, and their contribution was rising fast. In short, Putin’s ambition 
was to ensure that Russia remained a full-service economy, repudiating former 
senator John McCain’s rather nasty jibe that Russia was no more than a ‘gas station 
masquerading as a country’.  14  
 Th is was the strategy pursued by Labour administrations in the UK in the 
1960s and 1970s, and had long been part of post-war French  dirigisme . Th e 
post-war Japanese ( keiratsu ) and South Korean ( chaebols ) also provided directed 
development based on industrial strategies. Th e creation of ‘national champions’ 
in Russia undoubtedly prevented a number from going bankrupt, while insulating 
them from asset stripping and foreign acquisition (although foreign partnerships 
were welcomed). Th us, while the model is internally coherent and rational, and 
draws on the solid, although mixed, international experience, the Russian model, 
naturally, has its own specifi cities. Although corruption is far from unique to the 
Russian model, the weakness of the rule of law and the interpenetration of economic 
and political elites created a distinctive ruling class. Th e military dictatorships 
in Egypt and Pakistan had also fostered fused elites, as also in Indonesia earlier, 
but in the Russian case, a civilian elite structure makes it impossible to tell where 
politics ends and business begins. 
 Th e fi nancial crisis from 2008 once again prompted the evolution of the Putinite 
economic model. Th e anti-crisis programme of March 2009 pumped trillions of 
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roubles into the economy to prevent businesses from collapsing, and in return they 
maintained employment without wage reductions. Cheap government loans or 
subsidies ensured that production continued irrespective of competitiveness. From 
the very beginning, Putin had insisted on the ‘social responsibility of business’, but 
this was a new form of ‘public-private partnership’. As one commentary on the 
period puts it, ‘In giving up on economic logic, businesses and individuals start to 
follow a quasi-political logic.’ Th is applies not just to corporations but also to the 
behaviour of social groups:  ‘Instead of defending their own economic interests, 
they start to compete over the amount of money and preferential treatment 
provided to them by the government.’ Th is provided a loyalty base for the regime, 
which was mobilised against protestors in 2011–12 and then consolidated at the 
time of the patriotic mobilisation over Crimea in 2014. Th e new model introduced 
selective protectionism accompanied by the growth of government contracts, 
notably in the defence industries, accompanied in early 2013 by the ban on the sale 
of strategic Russian assets to foreigners. In other words, aft er 2008, the economy 
became increasingly ‘governmentalised’.  15  Th is was not outright nationalisation, 
but it certainly impeded the implementation of the various plans for privatisation. 
Th is was a quasi-war economy, which anticipated confrontation with the West and 
allowed Russia to weather the sanctions from 2014. 
 In August 2012, nineteen years aft er its original application, Russia fi nally 
joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO), just at the time when domestic 
and international pressures were pushing the government away from the liberal 
integration model. However, Putin’s policy in this area as in others is always a 
combination of oft en incompatible elements (the uncharitable would call them 
inconsistent, if not mendacious). Amid clear signs of economic slowdown, the 
Kremlin’s  Strategy 2020 in 2012 outlined the priorities for Putin’s third term. 
Th ese included a new growth model based on improved labour productivity, 
technological innovation, reformed social policy, economic diversifi cation and 
international integration. Th e  Strategy 2020 reform plan was devised by policy 
experts from several Moscow think tanks and called for a new model of economic 
growth based on the shift  from a demand to a supply economy accompanied 
by a fundamental reorientation of social policy. A  sluggish economy, shrinking 
workforce and an aging population required greater investment in the health 
and welfare system, but this in turn required accelerated economic growth and 
a stronger political voice for those on whom the burden of reforms would fall.  16  
Th is was a grandiose, comprehensive and ambitious plan for reform, running to 
864 pages, but in the event, investment slowed from 2013 as oil prices fell, and the 
crisis in international aff airs and sanctions stymied reform. 
 Structural problems are compounded by the weakness of Russian fi nancial 
institutions, which cannot eff ectively intermediate household savings (which in 
Russia are quite high) into productive investment. Much of the money goes abroad, 
or is hidden at home in the form of valuable goods or foreign currencies. Auzan 
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had long identifi ed Russia’s fundamental problem as one of ‘path dependency’, 
a point elaborated by the economist Sergei Guriev. He noted that the growing 
gap between Russian and US GDP could only be overcome if Russian economic 
growth exceed America’s by at least a factor of two over twenty-fi ve years. Th e 
fundamental factors that shape long-term economic growth  – human capital, 
economic and political institutions, geography and culture – change only slowly, 
and their interaction create ‘development traps, in which Russia now found itself. 
Economic agents require confi dence that the state would commit to long-term 
rules, and liberal democracy was a system designed to protect investors from 
expropriation and to restrain predatory behaviour.’  17  
 Commonly quoted fi gures suggest that by 2017, the state’s proportion of the 
economy had risen from some 35 per cent when Putin assumed power to 70 
per cent, but this fi gure has been challenged. An alternative study suggests that 
consolidated state expenditure rose from 30 per cent of the GDP in 2000 to 36 
per cent in 2016 (of which some 13 per cent comprises pension and other social 
payments), and as a proportion of the labour force, 30 per cent were employed 
in the state sector, including the federal and municipal levels and the twenty-fi ve 
largest state corporations. Out of the six hundred largest corporations, only 41 per 
cent belong to the state, representing 45 per cent of total output in 2016. In sum, 
taking into account various statistical methodologies, the state sector comprises 
between 26 and 41 per cent of the total economy, a far cry from 70 per cent.  18  
Other studies suggest that the state sector accounts for some 46 per cent of Russia’s 
GDP. Whatever the precise fi gure, it is clear that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) do 
enjoy advantages, including preferential fi nancial treatment and access to relevant 
fi gures in the government bureaucracy, which distorts the competitiveness of the 
economy. Th e regulatory burden remains high, despite numerous attempts to 
reduce sanitary, fi re and other inspections. Th e small- and medium-enterprise 
(SME) sector is still underdeveloped, in part because of the high contributions that 
they have to make to social funds. Overall, the quality of corporate governance 
has greatly improved, helped by the introduction of a corporate governance code 
in 2015. Financial and ownership transparency, the defence of shareholder rights 
and the appointment of genuinely independent directors were all improved, in 
part spurred by earlier hopes that Moscow would become a major international 
fi nancial centre. Even without those dreams, a stable polity and eff ective economic 
management allowed businesses to improve internal governance. Th is is not to 
suggest that everything is rosy, and the weakness of defensible property rights 
continues to hamper business development and investment. 
 Th is does not amount to the recreation of Soviet-style state capitalism, in 
which market forces are not only constrained (as they are in Russia today) but also 
eff ectively abolished in favour of administrative regulation and control. Rather, the 
Putinite system can be described as ‘statist capitalism’. As in the political sphere, this 
is a dual economy in which market relations structure the normative framework 
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but are tempered by state interventions. Many countries in the post-war period 
applied  dirigiste strategies to protect and develop vulnerable industries, and Russia 
today is doing the same – although with a lag of fi ft y years, in which time the world 
has moved on and today frowns on ramifi ed ‘industrial strategies’. As so oft en, 
Russia appears to be trying to implement a model that has already become archaic. 
While there is something to this, it is misleading. Russia’s perception of itself as a 
great power requires investment in military industries and the armed forces, and 
also prompts it to try to achieve full-spectrum development from shipbuilding, 
space exploration, aircraft  manufacture, nuclear power, car and truck making, 
as well as electronics, avionics and the fi nancial and services sectors. Th e goal 
is to decrease Russian vulnerability to external pressure in conditions of global 
confrontation and to increase ‘resilience’ – the ability of a system to return to its 
previous status aft er a period of stress. 
 Th e statist model is challenged by some of the liberal bloc, although there are 
also some statist liberals who accept an enhanced role for the state in the transition 
to a more sustainable economy. In Putin’s fi rst two terms, it became common 
practice to appoint offi  cials to the boards of companies where the government 
had a stake. Medvedev sought to distance the state from direct management, 
including, as noted, the ban in 2011 on state offi  cials serving on the boards of 
SOEs. When the ban was removed by Putin in 2014, an infl ux of bureaucrats 
joined the boards of state companies. Th e elite reproduced itself as the children 
of senior offi  cials moved into top positions. For example, Petr Fradkov, the son 
of Mikhail Fradkov, a former prime minister and former head of the Foreign 
Intelligence Service (SVR), became fi rst deputy chair of Vnesheconombank 
(VEB), the state-owned development bank. Sergei Ivanov’s son, also called Sergei, 
became president of Alrosa, the state-owned diamond company, while Dmitry 
Patrushev, the son of Nikolai Patrushev (the secretary of the Security Council) 
became head of the supervisory board of the Russian Agricultural Bank, and in 
May 2018 Dmitry was appointed minister of agriculture, bringing the so-called 
‘golden youth’ into governmental positions. Aleksei Rogozin, the son of the former 
deputy prime minister responsible for the defence industries (2011-18) and now 
head of Roscosmos, Dmitry Rogozin, became director general of the Ilyushin 
Aviation Complex. All this demonstrates the blurred line between the state and 
business, and between state offi  cials and business people. A  key commodity in 
Russia is access to policymakers, and there are many ways this is achieved. One 
of these is by business people becoming legislators, an issue that the State Duma 
has long recognised as reducing its legitimacy. Parties have imposed quotas on the 
number of business people who can join their lists. Th e phenomenon is replicated 
at the regional level where up to 40 per cent of legislators come directly from the 
business world, to great profi t for themselves and their companies.  19  Russia has 
still not adopted a law on lobbying, legislation that could regulate and possibly 
limit the phenomenon. 
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 Th e distribution of rents is exceptionally ‘lumpy’, with Russia becoming one 
of the most unequal countries in the world.  20  Th e richest 10 per cent own 87 per 
cent of the country’s wealth, with some hundred billionaires at the summit, while 
some twenty million people (13.8 per cent of the population) still fall below the 
poverty line. One per cent of the Russian population holds 46 per cent of all the 
personal bank deposits in the country.  21  Because of the redistribution of energy 
rents, inequality has slightly decreased, and income inequality is roughly at the 
same level as the United States. Th e Gini coeffi  cient measuring income inequality 
(where 0 means complete equality and 1 compete inequality) shows the United 
States at 0.39, Russia at 0.41 and China at 0.49.  22  In other words, Russian wealth 
stratifi cation is one of the worst of any major economy in the world, and off shore 
wealth is about three times greater than Russia’s offi  cial net foreign reserves. As 
incomes stagnate, the middle class has been eroded.  23  Inequality is compounded 
by gross diff erences between regions, with the Republics of Tyva and Altai on 
the bottom of most scales, while the big Russian cities and Tatarstan are on the 
top. Th us, nearly half the population in Tyva is below the poverty level, while 
in Tatarstan, it is only 7.4 per cent.  24  Th e most eff ective way to tackle income 
inequality is progressive taxation, but Putin has ruled out any change to the fl at 
rate 13 per cent income tax introduced in his fi rst year in power. 
 Th e challenges of the digital revolution have been recognised by the Russian 
government as the country enthusiastically embraced the new technologies. 
Th e tension between security and cyber freedom is as sharp here as elsewhere. 
Th e attempt by the government regulator, Roskomnadzor, in April 2018 to ban the 
messaging app Telegram, established in 2013, because of its refusal to hand over 
the encryption keys to the FSB provoked a vigorous reaction. At least twelve 
thousand people turned out to protest.  25  Th e ‘Yarovaya’ law, named aft er its main 
sponsor, the UR member of parliament Irina Yarovaya, came into force on 1 July 
2018. It requires internet service providers (ISPs) to keep records of their clients’ 
traffi  c and to hand them over to security offi  cials on request. Th e law also requires 
communications companies to hand over encryption keys on request. Attempts 
to close down Russia’s extraordinarily open internet culture threatened the core 
values of the more modernised part of Russian society. Already the government 
had blocked web networks, as in the case of LinkedIn, and there was even talk 
of shutting down Facebook, with its twenty-fi ve million Russian users. Telegram, 
however, was a diff erent case, with fourteen million users in Russia and two hundred 
million worldwide. Its founder, Pavel Durov, had already four years earlier been 
forced to relinquish control of his Facebook equivalent, VKontakte (VK), which 
was taken over by the Kremlin-friendly Alisher Usmanov. Roskomnadzor justifi ed 
its actions by the struggle against extremism as well as the 2014 law that requires 
all internet services in Russia to store their data on servers that are physically 
located in the country. LinkedIn failed to comply, hence all of Russia’s 4,500 ISPs 
were ordered to restrict access to the site. In July 2017, a law was adopted banning 
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the use of virtual private network (VPN) services, which allows users to mask their 
identities. Th e law was ineff ective, and following the ban on Telegram, VPN usage 
soared and Durov shift ed to the cloud services of Amazon and Google. 
 Russia is learning from China how to build internet fi rewalls, but the political 
context is very diff erent.  26  Russians are ready to defend global internet access, and as 
new laws to create a ‘sovereign internet’ were passed in April 2019, forcing internet 
providers to install devices to fi lter traffi  c, protests also gathered pace. Th e technical 
situation is also diff erent, with only three operators eff ectively controlling all traffi  c 
in China, whereas in Russia there are thousands.  27  Above all, the government had 
‘no plans to shut anything down’, when asked about social media networks in his 
Direct Line on 7 June 2018, although Putin noted his concern about terrorists 
using encrypted messaging systems but insisted that as a former security offi  cial 
he knew ‘how easy it is to ban something, but it is more diffi  cult to fi nd civilised 
solutions’. He would encourage the security services to use ‘modern investigation 
methods’ to prevent terrorist attacks ‘without limiting freedom, including on the 
internet’.  28  With ninety million users, Russia is Europe’s largest internet market 
(it overtook Germany in 2011), and internet penetration exceeds 75 per cent 
of the country and is growing mainly due to the older generation increasingly 
using mobile devices to connect to the network. Th e internet in Russia has been 
largely free since its inception, yet the pressure of controls continues to mount. 
Ignoring street protests and the advice of the Kremlin’s own Presidential Council 
for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, the Duma in March 2019 
adopted the law against ‘fake news’, imposing large fi nes for publishing ‘untrue’ 
reports that threaten ‘life, health, public order, security, infrastructure, and almost 
any public institution’; in other words, about almost everything. As if that was 
not enough, parliament adopted a second law allowing offi  cials to shut down any 
content containing ‘information expressed in indecent form which insults human 
dignity and public morality and shows obvious disrespect for society, the state, 
and offi  cial symbols of Russia, the Russian constitution, or other agencies that 
administer government power in Russia’.  29  Th e new legislation gave Roskomnadzor 
enormous discretionary powers, and they would no doubt be used selectively 
against critical voices. 
 Russia still faces the challenge of closing the long-term economic gap with its 
peers. Auzan talks of three paths. Th e development of  private capitalism requires 
improvement in the administrative quality of the state, above all the strengthening 
of the rule of law, the enhanced protection of property rights and the fostering 
of competition (accompanied by less emphasis on ‘national champions’). He 
warned that unless there is improvement if the quality of governance, the private 
capitalism route risks reverting to the situation of the 1990s, when regulators 
were captured by business, laws were not observed and competition worked 
towards negative selection  – the most predatory survived. Th e  state capitalism 
model requires a diff erent emphasis, above all improved strategic planning and 
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an active state engaged in public-private partnerships and state companies, all 
within the framework of a long-term economic strategy. Th e third model, and the 
one favoured by Auzan, is what he calls  popular capitalism , in which the savings 
accumulated during the consumer society period are funnelled into a national 
investment strategy. Th is ‘Hamiltonian’ strategy (Alexander Hamilton had devised 
the ‘American System’ that played a large part in US development in the fi rst half 
of the nineteenth century) requires a strengthened institutional investment sector, 
including pension funds, insurance companies and, of course, banks, to allow the 
direct entry of Russian citizens into the stock market and investment funds.  30  Th is 
sort of people’s capitalism (reminiscent of Th atcherite rhetoric) requires improved 
institutional trust as well as high-quality human capital, and, above all, determined 
eff orts to break path-dependent inertia. Elements of all three models are already 
being implemented, reinforcing the hybrid character of the Russian economy. 
 Th e independent Russian banking system was born in the 1990s, with many 
created to leverage money from enterprises to shareholders or to scoop up 
undervalued state enterprises rather than to intermediate fi nances into productive 
investment. Money laundering and cash conversion operations remain rife. Th e 
Central Bank of Russia (CBR) in the Putin years, against stiff  resistance, sought to 
clean up the banking sector. Over two-thirds of over 3,000 banks lost their licences, 
with the number since 2012 falling from 937 to around 500 today. Th e cull included 
most of the small regional and personal banks as well as some of the major players 
such as Otkritie. However, administrative rather than market measures were used 
to manage the process, including the failure to introduce adequate investment 
risk for investors. Th e Deposit Insurance Agency still covers investor losses up 
to $25,000 when banks go bust.  31  One of Putin’s main achievements has been to 
restore stability to the fi nancial system and to heal the scars of the various bank 
defaults and repeated loss of people’s savings in the 1990s. Th e question now is 
whether the stick has been bent too far the other way. Th e banking system is a 
good example of Hellman’s ‘partial reform equilibrium’, the concept popularised 
in the late 1990s to explain the way that further economic reform is blocked by the 
early winners of the reform process. 
 Economic performance and plans 
 Even before the sanctions and fall in oil prices in 2014, it was clear that the Russian 
economy was stalling. Growth averaged 7 per cent in the golden years to 2008 
but had slowed to 1.3 per cent in 2013 and 1.1 per cent in 2014, before falling 
by 2.2 per cent in 2015 and 0.2 per cent in 2016, with modest growth of 1.5 per 
cent returning in 2017 and 2.3 per cent in 2018. During the recession, infl ation 
accelerated to over 15 per cent, the budget defi cit rose to 3.5 per cent of the GDP, 
interest rates peaked at 17 per cent, there was a 40 per cent depreciation in the 
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value of the rouble (compared to the dollar) and there were large capital outfl ows 
(much of which was used to pay off  corporate debt). Th e government used its 
Reserve Fund and the Sovereign Wealth Fund, as well as the rent-management 
system as a whole, to cushion the social impact and shielded corporations and the 
fi nancial sector from its eff ects. Despite many alarmist predictions, the various 
sovereign wealth funds, as in 2009, worked in a countercyclical manner to ward 
off  a fi nancial crisis, and although diminished, they were not depleted and in 2017 
started accumulating again. In 2018, Russia enjoyed a current account surplus of 
$115 billion, but real incomes fell for the fi ft h year in a row. Th e federal budget 
recorded a surplus of 2.2 per cent, the fi rst since 2012. By mid-2019, the country 
held $520 billion in reserves, while sovereign external debt was extraordinarily 
low at just 15 per cent of the GDP, compared to the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) average of 78 per cent. 
 Th e sanctions imposed in response to the Ukraine crisis targeted individuals 
associated with the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and then were extended to 
cover the export of dual-use and military technologies, the fi nancial sector (making 
long-term borrowing abroad more diffi  cult) and parts of the energy sector. Th e 
Atlantic system and its allies (such as Japan and Australia) joined forces to ‘impose 
costs’ on Russia for its actions, but some major industrial countries such as China, 
India, Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, Iran and South Korea refused to participate, and 
made up for the shortfalls in fi nancing, technology and manufactures. In this 
respect at least, the world has become multipolar. A European study showed that 
in 2014–15, the sanctions resulted in $114 billion in lost revenue, with the pain 
shared almost equally between Russia, which lost more than $65 billion, and the 
United States and the EU, which together lost more than $50 billion. Over 90 per 
cent of that was borne by the EU, with Germany alone shouldering 40 per cent of 
the West’s losses.  32  By early 2019, 26 per cent of Russia’s total imports came from 
China and only 7.8 per cent from Germany – a historic shift  that was unlikely to be 
reversed. In one way or another, Russia has endured various forms of sanctions for 
a century as the West sought to undermine Soviet economic and military power 
and to modify its international behaviour. However, as Christopher Davis notes, 
‘Western economic warfare neither prevented the Soviet Union from becoming 
a superpower nor played a signifi cant role in bringing about the collapse of the 
communist regimes in the late 1980s.’  33  Even before the Ukraine-related sanctions, 
the United States aft er 9/11 had banned the export of some high-technology military 
and dual-use goods. Th e USSR had a sophisticated system of counter-sanctions, 
and Russia now resumed these practices, above all through its  spetsinformatsiya 
(technical information) system (otherwise known as industrial espionage). 
 Russia today is the world’s sixth-largest economy in purchasing power parity 
(PPP) terms (aft er China, US, India, Japan and Germany), with a GDP of $4.1 
trillion, increasing almost sixfold from $620 billion in 2000. In nominal terms 
(and this depends on a fl uctuating exchange rate), Russia ranks a more modest 
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eleventh, with a GDP according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of only 
$1.72 trillion, about the same as Australia’s. GDP per capita in PPP terms rose 
from $9,889 to reach $27,900 by 2017, the highest among all the Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa (BRICS) members, with the next highest, China, at 
$16,624. Over the same period, nominal monthly wages grew almost elevenfold, 
from $61 to $652, and following a decline during the recession, real wages were 
now rising across all sectors. Unemployment fell from 13 per cent in 2000 to 4.7 
per cent in May 2018, a record low for the post-communist period, while pensions 
increased over 1,000 per cent from $20 to $221, although in real times they are 
still very low. In 2000, infl ation was running at 36.5 per cent, whereas today it has 
fallen to a post-communist low of 2.4 per cent. When Putin was elected, Russia 
had barely $12 billion in reserves and a public debt that ran to 92 per cent of the 
GDP, while reserves (having provided a fi nancial lifeline in the 2009 crash and the 
recession of 2014–16) have been restored and are still rising, and public debt, as 
noted, has shrunk to 15 per cent of the GDP, the lowest among the G20 nations. 
Th e government’s debt load of 33 per cent of the GDP is also extraordinarily low 
for an industrialised nation and is less than a third of America’s 105 per cent in 
2017. Putin, in fact, has something of an obsession with debt, and spent his early 
years paying off  foreign state and private creditors (completing the repayment of 
the Soviet Union’s $104.5 billion foreign debt early). He then built up reserves 
in sovereign wealth funds, a prudent countercyclical strategy that as we have 
seen saved Russia twice – in the 2008–9 global fi nancial crisis and the 2014–16 
recession. Even the budget defi cit by 2017 had fallen to only 1.6 per cent of the 
GDP, an amount easily fi nanced by the government, and with the rise in oil prices 
and export diversifi cation, Russia once again enjoyed a budget surplus in 2018. 
 Th e CBR under Elvira Nabiullina pursued a conservative fi scal policy focused 
on infl ation targeting through positive interest rates and a fl oating exchange rate 
(introduced in November 2014). Th is is accompanied by the Gaullist strategy of 
building up gold reserves to loosen the grip of the dollar. Gold reserves in the 
Putin period more than quadrupled to reach 1,828 tonnes (worth some $454 
billion) in 2018, and Russia remains the world’s largest purchaser of gold and the 
world’s third largest producer.  34  Russia is one of many countries, including China, 
India and Turkey, who for obvious reasons have repatriated their bullion from 
the United States, and potentially the creation of a gold-backed cryptocurrency 
could topple the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency. Digital acceleration and 
geopolitical rivalry combine to challenge US economic predominance.  35  At the 
same time, Russia in 2018 sharply reduced its exposure to US Treasury bills, falling 
by more than 85 per cent from $96.9 billion to $13.2 billion. In October 2017, 
China launched a ‘payment versus payment’ (PVP) system for transactions in yuan 
and roubles, eliminating the need for the dollar to intermediate transactions, most 
prominently in oil trades. Russia and China were not only insulating themselves 
from US extraterritorial pressure but also sought to reduce their exposure to the 
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next global fi nancial crisis. By May 2018, global debt reached $237 trillion, higher 
than it had been before the 2008 fi nancial crisis, while just in the fi rst quarter of 
2018, the US Treasury borrowed a record $488 billion and annual defi cits broke 
all records. In 1971, the United States had severed the fi nal link between the dollar 
and gold, and since then it has been a purely fi at money system, meaning that the 
dollar’s value is no longer based on an independently redeemable asset but faith 
in the US government.  36  As that faith erodes, the move away from the dollar is in 
danger of becoming a stampede. 
 Russia is in danger of catching the ‘Japanese disease’, long-term stagnation but 
at a lower developmental level. Any attempt to stimulate the economy through 
a fi scal stimulus would only increase infl ation and corruption. Th is is why 
structural reform has been proposed to stimulate economic growth. Th e term 
denotes changing the regulations and structures in an economy to make it more 
competitive. Th e demographic changes facing the country add urgency to such 
plans. Up to 2012, the natural population (excluding migration) had inexorably 
decreased, but as a result in part of Putin’s pro-natalist policies (fi rst introduced 
in 2007), including generous maternity capital, between 2012 and 2015, births 
exceeded deaths, but this trend reversed in 2016. In 2017, the natural population 
declined by 135,000 and in 2018 by 86,700, largely as a result of the demographic 
crisis of the early 1990s, as the lower number of women born then had fewer 
children two decades later. A return to natural growth is anticipated in 2024, but 
in the meantime a new maternity capital programme launched on 1 January 2018 
granted increased support to low-income families, accompanied by measures to 
increase life expectancy. According to the federal statistical agency Rosstat, the 
population (including Crimea) on 1 January 2019 was 146.8 million. 
 A number of interlocking structural reforms have been proposed. First, a return 
to the privatisation programme of the 1990s although now conducted in a less 
anarchic and distorted manner. In the Putin years, an increasing proportion of the 
economy came into state hands, although there was no concerted nationalisation 
plan. Th e expropriation of the Yukos and Sibneft  oil companies in the mid-2000s 
was followed by the restoration of state control over key sectors such as shipping, 
shipbuilding and aircraft  production. Th e idea was to create ‘national champions’ 
that could compete in global markets. In the recent period, some private banks 
have been taken over as part of the attempt to clean-up the sector. In the early 
2000s, the mastermind of earlier privatisation, Anatoly Chubais, was put in charge 
of the marketisation of the giant electricity monopoly, RAO EES. He divided the 
system into production and distribution companies, and sold them off  to the 
market. However, very soon, many of these companies fell back into the hands of 
state-owned companies. While perhaps rational at a certain stage of development, 
liberal ideology asserts that state-controlled companies tend to breed ineffi  ciencies 
and, in Russian conditions, corruption and rent-seeking. Russia certainly needs 
more world-class private companies, but the experience of some botched 
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privatisations (notably the railways and utilities) in countries such as the UK acts 
as a salutary warning that the state is still required not only to defend the national 
interest but above all to defend the public interest from short-term profi t-seeking 
and the dysfunctions of semi-competitive markets. 
 A second issue is the need to ‘de-securitise’ the economy. In Putin’s second 
term, the government designated over forty industries as ‘critical for national 
security’. Reform here would expand access to these industries by foreign 
investors, which would reduce the privileges (oft en abused) by industry 
insiders and expand access to fi nancial markets, cutting-edge technologies and 
competitive management methods. Th e downside would be increased exposure 
to market failure and the loss of the employment security still enjoyed by Russian 
workers. Th is brings us to the third issue, the question of political reform to 
resist the baleful infl uence of the ‘third state’ and its associated corruption and 
‘raiding’. Fourth and above all, structural reform is intended to unleash Russia’s 
entrepreneurial potential to allow GDP growth rates to rise substantially, 
based not just on natural resources but also through the market mechanisms 
of a diversifi ed economy. To achieve this, structural reform would entail the 
consistent application of the rule of law, freedom to act commercially and the 
equal treatment of all investors. Th ere have been major achievements in all three 
areas, but substantial shortcomings remain. 
 Th e country has seen a succession of technocratic development plans. Less than 
40 per cent of the Gref plan in the end was implemented, and its successor,  Strategy 
2020 , was derailed by the recession. Some of Russia’s best economists and reform-
minded politicians have been involved in craft ing these plans, and they attest to 
the importance with which specialists are endowed in Putin’s Russia. However, 
the problem of partial implementation lies less in the quality of the plans than 
in their undefi ned goals. It is not so much that the strategies are embedded in a 
technocratic rationality (in an era when expertise is too oft en denigrated, respect 
for experts can only be commended) but that there has been a lack of political will 
in pushing through necessary reforms, and this lack of will itself is an outcome 
of the consensual model of politics practiced in the Putin years, as well as the 
power of horizontal structures which pushed back against reform (notably when 
it comes to privatisation) when vested interests are threatened. Th is applies not 
just to the endemic struggle between powerful corporate groups but also to social 
constituencies. Although trade unions still operate largely according to neo-Soviet 
logic, elements of the former Soviet social contract also apply. Workers are not 
sacked in a downturn, and a range of social benefi ts continue to be provided by 
the workplace. Only radical liberals have the appetite for a Th atcherite neo-liberal 
shake-out of the economy. Russia today, thus, looks rather like Britain of the 
1970s, with all of its achievements and failings including not only a ramifi ed social 
security system and welfare state but also ineffi  cient monopolies and nationalised 
industries. 
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 With the economy still mired in recession, in early 2016, Putin appointed 
the former minister of fi nance, Kudrin, co-chair of the Presidential Economic 
Council. In his speech to Putin and experts on 25 May 2016, Kudrin presented 
a report prepared by the CSR calling for fi scal consolidation, structural reform 
and greater incentives for investment. Th e plan, on which over 1,700 experts had 
toiled, outlined seven priorities:  improving quality of life, doubling the number 
of entrepreneurs, increasing productivity, expanding the non-commodities 
sector of the economy, introducing new governance methods, accompanied by 
urban development and court and military reforms. Kudrin argued that without 
structural reform, it would be impossible to return to pre-crisis levels and annual 
growth would not exceed 2 per cent, with the economy trapped by institutional 
constraints. He noted that the structural growth rate – the part of the GDP based 
on growth in labour, capital and productivity  – had steadily declined since the 
mid-2000s and was now less than 1 per cent a year.  37  Returning to the theme that 
had provoked his dismissal, Kudrin warned that Russia had to settle its disputes 
with the West if it wished to achieve the desired growth.  38  At that time, Russia’s 
military spending was set to increase by $10 billion, when the same amendments 
to the budget envisaged $7 billion worth of cuts to welfare spending.  39  In 2017, the 
CSR once again stressed the need to cut defence and security spending as a share of 
the GDP (from 4.4 per cent of the GDP to 2.8 per cent), and increase investment in 
human capital (health and education) and other productive investments (such as 
transport and communication). Kudrin and his team were particularly concerned 
that with an aging population, Russia would be spending an ever-increasing share 
of its budget and national income on pensions and healthcare.  40  
 Although Russia returned to cyclical growth in 2017, Kudrin and his team 
argued that without structural reform it would remain low. Kudrin’s key proposals 
included continued macroeconomic restraint, reform of state administration 
(including greater public control over law-enforcement offi  cials), raising 
the pension age, reducing the government stake in large companies through 
substantial privatisation and tightening revenue collection from the shadow 
economy. Th is was to be accompanied by some modest increased investment in 
healthcare and education to reinforce improvements in the business environment 
through judicial reform, designed to make the courts more independent. Th ese 
reforms would all carry political and social costs, hence Putin’s reluctance to 
take this path. Valery Fedorov, the head of the All-Russian Centre for the Study 
of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) polling agency, identifi ed a battle between two 
political agendas. Th e fi rst was the ‘patriotic’ programme, focusing on foreign 
policy and Russia’s role in the world, while the second was the ‘socio-economic’ 
agenda, devoted to domestic issues and in particular the economic crisis.  41  
Kudrin identifi ed with the second, whereas the main protagonist of the former 
was Sergei Glazyev, Putin’s advisor on regional integration between 2012 and 
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2019. Glazyev favoured fi scal expansion, a low refi nancing rate for the CBR and 
increased protectionism.  42  From the neo-traditional statist perspective, ‘structural 
reform’ was little more than a synonym for surrender to the West. Putin, typically, 
tacked between the positions, although Kudrin’s return to a public role signalled 
reinforcement of the liberal position. 
 Th e battle of the economic plans continued in the run-up to the 2018 presidential 
election. In early 2017, the government and two expert bodies delivered their 
reports to the Kremlin. One was devised by Kudrin’s team at the CSR and the 
other by the business ombudsman Boris Titov, who was appointed to the post in 
2012 to defend the rights of business owners, and his Stolypin Club. By contrast 
with the ‘macroeconomic’ restraint recommended by Kudrin, the Stolypin Club 
advocated a surge in spending to be fi nanced by monetary emission and by easing 
limits on the budget defi cit to allow it to grow to 3 per cent of the GDP. Th is in 
eff ect meant ‘printing money’ (a Russian version of quantitative easing) whose 
eff ects would be predictable: increased infl ation and corruption.  43  Th e Ministry of 
Economic Development also had its plans, which tended to be conservative with 
moderate policies, including holding down wage growth to allow profi ts to grow, 
thus allowing for more investment. 
 Th ose opposed to more ‘structural reform’ argued that Russia had already 
achieved much. It had a fl oating exchange rate (as of late 2014), prices set by supply 
and demand, a relatively fl exible labour market, a fl at rate tax and private property 
rights (although threatened by raiders). Russia’s positions in the World Bank’s Ease 
of Doing Business rating had dramatically improved, rising from 120th in 2010 to 
35th (out of 190 in the world) by 2018. Th e rights of minority shareholders had 
been fl agrantly abused in the 1990s, but now Russia ranked 51st for their protection 
(higher than some major industrial countries like Germany and Japan), while it 
ranks 18th for enforcing contracts.  44  Weak points remain the poor quality of the 
fi nancial market and banking, indefensible property rights, inadequate judicial 
independence and corruption. To raise the headline GDP growth rate, serious 
challenges would have to be addressed:  tax optimisation, especially to reduce 
the tax burden on small businesses; demography, and in particular investment 
in human capital, at a time when the working-age population of the country is 
falling and the ratio of workers to pensioners is also falling – currently there are 
two social security contributors to one pensioner, which by 2035 would fall to 
one-and-a-half to every pensioner – increasing pressure to raise the retirement 
age (Kudrin suggested 63 for women and 65 for men); industrial technologies, 
including technical education; public administration (in other words, political 
reform); increasing productivity; and the thorny issue of privatisation. Th e overall 
goal was to improve the economic growth rate and reduce dependence on natural 
resources. Th e central question was whether this could be achieved without 
dismantling the ‘rent-management system’. 
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 On 13 May 2017, the  National Economic Security Strategy to 2030 was adopted, 
the fi rst since 1996, identifying the main challenges and threats to Russia’s 
economic security and outlining measures to combat them: 
 Th e implementation of this Strategy should ensure the economic sovereignty 
of Russia and the resistance of the national economy to external and internal 
challenges and threats, strengthen sociopolitical stability, maintain sustainable 
socioeconomic development and enhance the standard of living and quality of 
life in the country. 
 Th e  Strategy divided challenges into four groups. Th e fi rst focused on natural 
and climatic changes, which could cause droughts, fl oods, food shortages and 
ultimately increased competition and confl icts. Th e second dealt with global 
economic processes including fl uctuations in global fi nancial and commodity 
markets, economic shift s, new types of regulations and changes in global energy 
demand, all of which could aff ect Russia. Th e third group covered challenges 
directed against the Russian economy, such as discriminatory provisions and 
sanctions, including restrictions on fi nancial fl ows. It was against these threats that 
Russia advanced its version of ‘resilience’, trying to insulate the Russian economy 
from external threats by reducing reliance on foreign technology and services, 
especially in the energy and defence sectors. Russian technological and human 
capital resources were stimulated by this sort of economic pressure but eff ectively 
meant partial deglobalisation. Th e fourth group focused on internal economic 
dynamics, including inadequate development of competitive employment in 
advanced sectors of the economy and the underdevelopment of the service sector. 
Russia has few non-resource companies in the world’s top rank, and enduring 
problems of underinvestment remain. Th e export-oriented commodities-based 
economy had natural limits, including the exhaustion of the resource base.  45  
Th e document noted the long-term trends moving against Russia, including the 
depletion of energy fi elds, declining labour resources and the global competition 
for talent. Like so many of Russia’s strategic documents, this one was torn between 
accepting the need for global integration, if Russia was to remain competitive, and 
the perceived imperatives of security. 
 Sanctions reshaped Russia’s economic policy. In agriculture, Russia’s response 
built on the lessons learned during the spike in food prices in 2007–8, which had 
shaped a food-security system that enhanced protectionist measures. On 6 August 
2014, a package of counter-sanctions placed an embargo on food imports from 
the EU, the United States, Australia, Canada and Norway, measures which without 
the sanctions would have been very hard to reconcile with WTO membership. In 
June 2017, the counter-sanctions were applied to an expanded list of countries and 
products, and were repeatedly extended. Th e policy triad of counter-sanctions, 
food security and food self-suffi  ciency boosted output in a range of products, 
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many of which had earlier been satisfi ed through imports. Every grain harvest 
between 2014 and 2018 exceeded 100 million tonnes, beating the Soviet record set 
in 1978. Th e record grain harvest in 2018 brought in 135 million tonnes, including 
nearly 80 million tonnes of wheat. Russia in 2015/16 overtook the United States 
to become the world’s largest wheat exporter, increasing its share of the global 
wheat market from 4 to 16 per cent by 2017. Combined exports of agricultural 
products rose by 20 per cent alone in 2018 to $25.9 billion, worth almost double 
as much as exports of arms and weapons. Th e year 2018 also saw record harvests 
for maize (corn), sunfl ower, soy, vegetables and fruits, accompanied by a rapid 
increase in the output of dairy products. With farming benefi tting from the 
protectionism aff orded by the food embargo, the agricultural lobby became one 
of the strongest constituencies in favour of continued sanctions.  46  Th e sector’s 
response to climate change was minimal, and the industrial agricultural model 
off ered few opportunities for organics and more sustainable models of farming, 
leading to continued soil and environmental degradation. 
 Th e liberal model of economic reform was challenged by more statist 
approaches. A  recent study notes that ‘most successful reforms in Russia were 
initiated from the top down, and that conversely, the withdrawal of a unifi ed 
and strong central authority from the country’s life led to an intensifi cation of 
inter-clan struggles for revenue, widespread theft  by oligarchs, and the fl ight of 
many economic players in the subsistence economy’.  47  Russia was faced with two 
contrasting economic reform plans. Kudrin advocated investment into economic 
multipliers such as infrastructure, social services, education, health and, above 
all, increasing labour productivity, while the alternative programme advanced 
by Titov and the Stolypin Club called for massive borrowing and New Deal-style 
spending to boost economic growth. Titov’s plan focused on the need for new 
economic stimuli but ignored corruption and the weak rule of law, which were 
the signifi cant factors depressing economic growth. Putin, as usual, temporised. 
Th is was evident in his annual news conference on 14 December 2017, when he 
noted that his electoral programme would focus on ‘infrastructure development, 
healthcare and education’, as well as high technology and improving labour 
effi  ciency. In response to another question, he asserted that Russia’s GDP had 
increased by 75 per cent, and industrial production by 60 per cent, since 2000, and 
although real wages had somewhat declined in the last three years, since the early 
2000s, real incomes had risen by 250 per cent and real pensions by 260 per cent. 
Infant mortality had decreased 2.6-fold and maternal mortality by 75 per cent. He 
warned of the ‘demographic pit’ because of earlier periods of high mortality and 
low birth rates, even though life expectancy had now risen to 73 years (67.5 for 
men and 77.6 for women) because of the lower death rate. Th ere had been some 
impressive achievements, but ultimately it was remarkable by how little the overall 
GDP had increased in nearly two decades of his leadership. More than that, real 
incomes were declining, with a 0.7 per cent fall in 2014, 3.2 per cent in 2015 and 
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5.9 per cent in 2016, at a time when two-thirds of the working population received 
below-average wages.  48  Putin announced that there had been almost weekly 
meetings of experts to identify growth drivers, but he gave no indication of what 
these were, although he stated that economic development would be increasingly 
driven by domestic demand. 
 Putin recognised the need to improve labour productivity but reiterated the 
importance of fulfi lling his ‘May Decrees’ of 2012, which set goals on increasing 
the wages of teachers, doctors, kindergarten workers, a programme that placed 
enormous pressure on regional budgets. Most doctors, health workers, teachers 
and cultural workers in Russia are paid by the state, and their wages remain low 
by international and even domestic standards. When wages do go up, it is oft en at 
the expense of new equipment and facilities. In his press conference in December 
2017, Putin claimed that 90 per cent of the targets of the May Decrees had been 
fulfi lled, although there is some scepticism on this count. Poorer regions were 
pushed into debt, with eight of them having a debt-to-revenue ratio over 100 per 
cent (with Mordovia the worst at 194 per cent), but dozens of regions simply could 
not aff ord the costs associated with the goals.  49  Putin also temporised on raising 
the retirement age, which stood at the level set in 1932 (55 for women and 60 for 
men) when life expectancy was much lower. He conceded that even Russia’s closest 
neighbours, Belarus and Kazakhstan, had raised the retirement age, and that if 
Russia did not follow suit, ‘there will be more and more people ready to retire and 
less able to work’, with a shrinking pot all round so pensions would have to be 
reduced. Nevertheless, with an election in view, Putin insisted ‘a fi nal decision has 
not been made’. He also promised that taxes would not be raised before the end 
of 2018. His overall position was that ‘shock treatment of the kind we had in the 
1990s is unacceptable’.  50  
 Powering Putinism 
 Putin and energy are indissolubly linked. Although a lawyer by education, Putin 
in the second half of the 1990s wrote his doctoral ( kandidatskaya ) thesis on the 
use of natural resources for national development, arguing that the state needed to 
be able to control their development to ensure that they were used to best eff ect. 
Although there has been considerable diversifi cation of the economy away from 
the old energy-based model, natural resources remain the foundation of Russian 
economic performance. Today, oil and gas exports account for 40 per cent of 
Russia’s budget revenues, although energy as a proportion of total exports fell 
from 70 per cent in 2013 to 59 per cent in 2017. When combined with revenue 
from other commodities such as iron, steel, aluminium and copper, revenue from 
natural resources represents 75 per cent of Russia’s total exports and together 
represents 60 per cent of gross GDP ($844.58 billion in value as of 2017).  51  Th e 
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fatal dependency on energy prices remains, to which the Soviet Union had already 
succumbed when prices plunged in 1985 and which Russia suff ered from in the 
1990s. In 2008–9, the price of oil plummeted from over $140 to around $40, and 
GDP contracted by 7.8 per cent in 2009. Oil prices soon recovered, allowing the 
country to return to a growth of 4.5 per cent in 2010. By the time oil prices once 
again fell precipitously, from $100 to under $60 in 2014 and below $35 by late 2015, 
economic growth had already tailed off  and now the country was plunged into 
recession, exacerbated by sanctions. Supply-cut coordination between Russia and 
Saudi Arabia from 2017 forced up the price of oil and, thus, increasing revenues, 
threatening to return Russia to the old pattern of oil dependency. 
 Th e policy now is to ensure that the rouble stops being a volatile petro-currency. 
Th is is why the ‘fi scal rule’ was introduced, stipulating that all revenues above a 
certain level (in early 2019, $42 a barrel) would be allocated to reserves rather than 
to spending. Th e idea is to break the link between energy prices and the budget, 
and with it the strength of the rouble. Although every additional $1 per barrel 
is worth $2.5 billion a year, with most going into the federal budget via taxes, 
oil dependency only increases vulnerability. Russia had occasionally run budget 
defi cits even when oil was above $100 a barrel, but the fi scal rule weakens the 
correlation between the rouble exchange rate and the oil price, and ensures a more 
solid footing for public fi nances. It also avoids the recurrent danger of the Dutch 
disease, when a country becomes excessively dependent on a single resource, and 
when the value of that item goes up the currency strengthens, undermining the 
competitiveness of other sectors in international markets. With energy prices 
once again rising from 2017, the pressure for a fi scal stimulus increased, although 
it would be unlikely to prove eff ective:  ‘Given the Russian economy’s “supply-
side” demographic and investment constraints, expansionary monetary and 
fi scal policies would produce only infl ation, real exchange-rate appreciation, and 
deteriorating external balances. A classic boom-bust overheating episode would 
be all too predictable.’  52  
 Th e old economic model based on oil is no longer delivering growth. In 
addition, in the era of sanctions, the government cannot easily borrow on foreign 
fi nancial markets and is thus forced to live within its means. Th e fl oating rouble 
exchange rate is accompanied by tight fi scal discipline. If in 2013 the budget 
needed $115 to balance, by 2018 it had fallen to $54. As oil prices once again 
rose in 2018, the budget again moved into surplus (for the fi rst time since 2011). 
One way to sterilise the cash infl ow is to buy gold, which Russia, as we have seen, 
did in great quantities. Th is makes the rouble eff ectively a gold-backed currency, 
unlike the American fi at system. Moscow also looked for ways to free itself of the 
dollar burden in oil trade to strengthen its economic sovereignty and resilience 
in the face of sanctions. At the same time, Moscow used the extra budget revenue 
to increase its foreign exchange reserves. All this at a time when the ratio of 
public sector debt to GDP is below the G20 average, the ratio of gross – including 
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commercial – external debt to GDP is around 32 per cent (Putin was obsessive 
about paying off  external debts), and the country has low infl ation and is running 
a current account surplus of 2–3 per cent. Higher oil revenues would only generate 
instability, and, thus, Russia sought a stable oil price of around $70. In 2008, Russia 
needed an oil price of $115 per barrel to break even, but this has now fallen to 
$49. Saudi Arabia needs more than that to break even, while higher prices only 
encourages US shale oil producers, thus increasing long-term competition 
in energy markets, and accelerates the shift  to non-carbon sources of energy.  53  
Putin has a well-deserved reputation as a fi scal conservative. Th ese are not the 
characteristics of a petro-state, let alone a ‘kleptocracy’. 
 Th e energy issue is one of the most divisive in Russo-West relations. In the 
1970s, the Soviet Union began to export gas to West Germany and later to the rest 
of Western Europe, as well as supplying its East European allies in the Soviet bloc. 
Th e Druzhba (Friendship) oil pipeline was built in the 1960s, against American 
opposition. Th e Bratstvo (Brotherhood) pipeline system from Urengoi through 
Ukraine was built from the 1980s to transport gas from the giant Western Siberian 
fi elds to the new markets, as well as funnelling gas from Turkmenistan to the 
West. Already in 1997 the Yamal–Europe gas pipeline was built through Belarus 
and Poland to Germany to increase capacity and to circumvent Ukraine, part of 
a strategy that long predates the current crisis.  54  Gazprom has a monopoly over 
Russia’s gas pipelines to Europe, and the system is monitored on a giant screen at 
Gazprom’s headquarters in Moscow, acting as the pulsing heart of Europe’s energy 
networks. In 2013, Gazprom exported 234.4 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural 
gas, 97 per cent of which (228 bcm) was delivered by pipeline to Turkey and the 
rest of Europe (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the Balkans and the EU), with the EU 
alone taking 149.5 bcm (64 per cent). Of this, 86 bcm transited through Ukraine, 
accounting for some 30 per cent of Europe’s total gas imports. Ukraine earned 
some $3 billion a year from transporting gas to Europe, although from 2016 it did 
not directly import Russian gas for domestic use. Even though political relations 
had broken down, in 2017, 94 bcm of Russian gas still transited Ukraine to the EU. 
Th e European Commission lobbied hard to maintain Ukraine as a gas transit state, 
otherwise it feared having to make up the loss of revenues. Th e present contract 
expired on 31 December 2019, and with new bypass pipelines being constructed, 
the fate of Ukraine as a transit state for Russian gas is at best uncertain. 
 In 2018, Gazprom exported a record 201.8 bcm, supplying 37 per cent of 
Europe’s gas market. In 2017, Russia’s gas exports to Europe alone rose over 8.1 
per cent to a record level of 194 bcm and topped 200 bcm in 2018. Gazprom’s 
total production rose by 12.4 per cent to reach 471 bcm.  55  Germany was by far 
the largest and fastest-growing market in 2015, importing 45.3 bcm, followed by 
Turkey with 27 bcm and Italy with 24.4 bcm; even distant UK was Russia’s fourth-
largest market in Europe, importing 11.1 bcm that year.  56  Th e share of Russian gas 
imports in Germany is 28 per cent; in Italy 37 per cent; in Slovenia, Greece and 
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Hungary between 41 and 45 per cent; while the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Finland, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are close to 100 per cent dependent on Russian 
gas.  57  Long before the Ukraine crisis, Moscow sought to diversify transport routes, 
and this is why the Yamal line was built. Th e two parallel lines of Nord Stream 
1 run 759 miles (1,222 km) from Vyborg on the Gulf of Finland to Greifswald 
in Germany, with the second coming on stream a year aft er the fi rst in October 
2012. Nord Stream 2 enters the Baltic at Ust-Luga in Leningrad Oblast and enters 
Germany in the resort town of Lubmin. It doubled the existing Nord Stream 
line’s capacity of 55 bcm when it came into operation in early 2020. Ukraine and 
Poland tried to block the new line, joined later by the United States (keen to sell its 
liquefi ed natural gas [LNG] to Europe). Th e German government insisted it was 
a purely commercial venture (built by a partnership of Gazprom with Germany’s 
Wintershall and Uniper, Austria’s OMV, France’s Engie and the Anglo-Dutch 
Shell), thus allowing the scheme to go ahead. Given Russia’s enormous reserves, 
the country ‘will continue to provide the lowest-cost gas for export to Europe 
through the 2020s’.  58  
 Th e EU devoted considerable eff ort to joining the gas pipelines from Europe, 
Asia and Africa into the Trans-Europe Network (TEN) to ensure security of supply 
to Europe, while Russia has diversifi ed its exports markets to Asia and into LNG. 
Th e fi rst shipment from the giant $27 billion Yamal LNG plant in December 2017 
was originally thought to be destined for the UK but in fact (aft er trans-shipment 
at the Isle of Grain terminal) was delivered to the Everett gasifi cation plant near 
Boston. Th e boom in LNG production means that natural gas, like oil, is becoming 
a global commodity increasingly freed from the physical constraints of pipelines. 
Nevertheless, pipelines are still the cheapest way of delivering large volumes of gas. 
In May 2014, at the height of the Ukraine crisis, Russia and China signed a thirty-
year $400 billion deal to deliver 38 bcm of East Siberian gas from the Chayanda 
and Kovytka deposits via a specially built pipeline called Power of Siberia, passing 
through the eastern sector of the Russo-Chinese border. On 10 November 2014, 
aft er a decade of negotiations, the two sides signed a framework agreement for the 
long-awaited ‘Western route’ to channel West Siberian gas through Altai to China, 
but this did not mean that the pipeline would be fi nally built. Despite the enormity 
of the deals, the total planned capacity of the two routes is only 78 bcm, compared 
to the 146 bcm Russia sold to Europe and Turkey in 2014. Th e Power of Siberia 
pipeline came on line in late 2019. 
 At the same time, the Druzhba oil pipeline is the world’s longest, running 
from Western Siberia to Western Europe through Belarus and Ukraine. It started 
supplying oil to what was then the fraternal socialist republic of Czechoslovakia 
in 1962 and since then has become a ramifi ed network. With the construction 
of the Baltic Pipeline System 2, signifi cant quantities will be exported through 
the recently completed Ust-Luga oil terminal, with a branch line to the Kirishi oil 
refi nery. Th is renders Russia less dependent on transit countries, especially diffi  cult 
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ones like Poland and Ukraine, and opened up new markets to tanker trade. Russia’s 
oil output by 2019 had risen for eleven consecutive years, despite the restrictions 
agreed with the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to limit 
production to force up prices. In 2017, Russian production reached 10.98 million 
barrels per day (bpd). Russian output under Putin has nearly doubled, rising from 
6.1 million bpd in 1999, and output peaked at 11.23 million bpd in October 2016 
before the OPEC cuts of 300,000 million bpd.  59  Russia has now become the largest 
supplier of crude oil to China, reducing supplies available for the European market. 
China receives the bulk of its Russian oil through newly built pipelines, with the 
capacity of the East Siberia–Pacifi c Ocean (ESPO) line doubling on 1 January 2018 
to 30 million tons annually, or about 600,000 bpd. Some oil is still exported by 
tanker from the Russian ports of Kozmino, De-Kastri and Prigorodnoe. Overall, 
Russia supplied China with some 1.3 million bpd in 2017.  60  
 Despite mutual interdependence, the Russian-European energy relations are 
characterised by distrust – and the persistence of this phenomenon reveals perhaps 
an underlying structural incompatibility between Russia and Europe, a view that 
is gladly endorsed by Eurasianists in Russia and Russophobes in the West. Ever 
since the Soviet Union established an energy relationship with Western Europe, 
there have been fears, fanned by Washington, that political autonomy would be 
compromised by dependence on Russian supplies. Th is attitude remained even 
aft er the Soviet Union disappeared, accompanied by persistent calls from the 
United States for Europe to reduce its energy dependence on Russia. In recent 
times, this has taken the form of the ‘Putinisation of energy’ thesis, advanced by 
Marin Katusa. He argues that at the end of the Cold War, Russia sought to control 
global oil and gas trades as part of the global struggle for energy markets between 
the United States, Saudi Arabia and other states.  61  Th e Ukraine crisis intensifi ed 
calls for a common energy policy for the twenty-eight countries in the European 
Union. In February 2015, an energy union was announced to create an integrated 
energy market by building a network of connector pipelines to create an integrated 
European energy market, with states cooperating to increase their energy security 
and to decarbonise their economies. Th e term ‘hybrid warfare’ has become 
popular to describe the multiple forms of pressure one country can exert against 
another and refl ects the intensifi ed ‘securitisation’ of interstate relations. Th e term 
was used by Matthew Bryza, the former US ambassador to Azerbaijan, when 
he argued that ‘energy is a weapon in Moscow’s “hybrid” war against Ukraine, 
along with covert invasion, military advisors and mercenaries, and information 
warfare’.  62  Th e strategic purpose was clear when the idea of an energy union was 
fi rst mooted in April 2014 by Donald Tusk, at the time Polish prime minister and 
later president of the European Council. He stressed the need to remove ‘Russia’s 
energy stranglehold’ on Europe.  63   
 Th e EU’s so-called Th ird Energy Package (TEP) of September 2009 sought 
to create a more competitive gas and supply market in Europe by separating 
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production from transport and ensuring third-party access to pipelines. Th e TEP 
is a series of legislative acts designed to reduce monopolies in the energy market, 
including a provision which prohibits gas producers from owning primary gas 
pipelines. As far as Russia was concerned, this was an ‘anti-Gazprom’ law, since 
it was directly aff ected by the legislation. Although Russian energy policy is 
oft en characterised as ‘geopolitical’ and the EU’s as market-based, both indulge 
in the two. Russia responded to the TEP largely through legal and technocratic 
instruments typical of the market approach.  64  On 24 May 2018, the EU and 
Gazprom resolved a seven-year antitrust dispute. No fi nes were imposed on 
Gazprom, but instead the state-controlled gas company agreed to change the way 
it operates in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), removing restrictions on how 
its customers in the region can use gas, removing the ban on exports to other 
countries and ensuring a competitive price for gas, with Gazprom committed to 
take active steps to integrate gas markets in the region. Th e countries now have the 
right to demand a price review to bring their rates in line with those rates at which 
Gazprom sold gas to Germany and the Netherlands.  65  
 While the EU perceives itself to be at market risk, Russia has long been worried 
by transit risks. Th is in particular concerned Ukraine, through which half of 
Russian gas deliveries to Europe passed. Since the 1990s, there had been endless 
controversies over deliveries across the country and to the Ukrainian market. 
Shutdowns in 2006 and 2009 caused irreparable reputational damage to Russia, 
irrespective of the specifi c rights or wrongs of its case. Understandably, Russia 
intensifi ed eff orts to bypass Ukraine as a transit country. In addition to Nord 
Stream, by early 2014, Russia had just about everything in place to build South 
Stream, the 2,386 km-long pipeline under the Black Sea to Bulgaria and then 
up through the Balkans to Hungary and the Austrian hub at Baumgarten. Th e 
project had been introduced in 2007 as an alternative to the EU’s Nabucco pipeline 
intended to bring Azerbaijani gas to Europe via Turkey and when running at full 
capacity would have supplied Europe with up to 65 bcm of natural gas annually. 
Following pressure from the United States and the EU, Bulgaria in June 2014 
pulled out of the project, forcing Putin to cancel the whole scheme in December 
2014. Instead, he announced what came to be known as Turkish Stream. Instead 
of tracking west, the pipes go south to Turkey, and then ultimately arrive at a new 
gas hub on the Turkey–Greece border, delivering the same amount of gas but 
through this alternative route. Distribution is then a matter for the EU to sort out. 
Th is is the sort of d é marche that we have come to expect from Putin. Making the 
announcement, Putin noted, ‘If Europe does not want to carry out the project, 
then it will not be carried out.’ Putin stressed, ‘We will re-concentrate our energy 
resources on other regions of the world’, and he added for good measure, ‘We 
think this is against Europe’s best economic interests and is causing damage to our 
co-operation.’  66  He reiterated the point in his press conference of 17 December 
2015, arguing that Bulgaria abandoned the South Stream project because the 
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leading EU institutions, notably the European Parliament and the European 
Commission, had pressured Sofi a to renege on its agreements to build the pipeline 
across its territory.  67  Th e struggle over energy pipelines is yet another indication of 
the enduring confrontation that has returned to Europe. 
 Sanctions and their effect 
 Th e new era of sanctions began with the December 2012 Magnitsky Act, which 
imposed penalties on Russians allegedly involved in the death of the auditor Sergei 
Magnitsky, and the list thereaft er was periodically extended. Punitive sanctions 
were fi rst introduced in 2014 in response to the Ukraine crisis and since then have 
been gradually ratcheted up. Th eir immediate eff ect was to amplify the impact 
of the fall in the price of oil with which they coincided. Th e EU and the United 
States repeatedly renewed the sanctions regime, and unless there is some sort of 
breakthrough in the European security order, they will remain for the foreseeable 
future. However, when used by the Trump administration to favour US energy 
companies (above all, shale gas producers for the LNG market) by trying to block 
the construction of Nord Stream 2, Germany and Austria objected. In the 1980s, 
European banks and companies (supported by their governments) resisted US 
attempts to block the construction of West Siberian gas pipelines to Europe, and 
the sanctions regime today provokes similar resentment in European businesses. 
Above all, the sanctions regime indicates that a long-term adversarial relationship 
has become established between the Atlantic powers and Russia. 
 On 25 July 2017, the House of Representatives voted 419–3 in support, and 
on 28 July, the US Senate voted 98–2 to adopt new sanctions, offi  cially called ‘HR 
3364 Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act’ or CAATSA. Th e 
CAATSA sanctions limit the president’s ability to ease or lift  the existing ones. 
Th e earlier measures imposed by President Barack Obama through executive 
orders were now given legislative force and, thus, could not be rescinded by the 
president.  68  Given the huge majorities, a reluctant Trump had no choice but to 
sign it into law on 2 August. Th is was a monster of a law, eff ectively ‘expropriating’ 
the management of foreign policy from the White House, and establishing a 
mechanism that could poison relations between Russia and the US for generations 
to come. Although the early Trump White House is typically portrayed as 
incompetent, in passing this legislation, Congress clearly feared that Trump 
would be too eff ective and would be able to weaken or even remove the existing 
Obama-era hostile legislation against Russia, and, thus, to defend its institutional 
prerogatives, and closed ranks in a bipartisan manner against the president.  69  Th e 
adoption of CAATSA undoubtedly marks a watershed in Russo-US relations.  70  
 Th e CAATSA measure stipulated twelve sanctions measures against Russia. 
Section 241 called for the Treasury Department in consultation with others to 
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submit within 180 days a detailed report identifying ‘the most signifi cant senior 
political fi gures and oligarchs’ in Russia, as determined by their closeness to the 
Russian regime and their net worth. Th is prompted Putin in a meeting with business 
people on 21 December to approve the idea of creating new mechanisms for the 
return of capital to Russia, including external government bonds denominated 
in foreign currency. Th e law extended sanctions to countries outside Russia 
(extraterritoriality) where US corporations or persons provided goods, services 
and technology for certain projects ‘in which a Russian fi rm is involved’, raising 
the concerns of European leaders and companies (especially those involved in 
building Nord Stream 2).  71  Th e package allows the president in consultation with 
US allies to sanction any entity that provides technology, services, investment or 
other support valued at $1 million or more to Russian export pipeline projects. 
Th ey were condemned by Germany for meddling in Europe’s energy supplies. 
Th e US ambition clearly was that US LNG exports to Europe could fi ll the gap 
if the Russian project was blocked. However, LNG is at least 20 per cent more 
expensive than pipeline gas and, thus, stands little chance of pushing Russia out 
of the European gas market. Nord Steam 2 representatives, moreover, insisted that 
with plenty of global LNG capacity, no single supplier was in a position to use gas 
supplies as a political instrument in Europe.  72  
 Th e Trump administration was as resolute as its predecessors in seeking to 
block energy interdependence between Russia and Europe. For the fi rst time since 
the end of the Cold War, US sanctions were not coordinated with Europeans and 
indeed appeared directly to challenge their economic interests. American LNG 
exports were now slated to replace Russian gas, even though it was more expensive. 
Other American corporate interests appeared no less concerned than European 
ones, and a number started lobbying against sanctions, including ExxonMobil, 
General Electric, Boeing and many others. However, their eff orts could at most 
lead to a mitigation of the rules in individual sectors and were unlikely to lead to 
the lift ing of sanctions in their entirety. 
 Th e ‘Kremlin list’ as stipulated by Section 241 was issued on the very last day 
allowed, 29 January 2018, and proved a disappointment to those who anticipated 
a harsh line. It appears that a list drawn up by experts in the hawkish Atlantic 
Council was jettisoned; instead, 114 names of top offi  cials was drawn from the 
English-language part of the Kremlin website and the 96 oligarchs came from the 
list of Russian billionaires of Forbes Russia. No immediate sanctions were placed 
on the 210 (except for the 22 who were already on previous sanctions lists), drawing 
an angry response from the likes of Senator Ben Cardin, the ranking member 
of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who wrote to Secretary of State 
Rex Tillerson stating that the failure to impose new sanctions was ‘unacceptable’.  73  
He did not have long to wait (although by then Tillerson had been dismissed as 
secretary of state). In response to the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in 
Salisbury on 4 March 2018, 153 Russian diplomats were expelled in a concerted 
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moved by the UK and its allies, and the Russian consulate in Seattle was closed. 
In response, Russia expelled a commensurate number of Western diplomats from 
Russia and closed the British consulate and British Council offi  ces in St Petersburg. 
 Amid a worsening diplomatic atmosphere, on 6 April 2018, Trump imposed 
the most devastating sanctions yet seen, in part in response to the Skripal aff air 
and the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma on the outskirts of Damascus. 
Th ey targeted what the United States said were individuals and companies that 
aided or benefi ted from what were considered the Kremlin’s ‘malign activities’ 
around the world, including the alleged interference in the 2016 US presidential 
election, supplying weapons to President Bashir al-Assad in Syria and subverting 
Western democracies. Th e US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on seven 
so-called Russian oligarchs, twelve companies they either owned or controlled, 
and seventeen senior Kremlin offi  cials. Th e sanctions made it diffi  cult for those 
on the list to do business in the United States or gain access to fi nancial markets. 
In particular, Oleg Deripaska, the head of one of the world’s largest aluminium 
companies Rusal, was targeted ‘for having acted or purported to act for or on 
behalf of, directly or indirectly, a senior offi  cial of the Government of the Russian 
Federation’. He had been a former business partner of Paul Manafort, Trump’s one-
time campaign chairman and subsequently indicted by the Mueller investigation.  74  
Th e disruption of the aluminium market forced a partial reversal in December 
2018 once Deripaska had divested himself of his interest in Rusal.  
 Th ese sanctions came out of the blue and were intended to ‘impose costs’ 
on Russia’s generally insubordinate behaviour. While Trump and his associates 
declared that they were no longer in the regime-change game, the militants in 
Congress still hoped to use coercive measures to shape Russian policy or even to 
provoke elite discontent leading to Putin’s overthrow. Instead, American pressure 
tended only to reinforce solidarity around the Kremlin and even advanced Putin’s 
goal of getting Russian capital (and even leading business people who had gone 
abroad for various reasons) to return. Th e goal of the American sanctions was not 
clear, but the overall intent appeared to be to provoke some sort of coup against 
Putin’s administration, either through creating splits in the elite or by stimulating 
a grass-roots movement in support of regime change. In fact, the vague and all-
embracing charges against Russia only rallied the country behind Putin. 
 Medvedev condemned the April 2018 sanctions as ‘outrageous and obnoxious’ 
but stressed that they forced Russia to rethink its place in the world. In his view, 
the policy of containing Russia was part of the West’s enduring strategy:  ‘Our 
international partners will continue to pursue it regardless of how our country 
may be called. Th ey did this with regard to the Russian Empire, and they did 
this many times with regard to the Soviet Union and Russia.’ Russia would adapt 
and respond through import substitution and improvements to its own social 
institutions. Th e assumption was that ‘sanctions will remain in place for a long 
time’.  75  Th is was view shared by the Russian public, with 43 per cent at that time 
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believing that they would not be lift ed in the next few years.  76  Putin himself noted, 
‘We are not surprised by any restrictions or sanctions: this does not frighten us and 
will never force us to abandon our independent, sovereign path of development.’ 
And he went on to declare: ‘I believe that either Russia will be sovereign, or it will 
not exist at all.’  77  Th e sanctions, in the early stages at least, strengthened Putin and 
weakened the liberal agenda, reinforcing conservative narratives of self-reliance 
and independence. 
 Th e summit between Putin and Trump in Helsinki on 16 July 2018 proved a 
disaster, with Trump apparently acquiescing with Putin’s view that Russia had 
not ‘meddled’ in the 2016 US presidential election. A new Congressional bill was 
introduced among others by senators Bob Menendez and Lindsey Graham, with 
the latter arguing that the legislation’s goal was to impose ‘crushing sanctions’. 
Th e measures included the ‘nuclear option’ of sanctioning Russian sovereign debt 
and state banks, which would devastate Russian and global fi nancial markets. 
Th e draft  bill, called ‘Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression 
Act’ (DASKAA), included four key provisions.  78  Th e fi rst proposed banning 
Russia’s banks, including Sberbank, VTB Bank, Gazprombank, Rosselkhozbank, 
Promsvyazbank and Vneshekonmbank, from operating in the United States, 
which would eff ectively block them from dollar settlements and ban US citizens 
buying Russian sovereign debt. Second, in the energy sector, a ban on investments 
in any government or government-affi  liated companies outside Russia worth more 
than $250 million. Th ere would also be penalties for any involvement, including 
providing equipment or technology, on new oil projects inside Russia worth more 
than $1 million. Th ird, within sixty days of the law’s adoption, the White House 
would have to provide a new list of Russians suspected of cyberattacks against 
the United States; the Treasury Department would have 180  days to update its 
‘Kremlin List’ of Russian state offi  cials and ‘oligarchs’; the Director of National 
Intelligence would investigate the ‘personal net worth’ of Putin and his family; and 
the State Department would have ninety days to determine whether Russia should 
be designated a state sponsor of terrorism. Fourth, there would be a new Sanctions 
Offi  ce to reinforce CAATSA, and an ‘Offi  ce of Sanctions Coordination’ in the State 
Department to coordinate work with the Treasury.  79  Th e overall eff ect would be to 
cut Russia off  from US fi nancial markets to a degree not seen since the US freeze 
on Japanese assets and a prohibition on trading its debt in 1941, eff ectively putting 
an end to all bilateral business. Th e result of that policy is well known. 
 Th ere was a pause in sanctions activity as politics focused on the November 
2018 midterms. Th e Defending Elections from Th reats by Establishing Redlines 
Act (DETER) was on hold, and the absence of any signifi cant Russian activity 
lowered the pressure for action. Th e House of Representatives was retaken by 
the Democrats, but this made little diff erence since sanctions activity had been 
conducted on a largely bipartisan basis. In February 2019, the US Senate returned 
to the DASKAA bill, with Russia’s ‘malign infl uence’ in Syria now cited as one of 
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the reasons for reintroducing the legislation. Th e bill prohibited US nationals from 
‘engaging in transactions with, providing fi nancing for, or otherwise dealing in 
Russia’s state debt’, as well as imposing restrictive measures on Russia’s shipbuilding 
sector along with twenty-four senior offi  cers in the FSB. Th is was in connection 
with the detention of twenty-four Ukrainian sailors aft er a confrontation in the 
Kerch Strait on 25 November the previous year, when three Ukrainian naval 
vessels were accused of violating the rules of passage from the Black Sea to the 
Sea of Azov. Investment in Russian export LNG energy projects located outside 
Russia would also be banned. Freezing measures against the operations and assets 
of state-run fi nancial institutions such as Sberbank and VTB had been removed 
from the earlier version. Th e Director of National Intelligence was to submit a 
detailed report on the personal net worth and assets of the Russian president no 
later than 180 days aft er the bill’s enactment.  80  Th e sanctions were getting personal. 
 Th ey were also getting more general. Th e new version of DASKAA was non-
specifi c and was eff ectively a way of waging the Cold War against Russia rather 
than tied to any specifi c policy goal. Th e sanctions regime looks set to endure for 
years, if not decades, as part of the neo-containment policy against Russia. Th e 
Russian response was correspondingly broad and can be summed up as follows. 
First, a range of counter-sanctions were imposed, including those of August 2014 
(and later extended) on food imports from sanctioning countries. In June 2018, 
Putin signed a legislation allowing ‘counter-measures against unfriendly actions’ 
by the United States and other foreign countries, eff ectively an upgrade of a 
December 2006 law providing for ‘special economic measures’. Th e new law was 
defensive and tempered some of the earlier ideas mooted by impassioned deputies 
in parliament, most of which would have caused more damage to Russia than the 
sanctions themselves.  81  Second, the country’s political economy was reoriented 
to ensure greater resilience and autonomy. Th e state’s role in the economy was 
enhanced, import substitution strategies intensifi ed and self-reliance became the 
guiding principle. Th is did not entail a return to autarchy, but there were elements 
of deglobalisation and the intensifi cation of deleterious facets of the Russian 
economy, above all, intensifi ed state control.  82  Stability-oriented economic policies 
were strengthened, reducing long-term prospect for economic growth. Th ird, in 
international aff airs the sanctions acted as a form of ersatz war, entrenching the 
growing hostility between Russia and the West and intensifying the ‘Second Cold 
War’. On both sides, there was a reluctance to engage in a full-frontal assault, 
although the military posture of both sides adjusted as the other was increasingly 
perceived as a potential military adversary. Doors were kept open for engagement, 
but structured dialogue was limited. Fourth, the Atlantic system became even 
more concerned with maintaining its unity and preventing Russia from driving a 
‘wedge’ between its two wings. Th is is a strategy that since the foundation of NATO 
in 1949 has become a synonym for blocking innovative ideas about restructuring 
European security. 
9781788318303_pi-306.indd   142 15-Oct-19   12:25:36
143
MANAGED CAPITALISM 143
 Fift h, Russia devoted considerable eff orts to the ‘heartland’ policy of making 
Eurasia a centre in its own right rather than a periphery to Europe and Asia, above 
all, through accelerating Eurasian integration accompanied by the intensifi ed 
modernisation of Siberia and the RFE. Sixth, Russia accelerated its long-term 
rebalancing towards the East, with China in the vanguard but with improved 
trading and political engagement with India, Japan and the Association of South-
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc as a whole. Seventh, Russia actively encouraged 
the development of post-Western associations, ranging from the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the BRICS group and a whole set of anti-
hegemonic actors as well as the G20. Th ese were not anti-Western but represented 
a framework for an anti-hegemonic alignment to structure what the Russia’s call 
a polycentric (multipolar) world. Eighth, all of this represented a long-term shift  
in global politics. Th e scholar and commentator Sergei Karaganov calls this an 
‘end to the Petrine period in Russian history’, in which Russia looked to Europe 
for innovation and development. Russia would maintain good-neighbourly 
relations with Europe, but its horizons and model of the future would no longer be 
located there.  83  In other words, the West’s sanctions regime, and the abuse of the 
open-trading regime and the rules-based order that it claimed to represent, was 
perceived in Moscow as only accelerating the West’s own marginalisation. Th e rest 
of the world had more positive agendas to pursue. 
 Sanctions remain the cure-all fi rst resort of American policy but increasingly 
failed to build in mechanisms for their withdrawal and, thus, became a blunt 
instrument of foreign policy. Th ey were used to punish any country that the 
United States did not like, but by limiting access to American fi nancial markets, 
they undermined the primacy of the dollar and US fi nancial institutions. Sanctions 
make life more uncomfortable for Russians and depress economic growth by at least 
an annual half percentage point, but neither Russian behaviour nor strategy will 
change. Sanctions stimulate anti-Americanism and encourage import substitution 
and resilience strategies. It is America that has become more isolated than Russia. 
It is now clear that Russia will have to live under a US sanctions regime ‘for a 
long time and seriously’ ( nadolgo i vser ë z ), as Lenin described the introduction 
of the New Economic Policy in 1921. Lenin also added ‘but not forever’ ( no ne 
na vsegda ), although Russians who recalled that the Jackson–Vanik amendment 
endured for thirty-eight years until in December 2012 it was immediately replaced 
by the Magnitsky Act could be forgiven for thinking otherwise. 
9781788318303_pi-306.indd   143 15-Oct-19   12:25:36
144
9781788318303_pi-306.indd   144 15-Oct-19   12:25:36
145
 6   FROM PARTNER TO 
ADVERSARY: RUSSIA AND 
THE WEST 
 Domestic and foreign policy in post-communist Russia interact to shape 
the polity. Russia emerged from the Soviet system with a protean state and 
an unformed foreign policy, and these interrelated identities were mutually 
reconstituted in the post-communist years. Th e representation of Russia as a 
‘great power’ was paramount, drawing on the legacies of the Muscovite, Imperial 
and Soviet periods, while at home, the idea of a strong state gradually reasserted 
itself under Yeltsin and became foundational under Putin.  1  As Putin put it in his 
annual address to the Federal Assembly on 20 February 2019, ‘Russia has been 
and always will be a sovereign and independent state. Th is is a given. It will either 
be that, or will simply cease to exist. We must clearly understand this. Without 
sovereignty, Russia cannot be a state. Some countries can do this, but not Russia.’  2  
Th is is why unmediated membership of an enlarging Atlantic community, unlike 
for most of its neighbours, would have entailed status demotion. Russia’s relations 
with the West has veered between cooperation and confl ict because of the tension 
between adaptation to the expanding West and the striving for foreign policy 
autonomy. In the end, relations settled into a pattern of enduring confrontation, 
the Second Cold War. Putin stamped his personality on Russian foreign policy 
statecraft , but he operated in the context where enduring structural patterns 
reasserted themselves. Russian foreign policy is not directly derived from its 
domestic order, although, of course, there is a dynamic interaction between the 
two. On coming to power, Putin argued that Russian foreign policy should serve 
domestic economic development, but at the same time he insisted that Russia was 
to be taken seriously as a major international power, goals that turned out to be 
incompatible.  3  
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 The clash of post-Cold War world orders 
 Th e end of the Cold War was accompanied by a startling claim by the Soviet 
Union and then by Russia: that by remaking itself with Russian membership, the 
West would revive and save itself, and overall would become a stronger and more 
enduring presence in international aff airs. In other words, by transforming itself, 
Russia eff ectively demanded that the historical West should also change. Th is 
ambitious demand – seen as arrogant and unnecessary in the West, but as benign 
and essential in Russia  – is the source of much misinterpretation. Th e Soviet 
and Russian leaderships insisted that the end of the Cold War was a common 
achievement, and hence the historic West could become a greater West with the 
addition of Russia, a more pluralist order with a diversity of systems, although with 
all committed to a new peace order. However, the Atlantic system was constituted 
not just as a military alliance but also as a community of values, and hence the 
pressure from the East to transform itself was perceived in Western capitals as a 
way of dissolving the alliance and dividing the European and American wings. In 
short, the roots of the new era of confrontation derive not from any fundamental 
ideological divide but from deep-rooted ideational diff erences about the character 
of the post-Cold War era and the level of institutional change required to ensure 
European security.  4  
 Th e origins of the Second Cold War lie in the way that the fi rst ended. 
Gorbachev believed that the end of the Cold War represented the common 
transcendence of the increasingly archaic but no less dangerous confrontation 
across the heart of Europe and globally. Russia was committed to a democratic 
transformation, but given its heavy legacy of authoritarianism, repeated attempts 
to modernise in a dangerous security environment, the Gorbachevian logic  – 
taken up later by Russian leaders – was that it would be better for the historical 
West to include the rough but receptive Russia and allow the transformation to 
take place within the framework of what would now become a greater West. Th e 
initial Gorbachev position was that the reformed Soviet Union would co-exist 
alongside the historical West but that their relationship would no longer be 
confl ictual, since with the end of the Cold War and the USSR’s shift  towards 
democracy, there was no reason for security competition to continue. Russia’s 
early post-communist leaders built on this but with the important modifi cation 
that instead of a pluralist and cooperative international system with multiple 
centres of power, Russia sought to internalise pluralism within a transformed 
West itself. Liberal Atlanticists like the foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, wanted 
Russia to join the historical West and thereby to make it a greater West. Other 
factions sought a more pluralistic international order, described as multipolarity, 
yet in the early days, most accepted the need for Russia to join a transformed 
European security community. 
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 Th e tension remained between those who wanted Russia to be in the West and 
those who considered that Russia should be alongside the West. On the Western 
side, there was an understandable reluctance for Russia, with all of its enormous 
problems and unresolved confl icts, to be taken in prematurely and on its own 
terms. As in a business merger, there was a struggle between two companies 
retaining their own identity aft er coming together or one eff ectively taking over 
the other. Th e Gorbachevian line came to be a dialogical third option: that both 
sides would change their identity to create something entirely new. Th e West was 
naturally reluctant to change its identity, since it had come out on top at the end 
of the Cold War. In military, economic and ideological terms, it appeared the 
victor. Russia was a much reduced power, so what need was there to undertake 
institutional change (for example, by dissolving NATO and creating common 
security bodies in which Russia would enjoy veto powers)? Th ere was also the 
danger of normative dilution, since Russia by any standard has a poor record of 
respect for human rights and for resolving confl icts by legal means. Although 
the West supported Yeltsin’s forceful crushing of the parliamentary  fronde in the 
autumn of 1993, it only intensifi ed concerns about a ‘premature partnership’ with 
Russia.  5  Th ese concerns were greatly intensifi ed by the start of the brutal fi rst 
Chechen war in December 1994. 
 Despite the manifest inadequacies, the West took a benign view of Yeltsin’s 
Russia and even helped devise the manipulative strategies that ensured his 
re-election in 1996. Th ere was no transformation of the historical West, and instead 
Russia and the West stood face to face. Russia, too, feared to undertake an internal 
transformation that would deny the elements of its own identity that made it a 
separate actor in world politics. Russian independence was accompanied by the 
explicit attempt to join the world as a liberal democracy but one shaped by its 
own traditions and able to assert its views in international aff airs. Russia’s internal 
transformation was considered its choice and not part of any Western ‘democracy 
promotion’ strategy. Russia embraced democracy as an ideal that was its own and 
not an import from abroad, and its transformation was considered a function of 
internal developments and not a manifestation of any alleged Western victory. As 
a result, post-communist Russia refused to dissolve itself into the existing Atlantic 
community. It was not a defeated power like post-war Germany or Japan or an 
ex-imperial power like France and Britain ready to accept its reduced status and 
power by associating its fortunes with the dominant power of the age. France 
compensated by taking the lead in developing what is now known as the EU, which 
has the potential of becoming an independent power centre, and Russia likewise in 
one way or another would remain the dominant power in Eurasia, rendering any 
putative dissolution into the Atlantic system even less likely. 
 Th ese strategic questions are entwined with normative issues. Th e debate over 
the international implications of democratic development continues to this day. 
As far as the Russian elite were concerned, democracy may now represent the 
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only universally acceptable and legitimate form of government, but it does not 
resolve fundamental questions of political economy and geopolitics. Democracy 
in the abstract does not come with ready-made answers about problems of 
national identity, state coherence, security or the balance to be drawn between 
traditionalism and what used to be called modernisation. Neither does it resolve 
the structural problems of international order. Russia’s status as a great power was 
not something that could be gift ed or withdrawn by external actors but was part 
of Russia’s character and destiny, as Putin repeatedly stressed. When this status 
is not recognised, it generates feelings of  ressentiment and encourages intensifi ed 
social competition.  6  Th e Atlantic system certainly wanted Russia to be part of its 
community, and thus exclusion was by no means a defi ned strategy. Th e problem 
was a structural one – an incompatible understanding of what the end of the Cold 
War meant and the character of the international system and Russia’s part in it. 
Russia could join the historical West, but as a subaltern; whereas Russia wanted 
to join a greater West, transformed and, in Russia’s view, rejuvenated by Russia’s 
membership. 
 Instead of the transformation desired by Moscow, the country faced enlargement 
of an already functioning system, into which it was invited but inevitably as a 
subaltern. Th is gave birth to the cold peace between 1989 and 2014, in which none of 
the fundamental questions of European security and post-Cold War international 
order were resolved. Faced with the implacable logic of enlargement, a process 
encouraged by the former Soviet bloc and Washington, exclusionary practices came 
to predominate. Enlargement was complemented by a globalist ideology in which 
the values of the expanding system were taken as universal. As far as Moscow was 
concerned, this was an asymmetrical peace in which Russia’s role in overcoming 
the Cold War was not adequately acknowledged. Th ere was an astonishing lack 
of institutional innovation, and in time, this inertia reproduced the ideological 
stereotypes of the past. Various ideas to create new bodies, such as a European 
security council under the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), were not developed. Instead, Western bodies expanded to fi ll the available 
space. Th e Atlantic community’s emphasis on international law and a rule-based 
order, as defi ned by that community, prevented a structural transformation of that 
community to encompass Russia. Ambitions for a fundamental transformation 
to create a greater West were abandoned, but insistence on Russia’s special status 
remained. Anything less would represent the conclusive dissolution of Russian 
self-identity as a great power and as a separate civilisation, and a continuation of its 
disintegration as an actor in post-Soviet Eurasia and in world politics. Th e costs of 
taking this route appeared too high, but what was the alternative? Th e reassertion 
of geopolitical ambitions and a sphere of infl uence alarmed Russia’s neighbours 
and revived archaic patterns of international politics. Russia had nowhere to go. 
Th e normative space was covered by the apparent triumph of liberal democracy 
as exemplifi ed by the Atlantic powers and the EU, and Putin was certainly not 
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going to revive the communist ideological challenge. Russia was stymied at all 
turns in geopolitical space, since any attempt to reassert even ‘privileged’ relations 
in post-Soviet Eurasia met with resistance from the new states reinforced by 
condemnation by the Atlantic community. 
 Post-communist Russia has been a permanently dissatisfi ed power. Th ere was 
not much it could do about it in the 1990s, even though there were permanent 
growls of dissatisfaction. Already in 1992, foreign minister Kozyrev talked 
about the onset of a period of ‘cold peace’. Th is was the term used by Yeltsin in 
December 1994. It was clear that Russia from the beginning was uncomfortable 
with the structure of post-Cold War international power. Th e growls became 
stronger when Evgeny Primakov took over as foreign minister in January 1996. 
He shift ed policy away from Kozyrev’s Atlanticism towards a greater emphasis on 
Russia’s great power status, closer links with other ‘rising powers’ such as China 
and India, and advanced ‘multipolarity’ as the desired model of the international 
system. Th e growls turned into roars when the NATO powers, ostensibly to halt 
genocide in Kosovo, bombed Serbia from 24 March 1999 for seventy-eight days 
without UNSC authorisation. Th e off ensive demonstrated to Moscow that it 
had failed to achieve the social status that it desired, as an equal partner in the 
management of European security. Strobe Talbott, Clinton’s advisor on Russia, 
records Kozyrev commenting, ‘You know, it’s bad enough having you people tell 
us what you’re going to do whether we like it or not. Don’t add insult to injury by 
also telling us that it’s  in our interests to obey your orders!’ (italics in original).  7  
Although relations were re-established soon aft er, the long-term eff ect of the 
Kosovo crisis can hardly be underestimated, contributing to the loss of mutual 
trust.  8  
 In the 1990s, the structural tensions were masked by a strong personal 
relationship between Yeltsin and Bill Clinton. Russia became embedded into 
European international society, signing the PCA with the EU in 1994 (because 
of the Chechen war, it only came into eff ect in December 1997)  and joining 
the Council of Europe (CoE) in 1996. Despite domestic criticism, Art. 15.4 of 
Russia’s 1993 constitution, granting priority of international law over domestic 
norms, remains in force, although tempered by an amendment of December 2015 
granting the Russian Constitutional Court the right to adjudicate whether rulings 
of the ECtHR are compatible with Russian law. In other words, Russia remains 
committed at the vertical level to the governance bodies of international society, 
above all the UN but also the WTO and all the other bodies of international 
legal, economic, fi nancial and environmental governance and their European 
manifestations. However, what Russia would never accept is the claim by any 
power or set of powers at the horizontal level to ‘own’ the international governance 
institutions, as part of some ‘US-led liberal international order’. Moscow insisted on 
the autonomy of these institutions and Russia’s right to interact with them directly 
and not mediated through any other order. Th is conservative internationalist view 
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of the international system is shared by Beijing and other partners in BRICS, SCO 
and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). 
 When Primakov took over as foreign minister in January 1996, he changed 
the business model of unifi cation with the West. Th e emphasis now was on 
both retaining their identity. His call for multipolarity and critique of uncritical 
adaptation to Western norms represented an enduring aspiration for ideational 
and geopolitical pluralism that continues to shape Russian foreign policy, and 
this is why Primakov is one of the few post-communist leaders who is respected 
across the factional spectrum, with the exception of radical liberals. However, 
the common identity model did not disappear, and in his early years Putin 
envisaged Russia joining NATO, driven by the continuing belief that it would be 
in the interests of all to transform the historical into the greater West. Despite 
the later sharp deterioration in relations and the emergence of an anti-hegemonic 
alignment with China, the two models of Russo-Western relations – one based on 
common identity and the other on separate but merged identities – still interact in 
surprising ways. In the event, and not through conscious choice, a third model – 
demerger and competition – came to predominate. All the evidence suggests that 
this was not the Kremlin’s preferred option, and neither was it the policy option 
desired by most of the historical West’s leaders. 
 However, it did enjoy signifi cant support in what can be called the ‘new West’, 
the former communist countries of Eastern Europe. Some countries were more 
virulent than others in viewing Russia as the once and future enemy. With the 
support of those in Washington who share their concerns (some of whom were 
East European  é migr é s), a powerful alliance was formed that helped shape a policy 
towards Russia that ultimately provoked a rift  and confl ict. In other words, instead 
of creating a greater West (with Russia inside), or even a wider West (with Russia 
a ‘strategic partner’ substantiated by some sort of institutional and ideational 
underpinnings with the EU), the traditional anti-Russian animus of the historical 
West, forged during the Cold War, was not dismantled but was radicalised through 
enlargement. As NATO and the Atlantic system as a whole expanded, its appetite 
grew, and Russia’s concerns were dismissed more forcefully. Th e enemy earlier 
had been the Soviet Union, with its programme to advance a world revolution to 
displace the capitalist ruling classes of the West, but it now became Russia, with 
its stubborn insistence on autonomy in international aff airs and its claims to be a 
great power and thus an equal with the United States in managing global aff airs. 
Th e radicalisation of the West meant that the denunciations of Russian behaviour 
and identity became more extreme. In the Cold War years, there had always been 
an implicit assumption that the object of attack was Soviet communism and the 
associated power complex, which held the ‘captive nations’ in thrall, but now 
Russia as an independent subject of international aff airs and even as a country 
became the subject of condemnation. What began as a relatively narrow strand 
of East European ‘Russophobia’ became a fl ood aft er the Orange Revolution in 
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Ukraine in the autumn of 2004, the gas disputes of 2006 and 2009, the ‘Maidan’ 
revolution of 2013–14 and Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015, although the 
antagonism had deep historical roots.  9  
 A parallel process was underway in Russia. Th ere had always been powerful 
strands critical of a merger with the West on any terms, notably among the neo-
traditionalists and Eurasianists, while the security bloc was wary for obvious 
reasons. Th e shift  was in part prompted by structural factors, above all the 
contradiction between liberal aspirations and great power ambitions. In the Putin 
years, this became the defi ning feature of his rule. Th is does not mean that Russia 
cannot be a great power and a democracy at the same time, but this requires a 
transformation of the international environment. Even France under Charles 
de Gaulle faced problems of adaptation aft er the loss of its empire, provoking 
tension with the Atlantic community of which it was a founding member. Th e 
challenges for Russia were incommensurately compounded by cultural and 
historical traditions that questioned Russia’s European credentials. On the other 
side, the Atlantic community was buoyed by the myth of victory in the Cold War 
and by the new challenges of terrorism and global insurgency, and could see no 
reason to embrace fundamental change, let  alone dissolution. Russian critiques 
of the US-led liberal world order were condemned as typically Soviet attempts 
to drive a wedge between the two wings of the Atlantic alliance. Th ese fears were 
greatly enhanced by the accession of the East European states, who considered the 
Atlantic community the guarantee of their security and development. 
 Putin’s frustrations spilled over in an angry and recriminatory speech at the 
Munich Security Conference on 10 February 2007. He condemned the ‘unipolar’ 
aspirations of a’ world in which there is one master, one sovereign’ and argued that 
‘at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for those within the system, but 
also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within’: 
 Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force – military 
force – in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss 
of permanent confl icts. … We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the 
basic principles of international law. … One state and, of course, fi rst and 
foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way.  10  
 Th is is how the new era of confrontation began. In Europe and the West, there 
was no strategic space for the reassertion of Russian power and status to develop. 
Th e only path that remained was adaptation to the norms and institutions of the 
Atlantic community, a path that Putin did not reject as long as it was accompanied 
by fl exibility in the management of the historical West. One way he tried to 
achieve this was by returning to Gorbachev’s idea of a common European home, 
now ‘rebranded’ as the project for a ‘greater Europe’. Th is reprises the old Gaullist 
idea of pan-European integration, advanced by Charles de Gaulle in his famous 
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speech in Strasbourg on 23 November 1959: ‘Yes, it is Europe, from the Atlantic 
to the Urals, it is Europe, it is the whole of Europe, that will decide the fate of the 
world.’  11  Th is was stymied in the years of the cold peace by structural factors (the 
predominance of Atlanticism and American hegemony) and systemic issues – the 
alleged incommensurability between Russian and EU ideas of democracy and 
human rights prompted by governance problems in Russia. Instead of greater 
Europe, the EU advanced its own wider Europe agenda to draw its neighbours into 
the EU’s orbit of good governance and democracy. By contrast with the pluralism 
of greater Europe, the wider Europe project is based on a series of concentric 
rings emanating from Brussels, weakening at the edges but nevertheless focused 
on a single centre. Russia’s concern about the monist character of wider Europe 
were intensifi ed by the development of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), formally 
launched in May 2009 in Prague. Th e result was a new division of Europe. Despite 
the aspirations voiced in the Charter of Paris in November 1990 for a ‘Europe 
whole and free’, new dividing lines were established. 
 The logic of Russian foreign policy 
 Th ere is a high degree of consensus on Russia’s foreign policy strategy, but there 
are plenty of debates over priorities and tactics. Russian governance is centralised 
in the hands of the president, but the Kremlin coordinates policy with a wide 
range of institutional actors while ensuring that it remains broadly in line with 
public sentiment. Th e Kremlin itself is the site of diff ering views, captured in the 
phrase ‘the Kremlin has many towers’. Th ere is agreement that Russian power 
and infl uence abroad should be increased, but how this should be achieved and 
the forms in which ‘power’ should be exercised is the subject of considerable 
disagreement.  12  
 A number of enduring themes shape Russian foreign policy. Th e fi rst is the 
refusal to accept any external hegemonic authority. Th e ‘Mongol yoke’ was formally 
repudiated in 1480 and the Poles were defeated in 1612, and thereaft er Russia 
entered the European state system as a great power. Th is precipitated the Great 
Northern War, leading to the crushing defeat of the Swedes at Poltava in June 
1709, and continued through Russia’s decisive intervention in the Seven Years’ 
War and then numerous wars with the Ottoman Turks and the ‘great game’ with 
Britain. In the Soviet period, resistance gained the ideological mantle of world 
revolution and, aft er 1945, the refusal to accept the Atlantic model of world order. 
Russian policy today is torn between accepting the indubitable fact of American 
predominance while resisting elements of US primacy. Primacy in the Clinton 
to the Obama years took the format of ‘leadership’ and was later formulated by 
Donald J. Trump as ‘greatness’. However defi ned, Russia resisted the un-negotiated 
enlargement of the US-led Atlantic system, culminating in wars in Georgia and 
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Ukraine, and what was perceived as irresponsible American dominance in the 
Middle East, prompting Russia’s military intervention in Syria in September 2015. 
Putin noted that up to 2,500 fi ghters of Russian origin and another 4,500 from 
Central Asia had gone to Syria, and warned that ‘the collapse of the Syrian state 
could potentially result in the creation of a massive terrorist hotspot that would 
last for a very long time, for many decades. And having a second Afghanistan here, 
right next to us is not the best of pleasures.’  13  
 Th e second theme is the striving to be recognised as a great power. Despite some 
early talk of  velikoderzhavnost’ (great powerness) when Putin fi rst came to power, 
the term was barely mentioned in later years and aft er 2006 has never been used in 
the main foreign and security policy documents. Th e negative reaction to the idea 
of Russia becoming an ‘energy superpower’, a phrase Putin used in December 2005, 
warned him that the term was provocative and counterproductive.  14  Th e focus up 
to 2012 was on domestic economic and social development, and given the lack 
of military resources and the weakness of the economy, Russia sought little more 
than to maintain its position as a regional power. Th e discursive shift  was more 
than a PR exercise and refl ected Putin’s understanding that excessive international 
ambition threatened domestic stability and development, as he had learned from 
the Soviet experience. Th is does not mean that he was indiff erent to Russia’s status, 
but in his earlier years these were given an ‘economistic’ twist. It is all the more 
paradoxical that in his third term Putin found himself locked in the classic Soviet 
trap, where foreign policy activism undermined domestic development. From the 
Kremlin’s perspective, if the international environment had been more benign, 
Russia’s reduced ambitions would have allowed the country to focus on domestic 
development.  15  However, Atlantic enlargement, as the Georgian and Ukrainian 
crises demonstrated, forced Russia to act. Frustration at the strategic impasse burst 
out in a more active foreign policy. 
 Th e third theme in the Putin years was the enhancement of Russia’s military 
potential. According to SIPRI databases, Russian defence spending stood at $31.3 
billion in 1995, $28.8 in 2000, $43 billion in 2005, $60.9 billion in 2010, $84.8 
billion in 2013 and peaked at $91 billion in 2015 (in constant 2014 dollars). Th e 
share of defence as a proportion of the GDP rose from 3.6 per cent in 2000 to 4.2 per 
cent in 2015 before falling back a little. In real terms, expenditure increased nearly 
threefold and in PPP terms is equivalent to some $200 billion. Th is is how Russia 
has been able substantially to modernise its equipment and combat readiness.  16  
Over the same period, the armed forces were reduced from 1,004,100 to 850,000 
personnel:  250,000 conscripts, 354,000 contract soldiers ( kontraktniki ), 220,000 
offi  cers and 30,000 military school cadets. Russia is one of the few European 
countries to maintain the draft , despite much discussion of moving towards an 
entirely volunteer force. Diffi  culties in recruiting and retaining  kontrakniki , despite 
greatly improved conditions of service, stalled plans for the phased abolition of 
conscription. Th is was accompanied by a modernisation programme based on the 
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Leninist principle of ‘better fewer, but better’. Th e hard-won victory over Georgia 
in August 2008 precipitated a long-delayed reform from autumn of that year that 
transformed the force structure and military capacity of the Russian armed forces. 
 It is in this context that we can identify four phases in Russia’s post-communist 
foreign policy. Th e  liberal internationalist period lasted to the mid-1990s, when 
all sides believed that a new post-communist community could be established, 
although it soon became clear that the West and Russia had very diff erent ideas 
of how this would be constituted. In the context of its apparent victory in the 
Cold War and Russian weakness and chaos, the historic West was unwilling to 
share leadership with Russia, and thus the problems that would later divide the 
continent were already evident. At the same time, Russia’s struggle for foreign 
policy autonomy was not based on anything approaching neo-Soviet notions of 
Russia as the core of an alternative geopolitical or ideological bloc. In the early 
years, Russia was highly cooperative, and even when there were diff erences of 
views, as over Bosnia in 1995, Russia continued to work with its Western partners. 
In the second phase, the era of  competitive coexistence , Primakov shift ed Russian 
policy from what traditionalists condemned as uncritical Atlanticism towards an 
ill-defi ned multipolarity and strategic competition with the West. What remained 
of the cooperative stance was tested in 1999 with the NATO bombing of Serbia. 
 Nevertheless, soon aft er Putin tried to reboot Russia’s engagement with the 
West through the  new realism strategy, the third phase that endured in various 
forms from 2000 to 2012. Th e strategy was realist not only because it accepted 
the fundamental premises of the realist paradigm in international relations but 
also because of its pragmatic orientation; and it was new because Putin tried to 
forge a novel synthesis of cooperative engagement while maintaining Russia’s 
independent stance and great power concerns. He believed that Primakov’s 
model of competitive coexistence was too close to Nikita Khrushchev’s policy of 
peaceful coexistence of the 1950s, predicated on inherent competition between 
the USSR and the West but not necessarily leading to war. Putin believed that a 
democratising post-communist Russia could do better than that. He tried to move 
beyond neo-Soviet representations of inherent confrontation. However, following 
the American abrogation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in June 
2002, the perceived lack of support for Russia’s ‘anti-terrorist’ second Chechen 
war, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, turmoil in Ukraine and much more, this, 
too, ran into the sands. By 2007, the disillusionment was complete, as refl ected in 
his Munich speech, yet the new realist strategy continued through the reset and 
Medvedev’s leadership, which sought to fi nd new forms of accommodation. In 
the event, no viable formula was found to place Russia’s relations with its Atlantic 
partners on a sustainable long-term basis. 
 Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, accompanied by protests against 
electoral fraud that were perceived by Moscow to have been part of Western 
attempts to destabilise the system, signalled the onset of a new spiral in the 
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deterioration of relations. Russian foreign policy entered a new phase of  neo-
revisionism and resistance. Neo-revisionism in this context means a defence of 
the international system, including the institutions of global governance at the 
top (the UN, WTO, and other instruments of legal, environmental and fi nancial 
governance), but resistance to the practices of the US-led hegemonic powers.  17  Th is 
was accompanied by the conservative consolidation of the regime accompanied 
by a shrill rhetoric of defi ance and attempts to develop an ideology of resistance. 
Much of this was ill-considered, and in many cases counterproductive, yet it 
refl ected the deep sense of strategic suff ocation. Th e failure to establish an order in 
which Russia could thrive resulted in the internalisation of external tensions and 
the externalisation of domestic contradictions. In the end, everything was in place 
for a resumption of confrontation. 
 Th ese changes were refl ected in Russia’s offi  cial documents. Each built on 
previous iterations, but together they sum up Russia’s view of itself and its place 
in the world. Drawing on earlier versions of April 2000 and February 2010, a 
new  Military Doctrine was adopted on 25 December 2014.  18  A year later, on 31 
December 2015, drawing on the earlier versions of January 2000 and May 2009, 
the new  Security Strategy was signed by Putin.  19  Th en, developing the earlier 
versions of July 2008 and February 2013, on 30 November 2016, a new  Foreign 
Policy Concept was adopted.  20  Th e doctrines, strategies and concepts dealt with 
diff erent issues, but together they convey the main foreign policy concerns of 
the contemporary Russian state. Some traditional themes were repeated. First, 
Russia’s status as a leading world power whose sovereignty was to be defended 
and respected, pursuing an independent policy in world aff airs. Russia was to 
be recognised as a great power, as one of the two major nuclear powers and a 
permanent member of the UNSC, and has a special responsibility to manage global 
issues. Second, the documents converge on a view of the world as increasingly 
chaotic and unmanageable, marked by intensifi ed competition for resources and 
infl uence between the major powers. Even the Arctic was becoming a source 
of vulnerability. Th ird, to ensure that the post-Soviet space remains a sphere in 
which Russia’s infl uence could be maintained, although this is studiously not 
couched in the language of a ‘sphere of infl uence’. Russia should remain infl uential 
both in bilateral relations and through the multilateral institutions such as the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the EEU and the Collective Security 
Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Th e development of integration processes in the 
post-Soviet space is an enduring theme. 
 Th e  National Security Strategy of 31 December 2015 revealed Moscow’s 
heightened sense of insecurity. Th e document starkly warned about the threat: 
 Expanding the force potential of NATO and endowing it with global functions 
that are implemented in violation of international legal norms, the bloc’s 
heightened military activity, its continued expansion and the approach of 
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its military infrastructure to Russia’s borders, all create a threat to national 
security.  21  
 Th e  Strategy portrayed Russia as a global player with legitimate concerns in its 
region and noted the containment strategy deployed against it. Despite the 
paradigm shift  in global aff airs towards confl ict, the  Strategy remained remarkably 
consistent with previous iterations. Confrontation with the West was now defi ned 
as a threat, accompanied by warnings of the ‘hybrid’ wars allegedly conducted 
against Russia. Th e country’s self-reliance and self-suffi  ciency was stressed, but 
there was no substantive shift  towards the ‘securitisation’ of new policy areas. 
Securitisation is not the same as militarisation and indicates the way that ‘normal’ 
politics gives way to the priority of national security discourses, which then shape 
policy.  22  Aft er 2014, NATO shift ed from the language of ‘strategic partnership’ 
towards militarisation, and a whole series of policy areas underwent a creeping 
securitisation (including the monitoring of the media to counter ‘Russian 
propaganda’ and ‘fake news’), although the process was uneven and divisions 
remained between the allies.  23  While most European countries were reluctant 
to engage in the wholesale securitisation of relations with Russia, the United 
States went the furthest. Already its  National Security Strategy 2015 warned that 
the United States ‘will continue to impose signifi cant costs on Russia through 
sanctions’ and would ‘deter Russian aggression’.  24  Trump’s proclaimed intention of 
improving relations with Russia provoked a storm of hostility in which Republican 
neoconservatives and Democrat liberal internationalists united to stymie moves 
in that direction. 
 However, typical of the Putinite moderation of extremes, the new  Foreign Policy 
Concept issued on 30 November 2016 refl ected no imputed condition of ‘war’ 
between Russia and the Atlantic community. Th e revised  Concept stressed Russia’s 
desire for good relations with all of its ‘partners’, the continued commitment to 
multilateral organisations and international economic integration, the supremacy 
of international law, the central role of the UN, the importance of democracy and 
Russia’s contribution to peace and security in Europe. Th e general stance remained 
the same: ‘Th e contemporary world is going through a period of profound changes, 
the essence of which is the formation of a polycentric international system.’ Th e 
West’s attempt to impede this natural shift  generated instability in international 
relations. Russia would ‘resist the attempts of individual states or groups of states 
to revise the generally recognised principles of international order’, for instance, 
using the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to intervene in the internal 
aff airs of other countries. At the heart of the document was a defence of Russia’s 
status as an independent player in international aff airs, a reluctance to be drawn 
into any alliances or putative blocs and the attempt to strengthen the ability of news 
media ‘to convey the Russian viewpoint to broad circles of the world community’. 
Even though at the time Russia was embroiled in the Syrian confl ict, the Middle 
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East was still ranked behind the post-Soviet space, Europe, the United States and 
the Asia-Pacifi c in its regional priorities. 
 Rather than enunciating an alternative ideological project or the creation of some 
sort of Eurasian civilisation, the  Concept reiterated Russia’s support for ‘universal 
democratic values’. Regional integration would be in conformity with WTO rules, 
and there was no suggestion that Russia would turn its back on globalisation. 
Instead, the document stressed Russia’s ambition to establish ‘constructive, stable 
and predictable cooperation with the countries of the EU’. Despite the tensions, 
the greater Europe ambition was retained in the form of Russia’s wish ‘to create a 
common economic and humanitarian space from the Atlantic to the Pacifi c Ocean 
on the basis of the harmonisation of the processes of European and Eurasian 
integration’. Even NATO was spared some of the harshest criticism, although 
it registered ‘a negative attitude towards NATO’s expansion and the alliance’s 
military structure approaching Russia’s borders’. Instead, Russia sought ‘an equal 
partnership’ while establishing ‘mutually benefi cial relation with the United 
States’. Th e  Concept accused the United States and its allies of undermining ‘global 
stability’ by trying to ‘contain’ Russia and reserved the right to ‘react harshly to any 
unfriendly’ moves. Cooperation was only possible on the basis of ‘equality, mutual 
respect of interests, and non-interference in one another’s internal aff airs’. Russia’s 
goal was good relations with all states based on ‘mutual respect’, and there was no 
enunciation of an anti-hegemonic strategy, although ‘polycentrism’ was defended 
and ‘full-scale’ partnership and cooperation with China was stressed. Th e tone 
overall was defensive, although enunciated in a confi dent manner that suggested 
a belief that the tide of history  – what in Soviet parlance had been called the 
‘correlation of forces’ – was running in Moscow’s favour. Th e document stressed 
Russia’s enduring commitment to universal principles, as long as these were not 
abused to justify interference in the internal aff airs of states.  25  
 Th e confi dent style was refl ected in Putin annual address to the Federal Assembly 
on 1 December 2016. Th e focus was on reform in domestic policy, although there 
were no substantive ideas on how to tackle economic stagnation, and the foreign 
policy passages were conciliatory in tone. He noted, ‘Unlike some of our colleagues 
abroad, who consider Russia an adversary, we do not seek and never have sought 
enemies. We need friends. But we will not allow our interests to be infringed upon 
or ignored. We want to and will decide our destiny ourselves and build our present 
and future without others’ unasked for advice and prompting.’  26  Th e conciliatory 
tone indicated that Moscow hoped to repair relations with the United States in 
the framework of a multipolar world order and recognition of Russia as a great 
power. Inevitably, the sticking point would be the tension between a ‘values-based 
foreign policy’, which in the historical West was a code for American leadership 
of the hegemonic liberal world order in which there was no room for ‘spheres 
of interest’ (in other words, for spheres in which the West did not dominate), or 
a more interest-driven recognition of a pluralist international system in which 
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great powers could have divergent concerns, and to avoid confl ict, some sort of 
diplomatic process was required. 
 Some new themes emerge in recent documents and speeches. First, as Russia 
strengthens and pursues an independent foreign policy, it encounters increased 
opposition if not outright hostility. Th is provokes the revival of traditional 
containment ( sderzhivanie ) strategies against Russia, applying the whole gamut of 
military, economic and informational instruments. Second, interstate relations are 
becoming more competitive but deceptive because of the mobilisation of ‘hybrid 
warfare’ through fi nancial and cyber instruments. Th ird, the dominant position of 
the West was being eroded by the rise of new powers, which prompts the historic 
West to defend its declining positions more assertively, above all through the 
containment of challenger powers. Fourth, the documents shift  between asserting 
that a multipolar world is in the making to the view that it is an established fact.  27  All 
these points reinforce Russia’s enduring critique of the Western-led international 
order and refl ect Russia’s perceived structural exclusion from that order as equal 
and constituent member. 
 A new era of confrontation 
 Putin came to power a committed Europeanist. A native of St Petersburg, a city 
built precisely as a ‘window to the West’, Putin was immersed in European culture. 
Although he grew up in Soviet times, his education drew on the classical repertoire 
of European culture. He lived for fi ve years in Dresden, a city that in so many ways 
epitomised the peaks and troughs of European civilisation. At the time when Putin 
worked there for the KGB in the late 1980s, the result of the bombing of February 
1945 was still evident. Th e ruins of the Frauenkirche, one of the fi nest examples of 
Protestant baroque architecture of the eighteenth century, had been left  as a war 
memorial by the East German authorities, and rebuilding only started in 1994. 
Why, then, did Putin the European become so alienated from the West? 
 Putin sought a new relationship with the EU, building on the PCA to develop 
the four Common European Economic Spaces, launched at the St Petersburg 
Russia–EU summit in May 2003. Th e Moscow summit in May 2005 outlined a 
series of ‘road maps’ for their implementation. However, as Igor Ivanov, foreign 
minister between 1998 and 2004, argues, ‘Th e roadmaps that were supposed to have 
developed into cooperation in several areas never turned into full-fl edged detailed 
documents. Th e Russia-Europe summits held twice a year gradually became 
pompous and insignifi cant events. And a full-fl edged security dialogue was never 
developed because of NATO’s reluctance to accept the new realities in Europe 
and the world.’  28  Th e exhaustion in mutual relations is refl ected in the desultory 
negotiations to devise a new framework to supersede the PCA aft er its ten-year 
expiration, with very little achieved by the time negotiations were suspended 
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in 2014. Th is also applies to the Partnership for Modernisation, agreed by the 
Rostov summit in July 2010, which sought to revive the stalled common spaces 
programme. Again, not much had been achieved by the time the EU imposed 
targeted sanctions in July 2014 restricting access to capital markets, defence, dual-
use goods and sensitive technologies (including in the energy sector). 
 Declassifi ed documents released in December 2017 showed that Western 
leaders had repeatedly promised their Soviet counterparts that NATO would not 
expand into Eastern Europe. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous assurance 
in his meeting with Gorbachev on 9 February 1990 that NATO would not move 
‘one inch eastward’ was only one of a plethora of Western assurances throughout 
the period of German unifi cation in 1990 and into 1991.  29  Th is sense of betrayal 
and Western lack of trustworthiness informs Putin’s neo-revisionism. It refl ects 
the Russian belief that the alliance’s enlargement left  Europe in a security limbo. 
In its review of 2014, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Aff airs (MFA) noted that 
the year was ‘marked by a build-up of elements of instability and an increase in 
outbreaks of crisis in international relations, which are currently transitioning to 
a new multi-polar world order’. Th e review noted the increasing competition in all 
areas, including over developmental models and moral values, accompanied by a 
series of ‘full-blown regional confl icts’. Th e Ukrainian crisis was the worst of these. 
According to the MFA analysis, 
 It refl ected major system-wide problems in the Euro-Atlantic area associated 
with the policy of Western countries, pursued during the last 25 years, aimed at 
strengthening their own security without taking into account Russia’s interests, 
and at ongoing eastward expansion of the geopolitical space under their 
control, which showed in successive waves of NATO enlargement contrary to 
the assurances issued at the highest level. Th e historic opportunity to form a 
system of equal and indivisible security was squandered.  30  
 A stark division emerged between those within the enlarged alliance and those 
outside, above all Russia, and what had become zero-sum struggles over the 
countries in between.  31  
 It was over Ukraine that all parties stumbled, and ‘everyone lost’.  32  Two 
fundamentally diff erent principles of state-building came into confl ict, the monist 
and the pluralist.  33  A  domestic confl ict over identity and the shape of Ukraine 
state-building became internationalised.  34  Putin’s speech on 18 March 2014 
justifying the takeover of Crimea stressed a number of themes. First, he held the 
Western powers responsible for the breakdown of the European system, to which 
Russian actions were considered a response. He excoriated them for ignoring 
international law in their various interventions, arguing that it was the height of 
hypocrisy and ‘double standards’ to accuse Russia of actions that were no more 
than a replication of Western behaviour. On this occasion and later, he referred 
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to the UN International Court of Justice judgement of 22 July 2010 on Kosovo, 
which stated, ‘General international law contains no prohibition on declarations 
of independence.’ Second, Putin justifi ed the annexation by the need to defend 
the ‘Russian world’ ( Russkii mir ). Th e term is vague with unclear boundaries, 
but it appeals to the sense that the Russian nation is broader than the Russian 
state of today, encompassing a community of  sootechvenniki (compatriots). Th e 
concept was applied by the insurgents in the Donbas who claimed a cultural 
affi  liation with Russia.  35  In Crimea, it was refl ected in the overwhelming vote in 
support of reunifi cation with Russia in the referendum of 16 March. Although the 
term became popular at this time, and has been used to describe an eponymous 
cultural organisation since June 2007, Putin soon stopped using the phrase. 
Characteristically, Putin has an instinctive aversion to a concept that could 
constrain his freedom of action. 
 Th ird, Putin generalised the crisis as an indication of the broader breakdown 
of global order: 
 Like a mirror, the situation in Ukraine refl ects what is going on and what has 
been happening in the world over the past several decades. Aft er the dissolution 
of bipolarity on the planet, we no longer have stability. Key international 
institutions are not getting any stronger; on the contrary, in many cases, they 
are sadly degrading. 
 In particular, he stressed that NATO enlargement ‘meant that NATO’s navy would 
be right there in this city of Russia’s military glory [Sevastopol], and this would 
create not an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole of southern Russia’. 
Fourth, Putin insisted that he was a friend to Ukraine: ‘I also want to address the 
people of Ukraine. I sincerely want you to understand us: we do not want to harm 
you in any way, or to hurt your national feelings. We have always respected the 
territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state, incidentally, unlike those who sacrifi ced 
Ukraine’s unity for their political ambitions.’  36  On this and other occasions, he 
insisted that Ukrainians and Russians were one people, although this does not 
mean that he thought that they should be part of the same state. Ukraine remains 
the rock impeding the normalisation of relations between Russia and the West. 
 All this looks like a Cold War, defi ned as a struggle which is deeply entrenched 
and with the potential to become an outright military confl ict but in which neither 
side is actively preparing for immediate war. Th e original Cold War represented 
entrenched ideological confl ict waged on a global scale both within and between 
states. Robert Legvold is right to argue that this is not a repetition of  the original 
Cold War but represents  a new Cold War.  37  Andrew Monaghan notes that the idea 
of a new Cold War is anachronistic and misplaced, looking back to the previous 
confl ict rather than examining the dynamics of the present one.  38  However, the 
renewed confrontation is part of a broader reconfi guration of international order 
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and is taking on systemic forms. In European and US-Russian relations, elements 
of a new Cold War have been restored, and although relatively localised in spatial 
terms, they are accruing some of the ideological quality of the earlier confl ict. Th e 
renewed confrontation has global aspects, and the rhetoric at times is quite vicious, 
with the epicentre once again a battle between competing visions of Europe. 
Ideational confl ict is no longer driven by the left -right division of the First Cold 
War but a struggle between self-defi ned democracies and authoritarian systems. 
Th e confl ict is generated by unresolved issues at the end of the Cold War, notably 
a stable and inclusive security order for Europe, as well as by the radicalisation of 
positions, in part generated by contestation over the new West in the borderlands 
of Europe. 
 Russo-EU relations became hostage to the Ukrainian crisis. Th e emphasis 
on unity over Ukraine overshadowed the potential for new policies rooted in an 
understanding that the crisis had multiple dimensions for which all sides bore 
responsibility. Instead, alternatives to ‘maintaining a strong and united Russian 
policy’ were condemned as ‘doomsday scenarios’, including the most awful in 
which Trump and Putin achieve a ‘grand power bargain’, which ‘allows Russia to 
bring Ukraine into its sphere of infl uence’.  39  A ‘grand bargain’ would not necessarily 
entail the latter outcome but would in fact represent a move towards averting 
the real ‘doomsday scenario’, the potential for nuclear confl ict between the great 
powers. Th e appropriation of this language to prevent a negotiated solution to the 
Ukrainian impasse indicates the depth of the crisis. Putin remains a committed 
European, but he became increasingly sceptical about the EU. Earlier acceptance 
that ‘Europeanisation’, defi ned as the normative incorporation of EU practices and 
standards into domestic legislation, gave way to resistance. From the beginning, 
Russia rejected the fundamental premise of ‘conditionality’ of the EU policy of 
granting certain privileges in return for normative subordination to the EU. Th e 
EU’s promotion of itself as the promoter of a certain historically defi ned model 
of virtue (values and normative standards) undermined Russia’s status as a great 
power and thereby eroded its identity. In the main, it is not the values themselves 
that are rejected but the way that they are promoted within the framework of an 
enlarging Atlantic system. Normative rhetoric is not free-standing and fl oating 
in some sort of disembodied ‘normasphere’ but is deeply embedded in a power 
system that operates according to the logic of enlargement that riled Russia from 
the fi rst post-Cold War days. If these same normative standards had been less 
representative of an enlarging Atlantic system, but part of a growing and deepening 
common endeavour of a greater Europe, then some of the contradictions and 
tensions may have been avoided. 
 Th e return of geopolitics represented the defeat of the aspirations for a ‘common 
European home’ or for a ‘Europe whole and free’ in the post-Cold War era. It is not 
clear how the impasse can be resolved. Th e solutions to earlier problems of post-
Cold War order now became the problems to be resolved. Th e stalemate in relations 
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between these two representations of the post-Cold War world order took physical 
form in the new jagged frontline across Eastern Europe, and psychological forms 
in the new propaganda war waged across various platforms, from think tanks to 
new social media and traditional print media. Th is geopolitical and hermeneutic 
impasse provoked a range of alternatives. In Europe, these are usually termed 
‘populist’, and this is true in the sense that many reject the old elite politics, which 
provide a stunted and limited vision of the future. It is no accident that much of 
the left  and right populism unite in condemnation of traditional Atlanticism and 
looks for an improvement of relations with Russia. Th e extent of Russian support 
and sponsorship has been greatly exaggerated. Moscow no doubt encourages any 
movement that could potentially break the impasse and allow Russia to escape 
neo-containment, but these movements are generated by domestic processes and 
international contradictions. Although Moscow’s bony hand was sought behind 
Britain’s vote to leave the EU in June 2016, no substantive evidence has been found 
of Russian ‘interference’. Equally, it is not accidental that liberal globalists and 
neoconservatives in the United States combine to use Russia as a stick to beat 
Trump’s assertion of conservative neo-isolationism and neo-mercantilism. 
 Trump came to power with very few consistent positions, but one of them was 
that it made sense ‘to get on with Russia’. However, any initiative once again to 
‘reset’ relations with Russia were stymied by the claims of Russian ‘collusion’ in 
getting Trump elected, accompanied by charges of ‘hacking’ and the use of social 
media to sow discord and undermine American democracy. Together, these 
charges became known as ‘Russiagate’. Although the evidence for these charges 
is thin to non-existent, the aff air had enormous consequences and prevented 
any moves towards a rapprochement between the two countries. In fact, Trump’s 
appointments to defence, security and foreign policy posts were mostly hard-line 
critics of Russia. By contrast, Russia sought to end its diplomatic isolation and to 
that end in March 2017 sent an ambitious proposal to Washington to normalise 
relations across the board. Th e off er was rejected, and Russia in July then off ered a 
more modest non-interference agreement, which was also turned down. Instead, 
relations took a sharp turn for the worse, resulting in the Congressional initiative 
to impose the CAATSA sanctions. Th is provoked an escalating cycle of expulsions 
of diplomatic staff  and the closure of facilities. 
 Putin’s frustrations boiled over in his speech at the annual conference of 
the Valdai Discussion Club on 19 October 2017. He condemned the one-sided 
character of US-Russian interactions in the sphere of nuclear security, holding 
the United States responsible for not reciprocating Russia’s unilateral granting 
of access to its nuclear weapons facilities in the 1990s. Putin charged the United 
States of having taken advantage of Russia’s weakness at the time. He recalled the 
Megatons to Megawatts programme, which ran between 1993 and 2013, whereby 
Russia down-blended its enriched uranium from the equivalent of about twenty 
thousand nuclear warheads into low-enriched uranium to be used as fuel in US 
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power stations. As part of the deal, ‘US offi  cials made 170 visits to top secret 
Russian facilities’ and ‘set up permanent workplaces in them adorned with 
American fl ags’. He noted that ‘from the Russian side unprecedented openness 
and trust was demonstrated’, but this was not reciprocated:  ‘What we got in 
return is well-known – a complete disregard for our national interests, support 
for separatism in the Caucasus, a circumvention of the UNSC, the bombing of 
Yugoslavia, the invasion of Iraq, and so on. Th e US must have seen the state of our 
nuclear weapons and economy and decided to do away with international law.’ 
Putin identifi ed America’s unilateral abrogation of the 1972 ABM treaty in 2002 as 
the key turning point in disrupting strategic stability. Washington’s hostility was 
‘returning the relationship between the two countries to the 1950s’, although he 
noted that during the Cold War, ‘there was at least more mutual respect’ between 
the two superpowers. 
 He noted that the previous month Russia had fi nally disposed of all its chemical 
weapons stockpiles, whereas the United States had persistently postponed its own 
destruction schedule and now planned to complete the process in 2023 at the 
earliest. He also criticised the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 
signed on 8 December 1987 that banned deployed and non-deployed missiles of 
intermediate range (1,000 and 5,500 km) and shorter range (500–1,000 km). As a 
result, some 2,692 American and Russian ground-based missiles were destroyed 
(the treaty did not apply to sea- or air-launched missiles). Putin complained 
that not banning air-based and naval launchers advantaged NATO states, and it 
represented ‘another case of Russia making unilateral concessions’. On Ukraine, 
Putin harshly condemned the West for having provoked the confl ict and for the 
stalemate in implementing the Minsk 2 peace accords.  40  
 Th is was reminiscent of his Munich speech in 2007, reciting a litany of complaints 
about Western behaviour. Since then, Putin’s list of grievances had become even 
longer, including the recognition of Kosovo’s independence, intervention in Libya 
and the war in Syria, with Putin accusing the West of practicing ‘double standards’ 
throughout. Putin argued that many of the achievements of the West, above all 
the creation of the welfare state, had been a response to the Soviet challenge. 
Th e big picture is the one that Putin, and before him Yeltsin and Gorbachev, had 
identifi ed: the failure ‘to open a truly new chapter in history’ aft er the Soviet Union 
ceased to exist. Instead, ‘aft er dividing up the geopolitical heritage of the Soviet 
Union, our western partners became convinced of the justness of their cause and 
declared themselves the victors of the Cold War’, and then interfered ‘in the aff airs 
of sovereign states, and exporting democracy just like the Soviet leadership had 
tried to export the socialist revolution to the rest of the world’. Th ese strictures were 
no doubt justifi ed when seen from Moscow’s perspective, but they did not off er a 
way out of the impasse. Th e ball as far as Putin was concerned was decidedly in 
the West’s court, but this reduced Russia to a reactive stance. Putin’s speech simply 
reaffi  rmed the strategic impasse in which Russia was trapped. 
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 Russiagate damaged relations at a time when both Russia and the United 
States faced a number of common challenges, ranging from the war in Syria, the 
Islamic State insurgency in Iraq and Syria, the continuing war in Afghanistan, the 
development of North Korea’s and Iran’s strategic potential, as well as strategic arms 
control between Russia and the United States. Intervention in Syria was in large 
part determined by Russia’s experience of radical Islamic insurgency in the North 
Caucasus and the fear that if entrenched in the neighbourhood (and for Russia, 
the Middle East is part of its neighbourhood), then Russia would once again come 
under threat. Putin worked to ensure that Islam in Russia, encompassing some 
twenty million people, remained within traditional channels. Enormous eff orts 
were devoted to training imams in Russia, insulating the country from Saudi-style 
salafi  fundamentalism (Wahhabism) and even more from the revived caliphate.  41  
Despite the strained relations, a communication channel was established at the 
level of deputy foreign ministers (between Sergei Ryabkov and Th omas Shannon).  42  
Th e potential for a dangerous drift  towards military confl ict has rarely been higher 
as the various Cold War mechanisms to constrain and manage confrontation and 
deterrence have been dismantled. 
 Th e US  National Security Strategy unveiled on 18 December 2017 warned 
against the ‘revisionist powers of China and Russia’, ranked alongside the ‘rogue 
powers of Iran and North Korea’ and the ‘transnational threat organisations, 
particularly jihadist groups’.  43  Th e theme was developed in the  National Defence 
Strategy , a summary of which was issued on 19 January 2018, which argued that 
the United States was emerging from a period of ‘strategic atrophy’ and needed 
to face ‘increased global disorder’ in which ‘inter-state strategic competition, not 
terrorism, is now the primary concern in US national security’. Top of the list of 
challengers was China, which was characterised as ‘a strategic competitor using 
predatory economics to intimidate its neighbours while militarizing features in 
the South China Sea’. As for Russia, ‘it has violated the borders of nearby nations 
and pursues veto power over the economic, diplomatic, and security decisions 
of its neighbours’.  44  Th e two states, as in the  National Security Strategy , were 
labelled ‘revisionist powers’. Th e  Nuclear Posture Review revealed on 27 January 
2018 once again lamented that in some way, the United States had ‘continued 
to reduce the number and salience of nuclear weapons’, while others, ‘including 
Russia and China, have moved in the opposite direction’.  45  Th e document outlined 
an ambitious programme for the modernisation of US nuclear forces (something 
that Obama had begun) that could not but ramp up nuclear confrontation. On 
20 October 2018, Trump announced that the United States would leave the INF 
Treaty, and on 1 February 2019, Mike Pompeo, the US secretary of state, gave 
Russia sixty days to come into compliance. On 4 March 2019, Moscow offi  cially 
announced that it was withdrawing from the INF Treaty. Moscow had long chafed 
at its restrictions, and its abandonment now deprived the United States of its 
status as the guarantor of security in Europe. Th e collapse of the old arms-control 
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regime also aff ected the 2011 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), due 
to expire in February 2021. Paradoxically, the treaty came into full eff ect just at 
this time, on 5 February, with both sides having met the limit of 1,500 deployable 
weapons. Th e  Nuclear Posture Review showed no enthusiasm for its renewal. As 
the Russian foreign ministry commented on 3 February, ‘the document is focused 
on confrontation and is anti-Russia’.  46  
 Putin’s annual address to the Federal Assembly on 1 March 2018 both 
confi rmed the start of a new arms race and denied it – as far as he was concerned, 
since 2002 Russia had devised a range of powerful weapons, and therefore there 
would be no need to match the United States weapon for weapon. Th e latter 
third of the two-hour speech introduced an awesome range of strategic and 
nuclear-capable armaments that Russia had or was developing. Putin lamented 
US withdrawal from the ABM treaty in 2002, the foundation of the arms-control 
regime, followed by the development of a ballistic missile defence (BMD) shield, 
including the deployment of interceptor missiles in Poland and Romania, against 
Russia’s strenuous objections. Putin noted the many proposals Russia had off ered 
to work together on BMD issues, but ‘all our proposals, absolutely all of them, were 
rejected’. As Putin put it, ‘We tried to talk to our partners. Russia is a major nuclear 
power. Th ey kept ignoring us. No one was talking to us. So listen to us now.’ Th e 
new weapons included the Avangard system (a winged glider with speeds of up to 
Mach 20 on a fl at trajectory in the atmosphere, avoiding traditional ballistic missile 
launch threats), the Sarmat super-heavy intercontinental missile, the Peresvet 
laser system and the aviation systems equipped with Kinzhal hypersonic ballistic 
missiles (to be carried on MiG-31 interceptors), the Burevestnik nuclear-powered 
cruise missiles of unlimited range and the Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle, 
also of unlimited range. Putin insisted that Russia would not be the aggressor 
and that the military build-up had been forced on Russia. Moreover, always the 
legalist, Putin insisted that the new nuclear technology were compliant with arms-
control agreements and Russia’s security commitments, including limiting the use 
of nuclear weapons in retaliation to a fi rst strike by an enemy if Russia or its allies 
faced an existential threat.  47  
 Putin took up the theme again in his 20 February 2019 address. He stressed 
that ‘building relations with Russia means working together to fi nd solutions to 
the most complex matters instead of trying to impose solutions’, and noted that 
US withdrawal from the INF Treaty was ‘the most urgent and discussed issue’. He 
would have preferred that the United States had behaved as ‘openly and honestly’ 
as they did when they walked away from the ABM Treaty in 2002. Instead, ‘they 
violate everything, then they look for excuses and appoint a guilty party’, as well as 
‘mobilising their satellites’ (a rather contemptuous reference to the United States’ 
NATO allies). He warned that ‘Russia will have to develop and deploy weapons 
that can be used not only against areas from which a direct threat will come but 
also against territories where decision-making centres are located’. Despite the US 
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violation of the INF Treaty by building the installation in Romania and Poland 
that Moscow alleged could be used to launch adapted Tomahawk cruise missiles, 
Putin stressed that ‘Russia does not intend – this is very important, I am repeating 
this on purpose – Russia does not intend to deploy such missiles in Europe’. To 
have done so would have risked repeating the confrontation of the 1980s. He gave 
an update on the development of the weapons mentioned the previous year and 
added a new one, the Tsirkon (Zircon) ‘hypersonic [cruise] missile that can reach 
speeds of Mach 9 and strike a target more than 1,000 km way both under water 
and on the ground’. He stressed that it ‘can be launched from water, surface vessels 
and from submarines’. In other words, the oceans were no longer the US fortress 
but the launch site for Russian missiles from vessels stationed off  US shores. Putin 
was quick to add that ‘Russia wants to have sound, equal, friendly relations with 
the USA. Russia is not threatening anyone, and all we do in terms of security is 
simply a response, which means that our actions are defensive.’  48  As in any arms 
race, the response to an adversary building up their military is to enhance one’s 
own capabilities, thus provoking a cycle that may lead to war, fi nancial overstretch 
or state failure, or all three. 
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 7   RECREATING THE 
HEARTLAND: EURASIAN 
PARTNERSHIPS 
 Th e centrepiece of Putin’s third presidential term was the deepening of Eurasian 
integration. In September 2013, he argued that ‘Eurasian integration is a chance 
for the entire post-Soviet space to become an independent centre for global 
development’, while insisting that its members would retain ‘their political 
independence’.  1  Th e creation of the EEU on 1 January 2015 represented the 
culmination of this endeavour, but even this soon became part of even more 
ambitious schemes. From 2016, Putin talked of a ‘Greater Eurasian Partnership’ 
(GEP), although he was vague on what institutional form such a macro-regional 
bloc would take. Its geographical limits were also unclear, and in some versions it 
included just post-Soviet Eurasia and China, while in others it encompassed all 
of Western Europe and the whole ASEAN region. However, in all variants, one 
aspect was clear: for Russia and its allies to retain autonomy in the new construct 
and not be swallowed up by the Chinese giant on the one side or the historical 
West on the other. Th is could only be achieved by enhancing the collective weight 
of post-Soviet Eurasia. Th is is what can be called Putin’s heartland strategy. 
Halford Mackinder, the founder of modern geopolitical thinking, in his 1904 
article submitted to the Royal Geographical Society, ‘Th e Geographical Pivot of 
History’, introduced the argument that he formulated in 1919 as ‘who rules East 
Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-
Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world’. Th e pivot area in this 
conception covers most of Eastern Europe and northern Russia. In the event, with 
the development of air and sea power, it did not quite work out as Mackinder 
anticipated. Today, this area is in danger of becoming not only peripheral but also 
an extended zone of contestation between external powers. Zbigniew Brzezinski 
spoke of Eurasia ‘as the globe’s central arena’ and devoted himself to ensuring that 
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it was not dominated by Russia. By contrast, Putin sought to construct a Eurasian 
regional order that would remain an independent actor in the new geopolitical 
environment. However, the Ukrainian crisis and the annexation of Crimea dealt 
Eurasian ambitions a deadly blow, as Russia’s neighbours wondered if they would 
be next to face Russia’s wrath. 
 Eurasian integration in perspective 
 Th e concept of Eurasia as a distinct political community is relatively new, dating 
back to the late nineteenth century.  2  Eurasianists are now one of the four great 
blocs defi ning Russian modernity, but their ideas are far from homogenous. Putin 
at most is a pragmatic Eurasianist, although the project to make Eurasia a new 
centre of political integration is overlain with various ideological concerns. Th e 
core of Putin’s strategy is to overcome peripherality and make Eurasia a centre 
of development and political infl uence. Th is represents not only a developmental 
project but also a civilisational challenge in which ‘to become modern is no 
longer equivalent to becoming Western’.  3  Neither is it to become Chinese. Th e 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has the potential to reorder geopolitical and 
modernisation perspectives. Also known as One Belt, One Road (OBOR), the 
plan draws on memories of the various ancient Silk Roads that ran from China to 
Europe to establish a land-based Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and a maritime 
counterpart, the Maritime Silk Route, to connect China with its trading partners. 
Fears that Eurasian integration would impede convergence with the EU became 
irrelevant as ties with China and Asia as a whole increased. Even East European 
EU member states established direct contact with Beijing (the 16+1 initiative 
established in April 2012, with some Balkan countries), indicating the potentially 
declining relevance of Brussels, while for the post-Soviet Eurasian states, BRI 
opened up new horizons. Th e failure at the end of the Cold War to create a greater 
Europe, bringing together Russia, the EU and all the states ‘in between’ ceded the 
geo-economic initiative to greater Eurasia.  4  
 Th e core of this strategy was the development of the EEU. When initially 
outlined in his landmark article of October 2011, the putative Eurasian Union was 
envisaged as a full union on the EU model.  5  However, when formally established 
in 2015, it focused on a customs union and the single market, and the more 
ambitious elements of supranational political integration were relegated to some 
indeterminate future. Th e goal was certainly not to recreate something akin to the 
old Soviet Union, as notoriously suggested by Hillary Clinton. Instead, the aim 
was rather more complex and had three aspects. Th e fi rst falls within the ambit of 
classical economic regionalism, where countries come together to reduce tariff s 
and other obstacles to encourage economic activity and interconnectedness. Th is 
functionalist angle is especially pertinent in a region that had once been a single 
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economic unit and where cultural and social ties are intense. However, these 
traditional ties also proved to be an obstacle, provoking fears that the Soviet Union 
or Russian Empire was being recreated in the form of a new greater Russia. Th e 
second goal was to create a substantive partner for the EU and, thus, to provide 
a broader platform for a potential greater Europe. For this reason, the EEU has 
developed in a manner complementary to that of the EU, operating within the 
functionality and regulatory regime of the WTO. However, in the short term, 
the planned EEU only exacerbated tensions over the lands in between, provoking 
the crisis over Ukraine from late 2013. Th e third factor is the attempt to provide 
more substance to the Eurasian heartland in the face of the expansion of Chinese 
capital into the post-Soviet Eurasian region. 
 A customs union came into eff ect in 2011, and the EEU formally came 
into existence as an economic union on 1 January 2015 with three founding 
members:  Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, with Armenia joining the next day 
and Kyrgyzstan later that year. Th e combined population of the bloc in 2016 was 
183.2 million (see  Table 7.1 ). Th e EEU shares the goals of other regional economic 
associations:  to enhance intra-regional ties, to modernise economies and to 
improve international competitiveness. Th e EEU has an ambitious agenda to create 
a single market. To advance this goal, the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) was 
established in 2006 and now encompasses all EEU members plus Tajikistan. By 
2017, the customs union and a common customs tariff  had been introduced; the 
creation of a common labour market was underway; the old Soviet standards 
framework (GOST) was being replaced by new technical regulations, most of 
which were compatible with those of the EU, potentially facilitating a free trade 
area (FTA) ‘from Lisbon to Vladivostok’, if ever the historic opportunity returns; 
and the institutional framework for integration was developing, including the EEU 
Court and the Eurasian Fund for Stabilisation and Development. Th e Board of 
the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council (SEEC) consists of two representatives 
from each country. Th e inaugural chair for a four-year term was the former 
prime minister of Armenia, Tigran Sarkisyan, and he was to be succeeded by a 
Belarusian in 2020 in keeping with the principle of alphabetical rotation. While 
the EEU explicitly took the EU as its model, it signifi cantly lagged behind the 
EU in developing the autonomy of its legal order and in the eff ective functioning 
of its organisation.  6  Th e member states jealously guard their sovereignty, 
especially Russia, and as a result, the development of supranationalism is greatly 
overshadowed by intergovernmental instruments. 
 With low oil prices, sanctions and economic recession, the EEU was launched 
in inauspicious circumstances. Trade volumes decreased across the board in 
the early period, although intra-bloc trade volumes fell at a lower rate than 
external trade and thus acted as a type of ‘shock absorber’. However,  Table 7.1 
demonstrates the extraordinarily low level of intra-bloc trade, with only Belarus 
approaching half. While in political terms the EEU has disappointed those who 
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hoped for more political integration, in functional terms, there has been steady 
although slow progress. Non-tariff  barriers were gradually removed, with 81 out 
of 450 obstacles removed by late 2016.  7  Equally, only slow progress was made 
towards harmonisation of the medical drugs and medical products market. 
Th ere was member state convergence to Russia, with four of the countries closing 
the development gap, although the poorest, Kyrgyzstan, showed little sign of 
convergence. Th e common labour market is one of the successes. Remittances 
from Russia traditionally made up some 30 per cent of GDP in Kyrgyzstan, 
although this declined during the recession of 2014–16. As the economies 
recovered, so did the scale of labour migration and volume of remittances. In 
2016, 2.35  million EEU member state citizens were registered as migrants in 
Russia. In that year alone, 362,000 people arrived to work from Kyrgyzstan, 
210,000 from Armenia, 98,000 from Belarus and 72,000 from Kazakhstan.  8  At 
the same time, the EEU has an ambitious programme to establish FTAs with third 
countries. Th e fi rst was with Vietnam and came into force in October 2016, and 
others are being negotiated including a non-preferential one with China. Th e 
enduring problem remains the top-down character of many of the integration 
eff orts, promoted by the Eurasian Economic Commission, the equivalent of 
the EU’s European Commission. Plans to encourage horizontal links between 
businesses across borders were only slowly realised. 
 All states are wary of Russian preponderance and, despite commitment to 
integration, seek to the maximum extent to preserve their sovereignty. Russia’s 
failure to consult its EEU partners over policies that aff ected them deepened 
concern. Russia took the fundamental decision to annex Crimea without consulting 
the EEU, and the dealings of the bloc with BRI are largely bilateral. Th e decision to 
impose counter-sanctions on the import of foodstuff s from sanctioning countries 
was taken unilaterally, a problem that was exacerbated when Russia treated the 
re-export of goods by Belarus and Kazakhstan, which they had the perfect right 
to do, as hostile conduct and imposed sanctions on the former. Th e transfer of 
Crimea broke the post-Soviet moratorium on border changes (similar to the 
established consensus in postcolonial Africa), alarming all of Russia’s neighbours, 
above all those with signifi cant Russian minorities such as Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
Russia responded to Belarus’s introduction in January 2017 of a fi ve-day visa-free 
travel through Minsk airport by establishing a security zone with border controls 
along the Belarus-Russian border and moved fl ights to Belarus from domestic to 
international terminals. Surprisingly, although the two have been part of a putative 
Union State from April 1996 (whose founding treaty was formally signed on 22 
December 1999), there is no common visa regime. Russia now suggested the 
establishment of a Schengen-style single-visa area, but Minsk has been reluctant to 
reduce its sovereignty in this sphere.  9  Th e developmental goals of the EEU too oft en 
ran aground on the fl aws in Russia’s domestic governance system. Th is was most 
sharply in evidence in the appointment in October 2017 of Belyaninov to head the 
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EDB. As we have seen, Belyaninov was dismissed as head of the customs service 
in July 2016 amid serious corruption allegations and the seizure of valuables at his 
home, although he was not charged with a criminal off ence. Under his leadership, 
the FCS became notorious for its arbitrariness and punitive methods of revenue 
extractions, favouring some companies at the expense of others. His appointment 
threatened to undermine the integrity of the EDB and reduced the credibility of 
the EEU as a whole in the eyes of potential partners, notably the EU and China. 
 As with the EU on which in some ways it is modelled, the EEU suff ers from the 
tension between supranationalism and national interests. Th e struggle to preserve 
national sovereignty means that intergovernmentalism became the main form of 
interaction, and the Supreme Eurasian Commission remained relatively weak, 
although like all such bodies it seeks to extend its prerogatives. Th e principle of 
unanimity for decisions slows matters, with delegated offi  cials oft en more loyal 
to their national governments than to Eurasian integration. Above all, Russia’s 
interest in Eurasian integration was susceptible to change, since its economic 
gains from integration were negligible. Th e EEU accounts for just 6–7 per cent 
of Russia’s foreign trade. As with so many issues, there is no consensus in Russian 
public or elite opinion in favour of integration, and even the Eurasianist faction is 
divided since most condemn the liberal model that is being applied, while liberals 
condemn the protectionist (and authoritarian) features of Eurasian integration, 
fearing that it impedes Russia’s necessary modernisation. Th e internal market does 
not function well, with frequent trade disputes, sanctions, border closures and 
exceptions to common tariff s. Th ese problems could well be overcome over time, 
and the EEU is by far the most ramifi ed attempt at integration in the region since 
the disintegration of the USSR, bringing together countries that share a common 
history and sociology, as well as geographical proximity. Th e ultimate challenge is 
to achieve the ‘integration of integrations’, including the harmonisation of trade 
policies and technical standards with the EU while fi nding a place for the EEU in 
the context of BRI. 
 China’s 21st Century Maritime SREB was outlined by Chinese president Xi 
Jinping at the Nazarbayev University during his visit to Kazakhstan on 7 September 
2013, and in October, on a visit to Jakarta, he outlined how SREB would develop 
regional infrastructure and trade with ASEAN. Th is bloc has traditionally defended 
the sovereignty of its member states, although in recent years there have been 
moves towards greater intergovernmental solidarity. On 28 March 2015, China 
offi  cially announced the OBOR strategy, a grandiose plan to link Asia, Eurasia and 
Africa with transport and infrastructure. Th is was the background to Xi’s visit to 
Moscow to celebrate the seventieth anniversary of the end of the Second World 
War in Europe on 9 May 2015, an event boycotted by most Western leaders (but 
not, appropriately, by Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel). Xi and fi rst lady Peng 
Liyuan were given pride of place at the Red Square victory parade. Th e previous 
day, Putin and Xi agreed to coordinate the work of the EEU and OBOR. Th is 
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became known as ‘conjugation’ ( sopryazhenie ) and meant that the two initiatives 
would cooperate while retaining their separate identities. At that time, thirty-two 
agreements were signed, including two framework declarations related to the 
economy. Russian companies gained access to Chinese fi nance, including credit 
lines in yuan. At that time, about 7 per cent of mutual trade was conducted in their 
respective currencies, refl ecting the mutual desire to reduce dependency on dollars 
and euros for payments. Th e joint declaration committed the two sides to engage 
in ‘dialogue’ and signalled the beginning of a transformative process based on what 
was termed ‘mutual benefi t’. Th e two countries pledged to cooperate over the two 
partially competing projects, Russia’s EEU and China’s SREB. Th e ultimate, though 
remote, goal according to the declaration was the establishment of a ‘common 
economic space’. As if to confi rm the centrality of the EEU in Xi’s plans, he visited 
the two other founder members of the EEU, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Although 
not yet proclaimed, a greater Asia was in the making. 
 BRI is part of a grand strategy to focus resources on what Xi calls the ‘China 
dream of the great rejuvenation of the nation’. BRI is a long-term developmental 
strategy intended to come to fruition by the hundredth anniversary of the 
founding of the PRC in 2049. By December 2018, over one hundred countries 
and international organisations had signed cooperation agreements within its 
framework. Th e partnerships could ultimately provide a new model of global 
leadership. Power redistribution does not necessarily entail frontal confrontation 
but could evolve through the gradual erosion of American primacy, at a time when 
the very notion of primacy is contested. China furthermore developed its own 
multilateral institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
which has already become the world’s second biggest multilateral development 
agency with more members than the Japan-sponsored Asian Development Bank. 
Th ere are also pan-Asian alternatives, notably the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP), working in partnership with the BRICS New 
Development Bank (NDB) and the SCO. Economic development policies and 
programmes like BRI have important geopolitical implications. Th is was evident 
at the fi rst Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing on 14–15 May 2017, where Putin’s 
developed his thoughts on GEP. In particular, he announced that at the heart 
of GEP would be a Eurasian Trade Facilitation Agreement. Th is decentralised 
approach was reminiscent of BRI itself. For Russia, a China-centric system would 
undoubtedly be more benign than the neo-containment policies predominant in 
the West. 
 BRI represents a foundational shift  in global aff airs, with China working 
without Western partners to advance joint projects in Eurasia. BRI is a core 
element of China’s grand strategy for the twenty-fi rst century. Although prompted 
by a slowdown in the growth of the Chinese economy, the US pivot to Asia and the 
deterioration in relations with its neighbours, it is a defensive response while trying 
to gain ‘strategic space’ for the rising China.  10  It is proclaimed open to all nations 
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and refl ects a positive-sum dynamic to create what the Chinese call a ‘community 
of common destiny’. It is in keeping with the anti-hegemonic thinking of the 
two countries. Nevertheless, there are some important unresolved issues. Just as 
Russia had been concerned about the knock-on eff ects of Ukraine joining the EU 
free-trade zone, so China was concerned that the creation of the customs union 
would create barriers for Chinese goods entering what would become the EEU. 
In the event, the demand for Chinese goods in Russia and Kazakhstan remains 
insatiable. Th e main entry point is Kyrgyzstan, and it remains an enormous 
‘back door’ for cheap Chinese imports into Central Asia. Th e EEU forced the 
imposition of an external tariff  barrier, much to the dissatisfaction of Beijing. Th e 
removal of customs posts between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan rendered this route 
increasingly attractive, and vast new trading complexes (including the dry port on 
the Chinese border at Khorgas) are being established with Kazakhstan. 
 With Eurasia becoming the centre of various global geostrategic collisions, it is 
hardly surprising that Central Asia once again became the focus of some sort of 
new great power contest, although not a reprise of the nineteenth-century ‘great 
game’ between Russia and Great Britain.  11  Today, there are at least four powers 
involved, although with diff erent degrees of intensity, with Turkey and Japan 
asserting a regional presence. Th e EU at various points announced its intention 
to engage more actively in the region, but in the end, it lacked the resources 
and commitment to become a major player. Th e focus of the United States in 
the 1990s was on energy politics, but aft er 9/11, Russia endorsed a more active 
military presence to facilitate the campaign in Afghanistan. Th e Americans leased 
a short-term base in Kyrgyzstan, and Russian pressure prevented this becoming 
permanent. Ultimately, the two main players remain Russia and China. Despite 
increasingly close ties at the global level, the two jostle for infl uence and position 
in Central Asia, although each is careful not to damage the interests of the other. As 
distinct from the original great game, the fi ve republics – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – are now active agents, playing off  the 
various external powers while struggling for regional hegemony and status among 
themselves. 
 Th e EEU’s place in the broader context of European politics remains contested. 
Member states seek the maximum room for manoeuvre with minimum 
commitment while gaining maximum benefi t. Th ere will always be tension 
between member states and supranational bodies, but the balance between gains 
in exchange for the loss of sovereignty is far from clear. Britain’s withdrawal 
from the EU (Brexit) sharpened the fundamental question about the necessity 
of Eurasian integration. Th e global trend towards regional integration appears to 
have reversed. Th is relates to the broader question of whether Eurasian integration 
can be seen as a progressive project. Moscow proclaims its commitment to the 
negative norm of non-interference in the internal aff airs of other states, and its 
defi nition of a great power is based on a type of order enshrining sovereignty, 
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non-interventionism and a pluralism of regime types.  12  Th us, Eurasian integration 
is nested in normative criteria that undermine integration, a contradiction that 
will sooner or later have to be resolved. 
 The post-Atlantic world 
 Putin’s leadership from 2012 was characterised by alienation from the historical 
West, accompanied by a ‘pivot to Asia’. In one of his election papers in early 
2012, Putin argued that China’s economic growth represented ‘a chance to catch 
the Chinese wind in the sails of our economy’.  13  Russia hosted the 2012 Asia-
Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vladivostok, a grandiose (and 
expensive) aff air acting as Russia’s declaration of intent to become an Eastern 
power. Th e burgeoning Russo-Chinese alignment was given an additional impetus 
by the Ukraine crisis from early 2014, accompanied by further estrangement 
from the West. Instead of the failed ‘greater Europe’ idea, Putin devised no less 
ambitious ideas for a greater Eurasia, encompassing at its maximum not only 
Russia and China and much of Asia but also the EU. Th e ambitions are boundless, 
but their physical and political limits are unclear. Russia’s vision of the future now 
extends beyond the customary aspiration to become European to encompass a 
more comprehensive global dimension, accompanied by a complex process of 
reimagining territories, boundaries, political communities and citizenship across 
the vast Eurasian space. Achievement necessarily falls far short of ambition, but 
the long-term direction of travel has been set. 
 Putin fi rst mooted the idea of GEP in his annual address to parliament on 3 
December 2015 when he called for discussions to establish an economic partnership 
between the EEU, ASEAN and the SCO. His speech drew on the ideas outlined 
in a Valdai Club report of June 2015 on how to link the EEU and SREB within 
a larger Eurasian framework. Th e aim was to maintain stability in Central Asia 
and to avoid Russo-Chinese rivalry.  14  Th e project was then mentioned on several 
occasions in 2016. At the St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on 
17 June 2016, Putin outlined grandiose plans for ‘greater Eurasia’. Th e details were 
vague, but the basic thrust was clear: Russia would encourage the ‘integration of 
integrations’ across a range of institutions encompassing all of Eurasia. Instead of 
the much-vaunted but stillborn greater Europe, Putin announced, ‘As early as June 
we, along with our Chinese colleagues, are planning to start offi  cial talks on the 
formation of comprehensive trade and economic partnership in Eurasia with the 
participation of the European Union states and China. I expect that this will be one 
of the fi rst steps towards the formation of a major Eurasian partnership.’ He was at 
pains to stress that this did not mean rejecting Europe: ‘Despite all the well-known 
problems in our relations’, the EU remained Russia’s ‘key trade and economic 
partner’. He thus invited Europeans to join the project for the Eurasian partnership 
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and welcomed the initiative by Nazarbayev to hold consultations between the EEU 
and the EU.  15  Contrary to those who argue that Putin seeks to weaken the EU and 
to exacerbate its internal divisions, the ambitious plan for a trading bloc from the 
Atlantic to the Pacifi c sought to make the EU a full partner, with the support of 
the Chinese leadership. Russia refused to choose between Europe and Asia, and 
instead the greater Eurasia idea tries to unite the two. 
 Russia was marginalised in the Atlantic system, but by repositioning itself 
as a Eurasian power, it seeks to regain centrality. Th e GEP is more than a way 
of compensating for failures in the West but represents what many in Moscow 
consider is a long-delayed rebalancing of policy. Russia emerged as the main 
proponent of the creation of a parallel set of global institutions, and this helps 
explain the ferocity of the onslaught against the country. Russia, like China and 
other partners in ‘post-Western’ ventures, fear exclusion from the privileges and 
benefi ts of the historical West and its assertion of extraterritorial power through 
sanctions and other measures. 
 Th e latter concern encouraged the emergence of a parallel set of regional and 
global governance institutions. Th e SCO is one of the major bodies at the heart of 
the anti-hegemonic alignment. First established as a coordination body for fi ve 
powers in 1996, it was transformed into an organisation in 2001 with the addition 
of Uzbekistan. Th e 2009 SCO summit in Ekaterinburg created a new category, 
‘dialogue partner’, and granted that status to Sri Lanka and Belarus, with Turkey 
joining the group in June 2012. Pakistan was the fi rst to apply for membership in 
2006, while Iran lodged its application the following year, with India following 
suit in 2010. Russia advocated SCO enlargement on the grounds that it would 
create a more balanced and powerful organisation. Understandably, China and 
some Central Asian states were hesitant. Russia argued that if Pakistan were to 
join, so should India, a view that in the end was accepted by China. Following the 
admission of India and Pakistan in 2017, the eight-member SCO accounts for a 
quarter of global GDP, 43 per cent of the world’s population and 23 per cent of the 
planet’s territory. It is also the most rapidly developing part of the world. 
 Although encompassing countries at very diff erent levels of development, 
disparate geographies and populations, various types of political regimes and 
with diff erent economic challenges, in purely quantitative terms, the BRICS bloc 
matters, comprising 44 per cent of the world’s population and 25 per cent of the 
global economy, and with all the countries enjoying enormous growth potential. 
BRICS created an independent fi nancial system to fi nance their development. 
Th e BRICS NDB was launched in 2015 with an initial capital of $100bn, and its 
Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) also became operational in that year 
with a $100 billion fund. Th ere is also a BRICS currency reserve fund with $100 
billion. Th e BRICS fi nancial institution, together with China’s AIIB, provides the 
fi nancial infrastructure to advance its international economic agenda. A Chinese 
plan to make the yuan the reserve currency of BRICS was rebuff ed by the other 
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members, and this refl ected some of the internal tensions in the bloc.  16  Th e group’s 
seventh summit in Ufa on 8–9 July 2015 agreed to develop and strengthen its 
international status. Putin noted that there was a moratorium on enlarging the 
group until adequate structures were developed.  17  Th e ninth BRICS summit took 
place on 3–5 September 2017 in Xiamen, China, accompanied by the usual debates 
whether the grouping represented an alternative to the established players allied 
in the G7 grouping. At the Xiamen summit, Xi promised $4 billion to support the 
NDB’s business development operations. 
 Th e BRICS alignment was established to enhance the infl uence of emerging 
economies in global governance, and it has had some infl uence in that respect. More 
profoundly, the bloc represents a broadening of the anti-hegemonic ambitions 
of its two core members, Russia and China. Th ey do not challenge the post-war 
US-led liberal international order as such, since all the BRICS members in one way 
or another are benefi ciaries of that system, but they do challenge the power system 
embedded in the liberal order and instead demand a more pluralistic world order. 
Th is is not simply the demand for multipolarity but represents a broader attempt 
to create an alternative world order within an international system regulated by 
more representative versions of the post-war institutions of global governance. 
Th e Russian deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov stresses that ‘BRICS is in fact 
an already established new centre of the multi-polar world and a new and more 
democratic system of international relations’. In a pointed rebuke to the US-led 
Atlantic community, he noted that ‘BRICS is a phenomenon of the 21st century 
and this is diff erent from military and political unions that come from another 
epoch and alliances of states built under a principle of hierarchism’.  18  He argued 
that ‘there is hardly any other international entity more dynamic and rapidly 
strengthening its positions than the BRICS interstate association’, and insisted that 
‘against the background of the aggravation of the international situation there is 
the growing need for coordination of the BRICS countries’ positions on resolving 
the crisis situations in various parts of the world’.  19   
 Th e Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov insists that ‘Russia views 
strengthening of ties with the BRICS states as its foreign policy priority’.  20  Th e 
offi  cial Russian long-term objective is ‘the gradual transformation of BRICS from 
a dialogue forum and a tool for coordinating positions on a limited range of issues 
into a full-scale mechanism for strategic and day-to-day cooperation on key issues 
of world politics and the global economy’.  21  Georgy Toloraya, the executive director 
of the National Committee on BRICS Research, notes that ‘Western countries 
had from the very beginning regarded BRICS as an undesirable and dangerous 
rival and wanted to bring pressure to bear on the association, trying to prove its 
unviability and emphasizing contradictions between its member states’.  22  Some of 
the criticism is justifi ed, but both the SCO and BRICS promote dialogue even 
between traditional contesting countries. 
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 Th e EEU has a dual rationality – as a functional integration project for post-
Soviet Eurasia and as an instrument to provide a platform for macro-regionalism. 
Th e latter aspect was clear at the joint May 2015 Ufa summit of BRICS, the EEU 
and the SCO, where Putin and Xi discussed concrete plans for the conjugation of 
the EEU and SREB. As for the SCO, the Ufa meeting stressed its growing role in 
improving cooperation in the fi nancial sphere and providing project fi nancing, 
accompanied by plans for an SCO development bank and a special drawing 
account. Putin expressed the wish that Chinese companies would develop Siberia 
and the Russian Far East.  23  Th e scholar Alexander Lukin argues that the SCO 
initiative was given momentum by the behaviour of the West: 
 Th us, while the US was celebrating its victory in the Cold War and Francis 
Fukuyama was announcing the ‘end of history’, China, India, Brazil and many 
other states in Asia, Africa and Latin America were eyeing the situation with 
concern. Had the US shown more restraint, developments would have taken 
a diff erent turn. But Bill Clinton and especially George W.  Bush chose to 
consolidate American successes and seek total US dominance in the world. 
Europe was unwilling to navigate an independent course and followed in 
Washington’s wake. 
 For Lukin, ‘Th e united West increasingly took on the role of the world’s policeman, 
substituting its ad hoc decisions for international law.’  24  Although the organisations 
were not directed against the West, with its participants in one way or another part 
of the Western system, its members ‘coordinated their responses to aspects of the 
new incarnation of the system that didn’t suit them’, prompting the creation of 
associations without western involvement.  25  
 Th e SCO summit in Tashkent in June 2016 took the coordination programme 
a step further, especially when it came to the construction of regional transport 
infrastructure. Th e meeting agreed that India and Pakistan would join the SCO 
in 2017. Th ere would now be four of the world’s nine nuclear powers in the SCO, 
changing the balance of power in the organisation. Afghanistan, Iran and Mongolia 
remain prospective members. At the forum’s seventeenth meeting in Astana on 
8–9 June 2017, India and Pakistan were formally admitted to join the existing 
members Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Th e 
observer states at that time included Afghanistan, Belarus, Mongolia and Iran, 
and there were a number of dialogue partners. Th e fi nal press release restated the 
SCO’s key goals: 
 Th e heads of state noted the importance of the Organisation’s further 
consolidation as an eff ective full-fl edged regional platform aimed at active 
participation in building a more equitable, polycentric model of world order 
that meets the interests of each and every state, promoting the process of 
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democratisation of international relations, creating an eff ective global and 
regional architecture of security and cooperation, and forming a human 
community linked by a common destiny.  26  
 Th e group agreed to intensify cooperation to combat the ‘three evils’ of terrorism, 
extremism and separatism. On the sidelines of the summit, Xi met with the 
Indian prime minister Narendra Modi, and the two pledged to enhance mutual 
trust, deepen practical cooperation, align development strategies and cooperate 
on major international and regional issues. Th ey would have a lot of work to do 
to achieve these goals. In addition to long-standing border issues, the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as part of BRI exacerbated tensions since 
the railway from Xinjiang enters Pakistan through the part of Kashmir occupied 
by that country. Th is was one reason why India did not send a delegation to the 
BRI Forum in Beijing in May 2017, reinforcing scepticism whether BRI would be 
of benefi t to India. 
 Within BRICS, the Russo-Chinese ‘authoritarian modernisation’ axis is 
countered by the more conventional democracies of Brazil, India and South 
Africa. Th ey also have divergent international orientations, with India more 
aligned with the United States, while China has traditionally supported Pakistan. 
Th e border dispute between India and China refl ected a deeper geopolitical 
antagonism between the two countries. When it comes to reform of the UN, 
and in particular widening permanent membership of the UNSC, Russia and 
China wish to maintain their existing status, whereas Brazil and India have long 
sought to become members. China has the additional concern that its traditional 
rival, Japan, could also be the benefi ciary of any substantive reform of the UN 
system. Th e BRICS countries meet as a group on the sidelines of G20 summits, 
but agreed positions on fundamental questions do not always emerge. At the same 
time, the BRICS Plus format has brought in a number of other countries. Mexico, 
Egypt, Th ailand, Kenya and Tajikistan were invited to the Xiamen summit, while 
Indonesia and Turkey have been considered for full membership of the bloc. In 
fact, so many countries have been considered candidate countries – in addition 
to those listed above, Vietnam, Nigeria, Pakistan, Egypt, Iran and the Philippines 
have been mentioned – that the moratorium on enlargement is probably a sensible 
strategy for the present. 
 Th e ambitious schemes for pan-Asian integration encompassing Russia, China, 
India, South Korea and many other countries represent variations of the Silk Road 
idea. Th e intensity and scope of these plans for spatial integration vary greatly, 
yet all are groping to fi nd a formula for states to combine in various integrative 
endeavours. Th e degree to which a substantive degree of sovereignty will be ceded 
to the institutions of integration remains contested. Nevertheless, together they 
suggest an alternative architecture and off er some substance to the idea of Eurasia 
and Asia aligning along a diff erent axis to that of the West. Th e surge in continental 
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regionalism refl ects the attempt to fi nd mediating institutions in a world lacking 
the stable bipolarity of the Cold War and aspirations to overcome the subsequent 
asymmetries in the international system. 
 Russia assiduously works to create a greater Eurasian community, encompassing 
its partners in the EEU as well as China, India, Iran and ASEAN in an attempt 
to create ‘a major Euro-Asian political and economic arc, one which spans from 
Belarus all the way to the border with Australia’.  27  Th e goal was not to repudiate 
globalisation or the institutions of international society but to render them less 
West-centric. In that aim, Russia found many willing allies in Asia and, indeed, 
within many Western countries. Th e anti-hegemonic strategy was not anti-Western 
but a complex attempt to introduce pluralism into the international system and 
to render international society more autonomous of what was perceived to be 
the double standards and opportunism of the American-led international liberal 
order. Th e development of substantive multipolarity has profound geopolitical 
ramifi cations. Oliver Stuenkel argues that the Ufa Declaration and associated 
documents signalled an important step towards the creation of a post-western 
world.  28  Western sanctions forced Russia to redouble its eff orts to engage with 
greater Asia, while China sees Eurasia as an essential part not only of its economic 
but also of its political future. With ‘Sino-Russian relations … closer than they 
have been at any time in the past fi ft y years, giving them the chance to reshape 
the global order to their liking’, Kissinger’s worst nightmare is coming to pass.  29  
Th e creation of systemic alternatives is not intended to be anti-Western but to 
act as models for a more inclusive and plural international system. Non-Western 
alternatives exist and are taking increasingly structured forms.  
 Putin’s Asian gambit: Escape from 
confrontation? 
 Karaganov, one of the earliest advocates of a turn to the East, argues, ‘Th e concept 
of Greater Eurasia can also help to solve European security problems created 
by the expansion of Western alliances and Russia’s natural reaction to that, and 
unsolvable within the old framework.’ He argues that along with Russia taking 
fi rm action ‘to deter the most dangerous manifestations of American policy, it 
is necessary to build a constructive alternative to the ruined bipolar world order 
and the crumbling unipolar one. A partnership or community of Greater Eurasia 
can and should become one of the key elements of this new world order.’  30  Th e 
sentiment was shared by Lavrov on the eve of APEC’s Lima summit in November 
2016, when he noted, ‘Th e Russian initiative on the Greater Eurasian Partnership 
… is intended to harmonize the emerging Eurasian multilevel system of integration 
structures and to combine the potential of the interested Asian countries and, in 
the future, of Europe as well.’  31  Th e GEP in his view did not mean that Russia 
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was turning its back on Europe. By December 2016, Lavrov listed the countries 
with which the EEU was negotiating FTAs, including China, Israel and Egypt. He 
stressed that these were part of the broader plan to develop greater Eurasia, where 
the EEU, SCO and ASEAN countries ‘can participate based on diff erent forms of 
cooperation’.  32  Th e secretariats of the three organisations met on the sidelines of 
the Russia-ASEAN summit in Sochi in May 2016, which confi rmed the interest of 
the South-East Asian countries in cooperation. 
 In this context, the intensifying engagement between Russia and China 
represents far more than a banal ‘pivot to Asia’ or a response to Russia’s alienation 
from the West.  33  Th e path to rapprochement has been long and diffi  cult. China has 
not forgotten the 1.5 million square kilometres of Siberia seized by tsarist Russia 
under what it calls the ‘unequal treaties’ dating back to 1689. In 1969, this provoked 
armed clashes over disputed islands along the Ussuri River. By 1971, the USSR had 
forty-four divisions stationed along the border. It was in this context that Henry 
Kissinger travelled to Beijing in 1971 to arrange the epochal visit of Richard Nixon 
the following year. Fear of the Sino-American axis prompted the Soviet Union 
to engage in d é tente and the Four-Power agreement on Berlin. It took a major 
eff ort by post-communist Russia to normalise relations with China. Th e Treaty 
on Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation was signed on 16 July 
2001, outlining the main principles and features of bilateral cooperation. Finally, 
Putin visited Beijing in October 2004 to fi nalise the border agreement and sign 
deals on energy cooperation. A resurgent Russia and modernising China began 
to align and presented a potential counterweight to American hegemony. On the 
fundamental issues in world politics, their positions are remarkably similar. 
 Russia and China had long been dissatisfi ed with the structures of international 
governance, considering that they had not been treated as equals in that system.  34  
Russian leaders from Gorbachev to Putin argued that Russia had voluntarily 
ended the Cold War and transformed the domestic order, and considered that 
the country by right deserved to be integrated as an equal in the top table of 
international leadership, irrespective of its economic and military weight. China’s 
route to neo-revisionism was rather more convoluted, although also based on the 
view that its equality was merited by its history and size. Both sought to adapt the 
Western developmental model to modernise their societies, although China’s use 
of the opportunities off ered by engagement in the international division of labour 
more adroitly avoided alienating its Western interlocutors. Neither was ready to 
repudiate the horizontal ties with the West, but both had come to the conclusion 
that it would be mutually benefi cial to strengthen their links in the context of the 
vertical commitment to international society. Th e deepening institutionalisation of 
non-Western regional and global associations meant that Russia achieved more in 
a decade with China than in a quarter century with the EU and the historical West. 
 In practical terms, this meant intensifying interactions between the anti-
hegemonic states. Russia’s trade with China rebounded strongly aft er the recession, 
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expanding by 31 per cent in 2017 to reach $87 billion and exceeding the target of 
$100 billion in 2018. Russia became the largest supplier of energy to the Chinese 
market, supplying 50 million tons of oil in 2017, and with the completion of the 
Eastern Route pipeline in 2019, Russia became China’s top supplier of gas. China 
became Russia’s top trade partner, representing 15 per cent of its total foreign 
turnover. Th e structure of bilateral trade also improved, with an increasing share 
of engineering and high-tech goods. China’s direct capital investment had also 
increased to reach $4.5 billion in mid-2018, with seventy-three projects approved 
and eleven projects worth $11 billion already implemented. China held a 29.9 
per cent stake in the giant Yamal-LNG project, along with France’s Total (20 per 
cent), and the two countries were cooperating to build a large-body long-haul 
airliner, a heavy helicopter, and were implementing a joint space programme 
for 2018–22.  35  Th e sanctions regime against Russia had a dampening eff ect, with 
Chinese fi nancial institutions reluctant to lend to Russia for fear of falling foul of 
US sanctions. Nevertheless, China became Russia’s single largest trading partner, 
taking 17 per cent of Russia’s international trade in 2018, accompanied by a rising 
trend for mutual payments in yuan and roubles as both countries worked to render 
themselves sanctions-proof by de-dollarising. On 17 May 2018, the EEU and 
China signed an agreement on economic cooperation that left  the tariff  regime 
unchanged but covered trade policy, technical regulations and phytosanitary 
control. To avoid the various bottlenecks in the sea lanes to Europe, China was 
particularly interested in exploiting the new opportunities of the increasingly ice-
free Northern Sea Route. 
 All of this is based on the deep personal relationship between Putin and Xi. 
Following Xi’s visit to Moscow for the 9 May 2015 anniversary, in September, 
Putin stood next to Xi in Beijing in the military parade to celebrate the seventieth 
anniversary of China’s victory in the Second World War. China was allied with the 
Soviet Union in the war against Japan and also suff ered catastrophically in a confl ict 
which in various forms had started with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. 
Th ese forms of solidarity between the two countries may be largely symbolic, but they 
generate a deepening climate of trust. In June 2016, Putin completed his fi ft eenth 
visit to China, where the two sides agreed to develop the mentioned wide-bodied 
long-haul plane, a heavy helicopter, and to coordinate their space programmes. 
Th ere is constant close interaction between the Russian and Chinese leaderships 
on the whole gamut of developmental and international issues. Critics call this 
an alliance of autocrats, but this underplays the degree of normative convergence 
between the two countries on the basis of anti-hegemonism, multipolarity and 
distinctive models not of autarkic but of autochthonous development. Speaking 
with journalists following the fi ft eenth Direct Line on 15 June 2017, Putin stressed 
the complementarity between the EEU and BRI outlined at the BRI Forum the 
previous month, and stressed that the initiative was the achievement of ‘our great 
friend, and my personal friend, Xi Jinping’.  36   
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 By the time of his state visit to China in June 2018, Putin could argue that the 
two countries had ‘built a relationship that probably cannot be compared with 
anything in the world. It is truly built on consideration of each other’s interests.’ 
In 2017 alone, the two leaders met fi ve times, and the close personal relationship 
meant that ‘President Xi Jinping is probably the only world leader I have celebrated 
one of my birthdays with’.  37  In stark contrast to the evident disarray at the G7 
summit held in La Malbaie in Canada in June 2018, at the SCO’s Qingdao summit 
in China at that time, a spirit of constructive cooperation prevailed. Xi for the 
fi rst time described the relationship with Russia as ‘strategic’: ‘President Putin and 
I both think that the China-Russia strategic partnership is mature, fi rm and stable’; 
and for good measure he added about Putin: ‘He is my best, most intimate friend.’ 
Th e meeting pushed ahead with the ambitious China-Mongolia-Russia Economic 
Corridor, a key item in BRI, and advanced plans for interconnectivity between BRI 
and the EEU. By that time, China had invested some $84 billion in SCO countries. 
Iran attended as an observer, and Russia reiterated its support for the country’s full 
membership. Th e SCO-Afghanistan contact group behind closed doors discussed 
plans on how fi nally to resolve the Afghan confl ict without Western ‘interference’.  38  
In his concluding press conference, Putin stressed that the combined SCO had a 
greater GDP than the G7 in PPP terms, and he showed no great interest in Russia 
returning to the G7, stressing the importance of the G20.  39  At this time, Karaganov 
urged Russia to ‘stop being afraid, let alone feel ashamed, of its Asianism’, and he 
called on ‘the whole of Russia’ to ‘realise that it is no longer an oriental periphery 
of Europe’.  40  
 By 2024, the Communist Party of China (CPC) will have been in power longer 
than the 74-year lifespan of Soviet Russia. As memory of the October 1917 
revolution fades, the Maoist developmental model that came to power in October 
1949, with all of its vicissitudes and modifi cations, appears to be more enduring. 
Putin’s neo-revisionism saw China’s growing power as less of a threat than a massive 
opportunity. Reform communism in Russia had proved a disaster, and Putin 
could only look on with envy at the success of post-Mao ‘communism of reform’. 
However, both countries faced the diffi  cult transition from mechanical to organic 
stability, although in Russia that path should be much easier. It has spent three 
decades creating the foundations for genuine constitutionalism, and theoretically, 
as the manual manipulations of the regime system erode, the institutions of the 
constitutional state are ready to assume the burden of governance. However, 
historical experience demonstrates that Russia has the unique ability to snatch 
defeat from the jaws of victory, so it is impossible to predict what comes aft er the 
Putinite stability system. 
 Bobo Lo notes that ‘the Kremlin seeks to build an alternative ideational 
and political legitimacy that challenges Western notions of global governance 
and moral universalism’.  41  Th is is not quite accurate, since the challenge is 
to the perceived inadequacies of the existing system of global governance, a 
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dissatisfaction that is shared by a number of countries and prompted the creation 
of alternative structures. Equally, the challenge is not to the practices of moral 
universalism, since Russia has no intention of repudiating such foundational acts 
as the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and remains 
a member of CoE (although its voting rights in the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (PACE) were suspended between 2014 and 2019). Russia and 
its allies considered that the values-based policies of the post-Cold War years had 
been applied instrumentally and selectively to advance the hegemonic power of 
the West rather than genuinely to advance the realm of justice. From Moscow’s 
perspective, it simply made no sense to condemn Russia’s failings while giving 
Saudi Arabia a free pass, where the abuse of human and civic rights is far more 
egregious. Moscow’s critique had some substance and, as far as Saudi Arabia is 
concerned, was even acknowledged by Obama in an interview in  Th e Atlantic .  42  
Th is fails to recognise that the historical West’s commitment to the principles 
as outlined in the Atlantic Charter are genuinely foundational, however fl awed 
in implementation. Equally, the West tends to underplay the hegemonic and 
commercial distortions in the application of its value-based policies. 
 Th e critique of ‘an imposed model that presents itself as universal’ provoked 
a ‘demand for alternatives’.  43  From our neo-revisionist perspective, this does not 
fully capture the ambiguities of Russia’s policy. It seeks to temper the practical 
application of moral universalism in what are perceived to be arbitrary and 
punitive ways while ensuring that the instruments of global governance refl ect 
global concerns. Th e goal is not simply the reproduction of polarity in a single 
world order but the creation of an alternative world order whose very existence 
would ensure geopolitical and ideational pluralism. Talk of an alternative 
globalisation does not mean the reproduction of what was increasingly seen as 
Western monism. As the Valdai discussion paper put it, 
 Th e Atlantic community is a unique example of value unifi cation. By contrast, 
non-western states are together in stressing the importance of diversity, 
insisting that no uniform emblems of a ‘modern state and society’ are either 
desirable or possible. Th is is an approach more in tune with the conditions of a 
multipolar world.  44  
 Even the Valdai paper failed to recognise the potential radicalism of the anti-
hegemonic perspective. Western sanctions accelerated the trend to fi nd alternatives 
to the dollar, such as pricing oil in gold and other currencies, but this did not entail 
withdrawal from global economic integration. China helped Russia withstand the 
sanctions, while the BRICS countries began to create an alternative to Atlantic-
dominated international institutions. Th is is a non-West that remains part of the 
global economy but seeks to ensure that universal rules became impartial and less 
embedded in a particular power system. In other words, a pluralistic multi-order 
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world would remain based on the UN system and the internationalisation of 
economies but would move away from the narrow perspectives of the historical 
West. If Russia could not join a new West, then it would become a founding 
member of a post-Atlantic international community. 
 Global Russia 
 In 2014, Obama claimed that ‘Russia is a regional power that is threatening 
some of its immediate neighbours, not out of strength but out of weakness’.  45  In a 
paradoxical way, Obama was right. If Russia had been able to assert its positions 
over the previous quarter century to create what it considered a more equitable 
European security system, if it had been able to block NATO enlargement to the 
point that the issue was off  the table, if it had been able to avert the showdown 
over Ukraine and prevent what it considered to be the illegal overthrow of the 
legitimate Ukrainian government, and if it had other ways of preventing the 
ultimate nightmare of American forces occupying the Sevastopol naval base, then 
it would not have felt the need to undertake such a risky venture as returning 
Crimea to Russian sovereignty. Th is was patently a repudiation of the norms of 
international conduct established in Europe aft er the end of the Second World 
War, but it was also no less obviously a defensive reaction to what was perceived 
to be the reckless advance of a potentially hostile Atlantic system. Th e expansive 
Atlantic order in Moscow’s view had become a revisionist force that threatened 
not only to undermine Russian security but also openly posed the question of 
regime change in Moscow itself. Soon aft er, Obama asserted that Russia ‘stands 
alone’ in the world, and he worked hard with his European partners that this 
would remain the case.  46  A  range of neo-containment measures were imposed, 
including sanctions, the beefi ng up of NATO forces along the border with Russia, 
exclusion from the G8 and treatment as a diplomatic pariah. 
 None of this changed Putin’s thinking or behaviour in the slightest, and it only 
stiff ened Moscow’s resolve. Th e hostile actions by the Atlantic system and its allies 
only confi rmed the Kremlin in its diagnosis that it was impossible to work with 
the West on equal terms and that there would be no negotiated settlement to the 
impasse in European and global aff airs. Russia now abandoned its last cold peace 
inhibitions and understood that it could act as a global player without reference 
to what at one point were called ‘strategic partners’. Instead, in a series of striking 
initiatives, Putin sought to assert Russia as an indispensable actor on the world 
stage. Moscow had always maintained a strong diplomatic presence in the world 
aff airs, but this was now reinforced by some bold moves. On 30 September 2015, 
Russia intervened in the Syrian confl ict, and within a little more than a year, it had 
not only stabilised the Damascus regime but had also eff ectively paved the way 
to the defeat of the insurgency across the country. With the fall of Islamic State’s 
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headquarters in Raqqa in October 2017 and the establishment of ‘deconfl iction’ 
zones in the areas still contested by insurgents, the Syrian civil war entered its 
endgame. In a whirlwind visit to the Middle East, Putin on 11 December 2017 
declared victory at the Khmeimim air base and ordered (not for the fi rst time) a 
scaling down of the country’s forces in Syria. In Egypt, he signed a multibillion-
dollar contract for a nuclear reactor on the country’s Mediterranean coast and 
restored historic links, including arms sales. In Turkey, Putin and Erdo ğ an 
condemned Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. Putin brokered 
deals with a range of leaders, many antithetical to each other. Putin was intent 
on restoring Russia as a global power, and this was achieved through adroit and 
supple diplomacy. 
 Th e Syrian intervention involved no more than a few dozen jets and several 
thousand support troops. By comparison, although Obama avoided military 
engagement, he ended up in confl ict with most US allies, including Israel and 
Saudi Arabia, while Trump’s incoherent policies only exacerbated confl icts, 
even between former allies such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, while his decision 
on 6 December 2017 to move the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem ran 
counter to numerous UN resolutions and the conventional model for resolution 
of the Israeli-Palestine confl ict, and was met with universal condemnation. 
Putin prevented Syria becoming a new Afghanistan and instead saved the Assad 
regime from collapse and achieved a type of peace that promised to preserve the 
integrity of the country, even though this will inevitably require a high degree 
of devolution to Kurds and other peoples. Th e Russian military displayed its 
enormous improvement since the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, where there had 
been no modern communications and weapons. Now the forces showed discipline 
and professionalism, armed with precision weapons and furnished with expertly 
trained pilots. Th e cruise missiles launched from the Caspian Sea demonstrated 
Russian ability to project power over long distances. Th e danger of confl ict with 
Ankara had been averted, and despite the shooting down of a Russian plane in the 
autumn of 2015, amicable relations were soon restored. Moscow cooperated with 
Iran in Syria, while recognising Israel’s security concerns. 
 Th e Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, acknowledged the warm 
relations with Putin when visiting Russia on Holocaust Memorial Day and the 
anniversary of the lift ing of the siege of Leningrad on 29 January 2018: 
 My friend, Mr President, I would like to thank you for the invitation to visit this 
impressive Jewish Museum and Tolerance Centre. I must add that I know this 
museum would not have been established without your assistance. I was very 
excited to see the description of the history of our nation in Russia, including 
the current period when Jewish life in Russia is thriving, largely owing to the 
support of the authorities and your personal support.  47  
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 Th e impressive Jewish Museum and Tolerance Centre in Moscow is one of the 
world’s largest of its kind and is part of the Jewish renaissance in the country, with 
many newly built synagogues. Although some two million Russians qualify for 
an Israeli passport because of their Jewish ancestry, there is no exodus currently 
underway, despite the sanctions and sluggish economy. Russia appears to have 
witnessed a sharp decline in anti-Semitism in recent years, and Jewish businesses 
are thriving.  48  Even relations with Saudi Arabia, a staunch backer of the opposition 
in Syria and a Russian antagonist since Cold War days, had warmed, resulting in 
a grandiose visit to Moscow by King Salman and a huge retinue in October 2017. 
Russia needed money for domestic investment and to fund its economic projects 
abroad, while both countries were interested in high oil prices.  49  Th ey disagreed 
over Syria, where Russia pledged to stay. Th e refuelling base in Tartus is projected 
to become a full-scale naval port capable of simultaneously hosting up to eleven 
ships. Th e 49-year lease agreement also grants the Russian Navy access to the 
territorial waters and other ports of the Syrian Arab Republic. At the same time, 
Egypt, formerly a major Soviet ally, allowed Russia airplanes to use bases there. 
 Russia’s claim as a great power to conduct an independent foreign policy 
included the ability to shape exceptions to the rules. In the fi rst two post-communist 
decades, Russia was in no position to assert this model of great power prerogatives 
and largely limited itself to attempts to infl uence decisions from the sidelines while 
criticising Western policy. Only with Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 
was criticism turned into a more assertive strategy. Russia no longer aspired to 
become part of the Euro-Atlantic liberal order, and instead it advanced a basket 
of nested regionalisms, including the idea of a greater Europe, a greater Eurasia 
and a greater Asia (in partnership with China), as well as a type of new globalism 
with its BRICS and other partners. Although the policy was craft ed by Putin, it 
represented an important shift  that in the view of Karaganov and others had been 
long delayed. It was required to ensure the development of RFE regions, to rectify 
what was considered to have been the dangerous over-reliance on relations with 
a hostile West. Th e modernisation of the RFE would allow Russia to become part 
of the world’s most economically dynamic region, one where Russian values of 
sovereign independence, non-interference in the internal aff airs of other states 
and conservative mores were reciprocated. 
 Russia refused to enter the historical West as a subaltern player, and it was 
now recognised not only as a global actor but also as one of the main challenger 
powers. Of the three great powers, Russia is by far the weakest economically, 
hence the contest would be deeply asymmetrical. Putin stressed that Russia 
would not overextend itself or be drawn into confl icts which it could not hope 
to win. Putin’s strategy is to avoid a major escalation, to avert major incidents, 
to regulate the situation in Ukraine and above all to stabilise the new normality 
of enduring confrontation. Putin also seeks to strengthen Russia’s economy and 
9781788318303_pi-306.indd   187 15-Oct-19   12:25:37
188
188  THE PUTIN PARADOX
domestic resources through technological modernisation and strategic industrial 
development. Th is does not mean, however, that Putin will renounce his politics 
of resistance. Russia looks for a way to break out of the strategic impasse in which 
it felt it had been trapped for a quarter century, and for that, a new model of world 
order was sought. Th is refl ected the deeper impasse in which Russia found itself, 
with its historical space for development constrained by the closed character 
of the Atlantic system. Only in the East were there opportunities for political 
development and where the traditional niceties of diplomacy and restraint from 
interfering in the internal aff airs of states were retained. 
 All this should be kept in perspective. Russia clearly lacks the economic muscle 
to reproduce anything like the former Soviet Union’s global stance. Russia is a 
great power but with patent limits. Th rough skilful diplomacy, Putin was able 
to multiply Russia’s power, but this is not a structural resource and will wane as 
Putin’s leadership ends. Russian policy is forced to be defensive and reactive, but 
this is now nested in the broader neo-revisionist strategy and growing partnerships 
in the East. Putin accepts that Russia is stymied when it comes to establishing 
balanced relations with the United States and now believes that there can be no 
‘strategic partnership’ with the EU. However, as Britain was to discover as it tried 
to negotiate its exit from the EU, the world is not waiting to embrace outcasts from 
the existing world order. Russia is in a rather diff erent position, because aft er the 
end of the Cold War, it tried to enter the Atlantic system, but in the end, the terms 
for both sides were unsatisfactory. Russia sought to transform the community it 
was trying to join, which its existing members, for understandable if ultimately 
short-sighted reasons, could not accept, and instead demanded that Russia adapt to 
the existing rules and power hierarchy, which Russia equally found unacceptable. 
Th e costs of failure for both were high: the Atlantic community reverted to a Cold 
War stance, diverting resources to enhanced military preparedness, accompanied 
by the political vilifi cation of its new antagonist. Russia also hunkered down and 
revived Cold War anti-Westernism accompanied by the cultural condemnation of 
its protagonist. Th is impasse is set to endure for at least a generation, unless some 
major event resets the calculations of all the parties concerned. 
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 Putin’s aversion to competitive elections is a sentiment no doubt shared by 
many democratic politicians but ultimately recognised by them as the price to 
pay for a healthy pluralism and a legitimate political system. Instead, Putin 
approached elections as a general does a battle, with bureaucratic mobilisation, the 
concentration of maximum force and the unloosing of the massed ranks of media 
cannons. Elections in this model are not seen as an expression of democratic 
contestation but as a deadly battle against foes seen and unseen. Th e struggle is 
against both the physical opponents, who are typically subjected to savage criticism 
by regime-allied media, and against the more intangible enemies who allegedly 
work to undermine Russia and who support attempts to stage a ‘colour revolution’. 
In 2012, this was perceived to be the ‘white ribbon’ movement, which aft er the 
election morphed into an intense period of contentious politics. Th e main driver 
was revulsion at sham elections and crude falsifi cation, as well as calls for change. 
Th e fundamental demand was for equal and universal citizenship with competitive 
elections where the vote is counted accurately and where the outcome is respected. 
Th is fundamental norm of a democratic polity is rooted in the principles of the 
constitutional state, but in a system where the administrative regime predominates 
and its technocratic rationality seeks to manage political processes, the quality of 
democracy is inevitably undermined. 
 Towards Putin’s fourth term 
 Th e protests of 2011–12 depressed Putin’s popularity to 60 per cent, the lowest 
since 1999, but aft er the reunifi cation of Crimea, his public approval rating soared 
to 86 per cent, the level around which it remained until his re-election in 2018.  1  
Public sentiment felt that a historical injustice had been righted. However, the 
view that the Ukrainian events changed the character of Putin’s leadership, shift ing 
it from electoral to war leader legitimacy, is exaggerated.  2  Putin certainly enjoyed 
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the accolade that came from putting himself at the head of a patriotic upsurge, 
but he soon pushed back against militant Russian nationalism. Th e Putin style of 
leadership fears political autonomy more than anything else, even if it is supportive, 
aware that independent movements are volatile and demand commitment from 
the leader, something Putin was never willing to grant. Putin refused to be 
captured by nationalist mobilisation, just as earlier he had fought oligarch and 
regional constraints on his leadership. Putin values his political autonomy above 
all else. His alliances are far from contingent, but they can never be absolute. 
 Th e Kremlin defeated the nascent opposition through a mix of coercion and 
concessions. Th e coercive measures included the trial of some thirty Bolotnaya 
activists (and simple participants), and over twenty were sentenced to prison or 
served time in pretrial detention.  3  Th e repressive measures included tightening the 
rules on rallies in June and the ‘foreign agents law’ of July 2012, followed by the 
June 2013 ‘anti-gay propaganda law’ and a law against ‘anti-religious extremism’ 
to defend the feelings of believers. Th is was balanced by the ‘regime reset’ (see 
 Chapter 4 ), a gradual political decompression intended to start from below and 
work its way upwards. As we have seen, the regime reset allowed some independent 
and opposition fi gures to become mayors and to enter regional legislative 
assemblies. It was in this spirit that the mayoral elections were fought in Moscow 
in September 2013, with Sobyanin allowing Navalny to make his impressive run. 
Th e regime stabilised the political situation while conducting an assertive foreign 
policy. As the presidential election of March 2018 approached, the economy 
and living standards were pulling out of recession, and Putin continued to enjoy 
astronomical popularity rates. 
 However, popular sentiment was shift ing. If earlier the desire for stability 
predominated, there was now a growing demand for change, in particular 
among the younger generation. For the fi rst time since 2003, those in favour of 
stability were in a minority. Some 51 per cent believed that the country needed 
‘signifi cant reform’, the fi rst time that ‘reform’ won out over ‘stability’ since 2003. 
Younger people were most in favour of reform (62 per cent), dropping to 51 per 
cent for those aged between 31 and 40, while those above were evenly split, with 
pensioners most in favour of stability. Th e greatest demand was for social equality 
and fi ghting corruption, reducing dependence on hydrocarbons, followed by 
the reform of science, education and health. Stability was now associated with 
stagnating economic conditions and social crises, so there was increased demand 
for improved living standards and a more stable social situation, with political 
concerns relatively low down the list.  4  Other studies stressed that in Moscow there 
was higher than average support for substantial reform, above all, for improvements 
in the social sphere accompanied by judicial reform and government support for 
business. Overall, views were evenly split, with 42 per cent of Russians in August 
2017 calling for decisive large-scale change, while 41 per cent favoured small-scale 
incremental change, but only 11 per cent wanted no change at all.  5  
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 Th is was the public face of politics. However, developments in the ‘basement’ 
were more decisive. Th e Crimean crisis strengthened the hand of the  siloviki 
over the liberals, and although Putin remained the decider, his policies refl ected 
the changing factional balance. As he aged, he appeared to have become more 
conservative, although without repudiating his fundamental principles, which 
as we have seen are a mix of Soviet and post-communist sentiments. Putin’s 
managerial approach failed to enunciate an inspiring vision of Russia’s future, 
but the Crimean events for the fi rst time in post-communist Russia gave vent to 
ideological enthusiasm, in this case grounded on patriotic and even nationalist 
views. While the regime soon brought independent nationalist mobilisation to 
heel and the patriotic enthusiasm evaporated, the strengthened position of the 
‘guardians’ endured. In other words, while popular sentiment was demanding real 
change, elite structures were going the other way and dug in to defend Putinite 
stability. Th is, sooner or later, was the recipe for a political crisis. 
 As the 2018 presidential election approached, elements of the ‘regime reset’ 
returned, although this did not add up to any substantive ‘thaw’. At most, this was 
a technocratic response to the political challenge of presenting the regime in the 
best light. Th e activist Ildar Daldin was released, and the sentence on Evgeniya 
Chudnovet, a teacher jailed for sharing an abuse video, was reconsidered. Th is 
was accompanied by a tempering of the patriotic rhetoric and a shift  in media 
policy to allow a more diverse range of voices to be heard. Th ere was less of the 
militant rhetoric condemning the liberal ‘fi ft h column’. In parliament, deputies 
such as Natalya Poklonskaya, the former prosecutor general of Crimea and ‘hero’ 
of unifi cation and an ardent monarchist, were forced to temper their militancy 
aft er she had called for Alexei Uchitel’s fi lm  Mathilda (about the aff air between 
Nicholas II and the Polish-Russian ballerina Mathilda Kschessinskaya) to be 
banned. As in the late Soviet period, even unsanctioned activity in support of the 
regime threatened the stability of the system, especially when it took potentially 
destabilising radical conservative forms. In the event, in August 2017, the fi lm was 
approved for general release. In other words, the ‘guardianship’ role of the regime 
was tempered. In the Duma, Volodin limited the scope of legislative initiative to 
prevent the seventh convocation once again becoming the ‘crazy printer’, spewing 
out repressive and declaratory laws characteristic of the previous session. As 
Tatyana Stanovaya notes, the regime sought to constrain the ‘lateral competition 
that they have themselves engendered’.  6  
 On 28 March 2016, the long-time hard-line head of the Central Election 
Commission (CEC), Vladimir Churov, was replaced by the respected human 
rights activist Ella Pamfi lova. She was appointed too late to change the legislation 
concerning the September 2016 State Duma election but fought against electoral 
malpractices. Despite her stated intentions, the election was attended by some 
credible charges of ballot stuffi  ng and vote fi xing, in particular, to depress the 
Yabloko vote in its St Petersburg heartland.  7  Overall, the regime-reset strategy 
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was successful to the extent that there was no repetition of the earlier protest 
mobilisation. Pamfi lova spoke of her intent to ensure that the 2018 presidential and 
regional elections would be fair, above all, through increased public monitoring 
of polls by political parties and NGOs to increase transparency.  8  She warned the 
governor of Kemerovo Oblast, Aman Tuleev, not to use ‘administrative resources’.  9  
Her eff orts were greeted with scepticism. Th e problem, critics argued, was that 
erstwhile liberals (such as Igor Artemyev, the former Yabloko members Elena 
Mizulina and Irina Yarovaya, human rights offi  cials Vladimir Lukin and Mikhail 
Fedotov, and Pamfi lova herself) once in offi  ce were ‘digested’ by the administration 
and became ‘court democrats’:  with some becoming ‘fi erce guardians of the 
regime, others turning into quiet task managers’.  10  Th e principles of inclusion and 
exclusion remained arbitrary and selective, with the Yabloko leader, Yavlinsky, 
calling the signature requirement ‘a means of political corruption’.  11  Pamfi lova 
called for reform of the municipal fi lter system, possibly to lower the threshold or 
to allow local lawmakers to support more than one candidate, although she agreed 
that the fi lter was required to prevent ‘scoundrels and fake parties’ to stand.  12  
 In December 2016, Navalny announced his intention to run for the presidency, 
and by mid-2017, he had established a network of 130,000 dedicated campaign 
volunteers in over 63 regional offi  ces, supported by tens of thousands of 
sympathisers and more than 1.7 million subscribers to his online video channels. 
Dissatisfaction with corruption and stagnation was brilliantly exploited by 
Navalny. His organisation Rospil chronicled the abuses and excesses of the elite. 
In early 2017, Navalny issued a very professional and slick fi ft y-minute fi lm, 
with English subtitles, called  He is not Dimon to You ( On vam ne Dimon ) about 
Medvedev’s properties and assets, including a Tuscan vineyard and villa, whose 
ownership was hidden behind a number of front companies.  13  Another notable 
expos é a year earlier discovered the alleged links in the chain hiding the assets 
of the prosecutor general Yuri Chaika. Navalny’s polished and powerful videos 
gained millions of viewers, with the one on Medvedev viewed over ten million 
times on YouTube in the fi rst month of its release. Navalny’s exposure of venal 
corruption, the acquisition of properties and assets in Russia and abroad, provided 
a damning indictment of the meta-corruption associated with the rule of the Putin 
elite. Tens of thousands of people rallied against corruption. However, the regime 
still enjoyed widespread poplar support, and a popular revolution was unlikely. 
 Navalny’s presidential bid was dogged by uncertainty because of his criminal 
conviction. Russian legislation forbids a convicted felon from running for public 
offi  ce, a rule introduced in 2012 to prevent any potential electoral gambit by 
Khodorkovsky. Navalny’s alleged crime dates back to the Kirovles scandal when he 
served on a voluntary basis as an advisor to the liberal governor of Kirov Oblast, 
Nikita Belykh, in 2009. In July 2013, Navalny was sentenced to fi ve years in jail, 
but it was subsequently suspended, allowing him to participate in the September 
2013 Moscow mayoral election. His impressive 27 per cent vote made him the 
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unoffi  cial leader of the democratic opposition. In a second case, in December 
2014, Navalny and his brother Oleg were convicted of embezzling over $500,000 
from the cosmetic company Yves Rocher. Th e brothers had apparently established 
an intermediary transport company which won a contract from Yves Rocher to 
use its services, even though in practice the work was done by subcontractors, 
with the brothers allegedly pocketing the diff erence. Th e scheme continued for 
four years, during which time Yves Rocher paid some  ₽ 55 million ($1.6 million), 
with over  ₽ 20 million going to the brothers. Alexei received a suspended three-
and-a-half-year sentence, while Oleg (who at the same time worked as a manager 
in state-owned Russian Post and whose involvement was crucial for the alleged 
scheme) received three-and-a-half years in prison, and each was fi ned  ₽ 500,000 
and had to pay  ₽ 4.4 million to a company whose interests were allegedly damaged. 
 Th e ECtHR judgement on the Kirovles embezzlement case in February 
2016 declared that Navalny’s right to a fair trial had been violated, that Navalny 
and his business partner Pyotr Ofi tserov had been convicted as a result of the 
arbitrary application of criminal law and that their actions were part of ordinary 
commercial activities. In November 2016, the Supreme Court overturned the 
sentence against Navalny in the Kirovles case and sent it to retrial. On 8 February 
2017, the Leninsky District Court in Kirov once again found Navalny guilty of the 
theft  of 10,000 cubic metres of timber products owned by Kirovles, and Ofi tserov 
was found guilty of having abetted this crime. Th e pair were given fi ve-year and 
four-year suspended sentences, respectively, and fi ned. Th e ECtHR on 17 October 
2017 also announced its adjudication in the Yves Rocher case, refusing to accept 
that the embezzlement charges were politically motivated but fi nding that the 
Russian court and investigators violated the Navalny brothers right to a fair trial, 
as well as the right to lawful punishment, and ordered the Russian government to 
pay the brothers  € 10,000 each in compensation as well as  € 62,800 in combined 
court fees. On 25 December 2017, the CEC ruled that his criminal record meant 
that Navalny could not be registered as a presidential candidate. Th us, one of the 
main opposition leaders was judged ineligible, casting a shadow over the fairness 
of the election. 
 As the election approached, there was an accelerated turnover of regional 
governors. Th e last time such mass dismissals had taken place was in the late 
2000s, when Medvedev changed over thirty governors in the fi rst two years of 
his presidency. A number of long-standing governors with the traditional ‘Soviet 
manager’ profi le were replaced by ‘young technocrats’, oft en with no links to the 
region they were expected to govern. At least four governors were in jail, awaiting 
either a trial or a court verdict on corruption charges, including Belykh. Most of 
the new appointments were in their thirties or forties, with the exception of the 
68-year-old former policeman Vladimir Vasiliev who took over from the veteran 
Ramazan Abdullatipov in Dagestan. Vasiliev was the fi rst non-Avar or non-Dargin 
leader of Dagestan since 1948, a region in which the proportion of ethnic Russians 
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had fallen from 9.7 per cent in 1989 to 3.6 per cent in 2010. Th e appointment was 
clearly intended to break the hold on regional resources by local strongmen.  14  Th e 
Kremlin no longer feared elections, and its nominations were almost invariably 
elected. Governors, moreover, were now more circumscribed in taking decisions 
independently, and even if they fulfi lled the main criteria  – that there were no 
major protests, that federal elections produced the appropriate results and that 
the Kremlin’s orders were obeyed – it was not enough to ensure the survival of 
some of the veterans. Even the delivery of economic development did not seem 
to be the key criteria. Th e Kremlin applied various ‘key performance indicators’ 
as neo-liberal governmentality reinforced traditional patterns of authoritarian 
management. Th e result was the further erosion of Russian federalism.  15  
 Although Putin is uncomfortable talking about his ‘legacy’ and how he will be 
remembered, he is clearly concerned about how he will be viewed in historical 
perspective, and he certainly believed that there was still unfi nished business to be 
completed in a fourth term. Th e election was a political and strategic test for the 
system. Kremlin-aligned think tanks, scholars and polling agencies were assigned 
to devise ‘an image of the future’ that Putin could use in the campaign. In the end, 
no consensus emerged despite several changes of the ‘curator’ responsible for the 
project – prompting the anecdote that Putin did not have a future. Th e initial triad 
of ‘justice, respect and trust’ was considered as the main slogan.  16  Th e focus of 
social demands had also changed. In 2011–12, the emphasis was on civic dignity 
and political inclusion, but following the economic recession, social justice became 
the main concern. Th e problem for the regime was how to reconcile recognition of 
the legitimacy of the demands without undermining its own record. Even though 
Putin surrounded himself with billionaires, he never forgot that his popularity 
was founded on forcing employers to pay wages and for the state to fulfi l, at least 
minimally, its constitutional obligations for social welfare. It is easy enough to 
attack instances of venal corruption, but any assault on meta-corruption would 
undermine the foundations of the regime itself. 
 Th e cultural turn in Russian politics aft er 2012 advanced ‘traditional values’, 
‘spiritual values’ and ‘sacred lands’, and refl ected the intensifi cation of confrontation 
with the West. However, as he faced re-election, his team understood that an 
appeal to transcendent values at the time of growing economic hardship and 
stagnant living standards was liable to backfi re. Russians had been forced to cut 
expenditure on transport and mobile phones, while the proportion expecting the 
government to initiate reforms had grown from 30 per cent to 44 per cent in the 
previous two years, indicating a demand for change.  17  Equally, an exaggerated 
emphasis on Putin personally also required a more substantive grounding in a 
practical programme of renewal and development. It would not be enough to 
parrot Volodin’s infamous declaration of ‘no Putin, no Russia’. Th e emphasis was to 
ensure legality – for the election to pass off  without major incidents of fraud while 
achieving the desired result  – to ensure that Putin’s re-election was considered 
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legitimate. Th e problem with this rather minimalist defi nition of legitimacy is that 
it did not take into account the larger issues, including the quality of governance 
and regime performance in delivering stability, equality and rising standards of 
living, as well as the enduring problem of creating a more dynamic, innovative and 
competitive economy. 
 The return of politics 
 Navalny exploited the liminal character of Putinism by exploring the tension 
between its regime and constitutional character. A  state of exception, even if 
for a long period it becomes the norm, presupposes a base normality. In post-
communist Russia, this is precisely the constitutional state, and this is what 
provides the dual state with its dynamism, generated by the inherent tension 
between the normality represented by the legalism of the normative state and 
the exceptionalism represented by the administrative regime. Above all, the 
contradiction between political reality and constitutional normativity opened up 
a fertile terrain for resistance and opposition. 
 By August 2017, Navalny had registered 570,671 signatures ready to support 
his candidacy.  18  His programme mobilised some powerful slogans, predicated on 
the belief that rooting out corruption would release enormous funds for increased 
health, education and welfare spending. He proposed a one-off  ‘oligarch tax’, to 
be levied on the benefi ciaries of the 1996 loans-for-shares privatisations, on the 
lines of New Labour’s windfall tax of 1997, and a  ₽ 25,000 (about $415) minimum 
monthly tax threshold and subsidised loans to allow people to buy their own 
homes. Later, Navalny outlined a bold programme of political reform, including 
greater powers for local government, federalisation, the reduction of presidential 
powers, parliamentary and judicial reform, amendment of the Criminal Code, 
reform of the FSIN and reform of the media’s regulatory framework. Th e economic 
programme was less coherent, including the contradictory promise that state 
property would be transferred to the Pension Fund and that it would be sold. Th e 
platform attacked various groups in favour of some mythical ‘people’, a classic 
populist strategy.  19  
 Social and political protests increased. Social protests covered such issues as the 
violation of social rights, falling living standards, job losses, defrauded investors, 
increases in utility charges, dangerous landfi lls and the non-payment of wages.  20  
One of the largest protest movements involved truckers incensed by the Platon 
system of road tolls introduced in November 2015, managed by Rostec and the 
Rotenberg brothers. As for political protests, the most notable were organised by 
Navalny and his supporters. In 2017, Navalny initiated nationwide protest rallies 
on 26 March and 12 June, refl ecting dissatisfaction with falling living standards, 
economic inequality, corruption and political stagnation. Most alarming for the 
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authorities was the youthfulness of the protesters. Th e initiative shift ed from 
the older generation of middle-aged ‘angry urbanites’ to a new generation of 
disaff ected youth. Navalny’s call for a monthly minimum wage of  ₽ 25,000 was 
accused of being populist, and in a time of budget defi cits, it meant that the middle 
class would be squeezed to provide the funds. 
 Navalny is part of a larger wave of revived political competitiveness. Th e 
opportunities opened up by the regime reset were exploited by the United 
Democrats coalition forged by Dmitry Gudkov and Maxim Katz in Moscow for 
the municipal elections on 10 September 2017. Five years earlier, the protests 
against national electoral fraud had prompted activists to contest the 4 March 2012 
Moscow municipal elections. Th ey ran for seats on Moscow’s 146 district councils, 
each composed of between 8 and 12 deputies elected for fi ve years. Of the two 
hundred independents who entered the ballot, seventy won seats. In 2017, Yabloko 
joined the United Democrats, despite its long-term refusal to enter coalitions. Th is 
time, 1,046 non-regime candidates balloted, running either as independents or as 
party candidates. Th e outcome demonstrated that Moscow deserved its reputation 
as a liberal city, with the United Democrats winning 267 seats, joined by a number 
of independents and over 70 members of the systemic opposition.  21  Yabloko 
increased its representation tenfold by winning 176 seats, making it the second-
largest party in the city.  22  UR won 1,152 of the 1,502 seats, but the authorities lost 
control of 38 municipal councils. In eight, including the district where Putin lives 
and votes, not a single UR deputy was elected. Th e innovative electoral strategies 
of the opposition paid off .  23  However, even in districts where the opposition won a 
plurality of seats, such as Fil ë vsky Park, they were prevented from taking the chair 
because of the rule that the incumbent remains in post aft er an election unless two-
thirds of the councillors vote for a change. Th e law does not explain what should 
be done where no group can muster such a majority.  24  A similar situation held in 
the Konkovo municipal district council. Elsewhere, democratic activists such as 
Ilya Yashin, now the head of Krasnoselsky municipal district, demonstrated that 
they could govern in a new manner.  25  
 Th e victory of a new generation of talented young activists demonstrated that 
there are plenty of people capable of building democratic institutions in Russia. 
Although their powers are limited, district councils can shape how a locality is 
run. Th ey also provide a safe haven for meetings and demonstration, which tend 
not to be allowed in UR-run areas. As noted, reforms enacted in 2012 stipulate a 
‘municipal fi lter’ whereby between 5 and 10 per cent of deputies have to nominate a 
candidate, which in Moscow means that candidates have to gather signatures from 
at least 110 municipal deputies to register their candidacy. Navalny’s run in 2013 
had only been possible with the help of UR deputies lending him their support. 
Th e opposition in Moscow now sought to nominate a regime opponent to run in 
the 9 September 2018 mayoral contest. Th e opposition united to form the Party 
of Changes, including Ksenia Sobchak and Dmitry Gudkov, although Ilya Yashin 
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and Yabloko refused unifi ed primaries. With deputies in only 62 districts, the 
opposition failed to unite to meet the threshold of nominations from 110 districts. 
Navalny played a destructive role by refusing to endorse any opposition group, 
and no democratic oppositionist was registered.  26  Th e incumbent, Sobyanin, won 
with 70 per cent of the votes, with the Communist candidate coming a distant 
second with 11.4 per cent. 
 Navalny became the charismatic face to the opposition to Putin’s rule. He was 
one of the few politicians in Russia with an independent network of regional 
volunteers able to mobilise at short notice. Navalny advanced classic liberal 
postulates on the rule of law, transparent government and constitutionalism, but 
he also embraces ideas drawn from the more conservative repertoire of nationalist 
ideas. In a well-publicised debate on 20 July 2017 with Igor Strelkov (Girkin), the 
militant nationalist and virulent monarchist who took his forces from Crimea to 
foment rebellion in the Donbas in March 2014, both came out as losers. Strelkov 
appeared to lose interest in the discussion, while Navalny failed to advance any 
coherent world view. Th e debate was important primarily because it took place 
at all and without offi  cial interference, indicating the return of elements of free 
public political debate. More disturbing, the discussion showed that Strelkov had 
strong and consistent nationalist views, combining a distinctive understanding of 
the global economy and various conspiracy theories, while Navalny was unable 
to advance a coherent response.  27  For Navalny, the main enemy was domestic 
crony capitalism, and he vowed to clean up the vast procurement system, which 
accounts for 37 per cent of the economy. By contrast, the enemy for Girkin was the 
West, which in his view carved up the USSR according to borders drawn by the 
Bolsheviks and destroyed Russia’s industrial base.  28  Strelkov advanced the classic 
conspiracy idea of Russia as a ‘besieged fortress’.  29  Strelkov noted that in 2014, he 
believed that Putin was ready to stage a ‘revolution from above’ in Ukraine, but by 
2015 when the ‘revolution’ did not come, he lost faith in Putin. He also criticised 
the offi  cial line on Chechnya. Th e debate once again demonstrated that the greatest 
threat to Putinite stability comes not from the liberals but from nationalists. 
 Th is is perhaps why Navalny became subject to sharp attack from Western-
oriented liberals, who condemned him for his refusal to accept that Crimea should 
be returned to Ukraine, for his attack on migration from Central Asia and for 
his erstwhile slogan of ‘stop feeding the Caucasus’. In the context of the alleged 
contemptuous dismissal by liberal globalists of the wave of populist resistance to 
globalisation, Gordon Hahn notes that ‘the Russian liberals’ assault on Navalny 
suggests the persistence of an equally disturbing pattern:  the Russian liberal 
intelligentsia’s mimicking the Western liberal-left ist elite and ignoring conservative 
and libertarian strains in Western democratic political thought and culture’. In his 
detailed study of the liberal critique of Navalny, there is one persistent theme: the 
danger that Navalny could become a second Putin. For example, the journalist 
Oleg Kashin attacked Navalny in the  New York Times , calling him an authoritarian 
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leader in the mould of Boris Yeltsin, while Vladislav Inozemtsev, a theorist of 
so-called post-industrial society, argued that Navalny lacked a ‘vision for the 
future’.  30  Th e political culture of the Russian democratic movement shared the 
authoritarian traits of the Putinite system. Too oft en its participants were divisive, 
intolerant, uncompromising and dismissive of the concerns of others.  31  
 Nevertheless, Navalny articulated popular demands applying not only 
nationalist themes but also edging towards class politics, of the sort that had 
appeared to be delegitimated by the Soviet experience, although he remained 
fi rmly pro-market. He condemned Putin for having created a system of predatory 
capitalism which profi ted only the top 0.1 per cent. Although Navalny was accused 
of Trump-like irresponsibility and populism, unlike Trump, he had no intention 
of skewing the tax system further towards the rich. As the election approached, 
Navalny’s ability to mobilise a protest movement appeared to be on the wane. In 
response to his call for a ‘voters’ strike’ on 28 January 2018, barely a thousand 
turned up in Moscow, although protests took place in a hundred towns across the 
country. Navalny himself was briefl y detained and then released, a pattern that 
was repeated many times. Th e authorities sought not to infl ame the situation and 
to avoid the mistakes of 2011. Navalny tried to broaden his appeal from the rather 
narrow liberal segment of Russian society to the national democrats, those who 
support the strengthening of democratic institutions while not renouncing Russia’s 
national interests in international politics accompanied by a strong role for the 
state in economic development. Russian national democracy had been the driving 
force in the destruction of the Soviet Union during perestroika and became the 
foundation for Putin’s ‘centrism’, the core electorate that Navalny now sought to 
win over. Navalny tempered some of his more extreme nationalist sentiments and 
focused on his anti-corruption campaign and on building a national movement. 
His Party of Progress established branches across the country but failed to be 
offi  cially registered. Despite his prominence and high name recognition, his polling 
support remained in the single digits. Putin’s unassailable lead was untouched 
by Navalny’s strictures, and rather than banning him from participating in the 
presidential election, it would have probably been wiser for the regime to let him 
run. But that would have entailed accepting a rather diff erent legitimation strategy 
for the regime – one based on a genuine democratic mandate – rather than one 
based on the plebiscitary approval of Putin’s leadership. 
 The 2018 presidential election 
 In January 2018, Putin became the longest-serving Russian leader (as president 
and prime minister) since Stalin, exceeding Brezhnev’s record of eighteen 
years and one month. Putin ran as an independent candidate, highlighting his 
position above the existing institutions and party system, and accentuating UR’s 
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marginalisation. Although UR won a constitutional majority in the September 
2016 elections, its ‘brand’ was tainted and it was never able to shake off  Navalny’s 
epithet as ‘the party of crooks and thieves’, a term he fi rst used in a radio interview 
on 2 February 2011.  32  Putin’s independent run emphasised his distance from the 
ruling elites and his historical role as the arbiter of Russia’s future. 
 As part of the ‘regime reset’ since 2012, there had been major changes to 
electoral legislation concerning presidential elections and the personnel managing 
the process. Th e redoubtable Churov was no longer at the head of the CEC, and, 
instead, Pamfi lova changed its membership. Th ere were at least fi ft een changes 
to presidential election legislation between 2012 and 2017, with fi ft y-nine out 
of the law’s eighty-seven articles and all four appendices amended. Two changes 
were crucial. Th e fi rst lowered the number of signatures required to register. 
Candidates running as independents have to gather 300,000 signatures, with no 
region accounting for more than 7,500, while those backed by non-parliamentary 
parties have to submit 100,000 signatures. Th ose running as representatives of 
parliamentary parties, as before, do not need any signatures. A  second change 
bars candidates with a criminal record from running for offi  ce for fi ft een years, a 
stipulation that kept Navalny off  the ballot box.  33  In addition, amendments to the 
law on political parties that came into eff ect on 1 January 2018 tightened the rules 
on sources of party funding, in conformity with recommendations from the CoE’s 
Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). 
 Th e ‘systemic’ opposition parties were still led by the veterans of the late Soviet 
period: Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky were in their seventies, while Yavlinsky had 
been leader of Yabloko since its foundation in 1993. Some activist members of 
parliament (MPs) from JR had been involved in the 2011–12 protests, including 
Ilya Ponamarev and father and son Gennady and Dmitry Gudkov, but they had 
been purged from the Duma. Th e staid and uninspiring Sergei Mironov reasserted 
his authority, and JR soon declined into irrelevance and did not bother to stand a 
presidential candidate. Th e party had been established by Surkov in the mid-2000s 
to provide a left -centre balance to UR, but it failed to develop as an autonomous 
social democratic party. As the presidential election approached, plans resurfaced 
once again to create a two-party system. Mironov would be replaced by a more 
authoritative leader, and the party boosted to provide credible balance to UR. Th is 
would be diffi  cult, since the CPRF already absorbed the protest vote, while the 
LDPR fi lled the populist niche, even though in practice it was little more than the 
radical branch of UR.  34  
 Of the sixty-four declared candidates, in the end seven were registered, 
including some well-known names. Top of the list, of course, was Putin. He 
declared his candidacy in a Soviet-style meeting with workers at the Gorky 
Automobile Plant (GAZ) in Nizhny Novgorod on 6 December 2017. When asked 
an apparently spontaneous question about his plans, Putin answered, ‘Yes, I will 
run for … president of the Russian Federation.’ By announcing his candidacy in 
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a working people’s collective, Putin rallied his blue-collar voter base. While polls 
showed a consistently high level of support, the problem would be to get the vote 
out on polling day. If victory was a foregone conclusion, then what was the point of 
making the eff ort? A Levada Centre poll at that time found that only 58 per cent of 
Russians planned to vote, a signifi cant fall from the 65.3 per cent who turned out 
for the 2012 presidential election.  35  
 As for his opponents, the old guard represented by Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov 
was hardly likely to set the electoral pulse racing. In the event, instead of the veteran 
73-year-old Zyuganov, the CPRF nominated Pavel Grudinin, the 57-year-old head 
of the Lenin State Farm ( sovkhoz ) on the outskirts of Moscow. He had been a 
member of UR until 2010 and did not join the CPRF, but his record made him 
a strong candidate. He saved his  sovkhoz from privatisation and break-up in the 
1990s and turned it into a model socialist collective, producing top-quality fresh 
fruit and vegetables for the city. He paid his workers about $1,370 a month, over 
double the Russian average. Grudinin was a fresh face and appealed to those tired 
of Putin aft er eighteen years. Like Putin, he appealed to Russians who regretted 
the Soviet collapse (58 per cent according to a poll in late 2017), and like Navalny, 
he spoke out against economic migrants from Central Asia. He ran on a populist 
platform, criticising corruption and inequality, and sought to restore elements of 
the former Soviet economy. As with the oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov’s presidential 
bid in 2012, it was not clear whether Grudinin really sought to replace Putin or 
simply to boost the turnout and gain the share of the vote allotted to the opposition 
to give the election an air of legitimacy and competitiveness.  36  Th e onslaught 
against him from the offi  cial media suggested that the authorities recognised that 
the communists retained a powerful voter base and that in the right circumstances 
and with the right leader, the orthodox left  could pose a serious challenge. Th e 
CPRF appealed to the disaff ected working class and the mass of the bureaucracy, 
as well as the older generation, but the ‘red-brown’ alliance of neo-traditionalist 
communists and nationalists was looking increasingly tired and failed to address 
the concerns of workers or even to defend trade union rights.  37  
 Candidates included the 39-year-old Maxim Suraikin, who was nominated by 
the Communists of Russia, a party registered in 2012 as part of the regime reset. 
Th e CPRF considered it to be little more than a spoiler organisation, designed 
by the authorities to confuse voters and to draw voters away from itself. In 2014, 
Suraikin had run for the governorship of Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and won 
about two per cent of the vote. Th e list naturally also included the 71-year-old 
Zhirinovsky, the emotional ultranationalist at the head of the LDPR who was now 
running for the presidency for the sixth time, having won 6 per cent of the vote in 
2012. Th e list also included the 59-year-old Sergei Baburin, the veteran nationalist 
who had been one of the leaders of the parliamentary rebellion against Yeltsin in 
1993 and a State Duma MP until 2007. He then served as a rector of Moscow State 
University. He now sought to return to national politics as the nominee of a small 
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nationalist party, the Russian All-People’s Union. Th e liberal-conservative Party of 
Growth nominated their 57-year-old leader, the business ombudsman Boris Titov. 
He was a successful entrepreneur himself, a co-owner of the Russian sparkling 
wine brand Abrau-Durso and the head of the Russian Winemaker’s Union. He 
gathered the requisite one hundred thousand signatures and was registered as a 
candidate. As noted, he advanced a moderate programme of reform, accepting 
that ‘Russian society, dominated by civil servants and millions of poor, is not ready 
for democratic change’.  38  
 As the representative of the Yabloko party with no Duma MPs, the 65-year-
old Grigory Yavlinsky successfully collected the required signatures. Yavlinsky 
is known as the ‘perennial candidate’, having fought two earlier presidential 
elections. In the fi rst, in 1996, he came fourth with 7.35 per cent of the vote, but in 
2000, as the self-declared democratic candidate, he came third behind Putin and 
Zyuganov, with 5.8 per cent of the vote. In 2012, his candidacy was not registered 
on the grounds that over 20 per cent of the signatures were invalid, and his 
registration this time indicated the Kremlin’s concern for the election to be seen as 
more legitimate. Yavlinsky’s programme included his long-term themes, including 
the struggle against corruption, democratic renewal and a balanced economic 
policy that eschewed the excesses of radical liberalism and neo-Soviet statism. Th e 
party had long campaigned for the return of elected mayors, arguing that ‘mayors 
in 1,555 out of 2,044 of our country’s towns and cities are getting appointed and 
displaced without any regard to the opinion of those who live in these cities and 
towns’.  39  His eye-catching promise this time was to grant every Russian citizen a 
free one-acre plot of land on which to build a home. Yavlinsky represented the old 
guard of the anti-communist revolution, the ‘lone knight of democracy and the 
market economy with a human face’, who ‘continues stoically to defend the ideals 
that had fi lled the hearts of millions of our citizens in the years of perestroika and 
the early 1990s’.  40  
 Th e 36-year-old Ksenia Sobchak stands out among the candidates. She is the 
daughter of Putin’s former mentor and sponsor, Anatoly Sobchak, the mayor of 
St Petersburg in the fi rst half of the 1990s, and was even rumoured to be Putin’s 
god-daughter. She entered politics during the protest wave of 2011–12 and 
became one of the most recognised opposition leaders. She then hosted a talk 
show,  Sobchak Live , on TV Rain ( Dozhd ), one of the few remaining independent 
networks in Russia. Following months of speculation, she declared herself a 
candidate in October 2017. She denied accusations that she had been put up to it 
by the Kremlin to boost turnout. In fact, she asserts that when she told Putin (at 
a meeting devoted to making a fi lm about her father) in the autumn of 2017 that 
she planned to run, he was not pleased.  41  Sobchak was nominated by the Civic 
Initiative Party and successfully collected the requisite one hundred thousand 
signatures. Her goal was to ‘create a new majority’, although her campaign focused 
on mobilising the radical liberal minority. Sobchak hoped to use the campaign 
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as a springboard for a political career. She argued that Russia broke international 
law in taking over Crimea, but Yavlinsky was the only candidate who called for 
international mediation to help resolve the issue.  42  Nevertheless, she adopted a 
generally sympathetic approach towards Putin, arguing that he was a ‘patriot’, 
determined to hold Russia together and avoid a slide into ‘a sort of a military-junta 
situation’. Sobchak was even considered a possible successor to Putin, since she 
would guarantee his security and immunity from prosecution, just as Putin had 
done for her father (and for Yeltsin). She believes that Putin would be prepared to 
leave offi  ce if his personal security and wealth could be guaranteed.  43  
 Sobchak declared that she would give up her candidacy if Navalny somehow 
managed to get on the ballot paper. Even though not a candidate, he dominated 
the campaign through his call for voters to spurn the election. Th e boycott strategy 
was dismissed by Sobchak as ‘pointless’.  44  Th e veteran opposition politician, 
Vladimir Ryzhkov (now the leader of the Choice of Russia movement), who 
became a co-chair of Yavlinsky’s campaign staff , also condemned Navalny’s 
call: ‘Th e boycott of the election is the demobilisation of our supporters. I mean 
the people who want change’, a group he estimated to comprise 25–30 per cent 
of the population, ‘who share democratic values.’  45  Navalny acted as if he was 
campaigning, issuing a programme that was subjected to withering criticism, 
even by liberals. Its incoherent left -wing populist economic proposals combined 
with the right-wing nationalist idea to issue work visas for migrant workers from 
Central Asia, together with the unsustainable promise to double the minimum 
wage.  46  Typically, he launched a blistering attack on Yavlinsky, Sobchak and other 
candidates, condemning them for falsifying signatures. He accused Yavlinsky 
of forging 60 per cent of his signatures and the others of up to 99 per cent. Th e 
grounds for the charge were unclear, but his attack on the establishment liberals 
damaged his standing. It appeared that Navalny was trying to discredit not only 
the election but also the candidates, a strategy that only accentuated his isolation 
from mainstream politics. In the event, he and his chief of staff , Leonid Volkov, 
were arrested on 22 February 2018 and held for thirty days for repeated public-
meeting rule violations, taking him out of circulation for the rest of the election. 
 In his annual press conference on 14 December 2017, Putin was guarded 
about what his presidential programme would look like, although he stressed that 
‘Russia must be spearheaded into the future. It must become a modern country 
with a fl exible political system, its economy must be based on high technology, 
and labour effi  ciency must increase manifold.’ He announced that he would run as 
an independent candidate, but ‘I count on support of political forces who share my 
views on the development of the country’. In response to a question from Sobchak, 
who had announced that she would be running on a platform ‘against all’, Putin 
asked, ‘What are your proposals for solving today’s existing problems?’ He argued 
that ‘the character mentioned by Sobchak’ (continuing his tradition of refusing 
to use Navalny’s name in public) was no more than a local version of the former 
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Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, who would ‘destabilise the situation in 
the country’.  47  
 Putin’s campaigning was hard to distinguish from his usual presidential 
activities, although there were now more meetings with voters. Visiting the Tver 
Carriage Works in mid-January, Putin reinforced the point that his interventionist 
industrial strategy had twice saved the plant from bankruptcy. During the 
economic crisis of 2009, Putin diverted millions of dollars from state funds to pay 
for orders, and once again in 2017 when he introduced major long-term tax breaks 
on the purchase of long-distance rolling stock, prompting hundreds more orders 
for railway carriages.  48  Th e visit reinforced Putin’s base among the industrial 
working class, which he had protected from job losses while ensuring the regular 
payment of wages and stable expectations for the future – a far cry from when he 
had come to power in 2000. Despite the talk about youth dissatisfaction, Putin’s 
core electorate  – workers, bureaucrats, pensioners and small-town residents  – 
held fast to the belief that Putin represented the best option in the given historical 
situation. Not surprisingly, Putin’s confi dence rating among ordinary Russians 
reached a 2017 record high of 57.7 per cent in December, with his approval rating 
remaining unchanged at 84 per cent.  49  
 Th e campaign lacked a clear focus. In 2008, it had been ‘modernisation’, and in 
2012, ‘regaining sovereignty’, but in 2018, the ideas of modernisation and reform 
were notably absent. Th e opposition remained vague on how their aspirations 
would be implemented, whereas Putin’s campaign focused on himself:  ‘A strong 
president is a strong Russia.’ His engagement was lacklustre, reinforcing his long-
held dislike of the electoral process. Unlike in earlier campaigns, notably in 2011–
12 when he had issued a range of position papers in the media on fundamental 
policy issues, he limited himself to set-piece presentations. Th e most signifi cant 
was the postponed annual address to the Federal Assembly on 1 March 2018. Th e 
latter part of the speech, as noted, presented a range of strategic super weapons, but 
the oration was less about guns than butter. Th e address outlined ambitious plans 
to boost GDP growth above the global average and to raise the country’s GDP per 
capita by 1.5 times by 2025 by increasing labour productivity, intensifying capital 
investment, expanding non-hydrocarbon exports and developing the small- and 
medium-business sector. Spending on healthcare was to double to 4 per cent of the 
GDP, while some  ₽ 11 trillion ($190 billion) was to be invested in infrastructure 
by 2024. Over the same period, the poverty rate was to be halved, while raising 
household incomes was identifi ed as a ‘key task’ of the next decade. Some 29 per 
cent of the population had been living in poverty when he assumed offi  ce in 2000, 
but this had fallen to 10 per cent by 2012, but as noted, the recession pushed some 
20 million (13 per cent) under the poverty line. In a signifi cant theoretical shift , 
Putin noted, ‘Stability forms the foundation, but it is not enough to ensure further 
development.’ Th e stability system was to give way to a new developmental model 
based on the technological revolution as well as reindustrialisation.  50  Despite 
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the militant talk about new weapons, the speech represented a victory for liberal 
economists like Kudrin, who had resigned in protest over increased defence 
spending in 2011. 
 It would be hard to match the 65 per cent turnout of 2012 when Putin had won 
with 63.6 per cent of the vote, even though the Kremlin set the unoffi  cial goal 
of 70/70 – whereby Putin would receive 70 per cent of the votes from a 70 per 
cent turnout. Th e historically low turnout of 47.8 per cent in the September 2016 
parliamentary elections served as a warning, especially when the total was even 
lower in major cities such as Moscow and St Petersburg, with barely 30 per cent 
of voters turning out. To broaden his appeal, Kudrin oversaw the preparation of 
Putin’s election manifesto. 
 Putin won a triumphant endorsement for a fourth term, winning 76.69 per 
cent of the vote on a 67.5 per cent turnout (see  Table 8.1 ). He was supported by 
over half (51.76 per cent) of the total population with the right to vote, receiving 
56.42 million of the 73.58 million ballots cast, his biggest win ever. Compared to 
2012, turnout rose by 2.4 per cent and Putin’s vote rose by 13 per cent over the 
46.6 million votes he received that year. Grudinin took second place with only 11.77 
per cent (8.7 million votes) and Zhirinovsky came a distant third with only 5.65 per 
cent (4.1 million votes). Pamfi lova insisted that the election had been ‘transparent, 
competitive and in line with the law’, although Western commentary was harshly 
critical. Th e Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) report 
found the whole operation wanting, although well run. Th e group’s election 
observation mission concluded, ‘Overall, the campaign was marked by a lack of 
genuine competition among contestants.’  51  Th e full report issued in June came to 
the same conclusion, eliciting a furious attack by the Russian foreign ministry on 
the OSCE’s Offi  ce for Democratic Elections and Human Rights (ODIHR), based in 
Warsaw, which it condemned as ‘once again being politically engaged’, and called 
on it to change its election monitoring practices.  52  Although a few videos of ballot 
stuffi  ng appeared, Pamfi lova achieved her goal of running one of the cleanest 
elections in the post-communist period. Th e new system of ‘absentee voting’ did 
allow some multiple ballots to be cast, but the habitual ‘electoral sultanates’ (to 
use Dmitry Oreshkin’s term) curbed their enthusiasm, and in Chechnya, instead 
of the customary 110 per cent of the vote on a 99 per cent turnout, Putin received 
a more modest 91.5 per cent of the vote. Even the veteran election-fraud analyst 
Sergei Shpilkin noted that falsifi cations were a record low, although in his view it 
still aff ected some 8.5 million votes.  53  New forms of administrative mobilisation 
appeared to have been at work.  54  All agreed that electoral malpractice this time 
round were lower than previously, although estimates range from some six million 
votes subject to some form of fraud to almost none. Whatever the precise fi gure, 
any fraud and managerial manipulation of turnout is too much.  
 Despite being advised against, Trump telephoned to congratulate Putin, as 
did German chancellor Merkel, French president Macron and EU Commission 
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president Jean-Claude Juncker. Th e election was certainly not a ‘fraud’ or a ‘sham’, 
although clearly it had a plebiscitary element. Th e Kremlin enjoys a monopoly on 
‘administrative resources’ and dominates the mass media, but all candidates were 
given plenty of airtime in the televised debates. Navalny was not allowed to run, 
but Sobchak and Yavlinsky were serious candidates. However, the liberals in total 
received less than 3 per cent of the vote, fewer than the 4 per cent received in the 
September 2016 Duma election. Communists and nationalists remain the centre 
of gravity of opposition, who together garnered some 19 per cent. Pastukhov 
argues that this represented a ‘political defeat’ by the Russian liberals that could 
not be simply ascribed to administrative or other resources ranged against them. 
Putin’s political course enjoyed, in his view, real support among the electorate, and 
even if all candidates and parties were allowed to participate and if the media was 
opened wide, even then Putin would have won, and in all probability so would a 
successor with a similar programme. Th us, the view that the ‘post-Putin’ period 
 Table 8.1  Presidential election of 18 March 2018 
 Candidate  Vote (million)  Percentage 
 Putin, Vladimir 
(independent) 
 56,430,712  76.69 
 Grudinin, Pavel (CPRF)  8,659,206  11.77 
 Zhirinovsky, Vladimir 
(LDPR) 
 4,154,985  5.65 
 Sobchak, Ksenia (Civil 
Initiative Party) 
 1,238,031  1.68 
 Yavlinsky, Grigory 
(Yabloko) 
 769,644  1.05  
 Titov, Boris (Party of 
Growth) 
 556,801  0.76 
 Suraikin, Maxim 
(Communists of 
Russia) 
 499,342  0.68 
 Baburin, Sergei (Russian 
People’s Union) 
 479,013  0.68 
 Electorate  109,008,428 
 Number of ballot papers 
issued 
 73,578,992 (1.08% invalid or blank) 
 Turnout  67.54% 
 Source: Central Electoral Commission, ‘Rezultaty Vybororov Prezidenta Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii’,  http://old.cikrf.ru/analog/prezidentskiye-vybory-2018/itogi-golosovaniya/ . 
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would automatically improve the chances of the liberal opposition represented 
‘one more utopia of the intelligentsia’.  55  
 Th e election refl ected the broader duality of the system, combining authoritarian 
and democratic elements. If the election is considered a barometer of the mood 
of society, then it was clear that Putin enjoyed enormous popularity, and the vote 
provided him with a solid endorsement for his fourth and presumably fi nal term 
in offi  ce. Th ere was a palpable desire for change, but change within the system 
and not from outside. Th e ideology of stability had prevailed, and although 
Putin no longer required electoral legitimacy to the same degree as before – aft er 
Crimea and so many years in offi  ce he had become a type of national leader – the 
election confi rmed him as the president who promised to deliver both stability 
and change.  56  
 Challenges of Putin’s fourth term 
 Putin’s inauguration on 7 May 2018 was less macabre than the similar event six 
years earlier. Once again there were protests but not as violent as on the earlier 
occasion. In Moscow, Navalny moved the date and site of an offi  cial meeting to 
coincide with the inauguration, and across the country, demonstrators, whose 
youth was noticeable, chanted Navalny’s slogan: ‘Not Our Tsar’. Th e heavy-handed 
attempt to close down the messaging app Telegram provoked a strong reaction in 
society. Th ere remain profound social and political blocks on reform, including 
the lack of agreement on the need for structural reform at all. Th e term ‘stagnation 
plus’ was used to describe a system that was growing but at anaemic rates and in 
which some fundamental underlying questions were unresolved. 
 In his inauguration speech, Putin insisted, ‘Russia must be a modern and 
vibrant society ready to take up the challenges of the time and respond to them 
with all its energy in order to consistently build up its leadership in areas where 
our positions have been traditionally strong.’ He argued, ‘We need breakthroughs 
in all areas of life. I  strongly believe that only a free society that is open to all 
new and cutting-edge advances, while rejecting injustice, ignorance, obscurantist 
conservatism [ dremuchee okhranitel’stvo , which can also be translated as ‘backward-
looking guardianship’] and bureaucratic red tape, is capable of achieving these 
breakthroughs.’  57  Returning to the Kremlin from which he had not departed, 
Putin faced a number of fundamental challenges: the need to boost the economy 
through structural reform of social and political relations, the related question of 
how to temper the hostility of the West and how to manage elite relations in the 
context of the likelihood that this would be his fi nal term in offi  ce. Th e race to 
shape the succession had begun. 
 According to the constitution, following a presidential election, the government 
has to resign, and the Kremlin then has two weeks to nominate a candidate to 
9781788318303_pi-306.indd   206 15-Oct-19   12:25:38
207
THE WINDS OF CHANGE 207
parliament for approval as prime minister. Medvedev had occupied the post since 
the fateful  rokirovka in 2012, and there was considerable speculation whether he 
would be replaced. Suggested alternatives included the CBR governor Nabiullina, 
Moscow mayor Sobyanin, industry minister Denis Manturov and even Kudrin, 
who had fallen out with Medvedev over military spending in September 2011. 
Th e decision would shape economic and social policy in Putin’s fourth term while 
preparing for the anticipated succession. Th e prime minister takes over when 
the incumbent president leaves offi  ce early and is, thus, in pole position for the 
succession. Putin’s dislike of disruptive personnel changes is well known, and in the 
end, he plumped for continuity. Medvedev was nominated and overwhelmingly 
approved by parliament to continue as prime minister. Th e choice disappointed 
those who looked for an end to liberal dominance in economic and social policy. 
Medvedev occupies a centrist position, and although he clearly favours the 
relaxation of state control and more liberalisation, he remains within the Putin 
consensus. Medvedev’s loyalty, hard work and lack of independent political 
ambition served Putin well at a time of heightened speculation over a possible 
successor. 
 In the ensuing cabinet reshuffl  e, the existing political balance was retained. 
Eight ministers were replaced, and a new minister added through the division 
of the ministry of science and education. Th e security and foreign policy bloc 
remained virtually the same, with the exception of the emergency situations 
ministry, but there were signifi cant changes in the economic and defence 
portfolios. Medvedev’s long-term ally Konstantin Chuichenko became the 
government’s chief of staff , while Dmitry Rogozin, responsible for the defence 
and space industries, was replaced by deputy defence minister Yuri Borisov. Th ere 
was disappointed anticipation that Kudrin would be given some sort of advisory 
role to manage economic reform and to rebuild relations with the West. Kudrin 
was not given a top ministerial or advisory post, but his allies dominated the 
cabinet, notably the fi nance minister, Anton Siluanov, and the former head of the 
Audit Chamber, Tatyana Golikova. Kudrin had long urged structural reform and 
argued that democratisation of the political system would help alleviate tensions 
with the West.  58  His plans for structural reform, issued by the CSR and dubbed 
‘Plan K’, included slashing the number of bureaucrats by 30 per cent in six years, 
a resumption of the ‘administrative reform’ launched by Putin when he fi rst came 
to power, which would see expenditure on the state apparatus falling from the 
current 2.5 per cent of the GDP to 1.74 per cent. He called for signifi cant increases 
in spending on education, healthcare and infrastructure, noting that Russia 
devoted 11 per cent of its GDP to this, whereas the average in the West was some 
14 per cent. In short, Kudrin sought a ‘transition from a band-aid approach to 
development’.  59   
 In the event, it was impossible for Kudrin to join the cabinet as a deputy prime 
minister because of his strained personal relations with Medvedev. Instead, Kudrin 
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was appointed head of the Audit Chamber, disappointing those who looked for 
radical reform. Kudrin set himself four goals in his new post: curbing corruption, 
linking Russia’s strategic goals to the actual budget, enhancing budgetary 
control and informing the public on progress in fulfi lling national development 
goals.  60  Th e Audit Chamber’s regulatory powers over regional expenditures 
were expanded through amendments to the Budget Code on 30 May, and later 
it was given a broader mandate to fi ght corruption and greater oversight powers 
over government expenditure. In that context, ‘Plan K’ stood a good chance of 
being implemented, accompanied by continued budgetary conservatism and 
macroeconomic stability. It also meant the possible launching of unpopular 
reforms with potentially catastrophic social and political consequences. Th ese 
included the dismissal of up to a third of all Russia government offi  cials as part 
of attempts to slim the bureaucracy as governance became increasingly digitised. 
It could also mean the closure of some ineffi  cient factories, including those in the 
three hundred so-called company towns (monotowns, or  monogoroda ), in which 
a single industry or employer dominates the local economy, with devastating 
results for the fourteen million people living in them. It would also mean serious 
moves to dilute the centralisation of power and resources. In 2019, Moscow and 
St Petersburg together produced 32 per cent of Russia’s output, compared to 25 
per cent fi ft een years earlier. Kudrin’s call for some other urban centres, such 
as Ekaterinburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk and Vladivostok, to become 
locomotives for growth was refl ected in the government’s ‘Spatial Development 
Strategy until 2025’, adopted in February 2019.  61  Above all, discussions over 
raising the pension age took place against the background of the long-term decline 
of pensions as a proportion of working-age incomes. Various studies projected 
that raising the pension age would have a considerable eff ect on boosting GDP 
growth.  62  Overall, in his post at the Audit Chamber, Kudrin was set to infl uence 
economic policy and maintain macroeconomic discipline. 
 Putin’s Federal Assembly address of 1 March was given force through a new set 
of ‘May Decrees’ issued on the evening of his inauguration, 7 May 2018, outlining 
his plans for the next six years. With military modernisation considered complete, 
attention now returned to social and economic development. Th e ambitious goals 
included accelerating productivity growth to 5 per cent (the average since 2009 
had been 1 per cent), doubling the share of SMEs in the GDP from 20 per cent to 
40 per cent and increasing the number of people employed by SMEs from nineteen 
million to twenty-fi ve million. Th e number of people living below the poverty line, 
at the time some twenty million people or 13.8 per cent of the population, was to 
be halved. Th e focus was to be on domestic development, accompanied by cuts 
to the defence budget. Th ere would be a surge in spending on roads, education 
and healthcare accompanied by increases in real incomes, raising pensions and 
cutting poverty, as well as investment in high-tech, export-oriented industries 
and the creation of ‘transport corridors’ to improve Russia’s road, rail and sea 
9781788318303_pi-306.indd   208 15-Oct-19   12:25:38
209
THE WINDS OF CHANGE 209
connections with the outside world. Th is was to achieve the goal of creating at 
least $250 billion in non-resource, non-energy exports annually, part of Russia’s 
long-term diversifi cation strategy. Russia was to join the group of the world’s fi ve 
largest economies by 2024 by raising its growth rate above the global average while 
maintaining macroeconomic stability (a warning shot against the mobilisation 
school of national development), with infl ation not to rise above 4 per cent. 
 Th e detailed implementation plan drawn up later imposed detailed key 
performance indicators for twelve national projects. Th ese ranged from 
demography, healthcare, education, housing, ecology, motorways, labour 
productivity, science, culture and SMEs to international cooperation and support 
for exporters. Life expectancy (currently averaging 72 years: 77 for women and 
only 66 for men) was to be increased to 78  years (80  years by 2030), and the 
‘unacceptable’ poverty rate was to be halved. Development of the digital economy 
was a priority, including a large and secure information and communication 
technology (ICT) infrastructure for high-speed broadband, accompanied by 
a shift  to the use of home-produced soft ware. Information security was to be 
achieved by using domestic technologies.  63  Th ese were all worthy goals, but as 
critics like Kudrin pointed out, they avoided addressing the crucial issue of reform 
of the justice system and tackling corruption. As one commentator noted, Putin 
had governed Russia as a rich country, spending on extravagant showcase projects 
and military modernisation, whereas governing Russia as a poor country would 
focus on tackling poverty, inequality, energy effi  ciency, education and health.  64  
 Th e national projects were estimated to cost some  ₽ 8 trillion ($126 billion), 
with the funds in part coming from cuts in the defence budget. Military spending 
had grown by around 10 per cent annually for much of the Putin era to reach 6.6 
per cent of the GDP in 2016, but by 2018, this had fallen to 3.9 percent and was 
projected to fall further. Th e shift  in priorities from guns to butter refl ected what 
the Levada Centre had identifi ed as a growing ‘war weariness’ in the population. 
Although half of Russians appreciated the country’s restoration of great power 
status, 45 per cent faulted Putin for having failed to ensure a more equitable 
income distribution. Meanwhile, VTsIOM found that although Putin’s personal 
approval rating remained astronomically high, at 82 per cent, almost 90 per cent 
said that the country needed reform, while only 2 per cent considered no change 
necessary.  65  If Western sanctions were designed to alienate the Russian people 
from Putin, then they had spectacularly failed. 
 With the election out of the way, the government on 14 June 2018 announced 
a rise in value-added tax (VAT) from 18 to 20 per cent from 2019. Even more 
portentously, Medvedev on the same day, the opening of the World Cup, introduced 
legislation to increase the retirement age for men from 60 to 65  years by 2028 
and from 55 to 63 years for women by 2034. Th e forty-four million pensioners 
comprised a third of the country’s population, although twelve million continued 
to work and twelve million had disabilities. Russia’s working-age population was 
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decreasing as a proportion of the total population, having fallen from 62 per cent 
in 2010 to 58 per cent in 2018. Th e proportion of pensioners was anticipated to 
rise sharply over the next decade, at a time when the Russian Pension Fund (RPF) 
is already running a defi cit of $53 billion, with the shortfall made up by transfers 
from the general budget. Pension spending was approaching 9 per cent of the 
GDP. It was estimated that the reform will save the government some $27 billion a 
year while allowing pensions to be increased. 
 Even though the change would not aff ect current pensioners, the move 
provoked a wave of protests. Given Russia’s enormous natural wealth, it was 
not clear why the National Welfare Fund was worth just 5 per cent of the GDP. 
Similarly, why not increase taxes on the rich, decrease spending on ‘vanity’ 
projects and foreign wars (Ukraine, Syria), reduce corruption, and divert more 
energy revenues directly into the RPF. Th e pension reform appeared to break the 
fundamental premise of the Putinite social contract: the continuation of Soviet-
era benefi ts in return for Soviet-style political quiescence. Navalny intiated 
some twenty demonstrations on 1 July, but more signifi cantly the trade unions 
organised protest meetings across the country. A Levada Centre poll found that 
89 per cent viewed the pension reform negatively, reinforcing popular alienation 
from the state.  66  Th e Supreme Court announced an easing of the harsh rules 
governing street rallies, imposed in June 2012 in the wake of the Bolotnaya 
protests, limiting the right of municipal authorities to ban meetings. Aft er a long 
period of silence on the issue, on 29 August, Putin off ered concessions, reducing 
the pension age for women to 60 years, guaranteeing pre-pensioners the right 
to work in the fi ve years before the retirement age set by the new law and some 
other measures.  67  Putin undoubtedly remembered how plans to monetise Soviet-
era social benefi ts in 2005 provoked the largest mass protests over social issues 
of his presidency. 
 A Levada poll in July 2018 found that only 16 per cent of the population 
supported Putin’s foreign policy, down from 22 per cent two years earlier, 
reinforcing the need to focus on domestic issues.  68  At the same time, it was clear 
that Putin was looking for a way to mend fences with the West, and, thus, despite 
the cascade of sanctions he kept the door open for a summit with Trump. Kudrin 
had long argued that the restoration of economic growth required an easing of 
sanctions and access to Western fi nance and technology. Instead, it appeared that 
the virtual state of war with the West had become the new normal. However, Putin 
tried to avoid being driven into a ‘fortress Russia’ corner, and this is why his fourth 
term began with such ambitious developmental plans. Th ere was nothing here 
about self-isolation, although a robust response to what were considered Western 
provocations would continue. Th e overall strategy was ‘Russia fi rst’, with the 
emphasis on spending on roads, education and healthcare. Th ere were ambitious 
growth targets, but macroeconomic stability was not to be sacrifi ced. It was in this 
context that Putin met Trump for their fi rst summit in Helsinki on 16 July 2018. 
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Expectations for the meeting were deliberately kept low, and in the event, even 
less was achieved because of the catastrophic fallout of the Russiagate allegations. 
 As for the succession, no sooner was he elected than the question was posed. 
On the evening of his victory, Putin was asked whether he planned to change the 
constitution, to which he replied that he had none in mind ‘yet’. When asked to 
clarify whether this allowed the possibility of him becoming president again in 
2030 if he did not change the constitution, Putin replied, ‘Listen to me … Let 
us count. Am I supposed to be president until I am 100 years old? No.’  69  On 25 
May 2018, on the sidelines of SPIEF, Putin confi rmed his intention to abide by 
the constitutional limit of two consecutive terms. In a news conference, Putin 
answered, ‘I have always abided strictly and will abide by Russia’s constitution.’ 
He went on to note, ‘Now I am serving the second consecutive term. … As you 
remember, I was president twice before and then stepped down from offi  ce since 
the Constitution does not allow to be elected for the third term. Th at’s all. I am 
going to comply with the rule in future.’  70  He conducted a minor reshuffl  e of 
his administration. Vaino remained chief of staff , but his fi rst deputy, Kirienko, 
gained two additional briefs: managing the aff airs of the State Council (there are 
persistent rumours that this could be a vehicle for Putin to retain power aft er 
2024) and responsibility for information technologies and e-democracy, allowing 
him to fi ght attempts by the security services to clamp down on internet freedom. 
 Th e regional elections in September 2018 revealed powerful protest sentiments, 
with the CPRF winning regional legislatures in three regions and UR forced into 
run-off  gubernatorial elections in another four, while the opposition won the 
mayoral election in Yakutsk. In Primorsky Krai, the CPRF candidate, Andrei 
Ishchenko, was heading for victory when a late surge of votes allowed the UR 
candidate to win. Th is was obviously fraud, and Pamfi lova insisted on a rerun. It 
was not clear why there was such ‘manual intervention’ in the vote, since Irkutsk 
Oblast had long been run by opposition parties and the sky had not fallen in. In 
the new vote, the winner (with 62 per cent of the vote), Oleg Kozhemyako, ran as 
an independent, confi rming the trend towards governors losing party affi  liation as 
the UR ‘brand’ became increasingly toxic. Th e Primorsky case shows how the fi ght 
for mechanical stability had become such a deeply ingrained refl ex that it came to 
undermine stability. Pension reform and the rise in VAT alienated voters, and it 
was only to be expected that this would be refl ected in the ballot box.  71  It was also 
refl ected in the sharp fall in Putin’s personal ratings. By early 2019, trust in Putin 
had fallen to a thirteen-year low, slipping down to 33.4 per cent in January, the 
lowest since January 2006. His approval rating remained high at 62.1 per cent, still 
above the historic low of 59 per cent in August 2013. Nevertheless, this represented 
a sharp fall from the historic highs of an over 80 per cent approval which had been 
maintained since the Crimea crisis.  72  Th e Crimea boost was clearly over. Th ese 
data confi rm the pent-up demand for change, accompanied by a desire for greater 
equality, to be delivered by the traditional paternalistic distributive mechanisms.  73  
9781788318303_pi-306.indd   211 15-Oct-19   12:25:38
212
212  THE PUTIN PARADOX
 Th e catastrophic consequences of the last bout of major reform in the 
late 1980s  – the dissolution of the political system and the disintegration of 
the country  – still casts a long shadow. Th e concept of ‘reform’ has negative 
connotations. Nevertheless, Russia appears to move in thirty-year cycles, and there 
is a pent-up demand for change, although diff erent parts of society understand the 
term diff erently. Up to 80 per cent of respondents in one survey wanted change, 
with those who had gained least from earlier reforms – people over 55, poor and 
without higher education living in towns with fewer than a hundred thousand 
inhabitants – the keenest for radical change. Th ere was a large bloc of gradualists, 
many of whom supported Putin, who wished for judicial reform, free elections 
and media freedoms – a very large constituency which could be found in Moscow 
and the big cities. Contrary to popular views, young people were not the only 
drivers of change, although the generation who had grown up with Putin knew no 
alternative and feared losing the stability given by his system. Th ere was a general 
consensus across all social groups that the government’s priority should be the 
people’s welfare, including higher living standards and greater justice, and, thus, 
less of a focus on foreign aff airs. Th ere is a strong awareness that reforms come 
at a cost, and over three-quarters oppose changes in social benefi ts. Russia was 
caught in a bind: change was recognised as necessary, but people were reluctant to 
countenance changes that would aff ect their immediate personal welfare.  74  Th is is 
the dilemma at the heart of the Putin phenomenon. 
 Putin’s presidential address to Federal Assembly on 20 February 2019 
recognised these issues in a speech that was largely devoted to domestic aff airs 
and socio-economic development. He described the resources devoted to the 
national projects, in particular to deal with the demographic challenge. He 
outlined an impressive list of promises to deal with poverty, schools without 
heating or running water, waste problems, access to medical care, high-speed 
internet, nurseries, mortgage lending, ways of dealing with economic crimes and 
much more.  75  All this was highly ambitious but refl ected Putin’s view that with 
military modernisation largely completed and Russia defended by the various 
advanced missile and other systems (he devoted a fi ft h of the speech to this issue), 
he could return to the agenda outlined when he fi rst took offi  ce – to concentrate 
on domestic development. Putin’s renewed focus on development and social 
issues refl ected concern that the whole edifi ce of Putinite stability was fragile and 
could collapse under the pressure of external sanctions and the pent-up demand 
for change at home. Th e systemic and non-systemic opposition was weak and 
divided, yet street fi ghters like Navalny could, in a crisis, mobilise the masses.  76  
Th e extensive protests in the summer of 2019 against the exclusion of independent 
non-systemic candidates from the Moscow City Duma elections of 8 September 
acted as a warning of what could be to come. Th e heavy-handed response, with 
mass arrests and brutal beatings, served only to swell the number of participants. 
Th ese protests were largely leaderless and demonstrated the mobilising power 
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of social media. Th e fundamental question is the degree to which the roots of 
organic solidarity had sunk through the carpet of mechanical stability into the 
society below, and the extent to which the institutions of the constitutional state 
could assume the burden of governance if regime mechanisms retreated or were 
destroyed. In other words, could Putinite stability endure without Putin? 
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 We are now in a position to refl ect on the Putin phenomenon more broadly, including 
an assessment of his character and reception abroad. We can ask whether there is 
such a thing as ‘Putinism’, and if so, what its main characteristics are. Equally, it is 
appropriate to examine whether some ‘grand strategy’ underpins Russian policy 
in the Putin era and, in particular, in foreign policy. A grand strategy is defi ned 
as some deep structure to domestic and foreign policy that transcends individual 
leaders and which has some overarching purpose. A grand strategy identifi es a 
nation’s core interests, what external forces pose a threat and who are the country’s 
friends, and how the country’s leadership can respond. By contrast, one of the 
main criticisms levelled against Putin is that he is brilliant at tactics, above all, in 
factional manoeuvring, but lacks an overarching vision of where Russia should 
go. Th ere is some truth in this, and certainly Putin avoids any grand statement of 
his ‘certain idea of Russia’ (to paraphrase Charles de Gaulle’s ‘All my life, I have 
had a certain idea of France’), but Putin has never been reticent about talking 
about the problems and challenges facing Russia, from his  Millennium Manifesto 
onwards. He was unequivocal in stating that foreign policy should serve domestic 
development, but from the Russian perspective (and this is the consensus view of 
the Russian elite at least since Primakov), the failure to devise an adequate post-
Cold War peace order forced Russia into a more assertive foreign policy stance. 
Russian domestic development is inextricably entwined with foreign policy issues, 
although neither can be simply reduced to the other, but it is out of this dynamic 
interplay that the Putin phenomenon has been shaped. 
 Putin’s people and power 
 Putin is one of the most traduced political leaders of our era. Matt Taibbi calls 
this ‘Putin derangement syndrome’, the exaggerated and fact-free assertion of 
supernatural and typically demonic powers to the man. Putin emerged as some sort 
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of universal demiurge in the 2016 US presidential election, and in the following 
period Russia was the stick used to beat Trump and to weaken his authority. Much 
of the Russiagate scandal was a fact-free zone in which political fantasies and 
conspiracy theories played out. Russia was involved in the election, through the 
social media activities of the St Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency, as well 
as possibly the exfi ltration of material from the servers of the Democratic National 
Committee and others associated with the Democratic Party campaign, but the 
scale and eff ect of this activity still remains to be assessed. Russia’s ‘hacking’ of 
American democracy allowed the worst prejudices against Russia to be given free 
rein, accompanied by vindictive sanctions. Liberal globalists and neoconservatives 
united in their condemnation, and only orthodox conservatives (like Patrick 
Buchanan) and elements of the traditional left  challenged the consensus.  
 Brian Taylor argues that the phenomenon can be defi ned by what he calls ‘the 
code of Putinism’, a certain worldview of Putin and his associates combined with 
a set of beliefs about the strong state, conservative values, anti-Westernism and 
hyper-masculinity. Th e Putin system in his view is more than Putin’s personal 
preferences but represents a certain mentality and social construct based on 
‘clans’ and ‘networks’. Th e system in his view is also dysfunctional, making 
Russia ‘an underperforming country at the domestic level and an overambitious 
one at the international level’.  1  Th e ‘code of Putinism’ explains the ‘move from 
a frail but functional semidemocratic system in 2000 to the authoritarian 
hyperpresidentialism we see today’.  2  Matters are rather more complicated than 
that. Th e roots of post-communist authoritarianism reach back to the anti-
communist revolution and the 1990s, the power system remains fragmented 
although superfi cially concentrated and the alleged ‘hyperpresidentialism’ of the 
‘power vertical’ is challenged by powerful horizontal forces. 
 Th e pressures unleashed by Putin’s style of governance impelled one of his 
bravest and most perceptive critics to fl ee the country. Yulia Latynina has a column 
in the investigative  Novaya Gazeta newspaper and a weekly programme on the 
politically independent  Ekho Moskvy radio station. Aft er an escalating series of 
provocations, including the release of some sort of gas into her home and her 
car being burnt, she left  Russia in September 2017, although she continued her 
journalistic work. In her valedictory letter she notes, 
 My departure from Russia comes as a surprise – even to me. I always laughed 
at those who, seven or eight years ago, said Russia was a dangerous country 
and that Putin was worse than Stalin. Because this was not the case. When 
Anna Politkovskaya was murdered in 2006 we journalists understood this 
to be an exception – she had been investigating Chechnya. Th ere were cases 
where people were poisoned, like Alexander Litvinenko, but we understood 
that he was a former KGB agent and Putin regarded him as a traitor. … Now the 
situation has changed drastically. A tidal wave of violence has been unleashed, 
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with the attacks around the fi lm ‘Mathilde’ being just one example. It’s not that 
Putin or the Kremlin are directly instigating these kinds of attacks. … Th ey’re 
empowering ‘local talent’, and those people are given a free pass … to become 
great in the eyes of Putin. Th is doesn’t absolve the Kremlin from responsibility. 
It makes it worse. 
 She went on to make the case for the classical Weberian state: ‘Th e state should 
have a monopoly over violence. And by withdrawing the direct connection 
between the people who perpetrate violence and the Kremlin – which sanctions it, 
but does not order it – it is renouncing control.’ She is right to note that the  
 watershed moment was the murder of Boris Nemtsov [on 27 February 2015]. 
Putin was furious. He saw the murder as an encroachment on his power and 
it was. Under the guise of serving Putin, the man who gave commands to the 
Chechen killers showed that he, and not Putin, is all-powerful, because for him 
real power is the power to kill anybody.  3   
 I have quoted Latynina at length because she accurately diagnosed the failure 
to impose the monopoly on violence and, indeed, to uphold the law when it came 
to business raiding and the emergence of regime-affi  liated business and other 
interests that the regime could challenge only at the peril of its own existence. 
Equally, the pact with the Chechen leadership provided short-term benefi ts but in 
the long run undermined the integrity of the state and potentially even unleashed 
forces that could challenge the power of the regime. Despite all of this, Latynina 
promised, ‘I will be back. Once things sort themselves out.’ We look forward to 
her return; and, with her, so many who have been forced to leave their homeland 
not because of Putin’s presidentialism but because of the culture of power that he 
fostered and because of his pusillanimity when it came to challenging horizontally 
entrenched societal forces and interests. He did in the end take on the  vory v 
zakone but not the entrenched interests closer to home. 
 Th e perception of systemic disruption intensifi ed as Putin entered his fourth 
term. Sechin exerts enormous informal power at the head of Rosneft , but in 
destroying Ulyukaev he may well have wished to consolidate his political status 
as an untouchable political actor.  4  His heavy-handed assertion of what he took 
to be Rosneft ’s interests created enemies while alienating allies. Th e attack on 
Ulyukaev warned the whole elite that no one was safe.  5  At the same time, long-
dormant institutions were coming back to life. Following the September 2016 
parliamentary elections, Volodin revamped the Duma’s organisational apparatus, 
changed legislative procedures and tried to impose greater discipline on the voting 
behaviour of deputies. Th e Duma no longer churned out ill-considered laws, 
although by all means not all were wise. Almost half of the Duma’s members changed 
in the elections of September 2016, while in 2017 alone, one-fi ft h of the country’s 
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eighty-fi ve regional governors were replaced. In mid-2017, the leadership of UR 
changed. Although Medvedev remained the nominal leader, Andrei Turchak took 
over at the head of the party’s General Council. He moved quickly to revive the 
party’s governing structures and tried to make UR a more ‘constructive’ actor in 
the making of policy and management of political aff airs. Above all, he sought to 
reduce UR’s dependence on the executive. As one perceptive commentary puts it, 
 Turchak’s stance is an indication of how there are now diff erent autonomous 
forces in Russian domestic politics, whose leaders have their own personal 
access to the main stakeholder, Vladimir Putin. Each structure has its own 
bargaining power and can form coalitions with others under the umbrella of a 
‘Domestic Policy Corporation’. … Meanwhile, the subsidiaries will continue to 
break away from the grip of a once-unifi ed domestic policy holding and try to 
take over their counterparts.  6  
 Amid the signs of elite turbulence, there were indications of rising centrifugal 
trends. Elements of resistance in the regions suggested that the power of 
‘horizontalism’ remains as strong as ever. In January 2017, for example, the 
governor of Belgorod Oblast since 1993, Yevgeny Savchenko, ignored pressure 
from the Kremlin to resign and announced that he would run for re-election, and 
in due course he was voted back into offi  ce. Belgorod in the 1990s had been part of 
the so-called ‘red belt’ of communist regions but since then had fl ourished within 
the framework of a distinctive model of regional developmentalism. Tatarstan has 
long defended its privileges, and although in summer 2017 Moscow refused to 
renew the federal treaty, the republic continues to resist centralising pressures. 
Attempts to remove Tatar language courses as a compulsory part of the school 
curriculum were stymied, although the struggle continues. Th ere was also a battle 
over budget revenues, with Sakhalin managing to retain 50 per cent of its oil 
production revenues, when Moscow tried to take 75 per cent.  7  Overall, despite 
attempts at renewal and technocratic reformulation, the Putin system is based on 
extreme elite stability. A Reuters study in late 2017 compared the profi les of 784 
current regional governors, members of the Federal Assembly, the government, 
the Security Council and the presidential administration to the 768 who were in 
power in May 2012. It found little sign of renewal. Of the 784 positions, 314 had 
changed hands in the previous two years, fewer than in May 2012 when that fi gure 
was 368. Typically, when an offi  cial loses their job, they are found another post. 
Th e average age of all offi  cials rose from 52.6 in 2012 to 55.5 in 2017.  8  
 Th e shift  into a neo-revisionist stance aft er 2012 was accompanied by attempts 
to ‘nationalise’ the elites. Th e ultimate goal was to reduce the threat of splits and 
betrayal, but the immediate goal was to render Russia less susceptible to foreign 
pressure by ensuring that political and business leaders kept their wealth and 
property at home. Harsh registration requirements were imposed on foreign 
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holdings, and certain categories of politicians were totally prohibited from owning 
foreign property or bank accounts. As in the economy, a long-term import 
substitution strategy was applied to insulate the country from foreign threats. 
Putin treated the country in the way that he managed his leadership: maximum 
autonomy and minimum dependency. Th e repatriation of funds and property had 
the incidental benefi t, from the regime point of view, of rendering the elite more 
vulnerable to domestic constraints. 
 Th e former Kremlin adviser, Gleb Pavlovsky, has long talked about a ‘collective 
Putin’ – suggesting that he is the aggregator of the consensus views of the Russian 
elite and that his role has become ‘more formal and less decisive’.  9  Th e independent 
behaviour of such business leaders as Alisher Usmanov and, above all, Sechin 
reinforces the argument that the elite could comfortably survive without him. In 
the 2018 election, Pavlovsky went further to argue that ‘it is now possible to talk 
about a system that operates without Putin’, with Putin less inclined to intervene in 
the power struggles within the elite, and as an apolitical president, one who ‘never 
been interested in classical “politics”, seeing it as an empty term’, allowing decisions 
to be taken in his name. Russia was developing, in his view, into a ‘collective 
regency’, with Putin’s inner circle and the presidential administration as a whole 
becoming independent players in their own right. Th e accelerated appointment 
of ‘technocrats’ was the fi rst step of the ‘transition into the post-Putin Russia’. 
Th us, 2018 was not about getting to a post-Putin Russia but about planning the 
transition.  10  Th ere is something to be said for this, but Putin’s independent agency 
should never be underestimated. 
 Th e Minchenko analytical company has long been tracking changes in the 
elite through the use of the ‘Politburo 2.0’ metaphor, rejecting the ‘collective 
Putin’ model in favour of the old Soviet Politburo archetype of delegated power. 
Th e term was coined in a report published in 2012 arguing that the Russian power 
system comprised a network of delegated authority reminiscent of the Soviet 
Politburo.  11  Th e new representation of the Politburo is not a formal institution, 
and unlike its predecessor it does not meet regularly in the Kremlin’s Walnut 
Room, and neither does it have any formal procedures. Th e new model includes 
the most infl uential fi gures in contemporary Russian politics, including the top 
government offi  cials and business interests that are aligned with the Kremlin. 
Th e focus is on the so-called ‘power vertical’, but the Politburo model once again 
reinforces the argument that the ‘power horizontal’ is no less important. In a 
later report, the Minchenko group argued that the Russian governance model 
had changed from a binary or ‘bipolar model’, in which two micro-factions 
broadly balanced each other, towards a sectoral approach in which Putin’s 
power rested on his ability to adjudicate the allocation of resources to key 
sectors, including the defence industrial complex, the energy sector (notably 
Sechin), industrialists and manufacturers (Chemezov), the fi nancial sector and 
the security apparatus.  12  
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 Th e authority of the government offi  cials is derived both from their formal 
offi  ces as well as their closeness to Putin. Th is group includes Medvedev, the 
minister of defence Sergei Shoigu, as well as the mayor of Moscow, Sobyanin. 
Th e other major group comprises business people who are part of Putin’s inner 
court: Arkady Rotenberg, Gennady Timchenko and Yuri Kovalchuk. Some fi gures 
bridge the two constituencies, notably Sechin, who in certain respects became a 
law unto himself. Th e Politburo analogy is complemented by the ‘court’ model, 
comprising various individuals with no formal government authority or business 
interests but who nevertheless are infl uential. Th ese include Tikhon Shevkunov, 
the Orthodox bishop formerly at the Sretensky Monastery and now Metropolitan 
of Pskov and Porkhov, who is considered Putin’s confessor. Individuals who began 
their careers as part of Putin’s court later moved to occupy offi  cial positions, notably 
Putin’s protocol offi  cer Anton Vaino who became head of the PA, Alexei Dyumin, 
Putin’s former chief security guard and advisor before becoming governor of 
Tula Oblast in February 2016, and Yevgeny Zinichev, a former bodyguard who 
before being appointed minister for emergency situations in May 2018 was acting 
governor of Kaliningrad region.  13  Th e old generation was not leaving but there 
was a gradual transition to new leaders. Th e existing system tried to renew itself to 
avert transitioning to a new order. 
 Is Putin an ism? 
 Is there such a thing as Putinism? Can his name be associated with a distinctive 
political practice and ideology to merit the addition of the ‘ism’ suffi  x? Or is Putin 
just another transactional rather than transformational leader?  14  Despite his 
longevity in offi  ce, is Putin simply part of the long tradition of Russian authoritarian 
leaders whose top-down methods fail to achieve Russia’s genuine modernisation?  15  
Perhaps ultimately the whole Putin phenomenon is little more than a Russian 
version of postmodern populism or nativist illiberalism? Putin undoubtedly has 
an inimitable style, but that in itself does not add up to an original combination of 
ideas and practices. Or by contrast, did Putin reshape politics to the degree that he 
set Russia on a trajectory that will shape the country’s future? 
 Putinism certainly exists in the limited sense that it is a distinctive response to 
specifi c problems of Russian development and governance. Although it represents 
a certain style of governance and type of statecraft , it has much in common with 
the one devised by Yeltsin within the framework of the dual state but made to work 
much better. Th is model of regime-society relations delivers certain public goods, 
but it is profl igate and stunts talent and the entrepreneurial spirit, although it does 
not stifl e them entirely. Above all, the system of managed democracy undermines 
the transformation of the consumer and bourgeois into a  citoyen , someone aware 
of their political and social rights in a constitutional state and ready to defend 
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them. Th ere has been no attempt to restore even a basic level of Soviet-style 
equality, and instead Russia remains one of the most unequal countries in the 
world. Putinism is a distinctive synthesis of authoritarian managerial practices and 
democratic proceduralism, neo-liberal social policies and neo-Soviet paternalism, 
partial decommunisation and hesitant destalinisation, and a combination of 
adaptation and resistance to the US-led liberal international order. But is it an 
enduring historical or international phenomenon, even if elements are replicated 
elsewhere and will no doubt be repeated in Russia? From this perspective, the 
moniker ‘Putinism’ is inappropriate. Putinism is not a movement with an enduring 
structure that will outlast the rule of its founder. It not an original programme for 
the transformation of economy and society, and its foreign policy is in line with 
that pursued by Russia for decades if not centuries. It is not an ideology in which 
adherents can have faith, providing coherent answers to the mysteries of national 
fate and destiny. Th e defence of national sovereignty and cultural traditions does 
have resonance elsewhere, but it is far from unique to Russia. Putinism is a rational 
(although not necessarily the optimal) response to immediate challenges, and to 
that extent gains support if not adherents, but it lacks a transcendent quality that 
off ers a better vision of the future or which could be substantively appealing to 
other countries. 
 Considered in its time and place and within the framework of a pragmatic lens, 
Putin provided answers to many of the questions facing post-communist Russia. 
Putinism may not have been the ideal solution, but in the harsh conditions of a 
country trying to reconstitute itself from the debris of a collapsed social order 
and in which the dominant external powers, generously but misguidedly, tried not 
only to turn Russia into a new version of themselves but also to render it a toothless 
international power, Putin’s solutions were cogent and logical. Ultimately, Putin 
did not repudiate the principles on which post-communist Russia is founded and 
thus remains heir to the aspirations of the anti-communist democratic revolution. 
Equally, Putin remained loyal to the vision of a proud and independent Russia 
initially enshrined in the Declaration of State Sovereignty of 12 June 1990. No less 
important, the country’s political economy remains market capitalism, although 
with a state corporatist neo-patrimonial twist. In all three respects Putin is 
transactional, believing that what works in a given situation is best. Putin tamed 
the extremes of left ist restorationism and right-wing revanchism, and drew on the 
power of the four main ideo-interest currents to preside over an unprecedented 
era of political consensus and even of concord. But this has been achieved in a 
bureaucratic manner and in a technocratic style to achieve mechanical solidarity. 
Will the stability generated by that consensus be maintained without Putin’s skilled 
and pragmatic leadership? Th e historical situation remains open, and the tension 
between the two wings of the dual state represents divergent options for Russia’s 
future development. In his absence, will the institutions of the constitutional state 
come into their own and sustain a more competitive and accountable democracy, 
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or will the incumbent elites rally round to consolidate the authoritarianism of the 
regime state? Can there be a smooth transition to genuine constitutionalism, or 
will the country once again descend into a war of all against all? 
 We have described the anti-revolutionary ethos underlying the transactional 
and pragmatic Putin phenomenon. Russian history since 1991 represents some 
sort of ‘restoration’, as aft er the English Revolution in 1660 and Napoleonic France 
in 1815. In both cases, the achievements of the earlier period were incorporated 
into the new system, although shorn of their radicalism. Th ere is no attempt to 
reverse the results of the revolution, but the principles on which the revolution was 
conducted are repudiated. In the Russian case, Putin not only incorporated much 
of the welfare benefi ts of the Soviet system into his social policy and reproduced a 
Soviet-style social contract of stability and progress in return for political passivity 
but at the same time also accepted the results of liberal revolution of the 1990s. 
Putin came under pressure from both the communists and liberals like Navalny to 
challenge the ‘loans-for-shares’ privatisations of the mid-1990s, but apart from the 
appropriation of the Yukos oil company (for a specifi c set of reasons), the property 
settlement of the 1990s remains largely in place. In fact, Putin accelerated the 
creation of the legal framework for a market economy, and although in rhetorical 
terms he condemned the excesses of the period, he accepted that he was a legatee 
of its achievements. He understood that even in the late Yeltsin period under the 
management of Chubais, Nemtsov, Kirienko and others, and above all Primakov 
when he was prime minister from September 1998 to May 1999, the oligarchs were 
already on the retreat, the public fi nances were better managed and from late 1999 
the economy had already returned to growth.  16  
 Putin’s restoration, in other words, has been a very moderate one, and it 
certainly did not represent a counter-revolution. Th e corollary of Putin’s anti-
revolutionism is the profound moderation of Russian politics aft er more than a 
century of excess. Th e second half of the nineteenth century saw the increasing 
radicalisation of the Russian intelligentsia, with a part assuming a revolutionary 
strategy and others adopting more militantly conservative, even reactionary, 
positions. Th is culminated in one of the most radical events of the twentieth 
century, the Bolshevik revolution. Th e extreme wing of the revolutionary socialist 
movement then imposed perhaps the world’s most ambitious attempt to eradicate 
market relations, although tempered by numerous tactical retreats. In the end, the 
success of the project proved its greatest failing. Th e refusal even in the post-Stalin 
years to integrate market mechanisms into the planned economy (the Chinese-
style ‘communism of reform’ gambit) ultimately fostered ineffi  ciency, declining 
growth rates, shortage of consumer goods and services, and ultimately the collapse 
of the system. Once again, as in 1917, rather than an evolutionary transformation, 
1991 saw systemic collapse and the disintegration of the country. And once again, 
a radical faction of the intelligentsia drove forward a plan for the transformation 
of the country in a form of anti-communist neo-Bolshevism.  17  In comparison to 
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his predecessors, Putin is the great moderator. Th is is the fundamental source of 
his popularity. He represents a period of stabilisation aft er the revolutionary and 
counter-revolutionary storms that have racked the country for over a century. 
 A moderate is someone who tracks a path between extremes, and this is the 
essence of Putinism. While drawing on certain neoliberal ideas, Putin is far from a 
neoliberal, and the same applies to neo-traditionalism. His conservatism does not 
embrace such positions as banning abortions, although the percentage of Russians 
who consider the practice unacceptable has tripled over the last twenty years, from 
12 to 35 per cent.  18  Th e centre, as these data show, is never static but moves with the 
currents of political passion and interests; but Putin has moderated the political 
consequences of the shift s. Th ere is a normative core to moderation, as well as a 
sociological and historical foundation. Just as Charles II aft er the Restoration in 
1660 sought to draw the passion out of politics, and thus tempered the radicalism 
that had provoked the English Civil War, so the Putinite restoration focuses on 
pragmatic and technocratic consolidation and conservative modernisation. 
Equally, aft er the great transformative storm unleashed by the French Revolution 
in 1789, the Directory and then Napoleon Bonaparte sought to incorporate the 
positive without the radicalism of the revolutionary period, although it would take 
another half-century aft er his fi nal defeat in 1815 before France entered a proto-
Putinite period of consolidation under Napoleon III (see below). 
 Moderation is not abstract but has fundamental policy consequences. Putin’s 
resistance to the practices of Western hegemony resulted in his demonization, 
but he remains a moderate in foreign and domestic policy. In systemic terms, the 
Ukraine crisis was provoked by the radicalisation of all parties – Russia’s politics 
of resistance and neo-revisionism, the unmediated expansion of the Atlantic 
security system though NATO enlargement or bilateral US links, and the EU’s 
un-negotiated attempt to enlarge its sphere of infl uence to the East – but within 
that framework Putin’s response could have been far more extreme. Intervention 
in Crimea certainly represented the repudiation of the rules-based system as 
formulated aft er 1945, but from the Kremlin’s perspective, these rules had long 
been infringed by the Western powers when it suited them (the Israeli annexation 
of the Golan Heights is oft en mentioned in this context, as well as recognition 
of Kosovan independence), including the ‘coup’ that overthrew the legitimately 
elected leader of Ukraine. Zhirininovsky was pressing for Moscow to occupy the 
whole of Ukraine to liberate it from ‘fascist occupation’ and to restore a legitimate 
government in Kiev, while the CPRF also sought to free Ukraine from the alleged 
fascist yoke. A similar argument can be made about the Middle East, when ‘Putin 
was the moderate who saved Syria from destruction’.  19  
 Putin is in the Bonapartist tradition in seeking to fuse the left  and the right, 
off ering a combination of stability and reform. A  Bonapartist situation is one 
where social forces are equally balanced (in our case, between the bureaucracy 
and nascent political representations of the middle class), allowing the regime to 
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act with autonomy. Promoted as the ideology of reconciliation (comparable to 
 trasformismo in late-nineteenth-century Italy, discussed below), the inconclusive 
nature of the system takes the form of a dual state, with all of its inherent 
contradictions and accompanying stalemate. Th is is accompanied by the rejection 
of class politics, although when under pressure (as in 2012), Putin took advantage 
of his support among blue-collar and industrial workers to threaten the insurgent 
‘angry urbanites’, the nascent middle class demanding equal political inclusion 
and free and fair elections. At the same time, although political conformity is 
necessary for career progression, the Putin system does not demand internalised 
loyalty. It is not an ideological regime, and instead passivity or formal conformity 
is enough; even criticism is welcomed as long as it remains within the discursive 
bounds established by the regime. Th is provides a recipe for social peace and the 
pacifi cation of political extremes, but it can hardly inspire. While China still retains 
a belief in ‘the Marxist vision of a purposeful, ever-forward-moving, scientifi cally 
progressive history, one where the future is always better than the past’,  20  post-
communist Russia is devoid of such historical optimism. 
 Following the 1848 revolution and the overthrow of the ‘bourgeois’ rule of Louis 
Philippe, Louis Bonaparte, the nephew of Napoleon I, was elected president in 
December of that year and then, in a ‘self-coup’ on 2 December 1851, dissolved the 
National Assembly and thereaft er ruled as Napoleon III, with the ‘Second Empire’ 
declared in November 1852. Th e events are powerfully described by Karl Marx 
in his  Th e 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon , and his comments on the restoration 
of empire have relevance to Russia today: ‘Instead of  society having conquered a 
new content for itself, it seems that the  state only returned to its oldest form, to the 
shamelessly simple domination of the sabre and the cowl.’  21  Napoleon III appealed 
to French ‘greatness’, modernisation and a cross-class agenda of authoritative 
leadership cutting across the divisions of modernity. Th is is Putin’s agenda, 
drawing on the four main constituencies in contemporary Russia but entirely 
beholden to none. However, in both cases fundamental political issues remained 
unresolved:  in France, the ideals of the French revolution, and in particular the 
principle of popular sovereignty, came into contradiction with renewed imperial 
rule, while in Russia the normative ideals expressed in the 1993 constitution come 
into contradiction with the leadership and guardianship role arrogated by the 
administrative regime. Putin is rather less bombastic in foreign policy, although 
some would argue that Bonapartist adventurism in Mexico has its analogies in 
Putin’s actions in Ukraine and Syria. Napoleon III ruled until the Franco-Prussian 
War of 1870, which led to the catastrophic defeat of the Second Empire and his 
exile in England. 
 Bonapartism, as described by Marx, argues that the class stalemate (between 
the bourgeoisie and the working class) allowed Napoleon III to stand above all 
classes. Th e stability of the twenty years of the Second Empire saw the massive 
development of the railway network, the reconstruction of Paris and other cities, 
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access of women to higher education and belated industrialisation, but the political 
system in Marxist terms ‘lagged behind’ the economic base. Th is could be argued to 
be the case today in Russia, with a political regime managing society and political 
aff airs but not organically tied to the social structure. Th ere is the interpenetration 
of economic and political elite structures, notably in the corruption and inter-elite 
confl icts of the third state, but the lack of transparency and political accountability 
derives from the administrative regime trying to insulate itself from capture by 
social interests (as in the 1990s) or by the passions of the extremes, notably a mixed 
bag of neo-communists on the left  and various nationalists and populists on the 
right. As Marx noted of the Second Empire, ‘Only under the second Bonaparte does 
the state seem to have made itself completely independent. As against civil society, 
the state machine has consolidated its position.’  22  To overcome the contradiction 
and to keep the public gaze on himself, Napoleon III needed to ‘spring constant 
surprises, that is to say, under the necessity of executing a  coup d’ é tat en miniature 
every day’.  23  Th is describes Putin’s state of exception outlined earlier, although the 
surprises have been few. Th ere is force to the criticism that the Putinite system is an 
adequate response to the challenges of the mid-nineteenth century (and even that 
is questionable, as the fate of the Second Empire demonstrated) but not to those of 
the twenty-fi rst century. Th at is to deny the specifi c features of post-communism 
in Russia, which in a paradoxical way reproduces the dilemmas of the earlier era. 
Th e Russian revolution put time out of joint, and Putin and his cohort insisted 
that the political temporality of Russia, as a modernising great power, could not be 
determined elsewhere. 
 Putin has forged not so much a ‘historic bloc’ as a mechanical politics of 
consensus. Th is is the combination of interests and ideas to create what is taken to 
be ‘common sense’, an appreciation of what is normal and appropriate for the times. 
Th is can be summed up in Russia today by the idea of ‘conservative modernisation’, 
in which the two elements, just like the broader political system, are combined in 
a relatively stable equilibrium. Th e system is conservative rather than reactionary, 
appealing to traditional conservative values such as social stability, a historical 
version of the family structure and its perceived social values, the repudiation of 
radical change, the appeal to patriarchal paternalism accompanied by a neo-Soviet 
commitment to social security, state paternalism and social emancipation, above 
all, for women. In other words, to be a conservative in post-communist conditions 
is diff erent than being a conservative in a mature democracy (the radicalisation 
represented by neo-conservatism in these countries is another issue). In Russia, 
conservatism is still genuinely conservative, in the Burkean sense; it does not 
exclude ameliorative change and sensible reform, but it eschews a vision of 
transformation based on an ideological programme.  24  
 Although Putin has an almost visceral fear of being constrained by any label 
or ideology, his leadership led a modernisation project. He did not allow himself 
to be trapped by the label (unlike Medvedev in his four-year term), but Putin 
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is a cautious moderniser. His industrial policy is reminiscent of the post-war 
development strategies in Japan and South Korea, tempered by the  dirigisme of 
post-war France and the social-democratic developmentalism of ‘old Labour’ in 
Britain. Rostec hoovered up whole industries and sectors, yet provided space for 
them to modernise and become competitive. Th e next stage in classical economic 
theory would be the privatisation of these now successful companies (such as 
the Kamaz lorry plant in Tatarstan or GAZ in Nizhny Novgorod), but this was a 
step that Putin’s brand of conservative modernisation only hesitantly embraced, 
and even then largely for budgetary rather than ideological reasons. His was a 
conservatism that was statist in orientation and paternalist in social policy, rather 
than the Th atcherite version focused on hyper-individualism and rampant market 
forces. At the same time, Putin did not swerve to the opposite extreme, and there is 
little hint of proto-fascist, or even Orthodox, organicist ideas. Putin’s conservatism 
is liberal rather than collectivist. 
 Putin forged a ‘Putinite consensus’ rather than an enduring ‘historic bloc’. Just 
as in the factional model, the forces advancing the conservative modernisation 
project – the industrial managers, the working class, the bureaucracy, the organic 
intellectuals (Gramsci’s term for the intelligentsia serving the needs of a given 
hegemonic order) and even elements of the progressive statist intelligentsia 
concerned about Russia’s place in the world – all bought in to the Putinite model, 
while none were entirely satisfi ed. All have a stake but none can predominate; so in 
class terms, Putin speaks for the industrial working class, blue-collar workers and 
the vast state apparatus, while fostering the development of a consumer middle 
class while constraining their class power. Even intellectuals have bought into 
his vision of an independent and sovereign Russia conducting its independent 
foreign policy, while endorsing the limitations on oligarch power at home and 
the redevelopment of the country’s industrial and technological base. Of course, 
traditional intellectuals chafe at the restrictions while the middle class strives to 
become a ‘bourgeoisie’, where their representations of common sense become 
hegemonic. Instead, the Putin system spawned a vast army of ‘organic’ intellectuals, 
serving the needs of the regime itself. No class could pursue a hegemonic strategy, 
while each received a degree of satisfaction from the system. 
 In ideological terms, Putin revived the hallowed Italian tradition of 
 trasformismo , a fl exible centrist system of government prevalent from the mid-
1880s aft er Italian unifi cation. Putin’s reliance on the four major epistemic blocs 
structuring the Russian intellectual-interest community means that he pursues 
some liberal policies, but his administration is not liberal; and the same goes for 
the conservative-preservative tradition (the  okhraniteli ), the neo-traditionalists 
and the Eurasianists. Th e Soviet one-party system prevented the development of 
a classic West European-type party system, and conditions in post-communist 
Russia were not conducive to the belated construction of a classic left -right party 
system of the sort that in any case has been eroding in Europe. As a result, Putin 
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reproduced an archaic method of political management (highly reminiscent of 
Napoleon III’s), but one which was also becoming ‘postmodern’ in post-industrial 
societies. Th is is a result of the mimetic character of much of Putinism. To satisfy 
the neo-traditionalists, he went through the motions of restoring elements of the 
Soviet system; to please the  siloviki , he restored their status and privileges; and his 
pragmatic turn to the East allowed Eurasianists of various stripes to support his 
leadership. However, the problem of drawing on the forms and not the substance 
of the various factions was at its most acute when it came to the liberals. Here 
the mimetic quality was not so easy to square with the need to create genuine 
institutions that would sustain economic competitiveness, entrepreneurialism and 
civic dignity. While mimetic practices drew the sting from reactionary forces, it 
also enervated the constitutional foundations of the state which Putin proclaimed 
to be building. 
 Putin is hardly alone in his rejection of revolution as a form of political change, 
but his aversion to spontaneous change from below is constitutive of his political 
identity and a core element of anything that might be called Putinism. Th is is one 
of the fundamental reasons why the contradictions with the Atlantic system gained 
such explosive force. Th e Kremlin leadership became convinced it was the West 
that had become revisionist and sought to achieve ‘regime change’ to put in place 
new leaderships in the post-Soviet space (and the Middle East) more amenable 
to Western interests. So-called ‘colour-revolutions’ from this perspective sought 
to align the character of regimes with the West’s security interests, the process of 
‘transdemocracy’:  the combination of democracy promotion (sometimes taking 
forceful forms) and security as a way of creating the conditions for ‘democratic 
peace’.  25  Putin is a legitimist – the belief that legally constituted regimes should be 
defended, whatever type of system they espoused, and hence the West’s surprising 
adoption of strategies for revolutionary regime change was so disturbing for him 
(and for the Chinese leadership). 
 Putin’s ideological aversion to revolution, reinforced by the anti-revolutionary 
current in late Soviet thinking, resulted in his typically pragmatic consequential 
approach. Th e disastrous results of Western interventions and most of the Arab 
Spring revolts only reinforced critiques of forced regime change, which in the 
post-Soviet space takes the form of support for anti-Russian forces. Legitimism 
is a reasonable position for a Kremlin leader but becomes dysfunctional when 
not accompanied by recognition that oppressed peoples have the right to demand 
change, that corrupt and self-serving elites are hardly likely to give up power 
without pressure from below, and that legitimacy is not derived only from that 
the way that a regime is constituted but also from its conformity with the norms 
of international, constitutional and natural law. Putin was right to criticise the 
instrumental and selective mobilisation of these principles by the Atlantic powers, 
but this does not mean that they could not be applied at all. Th e rejection of double 
standards does not mean the repudiation of the standards themselves. 
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 Putin does not promise a substantive future and is very modest in his 
ambitions. Th ere is a crisis of utopian thinking and action, accompanied by the 
longing for the mythic era of stability and order of the late Soviet years. Th e very 
modesty marks an explicit break with the exaggerated utopianism of the Soviet 
period and also with the unrealistic expectations generated in the transition from 
communism. Th is is in keeping with his persistent attempt to deradicalise Russian 
politics by removing ‘the political’ from politics. Putinism appears to lack a long-
term perspective for the development of society and a people. Russia had been 
part of the Soviet future (although its national identity in that project had been 
diluted), and it was now intent on recovering its past to forge its own future. Putin 
is resolutely a pragmatic and transactional leader, and rejects any transformative 
agenda in day-to-day politics. He is the eff ective political manager  par excellence , 
focused on incremental gains and the resolution of immediate problems. He 
rejected the grand schemes advanced by three of the four epistemic blocs, forcing 
him closer to the conservative-guardianship perspective. For much of the post-
Soviet generation, utopian schemes for the betterment of humanity represent a 
dangerous illusion with potentially disastrous consequences for the societies on 
which these ‘experiments’ are conducted. Anti-utopianism generates a sceptical 
stance towards the socialist tradition, which is predicated on the possibility of the 
substantive amelioration of society, but it also deprives Putinism of a substantive 
core. By repudiating a long-term programme that could transcend the narrow 
horizons of the present, the Putin system became trapped in time: the continuing 
present began to look like stagnation.  26  
 ‘Putinism’ comprises many disparate elements, but there is no single synthesis. 
It is far from the single-minded ruthlessness of the great ideological projects of the 
twentieth century. Th ere is no coherent and consistent theory underpinning Putin’s 
politics, but there is a persistent set of principles. In economic policy, Putin is ready 
to privatise or eff ectively nationalise industries when appropriate, and he pursued an 
industrial strategy to develop priority sectors. Th is does not add up to a grand vision 
based on the anti-communitarian and individualistic logic of economic freedom 
and competiveness. Putin’s political practice is an eclectic mix of unreconciled 
facets that together do not add up to a coherent philosophy of development or of 
the public good. Putin does not believe that socialism can integrate Russia’s many 
traditions, while his conservatism draws on the late-Soviet stability system rather 
than on any philosophical text. His conservatism has tones of authoritarian neo-
liberalism, although it appeals to ordoliberal ideas of a regulated social market 
economy. He does not believe that unbridled capitalism is the key to human 
happiness, hence market forces are constrained. Putin combines social conservatism 
with statist capitalism, a synthesis that appears to be a peculiarly Russian response 
to the problems of post-communist and late capitalist development. Th is distinctive 
recombination reinforces Russia’s civilisational distinctiveness, but what it lacks in 
utopianism is balanced by a hint of traditional Russian messianism. 
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 Putin’s grand strategy 
 American grand strategy since 1945 has consisted of two mutually reinforcing 
principles: the development of a liberal world order, based on open markets, the 
rule of law and secure property rights; and the maintenance of US primacy (or what 
off ensive realists call regional hegemony), ensuring that US power would not be 
challenged in its hemisphere while creating a global alliance system that in the fi rst 
instance was directed towards the containment of the USSR but which aft er 1991 
was intended to ensure US ‘leadership’ in global aff airs. Chinese grand strategy 
asserts that the country has answers to some of the world’s major challenges, and 
in particular for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to facilitate China’s geopolitical 
and economic insertion into world aff airs, accompanied by a ‘new type of great 
power relationship’ with the United States.  27  Russian grand strategy develops in 
the shadow of the overwhelming primacy of the United States and its allies, and 
the re-emergence of China as a major power. Although Russian foreign policy has 
evolved in line with changing perceptions of the challenges facing the country 
and evaluation of Russian capacities, there remains a remarkable continuity in 
the country’s three main principles:  that Russia is a great power; that Russia is 
a constitutive member of the international community, subordinate to none 
and co-responsible for the management of international aff airs; and that foreign 
policy should serve domestic developmental goals – a principle that was eroded in 
conditions of confrontation with the West. 
 But does Russia’s leadership in the Putin years have a ‘grand strategy’  – 
defi ned as a coherent plan and vision for Russia’s future reinforced by a detailed 
programme to implement the plans and the greater vision? Monaghan puts the 
question well: ‘What does President Putin have in mind? Is he, indeed, a strategic 
genius – or is he making it up day-to-day?’  28  All leaders are constantly beset by 
immediate concerns, but the best have some sort of grander vision that would 
leave their country more prosperous and happier than when they assumed power. 
Th is is the defi nition of a ‘good leader’, but as a recent study has suggested, the 
recent period has been characterised by poor leadership and bad governance.  29  
Archie Brown develops the theme to argue that it ill behoves a country to rely on 
the ‘great leader’ to solve its problems, and, instead, the development of sound 
institutions and good practices serves a people better.  30  
 Monaghan cites contrasting views, ranging from the assertion that Putin 
fundamentally lacks a grand strategy and thus stumbles from crisis to crisis, that 
he is good at making early moves and then fails to follow through consistently, all 
the way to suggestions that Putin is ‘a  bad strategist, since he does not understand 
the relationship between military violence and political objectives, and is pursuing 
a self-defeating strategy that is reducing Russian power and leaving it isolated, all 
but ruining his ambition to return Russia to the ranks of the great powers’.  31  Such 
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categorical views tend to miss the essential feature of Putin’s leadership, namely 
its protean and changing quality. Th e challenges and crises are magnifi ed by the 
country’s size, diversity and accumulation of problems, compounded by the legacy 
of previous attempts to deal with them. Putin came to power with clear strategic 
objectives, many of them enunciated in his remarkable  Millennium Manifesto of 
December 1999. Th ere are few world leaders who have outlined in such detail their 
vision of the world and their country’s place in it, as well as the strategic objectives 
facing their nation and ideas on how they can be achieved. Putin argued that the 
overriding goal was the country’s economic and democratic development, and for 
that Soviet-style ideology, which had driven the country into a dead end, should 
be abandoned and instead global integration should be pursued. However, Putin 
insisted that Russia could not become a simple copy of the advanced capitalist 
democracies but that Russia should forge its own path, based on a reformulated 
statism, a reinvigorated patriotism and a new model of the greatness of Russia.  32  
 In his early years, Putin pursued a  remedial strategy designed to overcome 
the problems inherited from the Soviet Union and what were now defi ned as 
the excesses of the 1990s. Th e direct political infl uence of the powerful business 
magnates (oligarchs) was reduced, and the autonomy of regional governors curbed. 
However, the accompanying  developmental strategy, devised in the early period by 
German Gref, and some others, including in the legal and municipal government 
spheres by Dmitry Kozak, were derailed by deterioration of relations with the West. 
Th e reforming drive was also blunted by the munifi cence showered on the country 
by the sharp rise in the price of raw materials, above all hydrocarbons, that fi lled 
Russia’s exchequer and until 2008 drove annual rises in GDP of some 8 per cent. In 
Putin’s second term, a security-driven statist model of development was adopted, 
based on national champions and restrictions on the scope of international capital. 
Th is won Putin many friends in the  silovik , neo-traditionalist and Eurasianist 
camps but alarmed the liberals. Putin, typically, did not entirely abandon the latter 
and pursued an orthodox macroeconomic policy while heeding the advice of the 
minister of fi nances, Kudrin, and salted away enough of the bounty in sovereign 
wealth funds to save the country during periodic downturns. 
 Th e earlier tempo of economic growth was not restored following the global 
fi nancial crisis in 2009, indicating structural economic problems. Th e slew of 
strategic economic plans in the latter period of Putin’s premiership and then in 
his third term sought to address these issues.  33  However, while they identifi ed the 
problems and set worthy goals, they appear to have entered a neo-Gorbachevite 
cycle of great ambition but inadequate and incoherent implementation. Monaghan 
notes, ‘Strategy is  not a plan, nor is it a set of goals or objectives. Instead, strategy 
is the combination of the formulation of plans in theory  and their implementation 
in practice ’. Th us, a strategy is ‘a “bridge” between plans and action.’  34  Despite the 
deterioration of relations with the West and the onset of a new era of confrontation, 
the developmental model was not full-scale mobilisation, let alone military-style 
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mobilisation, but the plans did seek to ensure that Russia would survive the 
intensifi cation of sanctions, even a blockade, through domestic sourcing and the 
creation of fi nancial and other substitutes. Self-reliance and self-suffi  ciency became 
the watchwords, although not full-scale autarchy. Putin and leading offi  cials and 
commentators argued that the world was in crisis and becoming increasingly 
unmanageable and unpredictable, hence the country needed to insulate itself as 
far as possible from the spreading turmoil. As Putin noted in his landmark speech 
to the Valdai Club in October 2014, ‘Today we are seeing new eff orts to fragment 
the world, draw new dividing lines … and steps of this kind inevitably provoke 
confrontation and counter-measures.’  35  Th e West appeared intent on achieving 
regime change in Russia, and hence resources needed to be mobilised to counter 
the threat. 
 At the micro level, many observers identify the almost permanent sense of 
chaos and incoherence in the day-to-day running of public aff airs. Zygar stresses 
the absence of an overall plan and the predominance of tactical manoeuvres.  36  
Th e incoherence is generated by the problematic intersection of the vertical and 
horizontal dimensions of Russian power. Th e vertical of power is based not on 
the due processes of the constitutional state but on the manual manipulations of 
the administrative regime, although legitimated and given force by the authority 
of the constitutional state. Th e economic groups, the departmental bureaucracies 
and the accompanying venal concerns operate according to a very diff erent logic, 
exploiting positional advantage and individual and corporate benefi t. Th e ability 
of the administrative regime to achieve basic governance goals is undermined 
by the second logic, undermining the coherence of the polity as a whole. Th us, 
there is a double contradiction:  the endemic tension between the two branches 
of the state  – its administrative and constitutional wings  – and the broader 
contradiction between the vertical (although opposing) logics of administration 
and the horizontal set of informal practices rooted in the sociological character of 
power and the anthropological networks that have since the Soviet period devised 
informal network-style practices to survive and thrive in such a weakly ordered 
polity – what Ledeneva (among others) calls the  sistema . Th e informal practices of 
the  sistema subvert not only the authority of the institutions of the constitutional 
state but also the effi  cacy of the administrative regime. 
 Th e deleterious consequences of such a hybrid and multivalent system are clear. 
By the time of Putin’s re-election for a fourth term, Freedom House issued its 
annual report  Freedom in the World 2018 , with the subtitle  Democracy in Crisis .  37  
Russia had long been considered ‘not free’, and it now scored 6.5 on a scale of 1 
to 7, where 1 is best and 7 is worst, although as late as 2013 it still scored 5.5. Its 
aggregate score was a miserable 20 out of 100. Although the report identifi ed some 
genuine problems, mitigating and complicating factors (such as the continued 
relative freedom of the internet and some major newspapers) were ignored. 
Anatoly Karlin, who has long satirised the remarkable coincidence in Freedom 
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House scores between states opposed to US policy and low ratings, noted that this 
meant that Russia was now considered as unfree as Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Burundi, 
Chad, China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cuba, Ethiopia, Laos, Libya, 
Swaziland, Tajikistan, United Arab Emirates and Yemen, and that it was considered 
less free than Qatar, Iran, Belarus and Egypt.  38  Any scale that puts Libya, a country 
suff ering state collapse and civil war, and Russia at the same level must be suspect. 
Th is point was reiterated in another study, which questioned the World Press 
Freedom Index of November 2017, published by the Paris-based Reporters Sans 
Fronti è res, which ranked Russia at 148, well below not only Western countries but 
also below Arab states not known for their press freedom such as Kuwait (104) and 
the United Arab Emirates (119). As the study noted, ‘Contrary to popular belief 
that Putin’s rise to power in 1999 somehow triggered the gulf of assassinations of 
journalists, these assassinations have sharply dropped since 2000.’  39  Nevertheless, 
reports such as this have shaped foreign views of Russia in general and Putin’s 
leadership in particular. 
 Th e Kremlin considered the Western intervention in Libya illegal and disastrous, 
and hardened Putin’s view that the post-Cold War West was out of control and 
bound by none of the norms of international law and common sense that it 
proclaimed. Th is stiff ened his neo-revisionist resolve to assert an independent 
Russia in international aff airs while insulating the country from the Western 
pressure and vulnerability. Th is placed Russia on the direct path of confrontation 
with the historical West, to the detriment of both. Th e quality of political discourse 
was coarsened, and mutual vituperation took the place of reasoned analysis. 
Th is culminated in claims of Russian interference in Western elections and the 
onset of a new era of confrontation marked by sanctions, counter-sanctions and 
elements of a new arms race. Th e lack of restraint and the loss of old methods of 
managing confl ict means that this confrontation is as dangerous, if not more so, 
than the original Cold War. It had taken the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 
to establish channels of communication and other forms of confl ict management, 
but it is not clear that humanity would survive another such crisis. 
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 A paradox indicates something that at fi rst sight does not ring true and thus 
refl ects a duality of meaning. In his ‘What Is Enlightenment’, Immanuel Kant 
suggested that the whole modern world is paradoxical,  1  and in that sense 
Putin takes the paradoxality of modernity to new levels; or perhaps, he takes 
the inherent paradoxality to a point where it turns in on itself. Putin’s statecraft  
exploits the paradoxes of modernity to the point that we begin to question the 
character of modernity itself. Th e Putin phenomenon is paradoxical in its very 
essence. Its politics are developmental and conservative, rational and romantic, 
secular and religious, patriotic and internationalist. Th e fundamental paradox 
is that a modernising project to overcome the apparent ‘false modernity’ of the 
Soviet developmental project (itself one of the notable paradoxes of our time) 
assumed certain archaic practices that mimicked the Soviet experience. However, 
and most paradoxically, it may be the archaic forms of statecraft  and rule that 
endows the system with coherence and vitality that would otherwise be lacking. 
Th is dual modernity complements my dual state model. Th e earlier clash between 
the two modernising agents, the state and big business, aft er the Yukos aff air from 
2003 gave way to the pre-eminence of the state; but the way that this confl ict 
played out confi rmed the pre-eminence of the regime vis- à -vis the state. Th is 
ensured rule through, and not by, institutions; or put otherwise, rule  by law and 
not the rule  of law. Th e dynamic tension remains between the normativity of 
the constitutional state, with its concern for positive law, the rights and liberties 
enshrined in a liberal democratic polity, as well as the attempt to introduce 
elements of accountability through elections, parties and representative bodies, 
and the arbitrariness, opacity and formal rationality of the administrative regime. 
Th e two logics of statecraft  are inextricably entwined and, in conditions of Putinite 
rule, dependent on each other. However, both are threatened by the corruption 
and criminality of the third state. 
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 When success means failure 
 To the degree that there is such a thing as ‘Putinism’, its concerns have changed 
over time. In his fi rst term, the focus was on the emergency restoration of 
governmental authority, the remedial strategy. He tackled the assumed prerogatives 
of the ‘oligarchs’ and regional governors, guided by the need to stop the country’s 
descent into anarchy, criminality and global marginality. Th e second term shift ed 
towards greater developmentalism accompanied by the rise of securitisation, the 
implementation of the strategy of conservative modernisation, with the creation 
of state corporations and ‘national champions’ in the form of Rosneft  and Rostec, 
and the diversifi cation of Gazprom into oil production. Medvedev’s presidency 
saw Putin working as prime minister, where the focus rapidly turned to anti-crisis 
measures to deal with the consequences of the global fi nancial crisis. Putin’s third 
term sought to establish Russia as an independent pole in world politics through 
the policy of neo-revisionism, with Putin having lost not only any residual belief 
that the historical West could be transformed into a greater West but also that 
there could be any substantively fruitful relationship with the West at all. Hence, 
the emphasis was on advancing Eurasian integration and the development of 
Russia’s Asian vector of development. However, as Putin entered his fourth term, 
he seemed to have run out of ideas. He appeared less interested in managing 
intra-elite confl icts and was clearly frustrated by endless manoeuvring between 
the four meta-factions while apparently unable or unwilling to manage the 
escalating micro-factionalism. Th e impasse in international aff airs and mounting 
tensions with the Atlantic security system was pregnant with the possibility of 
open confl ict. Nikolas Gvozdev notes, ‘No one – not even the most liberal, pro-
Western candidates running [in the 2018 election] – would advocate for Russian 
subordination in a US unipolar system.’  2  Th is was indeed the case, but some way 
had to be found out of the impasse. 
 Although the Putin era by defi nition remains open-ended in terms of its 
teleology and eclectic in its social base and orientations, can we nevertheless 
identify some fundamental principles underlying the system? Liberal critics 
argue that it is motivated by nothing more than avarice and corruption, but this 
argument is too reductionist  – reducing a complex system to just one aspect. 
While kleptocracy is a feature of the system, it is not a kleptocratic system – if it 
was, the sovereign wealth funds would not exist but the money would have soon 
found its way into Swiss bank accounts. Equally, another set of critics, which in 
large part overlaps with the fi rst, argue that power retention and maximisation is 
the guiding principle of the Putin system. Again, this is undoubtedly one of the 
fundamental aspects of Putinite rule.  3  However, in the context of the dual state 
model, this sort of rational-choice power maximisation thinking is just another 
form of reductionism. If power (and greed) was the only thing motivating the 
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Putinite elite, then a very diff erent type of governance dynamic would be at work. 
Why bother with strict macroeconomic rigidity and tight fi scal discipline when 
the bounty could be showered on a grateful people? Why bother to force oligarchs 
to invest in public goods, if that money could be better stashed in the Cayman 
Islands? Why create corporations to develop aerospace, shipping, railways and the 
like, when the time could be more enjoyably spent in Mayfair? Above all, why even 
pay lip service to the constitutionalism that is so oft en breached in practice, when 
outright authoritarianism could deliver the venal goals with less fuss and bother? 
 One response would be that the Putin system is too clever to expose its 
real essence, understanding that thereby it would render itself vulnerable to 
popular hostility. Th at is why such a complex rent management system has been 
devised, to provide enough for the people to feel that they have a stake in the 
system’s maintenance. Equally, capitulation to the banditry of the third state 
would undermine the tenuous balance between the four main elite factions and 
destabilise the system as a whole. Th ese are substantive arguments but do not 
capture the paradoxes of a system in which the constitution guarantees great scope 
for economic and political freedom but in which regime management creates 
obstacles to its fulfi lment. 
 Th is book has tried to outline a non-reductionist dynamic model of Russian 
politics. Th e system cannot be reduced to one single factor  – greed, regime 
perpetuation or even Putin’s love of power. Equally, no single term can capture the 
multiple dimension of the Russian governance system and culture of power, but 
each term contributes to our understanding of how the system works and what 
motivates it as a whole. Th us, Russia has elements of electoral authoritarianism, but 
this does not capture other features of the system. Certainly, Russia is characterised 
by patronal politics, but there are also features that distinguish it from other post-
Soviet states with a similar character. Above all, there is a clear developmental 
strategy at work. Th ere may have been more eff ective ways of achieving economic 
development, but there were also far more dysfunctional approaches to managing 
the economy. Instead of linear models, a dynamic approach is required that 
does more than describe features of how politics is conducted; the belief that 
by pinning some sort of label the system is thereby defi ned. Political scientists 
spend much time arguing over the correct terms to apply, but many of them 
remain stuck in linear models based on some assumed trajectory towards or away 
from democracy. Instead, a dynamic model seeks to understand the system in 
its own terms. It understands that democracy operates on a spectrum, and while 
it is desirable to have more, it is very easy to have less. Th is does not mean that 
normative judgements are inappropriate but that these need to be located within 
an understanding of the rationale of the system itself. Otherwise, judgement 
becomes little more than orientalist imposition of an externally generated set of 
values. 
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 In this context, we can begin to understand the way that domestic and 
foreign policies interact. First, the maintenance of Russia as a great power is the 
core of its strategy. Th is means ensuring that the country retains its sovereignty, 
autonomy and independence in the international system. Second, Russia is 
a constitutive member of the international community and therefore has an 
inherent responsibility to be part of the management of global aff airs. Anything 
else is considered a repudiation of Russia’s history and an abnegation of the 
country’s responsibility. Th ird, foreign policy should serve Russia’s internal 
developmental goals. Th is element was introduced by Peter the Great and 
thereaft er in one way or another remains a constant. Even in the Soviet period, 
when the communist regime opposed market economies, the capitalist states 
were used for technology and later as energy markets. In the post-communist 
era, these three elements recombined, but all remain operative. Putin from 
the beginning stressed that Russia’s foreign policy should serve Russian 
developmental goals, but this later was tempered by the fi rst two strands. What 
is defi nitely not part of Russia’s grand strategy is a new ‘gathering of the lands’, 
of the sort that Russia had pursued since at least the sixteenth century. In 2014, 
it looked as if Russia’s virtual empire, a zone of ‘privileged interests’, would 
become a real empire, but this turned out to be no more than a fl eeting glimpse 
of a potentially dangerous path of development. Th ose who believe that Putin’s 
departure would allow harmonious relations with the West to emerge fail to 
understand that Putin is the expression of Russian concerns rather than their 
instigator. A change of leadership provides an opportunity for relations to be 
reset, but fundamental interests and contradictions remain. 
 Towards the succession 
 Russian history is littered with cases when the long rule of powerful leader comes 
to an end and the struggle for the succession destabilises the painfully built 
structures of governance. By 2024, Putin will have been leader, both as president 
and prime minister, for over twenty-four years. Th e end of the reign of a ‘long tsar’ 
usually signals a period of turbulence, if not disintegration. When Putin confi rmed 
that he would run for a fourth term, he also fi red the starting gun for the battle for 
the succession.  4  Putin’s fourth term became an extended preparation for Putin’s 
envisaged withdrawal from direct management of political life. In conditions 
where confl ict with the West has become part of the structure of domestic politics, 
the change of leader could off er the opportunity for a reset in relations, but it is 
important to stress that Putin’s foreign policy refl ects the consensus view of the 
Russian elite. Tony Wood emphasizes that Putin is the product of systemic factors, 
which will endure aft er his leadership ends.  5  Th is is indeed the case, but leadership 
matters, especially so in Russia. 
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 Th ere are seven basic models for the 2024 transition. First, the Central Asian 
option in which constitutional term limits are abolished, allowing Putin to run again 
in 2024 and as long as he wished thereaft er. Putin did not take this option in 2008, 
and it is unlikely that he would do so now. Th e second scenario is a re-run of the 
Yeltsin model of a hand-picked successor, from which Putin benefi tted in 1999. Th is 
model was applied in Kazakhstan when on 19 March 2019, Nazarbaev, aft er three 
decades in offi  ce and at the age of 78, handed over the presidency to his trusted 
associate Kassym-Jomart Tokaev, the speaker of parliament, while Nazarbaev took 
over as head of the Security Council for life while remaining Leader of the Nation 
and head of the ruling Nur Otan party. Th is was the Deng Xiaoping option, exercised 
by the Chinese leader in the 1990s as he withdraw from direct rule, and it was also 
applied by Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore. Th e third option is a variant of this, in which 
a placeholder is selected (as in 2008) until Putin is allowed to run again, which would 
mean another six years of tandem leadership, accompanied by policy paralysis. Th e 
fourth option is constitutional change to limit presidential powers and to strengthen 
those of parliament, in which the government would be headed by a more powerful 
prime minister resting on the primacy of their party in the Duma. Khodorkovsky 
has been one of the most consistent advocates of turning Russia into a parliamentary 
democracy, in the belief that presidentialism in Russia facilitates authoritarianism. 
When a version of this was tried in Armenia in the spring of 2018, it provoked a 
revolution and the elimination of the ruling party in the subsequent election. 
A variant of this is for Putin to remain as symbolic president, with executive powers 
transferred to a new cabinet government. Th e fi ft h version is for a single party to be 
proclaimed hegemonic and for its leader to become head of a strengthened executive. 
Th is is unlikely and the one-party model is unlikely to succeed – of the fi ft een one-
party systems in existence today, fourteen were established before or during the 
Cold War.  6  Th e sixth option is to create a presidency for the Union State of Russia 
and Belarus, rather like the rump Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Th e seventh option is to 
change the constitution to create a post that would keep Putin at the pinnacle of a new 
power structure, possibly as some sort of ‘national leader’. Th is could involve granting 
the State Council, an advisory body made up of regional leaders, enhanced powers 
and an expanded membership – to make it something like the Soviet-era Politburo. 
Other options include a military coup, which is unlikely. Th ere is, of course, an eighth 
option: that Putin leaves offi  ce as constitutionally mandated in 2024, and a successor 
is elected in a free and fair election. Th is would be Putin’s culminating achievement; to 
leave offi  ce in a manner very diff erent from the way he entered. Th e end of Putinism 
would, paradoxically, be its most triumphant vindication. 
 Th is does not mean that his successor will be a liberal in the Medvedev mould. 
More likely, a representative of the  siloviki with a strong professional background 
in the security services would be entrusted to bear the standard against Russia’s 
perceived opponents. By contrast, if Medvedev leads a successful economic reform 
programme in Putin’s fourth term and living standards once again rise sharply 
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and the economy enjoys sustained growth, then Medvedev would be in a strong 
position to return to the highest offi  ce. Th is will only be possible if the intensity 
of confrontation with the Atlantic system abates. What is clear is that China will 
shift  from being a regional to a global player, there will be continued stresses in US 
domestic and global leadership, and Moscow’s alignment with Beijing will remain, 
accompanied by deepening quasi-alliance relations with Turkey, Iran and some 
other countries. Th ere will also probably be a degree of domestic institutional 
rearrangement, with UR possibly being reformed and merged. A government of 
national unity may even be formed, drawing on representatives of the CPRF, JR 
and even the LDPR to fi ll some cabinet portfolios. 
 Sooner or later the Putin era will come to an end, and the question then 
becomes – what will happen then? Can ‘Putinism’ survive without Putin? Elements 
of what we identify as the dual state model of governance were established before 
Putin, continued when Medvedev was president, and there is no reason to doubt 
that they will endure in some form aft erwards. Putin, aft er all, is not a great 
institutional innovator, and although he created some para-constitutional bodies, 
he worked within the framework created by Yeltsin, in both its formal and informal 
aspects. Nevertheless, the dual state model suggests that the system remains in a 
permanent state of dynamic equilibrium: the strengthening of state institutions is 
followed by the reinforcement of the regime, and when the negative eff ects once 
again become apparent, there is a new campaign to strengthen state institutions. 
Without Putin to act as the supreme balancer, the system could develop in at least 
four plausible and interconnected ways: (1) a move towards the strengthening of 
the constitutional state, with greater autonomy for institutions and the gradual 
consolidation of a competitive liberal democracy; (2) by contrast, the consolidation 
of an autonomous regime ruling through more overtly authoritarian instruments 
and the open fl outing (or management) of constitutional principles and legal 
conventions, backed up by overt coercion; (3)  a continuation of the present 
unstable balance which is typically characterised as electoral authoritarianism, 
although probably managed with less of Putin’s customary adroitness; and (4) the 
reinforcement of the corruption and economic claims of the third state, creating 
an openly predatory and kleptocratic ruling elite. 
 Th e power grab by the propertied elite could well prompt mass dissatisfaction 
and protest, opening the door to a forceful change of regime amid talk of democracy, 
before the attendant chaos and perceived capitulation leads to the reconstitution of 
a new authoritarian system. Th e cycle of reform, chaos and consolidation would be 
repeated. Th e lessons of Egypt’s experiment with democracy are much discussed 
in Moscow. Aft er twenty-nine years in power, President Hosni Mubarak was 
overthrown in a popular revolution (part of the Arab Spring) in February 2011, 
but following a period of turmoil, a new strongman military leader, Abdel Fattah 
al-Sisi, seized power in July 2013 in a violent coup. In Russia, intra-elite contestation 
rather than popular mobilisation is more likely, although a combination of the 
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two is possible in which the various factions appeal to the people. Ultimately, 
popular mobilisation in such a case would be a function of elite rivalries. Only 
if the popular movement is strong enough to shape policy would such a model 
of events lead to greater democracy. Popular mobilisation in 1988–93 did not 
become an independent and enduring force. In contemporary Russia, this could be 
achieved if the systemic political parties, working with parties outside the Duma, 
become independent political actors. Aft er nearly three decades, these parties have 
established regional networks and gained administrative experience, and thus the 
situation diff ers greatly from the late Soviet years. However, as in the earlier period, 
there is a vast security apparatus, with the FSB, the National Guard and much more, 
and any political breakthrough would depend on how these organisations behaved. 
 Th e various options outlined here are predicated on the view that there is 
nothing in Russia’s political culture or attitudes to prevent the establishment of 
a competitive and accountable constitutional democracy, but the key variable is 
the route to that outcome. Within-system evolution and reform is the most likely 
path towards the creation of the stable institutions that are the essential foundation 
for a functioning democracy, whereas another revolutionary rupture and 
breakdown would only reproduce Russia’s cycle of radical ambition and eternal 
disappointment. Th us, paradoxically, the consolidation of the Putinite dual state 
off ers the possibility of an evolutionary path out of authoritarianism and societal 
disruption; at the same time, however, there is nothing inevitable about such an 
outcome. Th e sanctions regime imposed on Russia since 2012 is predicated on the 
view that the fourth model has already come to pass, with the consolidation of the 
power of ‘Putin’s cronies’, and that the system has already become a ‘kleptocracy’. 
Some genuine governance problems in contemporary Russia are identifi ed in this 
model, but it is targeting a ‘third state’ that so far is not able autonomously to 
defend its privileges and is instead part of a far more complex dynamic of political 
relations. Th e sanctions, if anything, lead precisely to the consolidation of the third 
state as the regime closes ranks against its enemies. 
 No major transformation of the system is currently envisaged, but change can 
come in unanticipated ways. In his study of 201 cases of democratisation between 
1800 and 2015, Daniel Treisman found that self-democratisation, where a regime 
curtailed its own powers, occurred in only 4 per cent of cases; in 16–19 per cent of 
cases, it took place as a result of some sort of elite pact, while in 64–67 per cent of 
cases, change took place as a result of what Treisman calls ‘democracy by mistake’. 
Th ese mistakes included attempts by regimes to increase their authority but in fact 
weakened it, when they underestimated the strength of the opposition and failed 
to apply the right mix of concessions and coercion and thus lost power (13–17 per 
cent of cases), or used too much repression, fuelling protests that provoked the 
overthrow of the regime (12–15 per cent), or scheduled elections or referendums 
that they unexpectedly lost, thus forfeiting power (6–9 per cent). A  common 
scenario was the Gorbachevian one, where there are plans to reform the system 
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but the process runs out of control, provoking dissolution and disintegration. 
Treisman notes that there are few cases of intentional democratisation aft er 1927.  7  
 Pavlovsky put his fi nger on the issue when he noted that ‘Putin is an uncontrollable 
natural phenomenon’, his retention of power has nothing ‘all-powerful’ about it 
but represents the maintenance of the power of three ‘classes’, each in part feeding 
on each other, on which his power rested: the  siloviki , the higher state bureaucrats 
( chinovniki ) in the government and presidential administration, and the president’s 
friends. Th is is a variation of my general model of the Putin system resting on a 
range of diff erent factions. Th e key point is Pavlovsky’s conclusion: 
 Liberalisation is not the key to Russia’s political future. Even though liberalisation 
of rules is essential for certain sectors – the world of entrepreneurs, culture and 
education, penitentiary policy, and network initiatives. But in general a Russia 
that becomes too rapidly politicised requires only a more open politics. Too 
oft en politicisation reaches an unbearable intensity, and its participants have to 
establish new rules of the game. What has Putin got to do with this? He is just 
one of the prizes to be won.  8  
 A gap was opening up between Putin the man and the so-called ‘collective 
Putin’, the network made up of his closest associates. Th e system, for Pavlovsky, 
began to operate without Putin. Th e Putin system appeared to enter its terminal 
phase, however long-drawn-out that may be. If Putin completes the full six years, 
by 2024 he will be 71. It is unlikely that he will amend the constitution to allow a 
third consecutive term (something he had refused to do in 2008) or return to the 
‘castling’ model employed at that time, which saw him become prime minister 
while Medvedev took over the presidency. Th e dying days of Yeltsin’s presidency in 
1999 were marked by intense elite confl ict, upheaval in the party system, as well as 
by regional turbulence, the still-unexplained apartment bombings in Moscow and 
renewed confl ict in Chechnya. When Putin’s two mandated terms came to an end 
in 2007–8, rivalries in the security services descended into all out confl ict, what 
was known as the ‘ silovik war’. Th ere were already signs towards the end of Putin’s 
third presidency that elite and security service factionalism could once again spin 
out of control. Th ere were intense intra- and interservice rivalries in the security 
agencies, and the imprisonment of Ulyukaev served as a warning of what could 
be in store as Putin’s grip relaxed. As Putin entered the ‘lame duck’ period of his 
leadership, there would be intense struggles for power and property. 
 Th e shadow forces in the ‘third state’ were in danger of coming into their own. 
Konstantin Gaaze puts it nicely when he distinguishes between Russia’s ruling 
regime as working ‘a day shift  and a night shift ’. Th e day shift  sees Putin running 
the government and international aff airs, and there are only occasional glimpses of 
the night shift  at work, as in Sechin’s legal incarceration of Ulyukaev. Gaaze sums 
up the dilemma:  
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 As Putin gets ready to serve a fourth presidential term from next March, 
the main question facing Russia is whether these shadowy night-time rulers 
will obey the orders of a leader whose time in offi  ce is beginning to expire, 
or whether they will act as freelancers, ignoring the man who created the 
authoritarian system that they will make use of.  
 Gaaze is basically describing the dynamics of the dual state. Every attempt to 
strengthen the power of the state bureaucracy allows it to ‘emerge as a competitor 
to the ruling regime in the Kremlin. Th e regime would then embark on a course 
correction, dismantling any state structure that challenged illegitimate decisions. 
By utilizing its power – either through violence or intimidation – the regime could 
never allow state institutions to develop and mature.’  9  Th e administrative regime is 
forced to keep the institutions of the constitutional state in a permanent condition 
of underdevelopment and subordination. In 2002, according to Gaaze, this led 
to a purge of regional elites and in 2005 the nationalisation of several sectors of 
the economy (notably Yukos in the oil industry). Th is was a cyclical dynamic 
that entailed the constant reinvention of the state, followed by its disruption: ‘By 
artifi cially rotating power between the institutions of the state and the personalized 
regime, Putin was able to maintain credibility at large while still ensuring that 
power remained concentrated in his hands.’  10  A  similar argument is advanced 
by the Moscow political analyst Yekaterina Schulman, who argues (as reported 
by Pavlovsky) that we are now dealing with ‘a frozen constitutional state: all the 
institutions exist but they simply do not work. Why don’t they work?’ Pavlovsky 
continues, ‘Because around a president who can’t be replaced is a narrow elite that 
benefi ts from his not being replaced.’  11  
 Th is was the greatest challenge for Putin in his fourth term. His survival as 
a real, rather than nominal, leader may well require a confrontation with meta-
corruption of the third state and the managerialism of the regime. In other words, 
to stay in power, Putin would have to destroy his system. Th is would require a 
strengthening of the modernising and developmental aspects of state power, 
possibly by the nomination of a respected reformist as prime minister. It could 
also require the strengthening of the independence of the institutions of the 
constitutional state  – the courts, parliament and the governmental apparatus  – 
draft ed as allies against the appropriative behaviour of the third state, and perhaps 
above all it would require popular mobilisation. Th is would open the path to 
greater democratisation, with movements from above joining movements from 
below. Th is would entail its own costs as manageability would be reduced, and there 
would be greater scope for the excess demands warned against by Huntington and 
the nationalist populism that is characteristic of democratic polities today. Matters 
could swing the other way, with the relative autonomy of the state extinguished 
by an overtly authoritarian consolidation, and kleptocracy would become the 
governing principle. Putin would no doubt prefer to be remembered as the leader 
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who fi nally brought Russia to democracy, however circuitous the path, rather than 
as the man who allowed the country to return to the chaos against which he had 
so long struggled. 
 Russia without Putin 
 As Putin eased into his fourth presidential term, Surkov warned that Russia faced 
‘one hundred years of solitude’. Th is did not ‘mean complete isolation’, but Russia’s 
choices would be constrained. Russia’s ‘mixed breed’ culture combined the East 
and the West: ‘He is everyone’s relative, but nobody’s family’. Russia had to decide 
whether to become ‘a loner in a backwater’, or ‘an alpha nation that has surged 
into a big lead’ over other countries.  12  In early 2019, Surkov was dismissive of the 
idea of choice and instead argued, in an article called ‘Th e long-lasting state of 
Putin’, that Putinism was a programme of the Russian government for the next 
one hundred years.  13  In this system, there would be no power-sharing with 
oligarchs, social classes, parliament or parties or even with the Russian Orthodox 
Church, and instead the supreme leader would communicate directly with the 
people. Surkov argued, ‘Th ere is no deep state in Russia (all of it is on display); but 
there is a deep nation.’ All institutions would be subordinated to the main task of 
communicating and interacting with the supreme ruler. ‘Putinism is the ideology 
of the future’, Surkov declared, and will continue to be ‘a new type of state’ for 
Russia. Th e historical precedent he drew on was not the pantheon which Putin 
himself used (above all Peter the Great), or even Catherine the Great or Stalin, 
but Lenin – a man whom Putin detested, as well as Kemal Ataturk and Charles de 
Gaulle. Surkov argued that just as Marx was no Marxist, ‘the real Putin is hardly 
a Putinist’. Th is would be autocracy without Orthodoxy. Th e article predictably 
provoked a storm of criticism. Surkov was portrayed as a Putin sycophant and his 
article as typical of the low level of intellectual life in Russia. Th e criticism was apt, 
since the article sought to recreate a past that never existed. 
 One of the more thoughtful responses came from Alexander Dugin, the arch-
exponent of new Eurasianism. Surkov’s analysis reminded him of the old Soviet 
slogan about the ‘inevitable victory of socialism’, and he warned that in Russia 
a system was typically designated as ‘eternal’ just before its end. He understood 
Surkov’s purpose as an attempt by the Putinite elite to perpetuate their rule. 
Th eir ‘solipsism’ could not replace ‘history and political logic’, and therefore 
Surkov’s analysis of Russian politics was ‘entirely and completely false in its very 
foundations’. Putin could dominate Russia’s present but could not infl uence the 
future immediately aft er him. So it had been with Gorbachev and Yeltsin (and, 
it may be added, Stalin), and it would be with Putin. Putin had saved Russia and 
‘returned it to history’, but none of his achievements had become irreversible. 
Putin’s political regime, Dugin rightly noted, was built on compromises ‘between 
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all poles and the forces of the state and society’. Putin maintained stability, because 
he himself was a compromise 
 between patriotism and liberalism in the economy, between Eurasianism and 
Europeanism in international politics, between conservatism and progressism 
in the sphere of ideas and values, between people and elites, between sovereignty 
and globalisation, between the 1990s and the non-1990s (that is, ‘something 
else’). But this compromise works only while Putin is there. It is intuitive and 
authoritarian, based on manual control and constant adjustment of the course 
by Putin himself. It is not refl ected in either the strategy or a project, and does 
not rely on society as a whole or on the elites. 
 Putin left  the main elements of the 1990s in place despite his criticism of the 
period, and although he changed the formula by adding patriotism, he retained 
liberalism in the economy and the entire constitutional framework of the earlier 
period. Despite its successes, the Putin system had ‘no clearly defi ned vector to the 
historical future’, which meant ‘the modern Russian regime has no future’.  14  
 Sooner or later Putin’s rule will come to an end, and although his system 
refl ected the character of the country, the relationship between man and system 
is far from deterministic.  15  Th e fundamental question is whether Putinism can 
survive without Putin. Equally, can the system achieve an evolutionary path to 
something else, or will it repeat the traditional Russian pattern of collapse, chaos 
and reconstitution? Following the reign of Ivan the Terrible, Russia entered the 
Time of Troubles ( smuta ), and under Catherine the Great, popular discontent 
exploded in the form of the massive Pugachev rebellion. In 1917, the Tsarist 
system was swept away by the February revolution, and the short-lived Provisional 
Government in turn was destroyed by the Bolsheviks. Again, in 1991, the seventy-
four-year Soviet system collapsed amid the ruins of the country. Is Russia on the 
eve of another upheaval on the historical pattern? 
 Six main paradoxes can be identifi ed. Th e fi rst is the way that power entraps 
its holder. Th ere is no evidence that Putin loves power for its own sake but sees 
it as a means to an end, although Putin clearly appreciates the authority and 
responsibility that comes with high offi  ce. Putin’s personal lifestyle is rather 
modest. He inhabits great palaces and offi  ces, and none grander than the Kremlin 
itself, but he does not own them; and on relinquishing offi  ce, these accoutrements 
of power will also be renounced. Th rough intermediaries, Putin has allegedly 
amassed an off shore retirement pension plan, but despite much speculation there 
is no public indication of the size or location of Putin’s alleged wealth. At the same 
time, Putin does not talk in grand utopian terms, but this does not mean that 
he lacks a sense of purpose, even of destiny, as the man chosen by fate to lead 
the country at a diffi  cult time and to ensure that it ended up more prosperous 
and more respected in the world. Th is is the essence of successful statecraft . Many 
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leaders have managed to stay in power for longer than Putin, so sheer longevity in 
offi  ce is a poor measure of the quality of statesmanship. 
 Putin appears trapped by the system of his own making. He cannot leave, as 
demonstrated when he kept hold of many of the reins of power during the tandem 
period, and allegedly he had been reluctant to return to the presidency in 2012. 
His return had always been the most likely variant, but it was not the only option. 
In the end, Putin could not leave, fearing the consequences for himself personally, 
for foreign policy, for the elite that had prospered under him and for the system 
of rule that he had created. Above all, the system needed his skills to keep it going 
and would not let him go. A  credible version has it that Sechin warned Putin 
against allowing Medvedev a second term, and if Putin nevertheless had given 
Medvedev the go-ahead, some sort of elite revolt may have been on the cards. Not 
surprisingly, in his third term, Putin began by focusing on ‘nationalising the elites’ 
by limiting access to foreign bank accounts and property. Th is was part of the 
‘de-off shoring’ strategy, which meant that elites became dependent on domestic 
power resources and in turbulent times would fi nd it hard to escape abroad. Putin 
remained the guarantor of power and privilege, but by the same token his power 
and privileges require the constant monitoring of the balance between the elites 
and the factions. Th e guards were now guarding the guardian. 
 Second, Putin is very good at balancing hegemonic projects, but he has not 
been able fully to articulate a hegemonic project of his own. He draws on the 
power of others, but he never became the centre of a ‘Putinite’ movement. Th ere is 
no equivalent in Russia to Peronism, of the sort practiced in Argentina, let alone 
a fascist movement led by a charismatic leader such as Benito Mussolini in Italy. 
Putin is a charismatic leader, but it is a paradoxical form of charisma that precisely 
accentuates its limitations and non-charismatic characteristics. Of course, the 
regime practices the usual deceptions that typically justify a system’s conception 
of freedom, but it does so by claiming a normality that is abnormal because of 
its constrained quality. On most developmental parameters, Russia is a normal 
country, facing the typical challenges of a late developmental state.  16  However, this 
is an exceptional form of normality, since not only does the regime claim extended 
prerogatives over political life and exercises the politics of exceptionalism, but in 
post-communist conditions the ontological foundations of political normality have 
been absent. It would take a long period of social recuperation for non-exceptional 
practices to prevail over regime arbitrariness. By stressing its non-charismatic 
features, Putin’s leadership, like the regime as a whole, seeks to normalise itself 
and shroud its exceptional character in routine, and this could well have provided 
the space for political normalisation in the long term. 
 Th ird, the dual state not only contours politics but also shapes developmental 
strategies. On the one side, talented engineers are encouraged to apply their skills 
to developmental projects, as in the impressive modernisation of Rosneft ’s Tuapse 
oil refi nery (although the engineer responsible was later forced to fl ee the country), 
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but this is accompanied by a darker side of factional confl ict and outright asset-
grabbing, as in Rosneft ’s seizure of Bashneft . In a system in which the normative 
and developmental states operate according to sanctioned principles of legal 
and economic rationality, but in which the ‘prerogative state’ exercises power 
arbitrarily and without constraints, at any given time it cannot be predicted which 
order will predominate. Unscrupulous operators take advantage of the tension 
between normative and prerogative features to achieve their goals. Th e goals can 
be positive, as in the struggle against organised crime, but the methods employed 
oft en subvert the rule of law. Th is is the core of the ‘paradox’ at the heart of Putin’s 
statecraft : progressive policies are applied in a regressive manner. 
 Fourth, in international politics, Putin condemned American claims to 
exceptionalism, yet the underlying rationale of his foreign policy is a diff erent 
form of exceptionalism – notably in the initial claim that Russia was a constituent 
part of the putative greater West because of its exceptional military (above all, 
nuclear) weight, diplomatic history and historic status. In other words, Russia 
sought to become a normal member of the Atlantic community on the grounds 
that it was an exceptional power. Th is paradox then has a number of subsidiary 
aspects. Above all, Russia calls for pluralism in the international system, defi ned 
as a polycentrism (multipolarity) in which there would be multiple great powers 
relating to each other not necessarily through a balance of power politics, since 
Russia is also rather keen on the ‘concert’ idea (leading to calls for a new Yalta) in 
which the rules of the game are established to allow the great powers to cooperate. 
However, while calling for pluralism externally, a monist political system (as this 
book has described) took hold at home. Although there remains a tension between 
the two wings of the dual state, and the various factions imbue the system with a 
deep level of sociopolitical pluralism, the articulation of interests at the political 
level takes parapolitical rather than overtly competitively political forms. Th e 
deeper paradox is that Russia’s ability to make demands in international aff airs 
may well be predicated precisely on the regime’s dominance in domestic aff airs. 
Th e contrast between the demand for pluralism abroad and the monist political 
system may in the end not be a contradiction but the condition for foreign policy 
autonomy. If foreign policy became subject to the same factional and institutional 
constraints as domestic policy, then policy paralysis would in all probability be 
reproduced. Th is in turn could generate the further paradox that if Russia had 
fully adapted to and aligned with the Atlantic power system, this could well have 
forced it into confrontation with China – an outcome that would in the long run 
be no less deleterious than confrontation with the West. In short, in foreign policy 
there are no easy options for Russia, and there is no ‘natural’, let alone indisputably 
‘rational’, path to adopt. 
 Fift h, the Putin system devised a complex machinery to maintain power and 
to insulate itself from social forces, while ensuring that it retained discretion to 
respond to social and political pressures as it saw fi t. But as so oft en in history, the 
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institutions devised to maintain power can take control over the purposes they are 
meant to serve. Th e apparatus of regime power, attended by exceptions to the rule 
of law, genuine constitutionalism and independent competitive elections, came to 
trap its incumbents in a cycle of mutual dependencies that reduced the autonomy 
of each of the actors. 
 Th e sixth paradox, and perhaps the one with the most devastating implications, 
is that the Putin phenomenon, with all of its achievements, drawbacks and 
contradictions, may well be the system with greatest viability in prevailing 
conditions. At home, there is no hegemonic historic bloc ready to take power, 
and with class forces stalemated, the regime-state fi lled the void. Abroad, 
stalemate also prevails as competing models of world order rage against each 
other in a situation pregnant with renewed great power and ideational confl ict. 
Th is is perhaps intuitively understood by the Russian people and establishment, 
hence the enduring high levels of popular support for Putin and continued elite 
loyalty. Th e support and loyalty are carefully managed, yet undoubtedly refl ect 
genuine sentiments. Putin is not the dictatorial monster portrayed in much of the 
Western media but fi nds himself at the helm of a complex governance system that 
ultimately refl ects Russia itself. But the phenomenon will not endure forever, and 
in the ultimate paradox, the system contains within itself the potential for its own 
transcendence. Th e regime rules within the constraints of the constitutional order, 
and thus it is far from an arbitrary dictatorship but reserves for itself the right to 
decide on the exception (the Schmittian defi nition of sovereignty). 
 In this system, the constitutional state acts as a fundamental resource for 
the ruling group to maintain itself in power, and there are therefore limits even 
to what can be defi ned as the exceptional. Th erefore, the constitutional order 
contains within itself the potential to push back against the arbitrariness of the 
regime, gradually reduce the scope of the exceptional and ultimately to reduce 
the discretionary scope of regime power to the parameters that are found in any 
modern democratic order. Th e dual state, in which there is a permanent tension 
between two logics of rule, the legal and the discretionary, contains the potential 
to reduce the arbitrary elements by strengthening genuine constitutionalism. Th e 
ultimate paradox may well be that the revolutionary overthrow of the system of 
arbitrary power would in all likelihood only intensify arbitrary power as the new 
revolutionary authorities consolidate their position, purge the old elite, reform 
institutions and create a new logic of the exception. From this perspective, 
ultimately the most revolutionary act in contemporary Russia would be to eschew 
revolution in favour of an evolutionary politics that reinforces the legal order 
against the arbitrary regime within the system itself. Th e greatest revolution in 
Russia would be not to have one. Th e Putin paradox would thus end with the 
greatest paradox of all. 
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